Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations

2nd Edition

Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach and M. Scott Solomon.
Now in its second edition, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* has been thoroughly updated with 14 new entries and a new preface to reflect the latest developments. There are new sections on Constructivism, International Political Theory, and English School, as well as a range of new thinkers. They include:

- Samuel Huntington
- Jürgen Habermas
- Barry Buzan
- Christine Sylvester
- John Rawls.

Fully cross-referenced throughout, this book has everything for students of politics and international relations or indeed anyone who wants to gain an understanding of how nations can work together successfully.


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FIFTY KEY THINKERS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Second Edition

Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach and M. Scott Solomon
CONTENTS

Preface to the Second Edition vii

Realism 1
Raymond Aron 3
Edward Hallet Carr 9
Robert Gilpin 16
John Herz 23
Samuel Huntington 30
George Kennan 36
Stephen Krasner 42
Hans Morgenthau 50
Kenneth Waltz 58

Liberalism 65
Karl W. Deutsch 67
Michael Doyle 73
Francis Fukuyama 81
Ernst Haas 91
Stanley Hoffmann 98
Robert O. Keohane 105
Richard Rosecrance 114

Constructivism 123
Friedrich Kratochwil 125
Nicholas Onuf 130
Christian Reus-Smit 137
John Gerard Ruggie 143
Alexander Wendt 151

Critical Theory 161
Robert Cox 163
André Gunder Frank 171
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Gill 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Gramsci 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jürgen Habermas 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Linklater 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English School</strong> 211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedley Bull 213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry Buzan 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy Dunne 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Vincent 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Wight 240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Postmodernism</strong> 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Ashley 251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Campbell 258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Foucault 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert B.J. Walker 273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feminism</strong> 279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Bethke Elshtain 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynthia Enloe 287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christine Sylvester 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Ann Tickner 302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Political Theory/International Ethics</strong> 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Beitz 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Held 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terry Nardin 326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Rawls 334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Walzer 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical Sociology</strong> 351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Giddens 353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Mann 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin Rosenberg 369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Tilly 374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immanuel Wallerstein 383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Index* 392
Since the publication of the first edition of Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, the field of international relations has undergone significant transformation. Constructivism, for instance, which was not listed as a section in the first edition, is now a fairly well established paradigm in international relations. In addition, feminism has continued to emerge as a prominent radical approach in international relations, as has postmodernism and critical theory (in the Frankfurt School tradition). Aside from these changes within the discipline, outside events have dramatically reshaped the international landscape and, in the process, inspired and encouraged international relations scholars and practitioners to rethink the issues and problems. This second edition is an attempt to showcase some of the key thinkers who have, or continue to, shed new theoretical and empirical light on international events of the past 10 years (the Kosovo War, the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terror) and on new trends within the discipline. In doing so, it treats the field of international relations theory as an engaged, yet pluralist study of the struggles for power in the international realm. However, it recognizes that international relations is a field in search of a reflexive, overarching paradigm, even a pluralist rigour that would frame the contributions of many different, competing approaches. As this apparent crisis in the discipline suggests, there are many new challengers to the existing conventional paradigms, with no one thinker standing out from the others. This second edition also reflects the need to incorporate the increasing influence of new thinkers and their attendant ideas and key theoretical approaches. Accordingly, we have added the following new sections to reflect the recent methodological developments in the field: Constructivism, the English School, and International Political Theory/International Ethics. We have also moved Theories of International Society, which appeared in the first edition, to the English
School, and deleted International Organization and Theories of the Nation to make room for the three new sections. In all, we have added 14 new thinkers.

Like the first edition, this second edition seeks to capture the complexity and allure of international relations through the lenses of its most influential thinkers. There will always be some thinkers deserving some special recognition. But whether one agrees with David Held’s or Andrew Linklater’s cosmopolitan ethics, it is important to recognize the wide-ranging influence of their cosmopolitan models. In the same way, Alexander Wendt’s social theory of international politics has significantly influenced our thinking about the relationship between state power and socialization. One might also add to this list the political theorists who continue to remain important sources of thinking about the ethics and moral principles of the international system, including John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. In formulating the criteria below, we have sought to dampen much of the controversy. Our criteria are based on two very open-ended, general questions: Which thinkers have introduced and formulated new and sustainable insights into international relations? And how have these insights generated new niches and models for constructing knowledge of international relations? In time, these questions ultimately gave way to four key criteria for selecting a key thinker: (1) depth, (2) novelty, (3) applicability and (4) imagination.

(1) Depth refers to the level of sophistication of the thinker’s theoretical analysis and applied theory. In this sense, it refers to the level or degree of engagement of the original theorist, or ideas that she or he has applied to international relations.

(2) Novelty characterizes the originality of the thinker’s contributions. Did he or she set in motion new trends in thinking about international phenomena? And to what extent have his or her contributions to the field stood the test of time, as would be the case with some of the traditional political theories and older international relations theorists?

(3) Applicability is conceived in terms of the systematization of ideas and theories. Do the thinker’s ideas and insights offer generative principles or highly sophisticated systematic theoretical models?

(4) Imagination reflects the following two questions: How do the thinker’s contributions allow us to imagine the changing forces of international relations? Does he or she open up new spaces of thinking about the holism of international relations, or understanding of the changing adaptations or transformations of the global realm?
Such criteria are by no means definitive. Those thinkers whose research and ideas have scored highly in one or more, or all of these categories, have not only exercised a strong past and/or present impact on international relations, but have earned the right to be labelled as one of the 50 key thinkers in international relations.

Steven C. Roach and M. Scott Solomon
May 2008
REALISM

Relations among states take place in the absence of a world government. For realists, this means that the international system is anarchical. International relations are best understood by focusing on the distribution of power among states. Despite their formal legal equality, the uneven distribution of power means that the arena of international relations is a form of ‘power politics’. Power is hard to measure; its distribution among states changes over time and there is no consensus among states about how it should be distributed. International relations is therefore a realm of necessity (states must seek power to survive in a competitive environment) and continuity over time. When realists contemplate change in the international system, they focus on changes in the balance of power among states, and tend to discount the possibility of fundamental change in the dynamics of the system itself. The following key thinkers all subscribe to these basic assumptions in their explorations of the following questions: (1) What are the main sources of stability and instability in the international system? (2) What is the actual and preferred balance of power among states? (3) How should the great powers behave towards one another and towards weaker states? (4) What are the sources and dynamics of contemporary changes in the balance of power? Despite some shared assumptions about the nature of international relations, realists are not all of one voice in answering these questions, and it would be wrong to believe that shared assumptions lead to similar conclusions among them. In fact, there is sharp disagreement over the relative merits of particular balances of power (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity). There is also much debate over the causal relationship between states and the international pressures upon them, and the relative importance of different kinds of power in contemporary international relations.
Raymond Aron was born in 1905 in Paris, the same year as Jean-Paul Sartre. They were both educated at the elite school Ecole Normale Supérieure, which also produced such authors and politicians as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Leon Blum, Georges Pompidou and Michel Foucault. Although Sartre’s name was usually much better known, in part because Aron’s Gaullism and staunch anti-communism made him a pariah among French left-wing intellectuals from the 1940s to the 1970s, his reputation has risen since his death in 1983 in comparison with that of his old sparring partner.

Aron’s work is too complex and extensive to lend itself to a neat summary. He was a journalist as well as a sociologist, and the range of his intellectual interests went far beyond the concerns of most students of international relations. In the field of international relations, Aron is best known for his book *Peace and War*, which first appeared in English in 1966. In addition to this book, the discursive range and historical depth of which did not make easy reading for students in search of a master key to unlock the apparent contingencies of interstate relations, Aron is also remembered for his incisive analysis of the dilemmas of strategy in the nuclear age. While it is not unfair, as we shall see, to classify him within the realist school of thought, it is also important to appreciate some of the main differences between his approach to the study of international relations and that of North American realist thinkers.

As a French Jew who had spent some time in Germany just before Hitler’s rise to power in the 1930s, Aron’s reaction to the rise of fascism in Europe and Stalinism in the Soviet Union set him apart from most French intellectuals in the postwar era. Despite his philosophical training in the abstract theories of history contained in the works of Marx and Hegel, his abhorrence of utopian thought and totalitarianism in all its forms lent an air of critical pessimism to his writing and a refusal to entertain the possibility that politics could ever be an appropriate arena for promoting particular versions of the good life by force at the expense of others. In 1978 he wrote that:

> [t]he rise of National Socialism…and the revelation of politics in its dialogical essence forced me to argue against myself, against my intimate preferences; it inspired in me a sort of revolt against the instruction I had received at the university, against the spirituality of philosophers, and against the tendency of certain sociologists to misconstrue the impact of regimes with the pretext of focusing on permanent realities.¹
This experience instilled in Aron a commitment to liberalism and an admiration for the work of Max Weber, rather than the utopianism and historical materialism of Marx that inspired other European intellectuals similarly disenchanted with progressive evolutionary theories of history (see in particular his book *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, published in 1955). A prudent approach to the theory and practice of politics lay in the acknowledgement of different and often incompatible political values, and therefore in the availability of and competition between divergent interpretations/ideologies that privileged some at the expense of others. Particular interpretations could be analysed critically in terms of their internal consistency, as well as their compatibility with existing social and political structures, but it would be utopian to believe in the use of reason to transcend such competition.

Informed by this outlook, much of Aron’s work focused on the nature of industrialization and the viability of different ways of promoting it in capitalist and allegedly ‘socialist’ societies. He was one of the first to argue that the Soviet model of central planning, while it facilitated forced industrialization, was not appropriate for running an ever more complicated industrial society. In principle, he defended Western, liberal capitalism against its leftist critics as the best means of combining economic growth with some measure of political freedom and economic redistribution. While recognizing the fact of class conflict, he never believed in the idea that ‘the working class’ was either sufficiently homogeneous or motivated to revolt against the inequities of capitalist society. If capitalist societies could combine the search for profits with some measure of welfare and redistribution, he saw no reason why the conflict between workers and capitalists should be zero-sum. Indeed, he hoped that in the longer term such societies could moderate ideological competition, although he worried about the dominance of pressure groups in weakening the democratic process and depriving liberal states of sufficient ‘steering capacity’ in the interests of the society as a whole.

When it came to the study of international relations rather than industrialization *per se*, Aron was inspired by the work of Hobbes and Clausewitz. To some extent, he shared the realist view that there was a fundamental difference between domestic and international relations, and that this difference should be the foundation for all international theory. For Aron, foreign policy is constituted by diplomatic–strategic behaviour, and international relations takes place in the shadow of war. By this, he did not mean that war was always likely, but that the legitimacy of violence to secure state goals was shared among states, and it could not be monopolized as it had been
within the territorial boundaries of the state. In his most famous phrase, international relations is ‘relations between political units, each of which claims the right to take justice into its own hands and to be the sole arbiter of the decision to fight or not to fight’.3

Of course, such an argument seems to place Aron squarely within the realist camp, but on closer examination Aron’s work is far more subtle than that of, say, Hans Morgenthau or Kenneth Waltz. While he agreed with Morgenthau that international relations was in some respects a struggle for power among states, the concept of power was too nebulous to serve as a master key for understanding international relations. Similarly, while he would agree with Waltz that the milieu of international relations was a unique structured environment, the latter did not determine state goals. Indeed, state ‘goals’ could not be reduced to a simple formula at all:

Security, power, glory, ideas, are essentially heterogeneous objectives which can be reduced to a single term only by distorting the human meaning of diplomatic strategic action. If the rivalry of states is comparable to a game, what is ‘at stake’ cannot be designated by a single concept, valid for all civilisations at all periods. Diplomacy is a game in which the players sometimes risk losing their lives, sometimes prefer victory to the advantages that would result from it.4

In the absence of a simple formula to predict state goals, the best one could do as a thinker, diplomat or strategist is to attempt an understanding of state aims and motives on the best evidence available. Peace and War may be disappointing for those in search of ahistorical generalizations, as it is at best a collection of partial hypotheses based on the ways in which states influence one another in light of different historical eras; the ‘material’ constraints of space (geography), population (demography) and resources (economics); and the ‘moral’ determinants arising from states’ ‘styles of being and behaving’.5

International theory, for Aron, ought not to try and privilege any one of these categories over the other, but to blend all three in a historically sensitive attempt to chart processes of change and continuity over time in the interaction of such ‘determinants’. If this is the case, while it may make sense to compare historical eras characterized by, for example, bipolar and multipolar configurations of power, hypotheses concerning their relevant stability could only be tentative in light of the fact that one cannot ignore the character of particular states within a distinct era. Whether the states share certain values or common
interests may be just as important as how they stand in relation to one another on some quantitative scale of ‘power’. Similarly, much of *Peace and War* is devoted to reproducing and analysing the weakness of a number of schools of thought that, in Aron’s view, exaggerate the influence of environmental factors, such as geopolitics and the Marxist–Leninist theory of economic imperialism, as causes of war. Aron points out, for example, that the ‘excess capital’ of France – which according to the theory would require overseas colonies to be invested in – usually went to South America and Russia rather than North Africa. Moreover, he suggested that there was no good reason why home markets should not expand indefinitely to absorb any ‘excess production’ of the advanced capitalist states. In contrast, he emphasized traditional interstate rivalry as the main ‘cause’ of war.

The final part of *Peace and War* is taken up with the question of how the international system has changed in the post-1945 era. Here he is particularly interested in whether nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed strategic thinking about the role of force in foreign policy. In this book and elsewhere, Aron showed a keen awareness of just how ambiguous the evidence was, as well as the central dilemmas facing the strategy and ethics of statecraft in the nuclear age.

On the one hand, he recognized that nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from conventional weapons in that their destructiveness, speed of delivery and limited military utility require that they be used to deter war rather than fight it. For the first time in human history, nuclear armed states had the ability to destroy each other without having to defeat their opponents’ armed forces. As soon as the superpowers were in a condition of mutually assured destruction (a condition reached by the late 1950s), they were in a condition of what has come to be called ‘existential’ deterrence. Each side had the capability to destroy the other totally in a retaliatory second nuclear strike, and the extreme sanction and fear of escalation were sufficient to deter each other from ever embarking on a first strike. For Aron, this existential condition was secure as long as neither superpower could destroy the other’s retaliatory capability in a nuclear attack, and as long as no iron-clad defence against nuclear weapons could be constructed. The effectiveness or credibility of nuclear deterrence did not rely on complex strategies or doctrines employed by either side to make the other certain of what would happen should direct conflict break out between them. The credibility of deterrence lay in the weapons themselves, not in the attempts by states to think of nuclear war in conventional terms, and Aron severely criticized nuclear planners and game theorists in the United States for thinking
otherwise. As with his exhortations regarding the inherent limitations of international theory in general, Aron insisted that nuclear strategy could never become anything like an exact science.

On the other hand, if Clausewitz was of limited help in thinking about the conditions under which nuclear war could be fought and ‘won’, the greater stability there was in deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union (notwithstanding the arms race between them), the less there was at lower levels in the international system. The superpowers themselves could be tempted to use conventional weapons in their ‘proxy’ wars, unless this gave rise to fears of escalation, and regional conflicts would continue in the shadow of the nuclear standoff between the big two. Aron concluded that the Cold War was both unprecedented and, in the context of the ideological differences between two superpowers armed with nuclear weapons, inevitable.

Despite, or rather because of, the unprecedented dangers of the nuclear era, combined with the uncertainty that had always characterized international relations, Aron believed strongly in prudence as the most appropriate ethics of statecraft. By this he meant the need to substitute an ethics of consequences over conviction:

To be prudent is to act in accordance with the particular situation and the concrete data, and not in accordance with some system or out of passive obedience to a norm… it is to prefer the limitation of violence to the punishment of the presumably guilty party or to a so-called absolute justice; it is to establish concrete accessible objectives…and not limitless and perhaps meaningless [ones], such as ‘a world safe for democracy’ or ‘a world from which power politics has disappeared’.6

In short, Raymond Aron must be remembered for his sober realism and liberal pluralism as a student of international relations and as a critic of Cold War excesses. In addition, he remorselessly alerted us to the limits that we can expect from theory and the need to base our generalizations on a deep familiarity with the contingencies of history, and to avoid either falling into a permanent cynicism or entertaining utopian hopes for the transcendence of international relations.

Notes

4. Ibid., p. 91.
5. Ibid., p. 279.
6. Ibid., p. 585.

**Aron’s major writings**


‘What is a theory of international relations?’, *Journal of International Affairs* 21 (1967), pp. 185–206.


See also: Hoffmann, Morgenthau, Waltz

**Further reading**

EDWARD HALLETT CARR

E.H. Carr is best known for his book *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*, which combines a trenchant critique of Western diplomacy between the two world wars with an influential framework of analysis. Carr’s work helped to establish the terms on which international theory has been discussed in the twentieth century, namely as an ongoing debate between ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’ or ‘utopians’. Carr did not begin this debate, nor did he stake out his own position clearly within it. What he did do was demonstrate how two contrasting conceptions of historical progress manifested themselves in international thought and practice. Furthermore, the facility with which he combined philosophical reflection, historical analysis and commentary on current affairs ensured that this book remains one of the classics in the field.

Carr was born in 1892, and he graduated from Cambridge University with a first class degree in classics when the First World War interrupted his studies. He joined the Foreign Office and attended the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the Great War. He returned to academia in 1936, when he was appointed Wilson Professor of International Politics at the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth. When the Second World War broke out, he became assistant editor of *The Times* newspaper in London. He returned to Cambridge in 1953, where he remained to concentrate on his research into the history of the Soviet Union. Although his research into the Soviet Union culminated in the publication of 14 books on the subject, Carr will always be best known for his contribution to the ascendancy of ‘realism’ in the study of international relations based on *The Twenty Years’ Crisis*.

In this book, first published in 1939 (the second edition appeared in 1946), Carr engages in a sustained critique of the ‘utopian’ thinking that he argues dominated Western intellectual thought and diplomatic practice in the interwar years. He suggests that all human sciences, particularly when they are young, tend to be somewhat prescriptive, subordinating the analysis of facts to the desire to reform the world.
The study of international relations, he argues, was overly influenced by a set of ideas that were themselves products of a particular balance of power in which Britain enjoyed a dominant role. Thus, it was committed to efforts to bring about international peace on the basis of norms and principles which were in fact limited to the historical experience of domestic politics and economics in Britain, and they could not be applied internationally in a world divided among states with very different degrees of power and commitment to the international status quo. Chief among these were the beliefs in both the natural harmony of interests (derived from nineteenth-century laissez-faire economics) and collective security. In particular, the latter treated war as a consequence of ‘aggression’ across borders.

If it were to be abolished, there would need to be an international organization; states would commit themselves to the rule of law and be prepared to co-operate to deter and, if necessary, punish ‘aggressors’, with a spectrum of measures ranging from diplomacy and economic sanctions to the use of collective force to assist the victims of aggression. Carr argued that the faith and optimism concerning collective security, as well as the institution of the League of Nations, which was designed to implement it, was based on the erroneous assumption that the territorial and political status quo was satisfactory to all the major powers in the international system. In a world of separate sovereign states of unequal power, this was unlikely ever to be the case. Conflict among states, therefore, was not merely a consequence of a failure to understand one another, but an inevitable result of incompatible aspirations that could only be dealt with on the basis of negotiation in light of the balance of power, rather than by appealing to ‘universal’ principles of moral conduct. He therefore dismissed the idea that peace could result from the replication among states of judicial or legislative processes that could be enforced by the state within the domestic arena.

Carr recommended that scholars and diplomats could have avoided some of the problems of the interwar period if they had adopted a less idealistic and more ‘realistic’ approach to international affairs. This approach would entail the need to substitute rhetoric with diplomacy, and to subordinate universal principles to the procedural ethics of compromise between status quo and revisionist states in the international system.

The process of give-and-take must apply to challenges to the existing order. Those who profit most by that order can in the long run only hope to maintain it by making sufficient concessions to
make it tolerable to those who profit by it the least, and the responsibility for seeing that these changes take place as far as possible in an orderly way rests as much on the defenders as on the challengers.¹

Carr argued that the relationship between realism and utopianism was dynamic and dialectical. Although he was a severe critic of utopian thinking in the 1930s and 1940s, he also acknowledged that realism without utopianism could descend into a cynical realpolitik: ‘[c]onsistent realism excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgement, and a ground for action’.²

There is, however, a tension between Carr’s portrayal of the clash between realism and utopianism, and his deeply felt need to mediate between them. On the one hand, his discussion of the theoretical differences between these ‘isms’ is infused with determinism (the Marxist idea that norms and values are simply epiphenomenal expressions of the ruling class), as well as metaphysical dualism (‘the two elements – utopia and reality – belong to two different planes that can never meet’³). The antithesis between them is analogously identified with a series of dichotomies that Carr posits as free will versus determinism, the relation between theory and practice, the intellectual versus the bureaucrat, and ethics versus politics. Carr then collapses the antinomy into an apparent dichotomy of power and morality, the latter subordinate to the former to have any effect. Given such presuppositions, realism and utopianism are both unsound doctrines, but each can only act as a ‘corrective’ to the other. But they cannot be transcended or synthesized in thought. All one can do, it seems, is see-saw between them, using the strengths of one to attack the other when one of them appears to be getting the upper hand in informing international diplomacy and the conduct of great power foreign policy.

On the other hand, Carr did argue that ‘sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place’.⁴ Whatever the philosophical difficulties involved in his argument, Carr sought to reconcile the competing tendencies in his own diagnoses and prescriptions for international stability. This led to some judgements that have been criticized, although, it must be said, with the luxury of hindsight. The most blatant example was Carr’s endorsement of the British government’s policy of appeasing Germany in the late 1930s. This was included in the first edition of The Twenty Years’ Crisis when it was published in 1939, but significantly absent
from the second edition published in 1946. As William Fox observed in his excellent examination of Carr’s views in the late 1930s, ‘[a] good big theory does give a handle on the long- and middle-run future, but it does not point directly and ineluctably to the big shortrun decisions’.5

During and immediately after the Second World War, Carr turned his attention to the prospects for international stability that did not attempt to predict short-term policies or diplomatic episodes. As a man of the Left, Carr hoped that it would be possible to learn from the Soviet experience in social and economic planning, and he hoped that communism and capitalism could coexist without undue antagonism. This was based on his deep suspicion of capitalism to promote equality among people or states, and his conviction that, for all its faults, communism rested on the belief in a common moral purpose that was necessary to generate the self-sacrifice that could provide a common bond between the weak and the powerful. Carr was acutely aware of the dramatic changes in foreign affairs brought about since the French Revolution and the growth of democracy. Mass participation in the political process could not be sustained unless Western societies discovered new ways to manage the market and achieve forms of social democracy that required intervention in the marketplace rather than naive nineteenth-century ideas derived from simplistic readings of Adam Smith. Notwithstanding his own somewhat naive view of Hitler in the late 1930s, he acknowledged that the Second World War was as much a product of revolutionary ideology as the clash of enduring national interests. Despite the horror of war, he argued that the experience of fascism and communism had contributed useful lessons to Western democracies, particularly the need for social planning and international intervention to tame the inequities of global capitalism.6

In his book Nationalism and After (1945), Carr compared the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century with those of the twentieth and, as with his other books of this period, he laments the application of ideas that may have been applicable in the past, but which were now obsolete. For those interested in the problems of nationalism at the end of the Cold War, Nationalism and After is still required reading, for many of its arguments and analyses are as relevant today as they were when Carr made them. In this book, he argues that the principle of national self-determination is no longer a recipe for freedom, but guarantees conflict insofar as its interpretation along ethnic lines is incompatible with the ethnic diversity of most states. Furthermore, twentieth-century nationalism is closely linked to
the rise of public participation in the political system, which would lead to a dramatic rise in the number of ‘nation-states’ if the process were not managed. At the same time, there was a clear incompatibility between the value of national self-determination as an expression of freedom and the waning economic power of the nation-state to deliver either military or social security to its people. According to Carr, the solution was to create large multinational and regional organizations of states which could better co-ordinate their policies and sustain a commitment to social justice than either Soviet-style communism or American ‘free enterprise’. In light of the experience of the European states during the Cold War, Nationalism and After was prophetic in its foresight.

Carr did not write a great deal on international relations per se after his two great works of the 1930s and 1940s. From the early 1950s onwards, he devoted his attention to the historical analysis of the Soviet Union, an enormous project in which Carr tried to empathize with the problems faced by Soviet leaders and refused to engage in a ‘moralistic’ condemnation of the Soviet political system. He always argued, however, that American fears of Soviet ‘aggression’ towards Western Europe were exaggerated, and that the West had much to learn from the East in its own attempts to reconcile individual freedom and egalitarian social policies:

The fate of the western world will turn on its ability to meet the Soviet challenge by a successful search for new forms of social and economic action in which all that is valid in the individualist and democratic traditions can be applied to the problems of mass civilisation.7

One might argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union has not meant the end of the challenge, merely the end of the need to confront a state whose own attempts to meet it failed so dramatically. Carr himself offered no blueprint for how that challenge might be met. To do so would have been precisely the kind of utopian exercise he deplored.

Carr died in 1982 at the age of 90, and his work continues to inspire debate among students of international relations. While he has been hailed as the author of one of the most important classics of the twentieth century, his portrayal of the continuing theoretical division between realism and utopianism is by no means convincing for many scholars in the field. Some, particularly those associated with the ‘English School’ of international relations, such as Martin Wight and
Hedley Bull, have argued that his dichotomy between realism and utopianism is far too rigid and simplistic an attempt to distinguish between theoretical approaches in the study of international relations. Others have condemned Carr’s apparent relativism, and his refusal to defend his socialist values in a far more explicit manner than he ever attempted. To some extent, this can be attributed to Carr’s Marxist beliefs (never elaborated in his own published work), and his indebtedness to the work of Karl Mannheim on the sociology of knowledge. But whatever its philosophical weakness, Carr’s work reminds us that however we justify our commitment to values such as liberty or equality, they remain abstract and somewhat meaningless unless they are embodied in concrete political and economic arrangements, the reform of which is contingent on a complex historical process in which progress cannot be guaranteed.

For a profound analysis of Carr’s view on historical progress, students can look no further than his text *What is History?*, which not only reveals Carr’s own views but remains a classic work on the reading and writing of history. Among other issues, Carr examines the notion of progress in history and historiography since the Enlightenment, noting that what began as a secularization of Christian teleology needed to be continually modified by later historians, and eventually by Carr himself, in order not to succumb to mysticism or to cynicism, but to maintain a constructive view of the past. In this book Carr tries to mediate between a view of progress as an eternal Platonic form standing outside history, and a historically determined goal set in the future, unformed and susceptible to being shaped by attitudes in the present. Carr’s early training, it must be remembered, took place within the full flood of Victorian optimism, only later to be reduced by the more pessimistic realities embodied in the world wars. The decline of England as a world power made Carr a spokesman for his generation when he expressed the notion that historical progress could not be true in the Victorian sense, yet might be true in some broader, complex sense. Carr’s own notion of historical progress is embodied in the idea that ‘man is capable of profiting (not that he necessarily profits) by the experience of his predecessors, that progress in history, unlike evolution in nature, rests on the transmission of acquired assets.’ According to Carr, progress is not a straight line to perfection, but it depends on the ability of people to learn from the past, and upon the ability of the historian to transmit that past to his or her culture in a useful way in light of contemporary problems. Human civilizations may rise, fall and stagnate as different groups within society gain and lose power, but ‘progress’ in Carr’s modified
sense can still persist. This is because as more and more different events take place, the collective memory of historians becomes richer. This in turn enables them more accurately to glimpse the ever-changing direction in which history is moving, and even to alter that direction to a more favourable course. We may still debate the merits of Carr’s own modest attempts to steer the course of international history, but there can be no doubt that among the 50 great thinkers introduced in this book, Carr remains among the greatest.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 89.
3. Ibid., p. 93.
4. Ibid., p. 10.

Carr’s major writings

Britain: A Study of Foreign Policy From the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War, London, Longmans, Green, 1939.
From Napoleon to Stalin, and Other Essays, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1980.

See also: Bull, Morgenthau, Wight
Further reading


ROBERT GILPIN

Robert G. Gilpin is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. He has been a congressional fellow and vice-president of the American Political Science Association, and he is best known for his work in international political economy. In response to those who argue that realism is overly concerned with the politics of military security and tends to ignore economic forces, Gilpin attempts to reintegrate the study of international politics (concerned with the role of power in shaping relations among states) with international economic forces (concerned with the nature and dynamics of firms in the marketplace). In addition, he is one of the few realists concerned with change, particularly in trying to explain the rise and decline of states over time. This has been a growth area in the study of international relations over the past couple of decades. It was inspired both by concern with the apparent economic decline of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s relative to Europe and Japan, and by the arguments of many liberals that the growth of economic interdependence among states was weakening their power and attenuating the historical relationship between military force and the ability to sustain state national interests.

Gilpin’s work reveals a consistent concern with the role of power and the management of power by the state. His first major publication was a study of the tensions between American nuclear scientists
and the US government on nuclear weapons policies in the 1950s. But his most important work emerged in the mid-1970s and the 1980s in the area of international political economy. Contrary to those who argued that the growth of economic interdependence was undermining the state and reducing the relevance of coercive military power to determine economic influence in world affairs, Gilpin argued that a liberal international trading order depended on the very factors it was alleged to be undermining, namely the presence of a powerful state to provide what have come to be called international ‘public goods’.

The basic argument is this. Markets cannot flourish in producing and distributing goods and services in the absence of a state to provide certain prerequisites. By definition, markets depend on the transfer, via an efficient price mechanism, of goods and services that can be bought and sold among private actors who exchange ownership rights. But markets themselves depend on the state to provide, via coercion, regulation and taxation, certain ‘public goods’ that markets themselves cannot generate. These include a legal infrastructure of property rights and laws to make contracts binding, a coercive infrastructure to ensure that laws are obeyed, and a stable medium of exchange (money) to ensure a standard of valuation for goods and services. Within the territorial borders of the state, governments provide such goods. Internationally, of course, there is no world state capable of replicating their provision on a global scale. Building on the work of Charles Kindleberger and E.H. Carr’s analysis of the role of Great Britain in the international economy of the nineteenth century, Gilpin argues that stability and the ‘liberalization’ of international exchange depend on the existence of a ‘hegemon’ that is both able and willing to provide international ‘public goods’, such as law and order and a stable currency for financing trade.

The overall direction of Gilpin’s argument can be found in his three most important works, US Power and the Multinational Corporation (1975); War and Change in World Politics (1981); and The Political Economy of International Relations (1987). The first of these is an examination of the foreign influence of American multinational corporations in the postwar era. Contrary to some of the conventional wisdom that the spread and autonomy of overseas corporate activity was beyond the control of the US government, Gilpin argues that their overseas activity can be understood only in the context of the open liberal economy established under US auspices at the end of the Second World War. Its hegemonic leadership and anti-Sovietism was the basis of its commitment to ‘liberal internationalism’ and the
establishment of international institutions to facilitate the dramatic expansion of trade among capitalist states in the 1950s and 1960s.

Gilpin’s next two major works were written in the context of a growing debate about the alleged decline of the United States in international relations, particularly in light of the dramatic economic recovery of Europe and Japan from the devastation of the Second World War. Although far more attention was paid to the work of Paul Kennedy in the late 1980s, Gilpin’s *War and Change in World Politics* is an important attempt to place the debate within an overall theory of the rise and decline of hegemonic states in international relations. The originality of this work lies in its attempt to integrate propositions both at the level of the international system and at the level of individual states within the system. Starting with certain assumptions about states, he seeks to explain the emergence and change of systems of states within a rational choice framework. In addition, he distinguishes between three kinds of change in international relations. *Interaction* change simply refers to changing interstate relations within a given balance of power. *Systemic* change refers to the overall governance of the system, the number of great powers within it, and the shift in identity of predominant powers, usually after a systemic war involving challenges to, and attempts to maintain, the existing distribution of power. Finally, and most significantly, *systems* change refers to a fundamental transformation of the actors and thus the nature of the system *per se*. For example, one could point to the emergence of the state system itself in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, or the change from empires to nation–states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Gilpin’s model of systemic change is based on a number of assumptions about states that he derives from microeconomic, rational choice theory. This is used to postulate a cyclical theory of change in the international system. It consists of five key propositions.

1. An international system is stable (in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to change the system.
2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the expected benefits.
4. Once equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs
of maintaining the *status quo* to rise faster than the economic capacity to sustain the *status quo*.

(5) If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.¹

As far as Gilpin is concerned, world history since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) has been a period of systemic change within a state-centric system, and the stability or otherwise of the system depends on the existence of a political and economic hegemon. But stability is difficult to sustain because economic and technological change is never evenly distributed among states. Hence over time there is an increasing gap between the status and prestige of particular states and the power they are able to deploy to safeguard their national interests. Despite the need for peaceful change in the system to manage the process of change, Gilpin grimly observes that, up to now, ‘the principal mechanism of change…has been war, or what we shall call hegemonic war (i.e., a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system)’.² The factors that lie behind change in the international system are largely environmental, and these structure the array of incentives that states have to try and change the system to their benefit, such as population shifts and the diffusion of military technology throughout the system.

Although the decline of empires seems to confirm the obsolescence of territorial expansion and its substitution by hegemonic states (such as Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States after 1945), the attempts by Germany and Japan to expand their territorial control in the first half of this century suggest that the mode of change remains indeterminate.

In the context of the debate over the alleged decline of the United States in international relations, the last two propositions deserve particular attention. Essentially, Gilpin believes that all hegemonies are transient because the costs of maintaining them rise more quickly than the resources available to do so. On the one hand, the hegemon is unable to prevent the diffusion of its economic skills and techniques to other states. On the other hand, the hegemon must confront the rising expectations of its own citizens. Over time, they will privilege consumption over production and resist further sacrifices in order to maintain the supremacy of the hegemon on the international stage.

The combination of internal and external factors leads to what Gilpin calls ‘a severe fiscal crisis’ for the hegemon. It then has a limited choice of options. If it wishes to maintain its power, it can either
confront its internal obstacles and reverse the tendency towards complacency, or it can attack rising powers before they mount a challenge of their own. Alternatively, it can seek to reduce its overseas commitments and promote strategic alliances with other states. Gilpin illustrates the former with reference to imperial China, while in the 1930s, Britain attempted the latter course of action. Gilpin is sceptical about the lessons of history, however. While each of these options has been pursued with varying degrees of success in the past, neither has been able to prevent the onset of war to resolve the disequilibrium of global power. In the late twentieth century, such a conclusion raises urgent questions about contemporary stability in the international system and the need to discover means other than war for managing the process of change, as the next ‘systemic’ war is likely to be the last in the context of nuclear weapons.

The third book, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (1987), is both a major textbook in the field of international political economy and a continuation of the themes addressed in his previous work. After exploring a range of sources of change that encompass finance, trade and investment in the postwar era, Gilpin concludes that the period of American hegemony in the international system is coming to an end, and that Japan is emerging as a potential hegemon in the international system. He believes that the decline in American power, caused by a mixture of internal and external forces, is detrimental to the maintenance of a liberal economic order among states. On the one hand, American exports of technology and capital have facilitated the recovery of Europe and Japan, while on the other hand, the costs of containing the Soviet Union have made it difficult for the United States to maintain its competitive edge over its rivals. In particular, the United States became a major debtor nation in the 1980s, while Japan had accrued large capital surpluses that it had invested in the United States. Gilpin believes that this situation has grave consequences for the continuation of a liberal trading system, as over time the United States will be reluctant to pay for public goods the benefits of which accrue to ‘free riders’ in the international system such as Japan. Gilpin argues that the decline of US hegemony is likely to usher in a period of ‘new mercantilism’, perhaps even the establishment of new trading blocs under the respective regional hegemonies of the United States, Germany and Japan.

Thus, in contrast to those who talk of ‘globalization’ in the world economy, Gilpin emphasizes the fundamental changes in the world economy that are a by-product of the erosion of American hegemony. He believes that we are now in the midst of a transition from a
long period of liberal internationalism to one of mercantilism, and whether the latter will be malign or benign remains a very open question.

Gilpin’s work has been subject to a number of criticisms, notwithstanding his novel attempt to adapt realism to account for change in the international system. Some writers have drawn attention to the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the theory, while others have argued that Gilpin’s pessimism regarding the future of the international system is based almost entirely on his ideological predisposition for realism and that his theory of change is little more than the application of a social Darwinian approach to the study of international relations.

The first type of criticism is particularly pertinent in light of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the past decade. Gilpin did not predict the end of the Cold War, but one could argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union has rendered much of his diagnosis of US decline obsolete, as the hegemon has no further need to engage in an expensive military competition with its arch-rival. The indeterminacy of the theory, particularly insofar as it tends to rely on two case studies (Britain and the United States), leaves much room for debate. As Richardson points out,

If the US is in the declining stage of the cycle, then Gilpin’s theory can suggest some of the reasons why, and can suggest options and constraints. But is it? How do we know that it is not, like imperial China or eighteenth-century Britain or France, capable of rejuvenation?…Gilpin’s theory is not rigorous enough to specify criteria which would resolve the issue: he assumes that the model of the declining hegemon fits the US, but does not, beyond a comparison with [its] position in the immediate post-war period, spell out the reasoning behind the assumption.3

One could well argue that in the last decade of the twentieth century, unipolarity has replaced bipolarity in international relations, and that the economic growth of the United States in the past few years, combined with the relative decline of Japan and other ‘newly industrializing countries’ in the Asia-Pacific region, renders much of the concern with American ‘decline’ out of date. The issue is difficult to resolve in the absence of agreed criteria either for measuring power in the contemporary international system, or for the selection of relevant timescales. One could also argue that China is the most important emerging hegemon at the end of the twentieth century, rather than Japan.
Others have drawn attention to the way in which Gilpin’s theory is informed less by its empirical validity than by his underlying assumptions and value judgements, rooted in a very pessimistic view of the world. As he has said himself, ‘it’s a jungle out there!’ Gilpin’s world view remains state-centric, and he is not convinced that the historic patterns of relations among states in an anarchical world are going to change in the near future. Some critics have suggested that Gilpin’s theoretical work is based on a fundamental assumption that the United States is a benign hegemon, but it is quite possible to construe nuclear deterrence as a public ‘bad’ rather than a ‘good’. Despite his attempt to synthesize realism and microeconomic utilitarianism, many remain sceptical about whether this provides an adequate basis on which to justify his underlying pessimism about the possibility of progressive reform in the international system.

Notes
2. Ibid., p. 15.

Gilpin’s major writings


See also: *Cox, Keohane, Krasner*

**Further reading**


**JOHN HERZ**

As with the work of Susan Strange, the writing of John Herz cannot be placed squarely within a ‘realist’ school of thought without some qualification. In his first book, he describes his own position as ‘realist liberalism’, a term that sums up the work of someone who acknowledges all the empirical constraints identified by more traditional ‘realists’, but who also affirms the need to transcend those constraints in search of a more humane and just world order.¹ In his work on the ‘territorial state’ in the 1950s, Herz believed that its transcendence was imminent, facilitated by the apparent failure of the state to fulfil its main purpose in the nuclear era – to defend its citizens. By the late 1960s, he acknowledged that the state was unlikely to disappear, despite the arrival of nuclear weapons, and his writing took on a more normative dimension, appealing to the need for more enlightened views of self-interest in foreign policy. In 1981 he wrote that:
We live in an age where threats to the survival of all of us – nuclear superarmament, populations outrunning food supplies and energy resources, destruction of man’s habitat – concern all nations and people, and thus must affect foreign policy-making as much as views of security.²

This shift in emphasis was accompanied by a sustained concern with what might be called an ‘immanent critique’ of the way in which foreign policy is often framed within what Herz argues are inappropriate ‘images’ of the world. He urges us (as observers of and participants in international relations) to distinguish between that part of ‘reality’ which is fixed and immutable and that part which arises from ‘the perceptual and conceptual structures that we…bestow on the world’.

³ In his long career, Herz has always tried to do so, and to evaluate dominant perceptions in light of what he once referred to as ‘mild internationalism’. In a short essay written for the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences in 1968, he distinguishes between a mildly internationalist ideology and more radical forms of internationalism. The former, which is both practical and desirable, aims at a world in which states remain the most important political actors, they are democratic and self-determining, and conflicts are settled by mediation, arbitration and the application of international law in the context of growing interdependence and co-operation. The goal of radical internationalism is to replace the existing system of sovereign states with some kind of world government.

Herz was born in 1908 in Germany. He attended the University of Cologne, where he studied legal and political philosophy as well as constitutional and international law. After completing his doctorate under the supervision of the legal theorist Hans Kelsen, Herz moved to Switzerland, where he enrolled in courses in international relations at the Geneva Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales. As with so many of the key thinkers in this book (Deutsch, Haas, Morgenthau), he went to the United States in order to escape the Nazis shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. He taught at Howard University, Columbia University, the New School for Social Research in New York and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1939–41). He then worked for the Office of Strategic Services and the State Department, and after the war he took up a permanent position as Professor of Political Science at the City College of New York and head of the doctoral programme at the City University of New York. His experience at the State Department taught him ‘how little one’s work and efforts at a lower
level mean for top decision-makers. He believed that the United States could have done more to establish democratic foundations in Germany in the early postwar years, but did not do so because it was so eager to build it up as a bulwark against Soviet communism. As a teacher, Herz continued to work on German democratization and the problems of regime change in comparative European politics. In addition to his work on international relations, Herz is well regarded as a student of Germany and has edited the journal *Comparative Politics* for a number of years.

In 1951, Herz published his first major book, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. In it he tries to steer a middle way between ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. He defines ‘realism’ as thought which ‘takes into consideration the implications for political life of those security and power factors which are inherent in human society’. In contrast, political idealism either ignores such factors, or believes that they will disappear once ‘rational’ solutions to political problems are presented and adopted. However, in contrast to Hans Morgenthau and other ‘classical realists’ of the period, Herz does not trace the ‘power factors’ to permanent characteristics of human nature. He acknowledges that the latter has many dimensions – biological, metaphysical and even spiritual – that combine to determine human behaviour, and any adequate account must recognize human ethical properties.

Instead of appealing to metaphysics, Herz posits the existence of a ‘security dilemma’ as the key factor. It arises from the individual’s consciousness that others may be seeking his or her destruction, so there is always some need for self-defence, which in turn may make others insecure. What is true among individuals is equally relevant to understanding group behaviour. In fact, Herz argues that the security dilemma is more acute among groups, for the simple reason that groups can develop means of self-defence that are far more destructive than those available to individuals. Moreover, insofar as individuals come to equate their own identity and worth with that of the group to which they belong, they may be prepared to sacrifice their life on behalf of the survival of the group. Thus, even if one makes the most optimistic assumptions about the nature and motives of individuals and groups, the security dilemma will persist as long as there remain groups that are not subordinate to a higher authority. In the modern world, these are sovereign states.

Of course, this argument is not original to Herz. Hobbes said something very similar in the mid-seventeenth century. Herz has become famous for the label ‘security dilemma’, however, as well as
for the skill with which he uses the basic framework to illustrate the history of international relations over the past 200 years. In the body of his book, Herz examines certain movements for democracy, nationalism and internationalism, showing how the ‘idealistic’ rhetoric behind such movements always ran into ‘realistic’ problems that doomed them to failure. At the same time, he acknowledges that ‘ideals’ are also part of political and historical ‘reality’, and that any philosophy that denies ideals engenders lethargy and despair. Robert Berki sums up Herz’s argument as follows:

Political means in the realist perspective must be fashioned so as to combat the ‘resistance’ of forces that hinder ideals, which means to enter the game that is played imperfectly in politics, with imperfect rules. The promised land lies perpetually over the horizon, and imagined means which derive their value from this promised land are unsuitable.8

Over the next two decades, Herz continued to elaborate on the nature of the security dilemma in postwar international relations. In 1959, he published his second classic work, International Politics in the Atomic Age. This introduced readers to Herz’s views on the rise (and imminent collapse) of the ‘permeability’ of the sovereign state. The book is divided into two parts. The first provides an account of the rise of the state that focuses on the role of military technology, while the second describes the crisis of the state in the nuclear era. While the first book focuses on the role of political philosophy in shaping our attitudes to international politics in general, the second is an application of ‘liberal internationalism’ in the specific context of nuclear bipolarity and the Cold War.

Observing the variety of units that have engaged in ‘international relations’ throughout history, Herz tries to account for the rise of the modern state in terms of its ability to provide protection and security to its citizens against armed attack from outsiders. As such, Herz engages in a form of ‘strategic determinism’. In particular, he focuses on the change from the small and vulnerable political units of the European Middle Ages (such as fortified castles and walled cities) to the larger units that came to be known as nation-states. He claims that the invention and widespread use of gunpowder enabled rulers, along with artillery and standing armies, to destroy feudal authorities within larger areas, which they could then protect by building ‘impenetrable’ fortifications. Compared with what preceded them, sovereign states were ‘territorially impenetrable’.
The crucial change in this situation took place in the twentieth century. First, there was a dramatic increase in the destructive capacity of air power between the two world wars, even though some military strategists had exaggerated its ability to win wars. As the experience of the Second World War demonstrated, the widespread bombing of industrial infrastructure did not incapacitate the states on which it was inflicted, and the targeting of civilians did not promote a general desire to sue for peace regardless of the consequences. For example, the fire-bombing of Tokyo with conventional weapons in early 1945 caused more direct casualties than the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima in August, and there was no evidence at the time to suggest that it would make a conventional invasion by allied troops unnecessary. Herz argues that nuclear weapons have now destroyed the ‘impermeability’ of the sovereign state, so that traditional ‘balance of power’ politics are finally obsolete. Of course, the ‘realist’ in him acknowledges that the security dilemma still operates, even though the means used to tame it undermine the purpose of doing so. Throughout the book, Herz laments the way in which the United States and the Soviet Union have failed to adapt to the new situation, building thousands more weapons than are required for the purposes of deterrence. The appalling condition of ‘nuclear overkill’ and the elaborate schemes of civilian strategists and nuclear weapons designers to escape from the new security dilemma have meant that we have lost sight of the more fundamental problem:

The very fact that technical developments of weapons and armaments in themselves wield such a tremendous impact has meant that they have almost come to dictate policies, instead of policies determining the type and choice of weapons, their use, amount of armaments, and so forth. In other words, instead of weapons serving policy, policy is becoming the mere servant of a weapon that more and more constitutes its own raison d’être.9

In short, the world had become too small for traditional territoriality and the protection it had previously provided. The balance of terror was not the continuation of the old balance of power. War, which had functioned as part of the dynamics of the balance, was no longer a rational means of policy. Herz claimed that what had once been considered ‘idealistic’ – namely the dilution of state sovereignty – was now an overriding national interest.

Almost a decade later, Herz acknowledged that ‘developments have rendered me doubtful of the correctness of my previous anticipations’.10
In the late 1950s, he had implied that the territorial state was in demise. Technological change, which he had claimed was a crucial factor in determining the rise of the state, would now facilitate the emergence of new forms of transnational and co-operative governance. Herz felt confident that arguments associated in the 1930s with idealism were now consistent with realism. What caused him to change his mind was not only the failure of political leaders to pay any more attention to him than they had when he worked for the State Department.

Herz identifies three reasons for the continuation of territoriality as a marker of political differentiation. First, decolonization had led to a remarkable ‘creation’ of new states, and Herz admitted that he had not anticipated the speed with which ‘old empires’ had collapsed. Second, Herz admitted that the technological determinism of his earlier argument was in fact deterministic. He had not acknowledged the power of nationalism in sustaining the territorial state regardless of its military permeability in the nuclear age. Third, while Herz continued to lament the arms race between the two superpowers, he later claimed that the balance of terror was more robust than he had thought a decade earlier. In 1968, he argued that if the nuclear arms race was to be controlled in the future, a ‘holding operation’ was necessary. This would consist of a set of policies such as ‘arms control, demarcation of bloc spheres, avoidance of nuclear proliferation…and reducing the role of the ideologies of communism and anticommunism’.

This is the context in which Herz defended the policies of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He did so by reinforcing the distinction between constraints that were inherent in the security dilemma, and misplaced perceptions of those constraints based on inappropriate images of international relations. For example, in 1974 he was vigorous in attacking the idea, then proposed by some conservative critics, that détente was a form of ‘appeasement’. Herz argued that there was very little similarity between the international political situation of the 1930s and the 1970s. The United States was negotiating from a position of strength, not weakness. The existence of nuclear weapons ensured that ‘aggression’ on the part of the (then) Soviet Union would be an act of suicide, not opportunism, and that détente, far from being a radical departure from realism, was in fact merely a prerequisite for more radical policies in the ‘common interest’ of humankind in survival.

During the 1980s, Herz became increasingly disillusioned with American foreign policy. Détente, upon which he had placed so much hope, collapsed and was replaced by what Fred Halliday famously called the ‘second’ Cold War. The renewal of the nuclear arms race, the superpowers’ intervention in Afghanistan and Central
America, and their failure to even begin tackling ecological and demographic problems all helped to impart ‘a despairing and anguished romanticism’ to his writing.14

Herz does not think that the end of the Cold War justifies complacency in the analysis of international relations. The Cold War came to an end because one superpower could no longer sustain its competition with the West, on ideological or economic terms. It did not come to an end as a result of any policy-makers deciding to place the ‘human’ interest over the ‘national’ interest. Although the fear of nuclear war between the great powers has lessened, it has been replaced by new fears of nuclear proliferation, and the legacy of old images lives on. For example, the United States continues to evoke the legacy ‘appeasement’ in justifying its policies towards Iraq, and there is no indication that what Herz calls ‘a survival ethic’ has replaced what he disparages as ‘regional parochial’ ethics in international relations. In his retirement, Herz has dedicated himself to what he calls ‘survival research’, concerned less with descriptive and explanatory analyses of contemporary international relations than with urging us to abandon the images of international relations that make ‘regional parochialism’ possible.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 185.

**Herz’s major writings**


‘The territorial state revisited’, *Polity* 1 (1968), pp. 11–34.


See also: Carr, Giddens, Mann, Morgenthau

**Further reading**


**SAMUEL HUNTINGTON**

Samuel Huntington turned 80 in April 2007. Throughout his long and highly successful career as a scholar and policy-maker of international
studies, he has sought to challenge conventional knowledge, often in provocative and controversial ways. Whether or not one agrees with his views, Huntington has exercised enormous influence on international relations and comparative politics. What makes Huntington such a unique and influential thinker is his ability to frame the changing dynamics of international politics in elegant and often intriguing ways. It is largely because of his focus on power and conflict that his work remains closely tied to realism in international politics. In fact, both conservatism and realism focus on the preservation and promotion of existing social and power relations and the need to understand the inevitable qualities of war. Indeed, some of the most provocative and controversial realist thinkers of the twentieth century, including Carl Schmitt, have stressed how the preservation of power reflects the imminence of war and conflict and the disastrous consequences that may ensue if we fail to understand these ontological possibilities.¹

Unlike Schmitt, however, who ultimately lost his professorship because of his loose affiliation with the Nazis, Huntington has enjoyed a long and highly esteemed reputation: an academic career that has spanned nearly seven decades, much of which has been spent at Harvard University, where he has taught since the early 1950s. In addition to his academic accomplishments, Huntington has played important roles in US politics and national security decision-making, serving as a co-ordinator of security planning of the National Security Council in the White House from 1977–78. At this time, he also co-founded the journal Foreign Policy, which has since gone on to become one of the most significant and most cited policy journals in the international relations discipline.

Huntington’s early academic works focused on the conflicting roles of liberalism and national security. His first book, The Soldier and the State (1957), assessed the tensions between civil and military life in the United States during and before the Cold War. Here he argues that liberalism, while crucial to accounting for the liberal values of its citizenry, had failed to explain the rising professionalism of the military.² One of his central research questions was whether the rising professionalism of the military was symptomatic of, or a counter-reaction to, the power of liberal democratic values. In addressing this question, he proposed that such professionalism required a more nuanced theory of the relationship between civilian and military life in order to overcome the limits and problems of liberalism (proounced by those such as Dewey). Driving his concern was the preservation of the moral and political fabric of American society, that is, the need to understand the changing nature of the external threats to
these values. It was imperative, in his view, to understand the internal and changing dynamics of American power, and to focus on the effects and consequences of this power. Huntington thus saw realism and conservatism as complementary forces in the struggle to secure and promote American power. American power, in his view, resides in the deeper appreciation of the values of hard work, social mobility, individual integrity and freedom of choice.

It is important to stress, however, that his conservatism remains a spirited defence of conservative thought; it is by no means an endorsement of the reactionary qualities of such thought. For Huntington, the reactionary attitudes that arise from the fear and paranoia of realism and conservatism are anything but elements of conservative thought. Rather, they represent a virulent attack on the life and values that conservatives wish to preserve. In short, it is just such reactionary impulses of conservatism, or unconstrained fear, that creates disorder or disharmony in American politics.\(^3\) Certainly, then, values and political order must be promoted in a coherent way to contain the effects of cultural conflict. In his book *The Third Wave*, Huntington argues that the new wave in the former Soviet-bloc countries and developing countries represents one of the great political orderings at the international level.\(^4\) Yet it is precisely this change that also introduces new forms of conflict, pitting against one another profoundly different cultural influences or visions of morality and political order.

This *realpolitik* vision of world politics lies at the core of his thesis, the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, which first appeared in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, and is perhaps his most well-known, provocative contribution to international relations.\(^5\) The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis holds that religion has emerged as one of the primary causes of conflict, and that the erosion of the nation-state, coupled with the rising influence of Western secular power (via globalization), reflects the likelihood that religion will replace the nation-state as the primary source of conflict in world politics. Its theoretical framework is based on two (seismic) indicators: so-called ‘faultlines’ between and among various civilizations, including Islam, Western secularism, Hindu, Sikh and Eastern Orthodox religion; and so-called ‘hotspots’ that refer to isolated areas of conflict. Of the various faultlines he describes, perhaps the best known is the North–South line that runs longitudinally from Scandanavia down through the Balkans and into North Africa. As one of the principal faultlines, this North–South line is where many traditionally warring religious groups (or ethnic groups with strong and opposing religious identities) are located, and where the
likelihood for conflict along religious or civilizational lines remains highest.

Huntington’s seismic analogies thus suggest the predictive value or likelihood of conflict. This predictive value is based on the idea that, like the expected shifting of tectonic plates, ethnic wars reflect the building-up of competitive pressures and hostilities among ethnic groups. Because civilizations are most fundamental to the identity of these groups, they also explain the deep-seated nature of the hostilities, or the fundamental causal link between hostilities and the reassertion of civilizations. This emergent shift from the nation-state to the civilization clash highlights two trends: the increasing decline of the nation-state; and the growing pressures between Western and Islamic civilization, where wars will increasingly be fought and launched in the name of civilization, and where the pervasive influence of globalization will continue to fuel many of these clashes.

Given the recent clashes between religious groups during the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era, Huntington is able to claim that civilization, not the nation-state, will probably become the fundamental source of global conflict. Critics of this position argue that Huntington exaggerates civilization as an essential and possibly exclusive cause of ethnic war, and that this causal primacy remains inherently anti-modernist and in stark opposition to much of the literature on nationalism, which assumes that the nation is an eternal idea. As one of the most well known scholars of nationalism, Benedict Anderson theorized that the nation is a wholly novel and eternal product of the imagination, which emerged from the fall of the great dynastic empires during the early modern period. The rise of Protestantism at this time combined with the invention of the printing press to produce print capitalism, and to signal the emergence of a new temporality, or way of experiencing time through the invention of newspapers and the clock. Together, they reflected the growth of a national consciousness based on immortality and sacrifice. Curiously, just as Anderson discusses national sacrifice, or a willingness to die for one’s country, Huntington suggests that more zealots may be willing to sacrifice themselves in the name of global jihad, which seeks to repel Western imperialism. Certainly, this is one main reason for the resurgence of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

What makes Huntington’s thesis so compelling, therefore, is its elegance and generalizability. Many critics of Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis have been quick to downplay the central influence of religion vis-à-vis the state, arguing that the state still assumes a
primary, if not definitive, role in explaining conflict, whether this applies to inter- or intra-state conflict. What is more, the US response to 9/11 reflected the resurgence of the state, not its mitigation vis-à-vis the civilization clash. One might conclude here that 9/11 is testament to the viability of both these factors, perhaps even their growing affinity, insofar as non-state agents of religious-based terrorism must rely on the state to project its extremist religious platform of a global *shariah* state (a state ruled by Islamic law).

It is also crucial not to lose sight of Huntington’s own deep-seated fear of the erosion of American values. In his most recent work on the American national identity and immigration, he argues that immigration, while having helped shape American identity, has also threatened the cohesiveness of American identity. Here he contends that the decline of the West and the forces of globalization have generated increasing pressures from within, which, in turn, have led to the adoption of many conflicting cultural agendas. In his view, while multiculturalism has defined US values or foreign policy priorities during much of the 1990s, it has also reflected a much weaker base of US power and concerted support. Huntington’s criticism of multiculturalism is thus meant to encourage people to reflect on the core values of the United States, or what it means to talk about a cohesive US identity that partakes of the majoritarian influence of Protestant Anglo culture. As he puts it: ‘Immigrants become citizens not because they are attracted to American Culture or Creed but by government of social welfare and affirmative action programs’.9

Still, Huntington’s work on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ raises a curious, some might say indelible, question: how are we to understand and explain the challenges to global order when greater toleration of individual values can be said to fuel such tensions and divisions? Amitai Etzioni, for instance, argues that a global architecture, or what he calls a ‘global nation’, is needed to synthesize further the differentiated political and social values of the West and East. Yet for Huntington, it may be fair to say that the overextension of morality and ethics (through global tolerance) merely repeats a liberalist mistake: of extending a multicultural agenda to a global world that remains divided and will continue to be so along fundamental cultural lines.

**Notes**


**Huntington’s major writings**

*The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations*  


*The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.


See also: Fukuyama
Further reading


GEORGE KENNAN

George Frost Kennan was born in Wisconsin in 1904 (the same year, incidentally, as his fellow realist Hans Morgenthau). He is best known as both a major contributor towards, as well as a trenchant critic of, US foreign policy during the Cold War. While it is not unfair to characterize him as a realist, he is less interested in contributing to international theory than in drawing on broad realist principles to analyse and evaluate diplomatic conduct.

In part, this is simply a consequence of his background. As a young man he was sent to military school, and then Princeton University, before joining the US Foreign Service in 1926. When President Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, Kennan was sent to the Soviet Union and was stationed in Moscow during the crucial years 1944–46. Perhaps most importantly, he had trained as a Soviet specialist in Riga, the capital of Latvia, in the late 1920s. This was during the brief period of Latvian independence, and Kennan not only came into regular contact with ‘White Russian’ émigrés, but observed first hand the rise of Stalin and the ruthless consolidation of his power in the Soviet Union.

Although he was not well known in the United States, this low profile soon changed after he published a famous article in 1947 in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*, although he attempted to maintain his anonymity by signing the article ‘Mr X’. It was based on an intensive analysis of ‘the sources of Soviet conduct’ that he had sent to the State Department in Washington in 1946 (the ‘long telegram’). At a time of profound uncertainty and debate over how the United States should conduct relations with the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War, Kennan’s warnings concerning
the expansionist drives of the Soviet Union and the need to ‘contain’ it struck a responsive chord back in the United States, and led to his appointment as head of the newly created Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, where he remained until retiring as a diplomat in 1950. Although he served briefly as the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952, and again in the early 1960s as the Ambassador to Yugoslavia when President Kennedy was trying to improve US relations with Tito, George Kennan spent most of his working life at Princeton University at the Institute for Advanced Study. There he produced a stream of books and articles on US foreign policy, the history of the Soviet Union, and the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations during the Cold War.

What emerges from his work is the outlook of a conservative, aristocratic critic of some of the most revolutionary changes in world politics, with a nostalgic fondness for the relatively more sedate world of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Despite his fame and the sheer volume of his writing, Kennan has never felt part of the United States. Even at the height of his influence in the late 1940s, he lamented the apparent inability of American leaders to understand the subtlety of his thought, and in much of his work he repudiates policies and practices implemented in the name of ‘containment’, a doctrine that will always be associated with his name.

To understand his disillusionment with American foreign policy, one has to appreciate both the ways in which it departed from Kennan’s vision, as well as Kennan’s deeply felt regrets about the evolution of international politics from a European-centred multipolar system to a bipolar system based on the dominance of two nuclear superpowers. In the late 1940s, Kennan argued that international stability depended on a recreation of a multipolar order that had been destroyed by world war. In particular, he advocated that the United States should use its enormous economic strength to help restore Europe and Japan as great powers, so that the burden of containing the Soviet threat could be shared rather than borne alone by a country that Kennan suspected was incapable of behaving in a moderate fashion abroad. As far as he was concerned, the aims of containment should have been limited to the defence and restoration of areas of crucial military–industrial power. In terms of method, he insisted that the best way in which the United States could achieve this was by offering economic aid to the war-torn economies of Europe and Japan. This would enable them both to recover their status and to weaken the appeal of indigenous, radical or communist movements. Although his early writings stressed the revolutionary
challenge of communism to international order, he always believed that if the Soviet Union were geographically ‘contained’, its appeal to other states would diminish over time and, indeed, it would undergo gradual internal changes that might transform its status from a revolutionary state to a more moderate great power. Unlike others trained at Riga, he never worried about communist ‘grand designs’ to conquer the globe. In an incisive analysis written as the Cold War was fading into history, Richard Barnet identifies four crucial factors that account for the failure of the Truman administration to follow Kennan’s advice.1

First, the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly in the 1940s that inspired Truman and some of his advisers to believe that nuclear weapons could be used to intimidate Stalin and achieve concrete concessions to American demands. Second, in the absence of any firm means of predicting Soviet foreign policy, the Truman administration relied heavily on the alleged ‘lessons of history’ of the 1930s, namely the self-defeating nature of ‘appeasement’ in the face of authoritarian aggression. Although the Marshall Plan was consistent with Kennan’s emphasis on economic aid, he was aghast at the language used in the formulation of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ in 1947, which appeared to commit the United States to an open-ended support of any regimes confronted with ‘internal subversion’ supported by the Soviet Union. Third, the United States was very eager to cement Germany in a Western alliance, and this required the presence of American troops on German soil as part of what was to become (in 1949) NATO. Finally, Kennan underestimated the degree of volatility in American public opinion. As Barnet puts it, ‘[the Truman administration] had run into trouble when they tried to present a nuanced view of the situation in Europe, and a consensus swiftly developed in the administration that scaring the hell out of the American people…was essential for combating the isolationist mood’.2

Consequently, Kennan’s original formulation of containment was, in his view, distorted by the conflation of the Soviet threat with communism in general, the emphasis on military rather than economic means, and the geographical expansion of the Cold War into Asia. In the mid-1960s, like Morgenthau, Kennan was a stern critic of US foreign policy in Vietnam. Consistent with his emphasis on ‘strong-point’ as opposed to ‘perimeter’ defence, in 1967 he testified to the Senate Foreign Relations committee that Vietnam was not vital to the United States’ strategic interests, and that the prestige of the country would not be hurt if it withdrew from the conflict. Oddly enough, Kennan shared the view of many radicals in the peace
movement that the American conduct of the Cold War could undermine the very ideals of freedom and democracy that the United States claimed to be defending, both at home and abroad. Such ideals could best be promoted if the United States tried to be an example to the rest of the world and refrained from trying to impose its ideals on other states, or supporting authoritarian regimes simply on the basis of their ‘anti-communist’ credentials.

Much of Kennan’s writing is concerned with the question of whether the United States is capable of behaving like a ‘traditional’ European great power. In his essays and lectures, particularly in the volume American Diplomacy, 1900–1950, he bemoaned what he liked to call American’s tendency to adopt ‘a legalistic-moralistic approach to international politics’. This was inevitable in a democracy like the United States, but it interfered with a cool calculation of the national interest on the basis of long-term trends in the balance of power rather than short-term fluctuations. A moral reaction is a short-term phenomenon when the public perceives the national interest to be at stake. Having no intensive knowledge of the situation, and lacking accurate facts even more than officialdom, citizens often have no option but to express their concerns in crude and moral terms. As a reliable guide to the conduct of foreign affairs, however, such reactions may have disastrous longer-term effects. For example, Kennan argued that the so-called ‘fall of China’ in 1949 did not represent a golden opportunity for the Soviet Union to cement a communist alliance against the West, but instead represented a major challenge to the Soviet Union as the leader of the communist movement. In an interview in 1972, and just prior to Nixon’s attempt to normalize relations with China, Kennan pointed out:

the position of Moscow as the ‘third Rome’ of international communism is essential to the carefully cultivated Soviet image of self. Take it away, and the whole contrived history of Soviet Communism, its whole rationale and sense of legitimacy, is threatened. Moscow must oppose China with real desperation, because China threatens the intactness of its own sense of identity.3

Although Kennan was a supporter of the policy of détente between the superpowers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it would be wrong to argue that the subsequent history of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union fully bears out the validity of Kennan’s original vision of containment. Certainly, the Soviet Union, as he had predicted, did ‘mellow’ over time, and the dramatic policies followed
by Gorbachev in the late 1980s testify to the inability of the Soviet Union to maintain its competition with the United States on a rapidly shrinking economic base. Yet Kennan takes no pleasure from the ending of the Cold War, which in his view might have occurred many years prior to the late 1980s without the enormous costs of the nuclear arms race. Indeed, the latter is an excellent example of the way in which US foreign policy had been distorted by an irrational fear that the Soviet Union might consider using nuclear weapons as rational means to expand its territory in Europe or engage in some form of nuclear blackmail.

Although the vast bulk of Kennan’s work has been devoted to diplomatic statecraft (or rather its lamentable absence during much of the Cold War), the reader must pore over his memoirs to distil the philosophical outlook that informs Kennan’s views on foreign policy in the twentieth century. Like many classical ‘realists’, Kennan has always harboured a tragic view of the human condition. In his book, *Around the Cragged Hill*, he describes humans as ‘cracked vessels’, doomed to mediate between our animal nature and an almost divine inspiration to escape the contingency of human limitations. It is always a constant struggle to control our more base passions and cultivate civilization. While he would agree with other realists that we cannot avoid the struggle for power that is inextricably linked with human nature, we are not animals, and our capacity for reason and morality obliges us to develop virtues that cannot be guaranteed to manifest themselves in any political system. His concern with democracies such as the United States is that public officials are always tempted to do what is popular, rather than what is right and virtuous. Similarly, in much of his work Kennan is deeply suspicious of free-market capitalism, which thrives on self-interest and greed.

George Kennan will be remembered as one of the most persistent, influential and trenchant critics of US foreign policy in the twentieth century. He has not been without his critics, however. One of the difficulties lies in his constant appeal to the national interest as a guide to foreign policy. He often implies that if only governments followed their long-term interests, as opposed to their short-term passions, order and stability would result. Yet this depends upon some consensus among governments, particularly among the great powers, on the values of maintaining some fair distribution of power among them and therefore the limits that they have to respect in seeking to represent the interests of their citizens. As Michael Smith has pointed out, ‘Kennan never considered whether, or how, the necessary consensus around those values could be built’.4 For those who wish to
build on Kennan’s legacy in the post–Cold War era, this is no less daunting a challenge than it was when Kennan began publishing his work in the 1940s.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 122.

Kennan’s major writings

Russia, the Atom and the West, London, Oxford University Press, 1958.
Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, Boston, Little, Brown, 1961.

See also: Aron, Morgenthau

Further reading

At the end of his autobiographical reflections on his career thus far, Stephen Krasner urges students ‘to resist succumbing to the fashion of the moment and to try to develop a mode of inquiry that does lend itself to some form of empirical validation, even if such validation can never be fully compelling’. These are virtues which Krasner’s work exhibits in abundance. They also explain his stature in the field as a scholar who refuses to follow the conventional wisdom of the day and whose fidelity to the ideals of empirical social science provides a model for others to emulate, even if they may dissent from his arguments. In an era when realism seemed to be under constant criticism from so many quarters, and in a subfield of inquiry with its raison d’être often alleged to be the absence of inquiry into economics by classical realists concerned with military security, Krasner’s work has helped to breathe new life into the realist paradigm. Along with the work of Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin, his contribution to the study of international political economy has helped to entice some liberal scholars (such as Robert Keohane) to present their own work as a modification of structural realism rather than a direct challenge to its core assumptions:
Realism is a theory about *international* politics. It is an effort to explain both the behavior of individual states and the characteristics of the international system as a whole. The ontological reason given for realism is that sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system. Sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system. There is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behavior of states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilize their own resources against external threats.²

In the 1960s and early 1970s, when Krasner was a young graduate student engaged in his doctoral research and later a faculty member of the Department of Political Science at Harvard University, all these assumptions were being questioned. In particular, there was a perception that insofar as these assumptions had ever been correct, international politics was undergoing immense structural change. The United States’ failure to win the Vietnam War, the oil crisis and looming trade problems with Japan occurred at the same time as many observers began to suggest that ‘anarchy’ was being replaced by a phenomenon of ‘complex interdependence’ among states. The traditional agenda of international relations, it was often claimed, was shifting from issues of ‘high politics’ (military security and nuclear deterrence) to what were sometimes regarded as the ‘low politics’ of trade and international finance. It was also a period when the state itself was no longer regarded among foreign policy analysts as a unitary, rational actor. In particular, the work of Graham Allison suggested that this assumption was often an inadequate guide to understanding governmental decision-making in the United States and, by implication, other states as well.³

This was the context in which Krasner, who at the time saw himself as ‘something of a gadfly’ in his own Department at Harvard, wrote his pathbreaking article ‘State power and the structure of international trade’ (1976), which, according to Robert Keohane, ‘defined the agenda [of international political economy in the United States] for years of scholarship’.⁴ Krasner’s argument is an attempt to account for variations in the ‘openness’ of the world economy, focusing on trade as his criterion of openness/closure, and measured in terms of tariff levels between states, trade as a proportion of gross national product, and the degree to which trade is concentrated at a
regional level. An open world economy is one in which tariffs are low, there is a high ratio of trade to national income, and a low regional concentration of trade. Having established his dependent variable, Krasner then examines variations in the distribution of economic power among states over the past 200 years, measured in terms of per capita income, gross national product and shares of world trade and investment. On the basis of his careful analysis of the empirical data, Krasner then makes a number of bold propositions and explains them by appealing to the continuing importance of the realist approach. He argues that periods of openness in the world economy correlate with periods in which one state is clearly predominant. In the nineteenth century it was Great Britain. In the period 1945–60, it was the United States. Consequently, the degree of openness is itself dependent on the distribution of power among states. Economic ‘interdependence’ is subordinate to the political and economic balance of power among states, not the other way round.

Krasner’s explanation for his findings relies on realist assumptions about state interests. A powerful state with a technological advantage over other states will desire an open trading system as it seeks new export markets. Furthermore, large, powerful states are less exposed to the international economy than small ones, so what Krasner called ‘the opportunity costs of closure’ will be lower too. In addition, they are less vulnerable to changes from abroad and can use this power to maintain their access to overseas markets. On the other hand, if power is more evenly distributed among states, they are less likely to support an open trading system. The less economically developed states will try to avoid the political danger of becoming vulnerable to pressure from others, while states whose hegemony may be declining fear a loss of power to their rivals, and find it hard to resist domestic pressures for protection from cheap imports. A crucial factor in Krasner’s argument is his claim that states do not always privilege wealth over other goals. Political power and social stability are also crucial, and this means that, although open trade may well provide absolute gains for all states that engage in it, some states will gain more than others. What is rational for the collective good of states is not necessarily the case for individual states. In his appraisal of Krasner’s argument and its contribution to the evolution of international political economy, Keohane makes the interesting point that it was powerful not only because it subverted the conventional wisdom of liberals, but because it contained flaws and suggested further avenues for research that inspired a whole generation of scholars in the late 1970s and 1980s.
Since the publication of his seminal 1976 article, Krasner has continued to elaborate its arguments and apply them across a range of issues in international political economy. In 1978 he published his first book, *Defending the National Interest*. Here, in contrast to liberals and Marxists, Krasner examines the United States’ policy towards raw material investments abroad during the twentieth century. His core argument is that the state is an autonomous entity that seeks to implement the ‘national interest’ against both domestic and international actors. In particular, he looks at those acts and statements of central decision-makers in the White House and the State Department that aim to improve the general welfare and show a persistent rank-ordering in time. What emerges from this study is that the American national interest in the international commodity markets has three components, ranked in order of increasing importance: stimulating economic competition; ensuring security of supply; and promoting broader foreign policy goals, such as general material interests and ideological objectives. His claim is that while smaller states focus on preserving their territorial and political integrity and their narrow economic interests, only great powers will try to remake the world in their own image. Since 1945, the United States has been such a great power, and the key to its foreign policy is ideology, namely anti-communism. Although this policy has been generally conducive to the growth of multinational corporations based in the United States, it cannot be fully explained merely as the long-term preservation of capitalism. Krasner attacks Marxist structuralists for their failure to explain the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, which caused so much domestic dissent for so little economic gain. On the basis of his analysis of the evidence, Krasner concludes that US decision-makers were often willing to protect the interests of American corporations, but they reserved the large-scale use of force for ideological reasons. This explains the use of force against Vietnam, an area of negligible economic importance to the United States, and the reluctance to use force during the oil crises of the 1970s, which threatened the oil supply to the entire capitalist world.

In a recent defence of the book’s argument, Krasner makes it clear that the main focus of *Defending the National Interest* was not a direct defence of realism and its portrayal of the international system, but rather ‘an effort to demonstrate the empirical plausibility of an important realist assertion: namely, that states could be treated as unified rational actors’. The national interest is a term that has been used very vaguely both by defenders of realism as well as its critics. For Krasner, it refers to ‘an empirically validated set of transitively
ordered objectives that did not disproportionately benefit any particular group in a society'.6 The normative implications of Krasner’s book, insofar as there were any, were that statism is not only consistent with realism, but something to be welcomed because it frustrates the ability of populist, economically privileged or other self-serving groups from capturing the state and shaping its policies for their own ends.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Krasner turned his analytical and theoretical skills back to the debate that was in part inspired by his 1976 article. As already noted, many of those who argued that interdependence was eroding the ‘anarchy’ of the states modified their position in light of Krasner’s arguments. But he himself had noted that there was not a perfect fit between periods of hegemony and open trade in the world economy. Significantly, there were important gaps in the causal argument and some empirical anomalies. As Keohane points out, ‘[t]he anomalies – Britain’s support of openness after 1900, the failure of the United States to exercise leadership after 1919, and arguably…U.S. support of openness after 1960 – practically leap off the page’.7

Of course, Keohane himself has done a great deal of research into such anomalies. During the early 1980s, he and a number of other scholars were responsible for popularizing the idea of ‘regimes’ as intervening variables between state power on the one hand, and international outcomes on the other. Regimes are principles and rules that regulate the interaction of states and other actors across a range of issue-areas, and they impart a degree of ‘governance’ to the international system. Krasner’s contribution to the debate on regimes, particularly regarding their capacity to transform state interests and maintain co-operation despite changes in the balance of power, is contained in his provocative book Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (1985).

In this book, Krasner argues that small, poor states in the South tend to support those regimes that allocate resources authoritatively, while the richer states in the North will favour those regimes with principles and rules that give priority to market mechanisms. By ‘authoritative’ regimes, Krasner refers to principles, rules and procedures that increase the sovereign powers of individual states, or that give states acting together the right to regulate international flows (such as migration or radio signals) or allocate access to international resources (such as the ocean seabed). In part, the reasons for this difference are straightforward. Third World states try to protect themselves against the operation of markets in which they are at a disadvantage. Transportation is a good example. The Third World has
supported the persistence of an authoritative regime governing civil aviation against pressure from the United States to move towards a more market-oriented regime. As a result, Third World states enjoy ‘a market share that is more or less proportional to their share of world airline passengers’. In shipping, however, the Third World has not been able to modify significantly the existing market-oriented regime. Consequently, most states in the Third World have a disproportionately low share of world shipping (often less than one-tenth) compared with their share of world cargo.

Krasner’s explanation for this marked difference of preferences goes far beyond conventional economics, however. As in all his previous work, he rejects the assumption that states pursue merely wealth, and he argues that Third World states are also involved in a struggle for power. They want to reduce their vulnerability to the market by exerting greater state control over it. In this endeavour, poorer states are able to use the power of the principle of state sovereignty, according to which all states are equal in a formal, legal sense. Sovereignty provides Third World states with a form of ‘metapower’, that of a coherent ideology to attack the legitimacy of international market regimes and the inequities of global capitalism. Krasner argues that the Third World’s challenge to global liberalism is really an attack on the rules of the game, rather than a direct response to economic poverty. For example, he produces evidence to show that poorer countries are collectively better off economically than they were in the past, and that their calls for a New International Economic Order came at a time when their growth and income were at a postwar high. Furthermore, his argument is strengthened by the support of many Third World states for authoritative regimes that conform to the principle of sovereignty, but which are also not in the economic interests of individual Third World states. For example, Third World states supported OPEC oil price rises in the 1970s, despite their devastating effects on the budgets of those that imported oil.

The upshot of Krasner’s realist analysis is that the attempt to establish regimes as a means of overcoming, or even attenuating, the effects of anarchy is not likely to work. The existence of universal regimes cannot disguise the inequalities of power in international relations, nor can such regimes modify the importance of state sovereignty. Rather, they provide a structural setting in which clashes between North and South are inevitable. Moreover, any clash between the rich and poor states is likely to be resolved in favour of the former. Thus, the ‘success’ of UNESCO in adopting an anti-liberal international information policy was followed by the withdrawal of the United
States and its financial support from the organization. Also, the United States simply refused to sign drafts of the Law of the Sea Treaty that included authoritative mechanisms to regulate deep-sea mining. Krasner is somewhat pessimistic about the ability of regimes to moderate conflicts of interest between North and South, but his work on this issue is a necessary corrective to more benign evaluations that ignore the continuing importance of sovereignty in world politics.

Since 1981, Stephen Krasner has worked at Stanford University as Graham A. Stuart Professor of International Relations. He was the editor of the journal *International Organization* between 1987 and 1992, and is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In the 1990s, Krasner has continued to publish important work on the nature of state sovereignty and changes in the global political economy, testifying to the continuing relevance of realist insights into international relations at the end of the twentieth century. Unlike those who are content to give their allegiance to theoretical approaches on ideological or personal grounds, Krasner is committed to the use of evidence to support his claims, and thereby ‘to discipline power with truth’. His work is a good example of how to avoid two academic vices: the manipulation of data in the absence of any larger theoretical context, and the temptation to dwell in the realm of meta-theory without relating it to the empirical world.

**Notes**

Krasner’s major writings

‘Are bureaucracies important? (or Allison wonderland)’, Foreign Policy 7 (1972), pp. 159–79.


See also: Gilpin, Keohane, Waltz
Further reading


HANS MORGENTHAU

Hans Morgenthau, who died in 1980 at the age of 76, has been dubbed ‘the Pope’ of international relations. He is certainly the best-known, even though he often claimed to be the least understood, of the classical realist thinkers in the twentieth century. Along with E.H. Carr and George Kennan, Morgenthau is best remembered as one who tried to develop a comprehensive theory of ‘power politics’ on the philosophical basis of realist principles of human nature, the essence of politics, the balance of power and the role of ethics in foreign policy. As a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, he sought to educate Americans in these principles so that the United States could learn how to conduct its foreign policy as an active, great power in the international system. Like Kennan, in the 1950s he acknowledged that he had failed to shape US foreign policy to any great extent. But his influence on the study of international relations, notwithstanding the vehemence with which his arguments have often been criticized, has been greater than that of any other ‘key thinker’ covered in this book.

Morgenthau was born in 1904 in Germany. As an only child of a somewhat authoritarian father, he was a shy and introverted boy who also had to cope with growing anti-Semitism and discrimination at school. Not surprisingly, he found solace in books and enjoyed reading history as well as philosophy and literature. In the 1920s, he studied at the Universities of Frankfurt and Munich, specializing in law and diplomacy. It was during this period that he discovered and devoured the work of Max Weber, who became both a personal as well as an intellectual role model. In particular, he admired Weber’s juxtaposition of rigorous detached scholarship with impassioned social and political activism, a combination that he sought to emulate throughout his life. In the early 1930s, Morgenthau taught public law at the University of Geneva. He also worked in Spain before fleeing Europe for the United States as Hitler consolidated his power in Germany.
He arrived in the United States in 1937 and managed to find academic work despite the anti-Semitism confronting many Jews in academia at the time. Although he taught for short periods at Brooklyn College (1937–39) and at the University of Kansas City (1939–43), his academic career was spent mostly at the University of Chicago (1943–71) and, after his retirement, at the City College of New York (1968–75) and the New School for Social Research in New York (1975–80). Although he worked for short periods for the government (as a consultant to the policy planning staff in the State Department in the late 1940s, and again in the early 1960s as an adviser to the Pentagon), he devoted most of his working life to writing and teaching. In addition to his theoretical work, Morgenthau was a prolific contributor to popular journals and magazines. Indeed, he published no fewer than four separate volumes of collected articles in his lifetime.

As a theorist, Morgenthau made his reputation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. His first book, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (1946), represents his most systematic exposition of a realist philosophy and constitutes an incisive critique of what he called ‘rational liberalism’. In contrast to what he claims is the dominant liberal belief in progress, based on an optimistic set of assumptions regarding human nature, Morgenthau asserts the more traditional metaphysical and religious conception of ‘fallen man’. All politics is a struggle for power because what he calls ‘political man’ is an innately selfish creature with an insatiable urge to dominate others. Human nature has three dimensions: biological, rational and spiritual. Although Morgenthau acknowledges that all three combine to determine human behaviour in different contexts, he focuses on the ‘will-to-power’ as the defining characteristic of politics, distinguishing it from economics (the rational pursuit of wealth) and religion (the spiritual realm of morality). Since the defining character of politics is the use of power to dominate others, morality and reason are subordinate virtues in politics, mere instruments for attaining and justifying power.

Morgenthau’s basis for positing international politics as a realm of continuity and necessity invokes a contextual dimension to political autonomy in addition to its substantive elements, thus revealing as naive the possibility of domesticating international politics via disarmament or the establishment of international parliamentary bodies. Within the territorial boundaries of the state, the struggle for power is mitigated through pluralistic loyalties, constitutional arrangements and culturally relative ‘rules of the game’. These both disguise and direct
the struggle for power towards competing conceptions of the good life. The legitimated coercive power of the state, combined with a network of social norms and community bonds, distinguishes domestic politics as an arena of potential progress. In contrast, all these factors are much weaker internationally. Here not only is the ‘will-to-power’ allowed virtually free rein, but it is accentuated by the multiplicity of states, whose individual sovereignty elevates each as the secular pinnacle of political and moral authority. Consequently,

[continuity in foreign policy is not a matter of choice but a necessity; for it derives from [factors] which no government is able to control but which it can neglect only at the risk of failure...the question of war and peace is decided in consideration of these permanent factors, regardless of the form of government...and its domestic policies. Nations are ‘peace-loving’ under certain conditions and are warlike under others.]

For Morgenthau, the function of international theory is to discover these conditions and, on the basis of an intensive examination of history, to examine patterns of continuity and change in them. His massive textbook Politics Among Nations, first published in 1948, remains the most systematic attempt to employ ‘realist’ principles in constructing an empirical theory of international politics. Such a theory is made possible by both the role of power in delimiting the scope and nature of the field of study, and the recurrent patterns of activity among states that the struggle for power produces throughout history. Furthermore, although Morgenthau claimed that his theory was applicable to all states, he focused directly on the most powerful of them, arguing that only the great powers determine the character of international politics at any one period of history.

On the basis of his interpretation of the historical evidence, Morgenthau argues that all foreign policies tend to conform to, and reflect, one of three patterns of activity: maintaining the balance of power, imperialism and what he calls the politics of prestige (impressing other states with the extent of one’s power). He outlines the conditions that determine which policy will be pursued, the proximate goals they are aimed at, the methods employed to achieve them, and the appropriate policies to counteract them. While he never discovers any firm ‘laws’ of the balance of power, the latter serves as a key organizing device in which he examines the difficulties of measuring power and the relative stability of various configurations of power. Although some kind of ‘balance’ is, in the long run,
inevitable in the anarchical system, its stability is a function of the ability and willingness of statesmen accurately to assess its character and then to work within the constraints that it imposes on their freedom of action abroad. This is particularly important in the post-1945 system, the stability of which is threatened by historical changes that have made the uniquely new ‘bipolar’ structure much more difficult to manage. Morgenthau highlights four changes in particular.

First, he argues that the number of great powers has declined since the eighteenth century. In the past, when peace depended on a stable balance among five or six great powers in Europe, the loose alliance structure among them induced caution and prudence in the foreign policy of each. The bipolarity of the second half of the twentieth century had robbed diplomacy of a necessary flexibility, and it resembled a zero-sum game in which marginal shifts in power could lead to war. Second, there was no great power to act as a buffer between the superpowers, and Morgenthau argued that this had been a key ingredient of European politics in the past when Britain could act as a neutral ‘arbiter’ in continental conflicts. Third, in the era of decolonization, territorial compensation was no longer available to maintain the central balance. In the past, the territorial division and distribution of colonies and lesser powers in Europe (such as Poland) had been an important technique for negotiating concessions in European diplomacy. Finally, the application of new technologies of transport, communication and war had transformed the twentieth century into an era of what Morgenthau called ‘total mechanisation, total war, and total domination’.2 In short, Morgenthau was very pessimistic about the capacities of the USA and the Soviet Union to maintain international peace.

Although the struggle for power was kept within barely tolerable limits by the mutual deterrence provided by nuclear weapons, he had no faith in their ability to maintain the peace. Since weapons were not the source of instability in the Cold War, neither could they be a cure. At the same time, Morgenthau had little faith in any liberal, or ‘idealist’, reforms of the international system. He devoted long chapters to the futility of international law, public opinion, disarmament and the United Nations. Given his metaphysical beliefs regarding human nature and the centrality of power, he condemned all attempts either to avoid the roots of the problem or to discover answers outside the existing framework of the states system. Such attempts were worse than useless – ultimately their failure led to cynicism and despair.
Morgenthau himself avoided such despair by suggesting that, despite the difficulties, there was still some scope for statesmen to moderate the instabilities inherent in contemporary international politics. However, the USA would have to learn to rid itself of some deep-seated illusions about international politics. Morgenthau’s third major book, *In Defence of the National Interest* (1951), is a sustained critique of what he described as ‘certain deeply ingrained habits of thought, and preconceptions as to the nature of foreign policy’ in the United States.\(^3\) He believed that American foreign policy was continually plagued by four main flaws (legalism, utopianism, sentimentalism and isolationism) that arise from the fortuitous geographical, historical and diplomatic separation of the USA from the European balance of power. If the USA were to play a constructive role in stabilizing the new balance of power after 1945, it would have to rid itself of these preconceptions and engage in a sober analysis of the new balance of power and the concomitant requirement to promote the national interest. In particular, Morgenthau was eager to demolish the ‘moralistic’ assumptions that he argued had characterized the diplomacy of Woodrow Wilson after the First World War. Instead, he urged a return to the ‘realistic’ diplomacy of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton in the eighteenth century, when the USA recognized and acted on behalf of the national interest—to prevent France or Britain from establishing sufficient power in Europe to threaten the security of the USA.

Stanley Hoffmann has written that Morgenthau ‘provided both an explanation [of international politics] and a road map’ for the conduct of American foreign policy.\(^4\) However, in seeking to unite the realm of theory with that of policy, it must be said that Morgenthau did not succeed in his ambitious attempt. While he is a key figure in helping to establish ‘realism’ as a dominant ‘paradigm’ in the study of international relations, the links between theory and policy have moved in the opposite direction; meanwhile Morgenthau himself, like George Kennan, became increasingly disenchanted with the conduct of American policy during the Cold War. Although the reasons for this failure cannot be entirely attributed to flaws in Morgenthau’s approach, neither can those flaws be overlooked.

Morgenthau’s international theory, while it remains impressive in terms of its historical reach, is beset by a number of tensions and contradictions that Morgenthau never succeeded in resolving. Three in particular are worth noting.

First, he never clearly distinguished between power as an end in itself and power as a means to achieve an end. On the one hand,
Morgenthau’s ‘second principle’ of political realism, in addition to other remarks in *Politics Among Nations*, affirms that ‘statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out’. On the other hand, his distinction between status quo and imperial states presupposes that the degree to which international politics is a struggle for power is dependent on the (in) compatibility of state interests. The struggle for power is not therefore a given, but is variable. Whether or not, and to what extent and under what conditions, states seek power then becomes a matter of empirical and historical study to discover the determinants of state interests. As John Vasquez points out, ‘power politics is not so much an explanation as a description of one type of behaviour found in the global political system [which] itself must be explained; it does not explain’.

Second, as Kenneth Waltz and others have pointed out, there is an important ‘level-of-analysis’ problem in Morgenthau’s work. It is never clear whether his pessimism about the nature of international politics derives from his metaphysical assumptions about ‘human nature’ or the anarchical nature of the international system per se. Insofar as human nature is the source of power politics among states, this is to commit the ecological fallacy in reverse – the analysis of individual behaviour used uncritically to explain group behaviour. As Waltz points out, one cannot explain both war and peace by arguing that humans are wicked. Insofar as the context of international politics is deemed to be the source of power politics, this presupposes what Morgenthau is often at pains to refute, namely that the international system has been characterized by change as well as continuity, and that the key change is from a relatively stable Eurocentric system to a global system, the central players in which cannot agree on the rules of the game. Finally, there is a real tension between Morgenthau’s commitment to theory as a description of reality and as an instrument of advocacy for American foreign policy. In addition to claiming that *Politics Among Nations* contained an empirical theory to be tested against ‘the facts’ and the ‘evidence of history’, Morgenthau was fond of invoking the metaphors of a painted portrait and a photograph to illustrate the relationship between theory and practice.

Political realism wants the photographic picture of the political world to resemble as much as possible its painted portrait. Aware of the inevitable gap between good – that is, rational – foreign policy and foreign policy as it actually is, political realism maintains not only that theory must focus upon the rational elements of political reality, but also that foreign policy ought to be rational.
The problem with trying to unite theory and practice on the basis of a somewhat dogmatic and determinist theory of the balance of power was one of inconsistency. Insofar as the theory is empirical, its claims to truth require that its key propositions be tested against the evidence. But this was rather difficult to do since Morgenthau was reluctant to operationalize his key variable of power so that it could be measured in any quantitative sense. More importantly, insofar as his critique of American foreign policy presupposed that it had failed to act in accordance with the requirements of ‘the national interest’, this undermined Morgenthau’s claims that international politics was not a realm of choice and contingency, but one of necessity and determinism. If international politics is indeed governed by ‘objective laws rooted in human nature’, which apply regardless of historical change and their recognition by those whose behaviour they explain, it should not matter whether statesmen recognize these laws or not. On the other hand, if their application depends on their prior recognition and conscious embodiment in ‘rational’ policy-making, they are not objective empirical ‘laws’ at all, and therefore cannot be invoked as part of a metatheoretical deus ex machina determining either state behaviour or patterns of activity arising from such behaviour.

From the 1950s onwards, while Morgenthau continued to publish successive editions of his magnum opus, he turned his attention away from theory to focus on American foreign policy and relations with the Soviet Union. Like Kennan, he became disenchanted with American foreign policy in the 1960s, particularly its involvement in Vietnam, which he courageously opposed on the classic principle of diplomacy that statesmen should never commit themselves or the prestige of their country to positions from which they cannot retreat without damaging their credibility, or advance without risking a direct clash with other great powers. In light of the generality of his theory, and its ambiguity regarding the nature of power in international politics, his views on the nature of the Soviet Union were not consistent, but he was acutely aware of the limits of American diplomacy in an era of decolonization, and his articles on the limits of nuclear weapons in foreign policy are among the best on the subject.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 383.

**Morgenthau’s major writings**

*Politics in the Twentieth Century* (three volumes), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962.

See also: *Carr, Herz, Kennan*

**Further reading**

Kenneth Waltz was born in 1924. He completed his MA at Columbia University in 1950, and in 1954 he finished his doctorate, which was published that year to great acclaim. *Man, The State, and War* was not only a superb exercise in the history of ideas on the causes of war between states – it also contained the germs of an idea that Waltz only fully developed a quarter of a century later. At one level his first book is simply an attempt to examine systematically the answers given by philosophers, statesmen, historians and political scientists to the fundamental question, what is the cause of war? He argued that they could be classified as either optimists or pessimists whose answers could be located among three levels of analysis or ‘images’. These were human nature, the domestic economic and political systems of states, and the anarchical environment in which all states coexist without a supreme power authoritatively to arbitrate conflicts between them. Waltz argued that it was necessary to be aware of the interaction between these images and not to exaggerate the importance of any one of them.
The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.¹

Over the next 25 years, Waltz wrestled with the problem of how to evaluate the empirical relationship between the images he had identified in his first book. He became a full professor at the age of 33 and was appointed Ford Professor of Political Science at Berkeley in 1971, having taught at Harvard and Brandeis in the intervening years. He contributed important articles on the merits of bipolar versus multipolar balances of power among the great powers, and in 1967 published a book comparing the foreign policies of the United States and Britain in light of their different political systems.

In 1979, on the eve of the election of Ronald Reagan and just as détente between the superpowers was giving way to a new (and as it turned out, terminal) phase of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, Waltz published the book that has been described as ‘the single most widely read contribution to neorealism, establishing [Waltz] as the paradigmatic successor to Morgenthau’.² Theory of International Politics is a key text in the field. There are several reasons for this success.

First, although its timing was in some respects accidental, the coincidence between its publication and the onset of a new Cold War ensured that its main argument would be particularly controversial. Waltz’s defence of the continued domination of the superpowers as the best guarantor of order and stability in world politics was put forward at a time when many believed that a nuclear war could break out in Europe as a result of the nuclear arms race. Second, unlike the early postwar realists (such as Carr or Morgenthau), Waltz claimed that he had achieved the equivalent of a ‘Copernican revolution’ in the study of world politics by finally unravelling the level-of-analysis problem that he had revealed in the 1950s. Third, Waltz claimed that Theory was the first scientifically defensible theory of the balance of power in international relations. In marked contrast to all those scholars who were arguing that international relations was undergoing a radical transformation as a result of growing interdependence in the international economy as well as the limitations of force in the nuclear age, Kenneth Waltz reaffirmed the salience of the state as the main actor in international politics and castigated his opponents’ arguments as reductionist and non-falsifiable. During the so-called inter-paradigm
debate that dominated international relations in the 1980s, Waltz was a key figure, and his book continues to be a critical reference point for supporters and opponents of neorealism in international relations.

The argument of Theory is both a continuation of some of the ideas first presented in Man, The State, and War, as well as a repudiation of the latter’s conclusions. Rather than exploring the interrelationship between the levels of analysis that he had identified in his earlier work, Waltz focuses on the autonomy and influence of the structural component of the international system. This third level influences state behaviour, and hence outcomes such as the incidence of war, by constraining states from certain policies and predisposing them towards others. He defines the international political structure by two criteria. The first is a principle of arrangement by which states relate to one another. The interstate system is a self-help, or anarchical, one. This principle, he argues, is constant over time, and severely constrains the degree to which a division of labour can take place between states. They are, as Waltz puts it, functionally undifferentiated. Multiple sovereignty therefore limits the scope for interdependence among states. While anarchy is a constant, the second criterion of the structure, the distribution of capabilities, varies among states. States are similar in the tasks they face, although not in their abilities to perform them. The empirical referent for this latter variable is the number of great powers that dominate the system. Given the small number of such states, and Waltz suggests that no more than eight have ever been consequential, international politics ‘can be studied in terms of the logic of small number systems’.3 He argues that this logic can be understood without making any untestable and vague assumptions about whether and to what extent states seek to pursue power. ‘[B]alance-of-power politics prevail whenever two, and only two, conditions are met: that the order be anarchic, and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.’4

Having isolated the structure, Waltz then argues that a bipolar structure dominated by two great powers is more stable than a multipolar structure dominated by three or more great powers. It is more likely to endure without system-wide wars. Again, in contrast to earlier realists who were concerned about the ideological confrontation of the superpowers in a nuclear era, Waltz claims that there are striking differences between multipolarity and bipolarity in terms of strategic behaviour. Under multipolarity, states rely on alliances to maintain their security. This is inherently unstable, since ‘there are too many powers to permit any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries’. In contrast, the inequality between
the superpowers and every other state ensures that the threat to each is easier to identify, and both the Soviet Union and the United States maintain the central balance by relying on their own devices rather than allies. The dangers of miscalculation and defection are thereby minimized. Nuclear deterrence, and the inability of either superpower to overcome the retaliatory forces of the other, enhances the stability of the system. In the terms laid down by his earlier work, by the late 1970s Waltz had finally identified himself as a third image optimist.

For over a decade since its publication, Theory and its author were at the heart of an intense and sometimes vitriolic debate in international relations. Some scholars praised Waltz for having overturned the liberal belief that international relations was undergoing structural change and for having provided the most systematic attempt yet to articulate a testable theory of the balance of power. At the other extreme, he was accused of legitimating ‘an authoritarian project of global proportions’.

Among those who admired the rigour of Waltz’s book, the debate revolved around his attempt to isolate the nature and effects of the structure of the international system, the degree to which his substantive conclusions were consistent with his premises, and the relationship between change and continuity in the international system.

The first issue is the degree to which Waltz succeeds in isolating the structure as a cause of state behaviour. He argues that it functions rather like the human liver, or a progressive income tax system working its effects by socialization and competition among states. Waltz admits that he was inspired by Durkheim as well as sociological studies of crowd behaviour, but the extent to which the structure functions independently of states’ perception of the balance of power is not clear. Attention has also been drawn to the inconsistencies between Waltz’s substantive arguments on the merits of bipolarity in the 1970s and his theory of the balance of power. Some of his critics have argued that the ‘stability’ of the Cold War had much more to do with nuclear weapons (a ‘unit level’ phenomenon) than bipolarity. Just because the superpowers were more powerful than other states in the system did not mean that they were equally as powerful as each other and had become successfully ‘socialized’ to the prevailing structure. Again, the explanatory and predictive power of Waltz’s theory was compromised by the difficulty of separating levels of analysis and determining the content of each. Finally, a number of critics have argued that Waltz’s model is too static and deterministic. It lacks any dimension of structural change. States are condemned to reproduce the logic of anarchy and any co-operation that takes place.
between them is subordinate to the distribution of power. Waltz’s assumption regarding the nature of states has been hotly contested by neoliberals, who believe that it exaggerates the degree to which states are obsessed with the distribution of power and ignores the collective benefits to be achieved via co-operation.

Rather than seeking to amend or reconstruct Waltz’s theory to deal with some of its alleged shortcomings, others have regarded *Theory* with much more suspicion as a scarcely disguised attempt to legitimate the Cold War under the mantle of science. Much of the book is concerned with problems of theory construction, the relationship between laws of behaviour and theories that explain those laws, and how to test a theory so that it conforms to proper behavioural scientific standards. For Waltz, a theory is an instrument to explain patterns of state behaviour within a circumscribed realm of human activity. Although explanation is a necessary precondition for successful purposeful action, theoretical inquiry is a politically value-free activity. Given his rigid distinction between international political theory and foreign policy analysis, the former cannot evaluate and prescribe for the latter. ‘The problem is not to say how to manage the world, but to say how the possibility that great powers will constructively manage international affairs varies as systems change.’7 Ironically, the system has changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of one pole of the structure, the Soviet Union. This dramatic turn of events was not consistent with the expectations of *Theory*, according to which the superpowers were maturing into ‘sensible duopolists’ at the head of an increasingly stable structure.

Since the end of the Cold War, Waltz has turned his attention to the consequences of what he sees as a shift from bipolarity to unipolarity. As one might expect, his recent work reflects some of the concerns he articulated in the 1960s regarding the undesirable consequences that flow from an imbalance of power. In particular, he argues that in the absence of effective countervailing pressures, the United States is likely to become increasingly unilateral in seeking to secure its foreign policy interests, and in so doing to rely on its military preponderance to secure any vision of a new world order. In this context, he is remarkably sanguine about the consequences of nuclear proliferation in international politics. In the early 1980s, he had argued that nuclear deterrence was a force for stability in world affairs, inducing states to pursue their goals without risking all-out nuclear conflict. He still holds to that argument, believing that the ‘managed spread’ of nuclear weapons may succeed in replicating the merits of nuclear deterrence in a multipolar world, and counteracting its
inherent dangers. This argument, however, assumes that the complex
dynamics of the nuclear relationship between the superpowers can be
unproblematically duplicated. Waltz has not responded to his more
radical critics for whom Theory is a testimony to the impoverishment
of international relations theory in a neorealist, positivist mode.

Notes

1. Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War, New York, Columbia
   University Press, 1959, p. 238.
   Groom (eds), International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory,
3. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Massachusetts,
   Addison–Wesley, 1979, p. 131.
4. Ibid., p. 121.
5. Ibid., p. 168.

Waltz’s major writings

‘Political philosophy and the study of international relations’, in William Fox
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Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967.
‘The spread of nuclear weapons: more may be better’, Adelphi Paper 171,
‘The origins of war in neorealist theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18
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‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International Security 18
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See also: Gilpin, Keohane, Morgenthau, Wendt

Further reading

Buzan, B., Jones, C. and Little, R., The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to


LIBERALISM

In contrast to realists, liberals see international relations as a potential realm of progress and purposive change. They value individual freedom above all else, and they believe that the state ought to be constrained from acting in ways that undermine that freedom. Domestically, the power of the liberal constitutional state is limited by its democratic accountability to its citizens, the need to respect the demands of the economic marketplace and the rule of law. Liberals believe that, despite the difficulties of replicating these constraints at the international level, they must be established to promote stability among, as well as within, sovereign states. Among the key thinkers included in this section, there are differences of emphasis between the priority to be given to co-operation and the international legal regulation of security and economic issue-areas. Karl Deutsch is responsible for the term ‘security community’ to describe the framework of relations among states in particular regions. Keohane is the most well known proponent of neoliberalism, which focuses on the rational utility of states, or why states seek to maximize their interests, and the functional properties of state co-operation. His primary aim, in short, is to show the conditions that facilitate co-operation. As his prominence in the discipline suggests, liberalism has provided an opportunity for contemporary liberals to assess the legacy of their intellectual tradition and its relevance at the end of the twentieth century. However, although some contemporary trends may appear to vindicate the insights of the ‘idealists’, liberalism must respond to new challenges as the forces of global capitalism undermine the apparent ‘victory’ of liberal democracy in the Cold War.
KARL W. DEUTSCH

Karl Deutsch was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1912. He was raised there and went to school at the German Staatsrealgymnasium, where he graduated with high honours. In 1934, he took his first degree at the Deutsche Universitat in Prague, but his graduate work was interrupted by his student activism against Nazi groups in the university. Eventually, he received his doctorate in law from the Czech-national Charles University in 1938. In the same year, he married and went on holiday to the United States. Although he did not intend to stay there long, after the Munich agreement he thought it wise not to return, and settled in the United States as a resident. His hatred of fascism and an enduring fascination with nationalist intolerance were to influence much of his later academic work.

In 1939, Deutsch received a student-funded scholarship for refugees from Nazism, and he enrolled for more graduate study at Harvard University. After playing a major role in the war years as an advocate of the Free Czechoslovak movement and also as a member of the International Secretariat of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 (that established the United Nations as successor to the League of Nations), he began teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In 1951, Deutsch’s doctoral dissertation, entitled Nationalism and Social Communication, was awarded Harvard’s prestigious Sumner Prize, and it was published two years later to great acclaim. He became Professor of History at MIT in 1952 and embarked on a long career devoted mainly to the study of political integration. At the Center for Research on World Political Institutions, he co-operated with a number of colleagues in an interdisciplinary, collaborative project, which led to the publication of Political Community and the North Atlantic Area in 1957. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1955, and taught at the University of Chicago as a visiting professor. In 1958, Deutsch was appointed Professor of Political Science at Yale University. There he completed (with Lewis J. Edinger) Germany Rejoins the Powers. This work used data on public opinion, the background of elites and economics to study the postwar progress of the Federal Republic. While at Yale, Deutsch was also very active in setting up the Yale Political Data Program to develop quantitative indicators to test theories and propositions in political science. In addition, he organized the Yale Arms Control Project to examine disarmament and arms control.

In 1967, Deutsch returned to Harvard University as Stanfield Professor of International Peace, where he remained until his death in
1993. While Harvard was his base, he also taught widely in the United States and Europe, particularly in France and Germany. The political scientist Samuel Beer remembered him as follows:

He was a reformer, but not a utopian. He did not jump to conclusions. His soaring ambitions for humanity were disciplined by an abiding sense of the difficulties of social engineering. His idealism was joined with his commitment to science in general and social science in particular. His work was concerned not only with the ends to be pursued, but also especially with the means, the institutional and practical means, of approaching those ends. Ardent internationalist though he was, he did not delude himself into thinking there was such a thing as the ‘body politic’ of mankind.¹

Deutsch is perhaps best known for his work on the social prerequisites and dynamics of nationalism and regional integration, as well as his rigorous application of behavioural methods to study processes of social mobilization at the domestic and international levels. Social mobilization refers to a process of change which affects substantial parts of the population in countries that are undergoing rapid modernization. He was concerned to develop empirical quantitative indicators of such change, so that propositions regarding its political consequences could be tested for their validity across time and space.² He proposed a model of nationalism based on the idea that it was fuelled by the need for the state to manage processes of mobilization that were, by definition, quite traumatic for citizens who were both uprooted from old settings, habits and commitments, and mobilized into new patterns of group membership and organizational behaviour.

Social mobilization, when it emerges on a large scale, tends to politicize increasing numbers of citizens and increases the range of human needs that the state must respond to. For example, people need provisions for housing and employment, for social security, medical care and insurance against unpredictable changes in employment patterns. For poorer countries undergoing massive change, governments based on traditional sources of authority and legitimation were unable to ‘steer’ the process successfully. Deutsch believed that only strong, modern nation-states could do so:

[The nation-state] offers most of its members a stronger sense of security, belonging or affiliation, and even personal identity, than does any alternative large group. [The] greater the need of the
people for such affiliation and identity under the strains and shocks of social mobilization and alienation from earlier familiar environments, the greater becomes the potential power of the nation-state to channel both their longings and resentments and to direct their love and hate.³

Deutsch also studied the international conditions that might affect whether a state would channel its citizens’ energies towards the outside world. In this context, he was a pioneer in the study of regional integration, and he introduced greater complexity into the usually sharp dichotomy between hierarchical authority relations at the domestic level and anarchical struggles for power and security at the international level. Whereas this realist image suggests that the solution to the problem of war in international relations is some form of world government, Deutsch undermined the conventional wisdom on the basis of his examination of relations among states in the North Atlantic area in the 1950s and 1960s.

He made a clear distinction between amalgamation and integration. An amalgamated community has one supreme decision-making centre, but it does not follow that its opposite is mere anarchy. Deutsch pointed out that it is possible to have a number of legally sovereign states that relate to each other in the form of a ‘pluralistic security community’ and that are confident that the chances of force being used to resolve conflicts between them are extremely low. In other words, they are sufficiently ‘integrated’ to resemble an amalgamated security community without the need to transfer sovereignty to a supranational level. He argued that the anarchy/hierarchy distinction should not be thought of as a dichotomy, but rather as a spectrum. ‘Integration and amalgamation overlap, but not completely…there can be amalgamation without integration [i.e. civil war], and…integration without amalgamation [i.e. international peace].’⁴ Thus, rather than attempting to impose amalgamation at the international level as the preferred route to peace, he suggested that it might be better to seek the establishment of ‘pluralistic security communities’.

Of crucial significance to this project is Deutsch’s idea of the ‘transaction–integration balance’. The growth of transactions among people does not automatically lead to greater integration. Consistent with his earlier work on social mobilization, Deutsch pointed out that ‘it is the volume of transactions, political, cultural, or economic, which throws a burden upon the institutions for peaceful adjustment or change among the participating populations’. As the volume of
mutual transactions increases, the opportunities for violent conflict also increase. Thus, a crucial concern in the quest for peace is ‘the race between the growing rate of transactions among populations in particular areas and the growth of integrative institutions and practices among them’. Sovereign governments may have integrative capabilities, but they are also the source of political and other transactions that may be disintegrative. So amalgamation can in fact hamper integration, and amalgamated control may itself be a danger to peace and a cause of conflict.\(^5\)

Within a regional context, the term ‘security community’ has two specific meanings. In the first instance, the community of states is able to intervene through diplomatic techniques or mechanisms to prevent a forcible settlement of conflicts among its own members. The second requirement is the ability of the community to present a common military front collectively against an external actor or set of actors. There are also several fundamental assumptions or criteria that are relevant to the emergence of a security community. For example, whatever regional organization exists, it must possess sufficient institutional maturity to generate the diplomatic techniques deployed to diffuse problems and crises. Furthermore, such maturity must have been accompanied by the mutual willingness among member states to resolve their differences at the organizational level. Indeed, mutually benign expectations of member states must be clearly matched by a discernible pattern of interaction or reciprocity. And finally, states in a security community must have a common perception of threat regarding external actors.\(^6\)

Arend Lijphart claims that Deutsch’s work represents a major challenge to the traditional realist image of international relations, undermining its core assumptions of states as unified rational actors in world affairs, and questioning the idea that international relations are best understood in terms of the sharp dichotomy between domestic and international relations.\(^7\) He believes that Deutsch was part of a ‘Grotian’ revival in the discipline, one that saw anarchy not as an independent variable, but as a possible outcome in a complex system that itself needs to be carefully studied to determine the conditions under which war is most likely to occur.

Deutsch was a pioneer of the study of cybernetics in international relations, which focuses on communication and control in political systems. His book *The Nerves of Government* (1966) was an attempt to describe the conditions under which decision-making systems were able to ‘steer’ flows of information, and he also provided a theoretical basis on which to measure the ratio between internal and external
communication as an indicator of the degree to which states were prone to self-closure and self-preoccupation.

As part of his substantive contribution to the development of international theory, Deutsch has to be acknowledged as a firm supporter of the ‘behavioural’ revolution in the discipline that caused so much debate in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in Britain. He was always concerned to substitute quantitative data for vague hypotheses based on historical or ideological interpretation, and part of his contribution to the discipline lay in the establishment of complex data banks to promote empirical theory in comparative politics and international relations. He played a major role in establishing the Yale Political Data Program to develop quantitative indicators that could help test significant propositions and theories in social science. Deutsch firmly believed that to develop the study of international relations as a scientific enterprise, students would have to access aggregate data and be able to employ sophisticated mathematical analysis in order to generate valid propositions that could be replicated by others in the field.

A good example of the use of such analysis can be found in his article (co-authored by J. David Singer) on balance-of-power systems in world politics. Here he employed sophisticated mathematical techniques to help determine the stability of international systems composed of varying numbers of great powers, and concluded that a multipolar system composed of at least five great powers was historically more stable than those that contained fewer great powers but were prone to structural instability. This is because, on the basis of chance alone, a four-to-one coalition rather than a three-to-two coalition is likely to occur at some point, and such overwhelming strength in one coalition of great powers is likely to lead to the destruction of the system. The analysis explicitly modelled the impact of arms races upon the stability of the international system, and is a good illustration of the benefits of quantitative data when used by scholars who are also sophisticated historians in their own right. However, Deutsch did not believe that international stability was best studied in terms of varying numbers of great powers, since such static analysis precluded attention to the more significant processes of interaction among states which could not be either reduced to, or managed by, conservative diplomatic techniques and a strong emphasis on military deterrence. As he put it, ‘dependable coordination cannot be built by deterrence and bargaining alone. A world of deterrent powers, a world of bargaining powers will, as a total system, be ungovernable.’

8
In short, Deutsch is best remembered as a pioneer in the study of international integration, at least on a regional level, and as a leading figure in the attempt to introduce greater methodological rigour into the empirical study of international relations as well as comparative politics. His theoretical work has inspired many students who have followed the trails he laid in the 1950s and 1960s, and his methodological contribution in establishing the legitimacy of formal modelling in the study of international relations continues to influence scholars around the world today.

Notes


Deutsch’s major writings

Two factors have militated against the systematic study of history in the Anglo-American study of international relations. First, there is the impact of what might be called ‘current affairs’ in determining the focus of study. In the desire for ‘policy relevance’ and an understandable urge to stay abreast of the issues of the day, students can easily become hostages to the daily headlines, unable and perhaps unwilling to stand back and try to assess longer-term patterns of behaviour among states. Second, and this is almost a ritual complaint in the field, the search for ‘laws of state behaviour’ in the 1950s and 1960s has left an indelible mark in the field. History was studied only insofar as it could generate ‘testable hypotheses’ or provide the equivalent of a laboratory for the testing of hypotheses themselves generated by logic and deductive reason.

The main reason for including Michael Doyle in this book is his appreciation for the ‘internal’ history of the field. In his recent (1994) critique of the way international relations and its history is presented...
in much of the literature, Brian Schmidt laments what he regards as its overwhelming ‘presentism’:

The present theoretical consensus of the discipline, or possibly some polemical version of what that consensus should be, is in effect taken as definitive, and the past is then reconstructed as a teleology leading up to and fully manifested in it...the net result of this presentist orientation is that the historical talk of faithfully reconstructing past ideas, practices and conversations becomes subservient to demonstrating a thesis about the contemporary nature of the discipline.1

Schmidt’s article was published in 1994, three years before the publication of what is, in my view, the best undergraduate textbook in contemporary international relations theory, Michael Doyle’s Ways of War and Peace (1997). When this book landed on my desk in mid-1997, I must confess to an inward groan. My first reaction was that here was yet another American ‘blockbuster’ of a textbook for gullible undergraduates, packed with contemporary ‘data’, a cornucopia of complicated models with arrows sprinkled liberally across the page, and hundreds of historical ‘snapshots’ illustrating the empirical ‘relevance’ of suggestive but unprovable generalizations. It is, however, a unique text, far superior to most books that seek to introduce students to the field in a theoretically rigorous manner. Its value arises from Doyle’s ability to combine two tasks. On the one hand, he is able to reproduce the ‘classics’ of the field while remaining sensitive to the context in which they were written. On the other hand, he demonstrates their contemporary relevance by extracting the relevant empirical generalizations contained within them and subjecting them to a rigorous examination in light of the historical evidence. This is the method that Doyle has used to great effect in the past, particularly in his work on Kant and Thucydides, and in his major study on imperialism.

Michael Doyle is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, the Director of the Center for International Studies and Director of Graduate Studies in the Politics Department at Princeton University. Born in Honolulu, Hawaii, Doyle was educated in France and Switzerland and graduated from Jesuit High School in Tampa, Florida. He studied at the US Air Force Academy before transferring to Harvard University, where he earned his BA, MA and PhD degrees in political science. Prior to taking up his present position at Princeton, he taught at the University of

MICHAEL DOYLE

74
Warwick and Johns Hopkins University. In 1993, he served as Vice-President of the International Peace Academy, and currently he is a Senior Fellow of the International Peace Academy in New York. He is the North American editor of *International Peacekeeping* and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Prior to the publication of *Ways of War and Peace*, Doyle was best known for his work on nineteenth-century European imperialism, as well as for his rigorous examination of the alleged connection between the prevalence of liberal democracy within states and the absence of war between them. In 1986, he published *Empires*, a fully multicausal analysis of European imperialism. The latter, he argues, has been poorly defined within the literature, making it difficult to generate testable hypotheses on the causes of this elusive phenomenon. Doyle defines imperialism as ‘a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another’. A comprehensive explanation of empire, therefore, should demonstrate the nature of such effective control, explain the motives for seeking control, and explain either the submission or ineffective resistance of the peripheral society. Any theory intended to describe and explain imperial relationships should, he argues, take into account four factors: the interests and capabilities of the metropole; the capabilities and interests of the periphery; the dynamics of transnational forces; and the nature of international systemic relations. Transnational forces are the means through which the imperial power affects the periphery. These may be military, trade, missionary or some combination of all three. International systemic relations refer to the balance of power among imperial states.

Doyle criticizes theories such as those of Lenin, Hobson and Schumpeter that blame imperialism primarily on the needs of the metropolitan states to expand. He also criticizes theories that blame imperialism chiefly on the weakness and collapse of the peripheral states. For Doyle, imperialism is not merely the consequence of forces in one or another part of the international system. Instead, nations and societies come into contact with one another through transnational forces. Imperialism is one possible result, depending on the relative capacities and interests of the societies involved.

In particular, three characteristics separate imperial states, or those with imperial potential, from states liable to imperial rule. Size and wealth, interestingly enough, are not the key factors, although these may affect the struggle between imperial states and have an effect on the scope of empire. More important are political centralization, unity and differentiation. Thus, a highly centralized, unified, differentiated...
state, such as England, is likely to overwhelm decentralized, fragmented, less differentiated states with which it comes into contact, resulting in imperialism even when the target states – such as China and India – are larger and even wealthier in aggregate terms.

Doyle also suggests that imperialism has important variations that need to be explained. Some empires exercised direct rule, while others ruled indirectly through indigenous leaders in the colonies. Doyle claims that the kind of rule does not depend mainly on the goals of the imperial power. He notes that European powers generally preferred informal rule where at all possible, as a less expensive way of obtaining the trading rights they valued. Yet trade required security, law enforcement and adjudication of interests between representatives of the imperial power and members of the peripheral states. Where the latter were weakly differentiated tribes of people, the peripheral state could not perform these tasks. The imperial state was then drawn, sometimes reluctantly, to exercise direct rule and undertake the necessary services itself through consular authority. State-making in the periphery was thus a consequence of imperial activity.

In contrast, where the peripheral state had a more differentiated patrimonial or feudal structure, the peripheral state could perform many of these duties, at least in controlling its own population. The metropolitan power could then make agreements with the peripheral state regarding trade and protection of its emissaries. The relationship that initially developed could be described as unequal, or dependent, but it was still not empire. This structure was often broken by the growth of indebtedness on the part of the peripheral state. The latter borrowed for a variety of reasons, from investment to state consumption. But in most cases the government invested too rashly to be able to repay its debts. In this event, the imperial state was drawn to exercise more control over the economy and budget of the peripheral state. Indirect rule developed as the ‘effective sovereignty’ of the peripheral state weakened.

Peripheral characteristics thus explain much regarding the contours of imperial rule. Yet they do not suggest when the pace of imperialism is likely to accelerate, or which colonies are considered the most important, or which great power is likely to be the leader in the process. For these issues, Doyle turns to systemic and domestic considerations within the imperial state. Systemic factors help account for the acceleration of imperialism after 1870. Up to that point, when British naval supremacy and industrial domination were widely acknowledged, European states were happy to use trading stations protected by Pax Britannica. After 1870, however, Bismarck’s orchestration of
European alliances and European powers’ attempts to gain secure markets for their own efforts at industrialization led to a scramble for territorial control overseas, mainly in the unclaimed regions of Africa. Following a general consideration of how the multipolar international system shaped the pace of imperialism, Doyle examines more closely how domestic considerations shaped the imperial efforts of France, Britain, Germany and Spain. Doyle concludes his book by arguing that a combination of the weakening of imperial interests among the European powers and a growing coherence in the peripheral states meant the end of empire in the twentieth century.

Empires is a fine example of the way Doyle engages with classical international theory. First, he reads the conventional theorists on the issue, re-presenting their arguments with due regard to the particular contexts within which they were arguing. Next, he extracts from their work a set of empirical generalizations. Third, he carefully examines the evidence to see how well classical theories stand up under the test of time. The approach is a cautious one, and the conclusion to his book is not particularly surprising. ‘No one explanation [of imperialism] was sufficient...[t]he foundations of empires remained a combination of causes.’ At the same time, Doyle’s book makes clear the need to avoid simplistic, unicausal explanations of complex transnational and international processes.

In 1983, Doyle engaged in a similarly thorough analysis of the work of Immanuel Kant. Doyle was among the first of a number of theorists who discovered, after an exhaustive empirical analysis of the historical record, what Kant had predicted and hoped for, an emerging ‘zone of peace’ among liberal democratic states. Doyle stated the proposition as follows:

Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another. No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states...a liberal zone of peace, a pacific union, has been maintained and has expanded despite numerous particular conflicts of economic and strategic interest.

This finding has been seized on by a number of liberal theorists of international relations, particularly Fukuyama, to proclaim that, with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism, and the
alleged expansion of liberal democracies around the world, war between states has become ‘obsolescent’. Doyle is far more cautious. While he welcomes the legacy of liberalism in creating a ‘zone of peace’ between liberal states, the very success of liberalism, for reasons outlined by Kant in the eighteenth century, give cause for concern in a ‘mixed’ system of liberal and non-liberal states:

The very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal states can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies…. According to liberal practice, some nonliberal states… do not acquire the right to be free from foreign intervention, nor are they assumed to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of other states. Instead conflicts of interest become interpreted as steps in a campaign of aggression against the liberal state.5

To simplify greatly, if the explanation for the separate peace between liberal states is due to their liberalism, it is tempting to argue that relations between liberal and non-liberal states cannot be peaceful, for the latter are, in a sense, at war with their own people. Lacking internal legitimacy, non-liberal states will be more willing (other things being equal) to engage in aggression against other states when it is in the interests of their leaders to do so. Doyle does not argue that this is the case, merely that liberal states, such as the United States, may act on this presupposition, and therefore be unwilling to accord non-liberal states the same degree of respect that they give to other liberal states. Indeed, the use of ‘appeasement’ as a term of abuse, whether applied to Britain in the 1930s or to the United States during the years of détente with the former Soviet Union in the late 1960s, owes something to this way of thinking. Consequently, when liberal states do go to war with non-liberal states, Doyle suggests that they are prone to what he calls ‘liberal imprudence’, as well as ‘liberal imperialism’, seeking to ‘export’ their liberal democratic doctrine to the rest of the world. In short, a world that includes liberal and non-liberal states is not necessarily a very stable one, and requires a healthy dose of realist prudence by liberal statesmen.

Doyle’s work on Kant and the liberal peace is included in his latest work, Ways of War and Peace. As with his book on the theory and practice of imperialism, Doyle applies contemporary social science methodologies to a review of classical theories of international relations. This is a great work of theoretical synthesis, for three reasons.
First, it is a superb analytical survey of classical approaches in the discipline. Indeed, if the reader is looking for a companion volume to the one you are presently reading, which focuses on key thinkers before the twentieth century, then Doyle’s book is highly recommended for this reason alone. There is simply no other volume that can provide as good a summary of the following: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Bentham, Smith, Schumpeter, Kant, Marx, Engels and Lenin. Doyle’s summaries of each are very well written, with extensive reference to key sources on each writer. They are also, at times, very amusing. For example, Rousseau:

He revealed late in life the deep psychological and sexual frustrations from which he had long suffered in his extraordinarily frank psychological memoir, *Confessions*. Can you imagine Henry Kissinger or Alexander Haig or some other contemporary proponent of Realism confessing in public that he went through life craving to be spanked? A bit of a con artist, he proceeded to set himself up as a teacher of music to young girls in Geneva before he could read a note. But above all he was a genius.6

Second, although Doyle uses what is now a somewhat old-fashioned typology of realists, liberals and socialist thinkers, he is appropriately sensitive to the important differences between thinkers in each category. As he rightly puts it, ‘worldviews align themselves on spectrums; they do not fall into neat boxes’.7 Appropriately, Doyle’s categorization of writers within each of his main groups is determined by their own arguments, not by some predetermined epistemological criteria invoked from on high by the author. There is a refreshing absence of any mention of the philosophy of science, positivism, postmodernism or ‘perspectivism’. In other words, Doyle does exactly what Schmidt called for in 1994, and he provides us with what Schmidt calls a ‘critical internal discursive history’:

The task…is to describe the evolution of conceptual forms the discipline has taken by examining the discursive practices that led to the different historical configurations. The concern of such a history is to re-assemble the internal academic discourse of international relations by following a relatively coherent conversation.8

The delineation of differences among realists is original and useful. Doyle distinguishes between fundamentalist, structural and constitutional realists. He also has some interesting points to make about the
members of the so-called English School, preferring to locate liberalism between realism and socialism rather than in the idea of ‘international society’, à la Martin Wight and Hedley Bull.

Finally, Doyle does not rest content with reconstructing a conversation among dead giants. He also elaborates their empirical generalizations and evaluates them against the available empirical evidence. Since so many of his classical mentors are political philosophers, translating their normative arguments solely into the language of empirical social science is inadequate, so the book contains two comprehensive chapters on the ethics of international intervention and distribution. It concludes with a tentative gaze into the future through the lens of each normative framework of analysis and, quite properly, Doyle does not pretend to be able to either conclude or transcend the conversation. His plea for pluralism in international relations theory is a suitable justification for greater toleration among students for, although he himself is a liberal, he acknowledges the need for realist prudence and he is also sensitive to the inequality that inspires socialist visions of world order:

A pluralistic model of world politics is not a contradiction to theoretical knowledge, but a basis for it. We as thinking human beings need not be, and for the most part are not, singular selves. Our modern identities are pluralistic, found in individual identity, nation, and class, as well as religion, race, and gender. We cannot escape multiplicities entering into our policy choices, nor, if we want to be true to ourselves, should we try to.\(^9\)

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 341.
Doyle’s major writings


See also: Fukuyama

Further reading


FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

Rather like E.H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1945), Francis Fukuyama’s book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) provided an interpretation of the significance of the end of the Cold War that captured an enormous amount of public attention. Almost overnight, the phrase ‘end of history’ was used as a synonym for the ‘post-Cold War era’ and Fukuyama, hitherto almost unknown among students of international relations, became an instant intellectual celebrity. In a sense, this was unfortunate. Fukuyama did not say that ‘history’ had come to an end in the sense that politics, war and conflict would no longer take place. Nor did he argue that the collapse of communism
would guarantee that all states would become liberal democracies. These misconceptions are perhaps a consequence of Fukuyama’s overexposure in the media. The subtleties of his argument, an ingenious blend of political philosophy, historical analysis and tentative futurology, can only be gleaned from a careful reading of the text, something that too many commentators have neglected to do. Ironically, however, once one abandons some of the more simplistic interpretations of Fukuyama’s argument, it remains unclear why the book did attract so much attention in the last decade of the twentieth century. The most interesting aspects of the book, in my view, were the ones least commented on, having to do with the characteristics of ‘the last man’ rather than the ‘end of history’ per se. Again, those who have focused on the first part of the book have downplayed these aspects. Only if one grasps the underlying pessimism of Fukuyama’s argument is it possible to avoid the temptation to celebrate or condemn him on the erroneous assumption that his book is merely an exercise in liberal ‘triumphalism’ at the end of the Cold War.

Francis Fukuyama was born in 1953. He was raised in the United States, but he is Japanese by descent. His grandfather on his father’s side fled from Japan in 1905 when Japan was at war with Russia, and his mother came from a well known intellectual family in Japan. Both parents were academically inclined. His father was a Protestant minister, and Fukuyama describes himself as ‘a sort of open-minded agnostic but without any anti-clericalism’. He went to Cornell University as an undergraduate and he received his PhD in political science from Harvard University. His thesis was on Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, but he also spent some time in France studying poststructuralism under Jacques Derrida. When he left Harvard, Fukuyama joined the Rand Corporation (an influential private think tank in the United States) as a policy analyst specializing in Middle Eastern political–military affairs and the foreign policy of the former Soviet Union. He has held a variety of positions with Rand and with the US State Department over the past 15 years. At present, he is the Hirst Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University.

In the summer of 1989, Fukuyama published a short article in the conservative journal The National Interest, entitled ‘The End of History?’ His major book was written in response to the debate that followed, although the book itself has continued to attract widely divergent opinions from across the ideological spectrum in the United States and elsewhere. For example, John Dunn describes it as a ‘puerile volume’ and compares it to ‘the worst sort of American
undergraduate term-paper’. In contrast, Wayne Cristaudo judges it to be ‘the most important defence of liberal democracy since John Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice*.  

The book operates at a number of levels. In the words of Perry Anderson, ‘no one has ever attempted a comparable synthesis – at once so deep in ontological premise and so close to the surface of global politics’. Given the scope of Fukuyama’s ambition, I can only sketch the main contours of his argument in the hope that readers will not substitute what follows for a thorough examination of the text itself. Any book that can attract such divergent opinions as those expressed by Dunn and Cristaudo deserves to be read with some care.

By the phrase ‘end of history’, Fukuyama is referring to the history of thought about legitimate first principles governing political and social organization. His argument is primarily a normative one. At the end of the twentieth century, the combination of liberal democracy and capitalism has proved superior to any alternative political/economic system, and the reason lies in its ability to satisfy the basic drives of human nature. The latter is composed of two fundamental desires. One is the desire for material goods and wealth and the other (more fundamental) desire is for recognition of our worth as human beings by those around us. Capitalism is the best economic system for maximizing the production of goods and services and for exploiting scientific technology to generate wealth. However, economic growth is only part of the story. Fukuyama appeals to Hegel’s concept of recognition to account for the superiority of liberal democracy over its rivals in the political arena. While economic growth can be promoted under a variety of political regimes, including fascist ones, only liberal democracies can meet the fundamental human need for recognition, political freedom and equality. It was Hegel who contended that the end of history would arrive when humans had achieved the kind of civilization that satisfied their fundamental longings. For Hegel, that end point was the constitutional state. In his version, Hegel appointed Napoleon as the harbinger of the end of history at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Fukuyama argues that we need to recover the philosophical idealism of Hegel and abandon the philosophical materialism of Marx and his followers, who believed that socialism was necessary to overcome the economic inequality of capitalist societies. Fukuyama also finds in Hegel a more profound understanding of human nature than can be gleaned from the ideas of such philosophers as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who privileged self-preservation above recognition.
In addition to Hegel, Fukuyama invokes Plato and Alexandre Kojève, Hegel’s most famous interpreter. From Plato, Fukuyama borrows the notion of *thymos*, variously translated as ‘spiritedness’, ‘courage’ or ‘desire’. *Megalothymia* is the *thymos* of great men, the great movers of history such as Caesar and Stalin. In contrast, *isothymia* is the humble demand for recognition in the form of equality rather than superiority. History is a struggle between these thymotic passions. The genius of liberal democracy is that it represents the end point of the struggle. The master–slave dialectic is a primary motor of history, which can never be stable as long as human beings are divided between masters and slaves. The latter will never accept their subordinate status, and the genius of capitalist liberal democracy is its ability to reconcile the thymotic passions. Shadia Drury sums up Fukuyama’s argument as follows:

Liberalism pacifies and de-politicises the aristocratic world of mastery by turning politics into economics. Liberalism pacifies the masterful *thymos* of the first man and replaces it with the servile *thymos* of the last man. Instead of superiority and dominance, society strives for equality. Those who still long for dominance have the capitalist pursuit of wealth as their outlet.5

Fukuyama also relies on the interpretation of Hegel by Alexandre Kojève, the Russian exile and political philosopher. In a series of lectures delivered in Paris in the 1940s, Kojève argued that the welfare state had solved the problems of capitalism identified by Marx.6 Thus, capitalism has managed to suppress its own internal contradictions. Furthermore, it not only provides material prosperity, but also homogenizes ideas and values, thus undermining the clash of ideology between states, thereby reducing the threat of war. Hegel did not believe that the end of war within states could be replicated at the international level. Kojève and Fukuyama argue that while wars will not disappear, the homogenization of values among the great powers will promote peace among the most powerful states, and these are the ones that matter in a long-term historical perspective.

Fukuyama’s philosophical views are elaborated in conjunction with a detailed examination of the inexorable trend towards liberal democratic forms of government in the twentieth century. He argues that, in Southern Europe, Latin America, parts of Asia and Eastern Europe, free-market economics and parliamentary democracy are, with some important exceptions, becoming the norm. He claims that there were only 13 liberal democracies in 1940, 37 in 1960 and
62 in 1990. He also traces the decline of war among democratic states over time, arguing that peace between states correlates closely with their internal convergence towards liberal democratic norms.

But the ‘end of history’, according to Fukuyama, is not necessarily welcome news. Despite the victory of liberal democracy as a normative model over its rivals, Fukuyama is concerned that the subordination of *megalothymia* to *isothymia* may be also the pursuit of equality at the expense of the pursuit of excellence. If there is too much equality, and no great issues to struggle for, people may revolt at the very system that has brought them peace and security. We cannot subsist merely on equal rights and material comfort alone, and those that satisfy themselves with these become what Nietzsche called ‘last men’ or, as C.S. Lewis put it, ‘men without chests’. At the end of the book, Fukuyama sounds a note of warning. Unless there are ways to express *megalothymia* in those societies lucky enough to have reached the ‘end of history’ (and according to his own statistics, less than one-third of all states have arrived thus far), liberal democracy may atrophy and die. At one point Fukuyama argues that perhaps Japan may offer an alternative to American liberal democracy and combine a successful economy with social bonds strong enough to withstand the fragmentary forces of liberal democracy. Many Asian societies, he claims, have ‘paid lip service to Western principles of liberal democracy, accepting the form while modifying the content to accommodate Asian cultural traditions’.

This is a theme Fukuyama pursues in his second book, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1995). Before considering the argument of that book, it is important to note some of the main criticisms levelled at *The End of History*.

First, Fukuyama’s appeal to Hegel and Plato has been called into question by some commentators, outraged by Fukuyama’s attempt to integrate Platonism with Hegelian dialectics. Shadia Drury, for example, points out that it is not possible to ‘[reconcile] Plato’s objectivist views with [an] intersubjective concept of recognition’. She argues that Fukuyama’s invocation of Plato is designed to avoid the awkward fact that Hegel himself never predicted that history would end, even in the sense that Fukuyama uses the term ‘end’. Nor could Hegel do so, given his commitment to the idea that history is inherently dialectical. John O’Neill, who attacks Fukuyama with Hegelian tools of analysis, makes a similar criticism. According to O’Neill, Hegel argued that ‘recognition cannot be its own end since it is parasitic on other goods’ which provide the appropriate criteria for recognition:
Recognition is required to confirm my self-worth as a being with powers of rationality and the capacities to stand above and shape particular desires. It is only from beings that I recognise themselves as having such powers and capacities that recognition counts...it is in virtue of this parasitic nature of recognition on prior goods that Hegel ultimately rejects an individualised market economy as satisfactory as means of recognition even with civil society itself.\(^9\)

It is unclear, therefore, how Fukuyama can coherently use Hegel to defend capitalism and liberal democracy when Hegel explicitly denied that such a combination could adequately achieve the goal of recognition. For all his criticisms of Hobbes and Locke, Fukuyama fails to make a sufficient break with their atomistic conceptions of human nature.

A second set of criticisms has been levelled at Fukuyama’s substantive empirical claims regarding the spread of liberal democracy around the globe and the inherently pacific nature of relations among liberal democratic states. On the one hand, Fukuyama defines liberal democracies in somewhat vague, formal terms. A liberal democracy is one whose constitution respects some basic political rights and requires the government to rule on the basis of explicit consent from its citizens through regular competitive and fair elections. While a broad definition facilitates some rough measurement of the ‘march of democracy’, such a crude indicator is hardly adequate for any firm conclusions to be made about the extent of freedom in the contemporary world. For example, according to Fukuyama, El Salvador and the United States both count as liberal democracies. The term itself becomes less clear now that there are, in his view, no alternatives against which to define it. In light of the historical mission that Fukuyama believes liberal democratic states to have fulfilled, the failure to distinguish between states within his broad category is a major weakness of the book as a whole. There is simply no analysis of the enormous differences in the way the states that he lumps together manage the tensions between freedom and equality in politics and economics. As for his argument that ‘liberal democracies’ do not go to war with each other because they are liberal democracies, Fukuyama fails to explore the possibility of other explanations in the literature on the causes of war.

Finally, there are problems with Fukuyama’s presumption that political and economic liberalism – the twin engines of his unidirectional historical motor – can coexist comfortably within the territorial
boundaries of the sovereign state. By contrast, much of the literature in search of a substantive term to describe the post–Cold War era is concerned with the contradictory dynamics of ‘globalization’ versus ‘fragmentation’, of which ethnic nationalism is a prime example. Globalization is a blanket term that conveys the limits to state power arising from the myriad dynamics of a global economy in which the state seems to be relatively powerless to manage its domestic economy. In particular, the integration of global capital, much of it speculative, tends to subordinate domestic politics to the demand for flexibility, efficiency and competitiveness on a global playing field that is anything but level.

Consequently, as governments become less accountable to those they claim to represent over a broader range of issues, so the spectrum of democratic choice before citizens narrows considerably. To the extent that economic globalization and political fragmentation are operating at different levels of social, political and economic organization, one could plausibly accept much of Fukuyama’s philosophical assumptions and reach opposite conclusions to the ones that he draws. On the reasonable assumption that global capitalism is exacerbating economic inequality both within and between states while simultaneously denying them a redistributive capacity to moderate its impact, the ‘struggle for recognition’ may take reactive forms such as ethnic nationalism. It is not clear how this problem can be solved merely by appealing to the virtues of capitalism and liberal democracy, since the main difficulty lies in striking the right balance between them, an issue that Fukuyama does not deal with in his book.

Since the publication of The End of History and the Last Man in 1992, Fukuyama has moved on to examine in more detail the cultural dimensions of comparative political economy. In 1995, he published his second book, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Having dealt with history, Fukuyama focuses on the social prerequisites of economic prosperity. He argues that economic success depends only in part on the factors emphasized by economists, competition, technology and skills. Fully as important is a supporting culture of trust or ‘spontaneous sociability’ – a readiness to get on with one’s fellow citizens in economically productive ways:

Virtually all economic activity in the contemporary world is carried out not by individuals, but by organizations that require a high degree of social cooperation. Property rights, contracts, and commercial law are all indispensable institutions for creating a modern market-oriented economic system, but it is possible to
economise substantially on transaction costs if such institutions are supplemented by social capital and trust. Trust, in turn, is the product of pre-existing communities of shared moral codes or values. These communities...are not the product of rational choice.11

At the core of the book is an examination of two contrasting groups of countries. The first comprises three economies in which civil society flourishes; that is, social institutions of many different kinds that play a large role in people’s lives, mediating between the family and the state. These ‘high trust’ economies are the United States, Germany and Japan. The economies of the second group, in contrast, lack strong civil societies, according to Fukuyama. They have strong families and strong governments at the centre, but little else. As examples of such ‘low trust’ economies, he chooses China, France and Italy.

The book is provocative for two reasons. First, although the idea of the importance of ‘social capital’ is not new (indeed, it can be found in the work of Hegel), Fukuyama’s categorization of states is unconventional, to say the least. Fukuyama argues that his lists reflect the degree to which states have or have not adopted corporate forms of organization as they underwent industrialization over the past 200 years. ‘High trust’ economies are better able to develop corporate structures than ‘low trust’ economies, in which family-sized businesses dominate the economy. Second, Fukuyama is keen to dispel the idea that it is useful to generalize about ‘Asian’ economic growth. He argues that, along the spectrum of ‘trust’, Japan and China are very different from one another. He argues that China’s allegedly low level of non-kin trust will impede economic growth. Apart from large corporate state companies, which suffer from high levels of debt, the lack of spontaneous tendencies to create large companies makes it difficult for China to create major strategic industries where scale is a crucial factor in success. Furthermore, it remains debatable whether a country without stable property rights and a reliable code of commercial law can maintain high rates of growth indefinitely.

To some extent, there is continuity between the two books. The underlying paradox of liberalism is the same. If you universalize liberal individualism, extending its premises to all spheres of life, liberal institutions (including the market) will eventually malfunction and then liberal democratic society will itself decay. As with the first book, however, there are at least a couple of major problems. First, just as Fukuyama’s dichotomy between liberal democracies and the
rest is somewhat crude, so is the basic division between ‘high’ and ‘low trust’ economies. On most indices of comparison (such as crime, lifetime employment, distribution of wealth, geographical and occupational mobility), the United States and Japan are far apart. Few commentators have been persuaded by Fukuyama’s typology linking them together. Similarly, there are doubts about his views on China. Constance Lever-Tracy, for example, argues that Fukuyama misunderstands the cultural dimensions of wealth creation in China, where ‘family fortunes grow by multiplication of small units, not by expansion of large bureaucratic structures’. She suggests that the transnational ‘networking’ between family firms, based on personal ‘trust’, performs the same functions that Fukuyama attributes to large bureaucratic structures.

In addition, even if the states he studies do fit into the categories of ‘low trust’ and ‘high trust’ economies, the bigger question is, so what? Whilst ‘the social virtues’ may have something to do with the creation of prosperity, it remains unclear just how much they contribute to economic growth, compared with other factors. Over the past two decades, for example, China has been the fastest-growing economy in the world and not, it seems, because of a sudden outbreak of trust. Just as there are different kinds of ‘liberal democracy’, so there are many subtly different forms of capitalism, which suggests that it is somewhat simplistic to search for and attempt to isolate a single factor contributing to economic growth.

Events post-9/11 have forced Fukuyama to re-examine and, in large measure, revise his famous thesis of the ‘End of History’. In his recent book *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, he argues that state-building is now more than ever crucial to constructing world order. His argument is based on several factors, including the trend towards failed states, the rise of civil wars, and market failure. In his view, the long and sustained pattern of state downsizing or market liberalization (in which the market and civil society were expected to promote democracy) has had mixed results. While it has spurred growth development, it has weakened civil society and stripped the state’s capacity to promote security and order. Some might say that this critical examination weakens his earlier thesis and downplays the benefits achieved from neoliberalization. On the other hand, Fukuyama is willing to concede that stronger regulations must be implemented in order to control the effects of capital flows and to promote peace and order within states. Still, he could be faulted for not focusing enough critical attention on the link between state-building and global order, that is, whether a stronger global
architecture is needed to complement the state’s capacity to resolve local problems and promote order.

In summary, the work of Francis Fukuyama is both provocative and infuriating. He is, to use Isaiah Berlin’s famous metaphor, neither a hedgehog (who knows one big thing) nor a fox (who knows many things), but both at the same time. The scope and ambition of his writing is large, and his ability to illustrate abstract philosophical arguments with a vast array of contemporary empirical data is enviable. Fukuyama is not a triumphal liberal at the end of the twentieth century. He is deeply worried about the apparent decline of ‘social capital’ in the United States, and his work suggests that the achievements of liberal democracy and capitalism are fragile. They depend on cultural factors that are crucial to the success of the liberal project. As Ross Poole argues, despite its concern with the individual, liberalism has never been very good at supplying the individual with a reason or motive for accepting its principles. In assuming the existence of a social world which is devoid of values, liberalism has assigned the task of creating them to the vagaries of individual choice. It then discovers that it has no strong argument against the individual who chooses values antithetical to liberalism.  

However, Fukuyama’s solution to this problem is, to say the least, controversial. While he is a firm opponent of cultural and moral relativism in all its forms, it remains to be seen whether he will provide an explicit defence of the communitarian values that underpin his recent work.

Notes


**Fukuyama’s major writings**

‘Social capital and the global economy’, *Foreign Affairs* 74 (September/October 1995), pp. 91–103.

See also: Doyle, Rosecrance

**Further reading**


**ERNST HAAS**

Ernst B. Haas is best known as one of the founders of ‘neofunctionalism’ in the study of regional integration, particularly in Europe. Since the
1970s he has explored the role of consensual knowledge among elites in facilitating interstate co-operation, and he has analysed the potential for reforming the operations of the United Nations. Like so many of the key thinkers represented in this book, Haas emigrated to the United States as a young man in 1938 to escape persecution by the Nazis, and his early life had an important impact on his intellectual commitment to exploring ways in which even arch-enemies could overcome their animosity and discover common interests. After serving with the American armed forces during the Second World War, he took advantage of the GI Bill to complete his university education at Columbia University in New York. In 1951, he took up a teaching position at Berkeley in California, and he became a full professor there in 1962. Since 1973 he has been Robson Research Professor in Government at Berkeley.

Haas’s early work on European integration has to be seen in the context of earlier efforts that had focused either on constitutional federalism as a means of integrating states into a larger political framework, or on functional means to promote transnational co-operation by starting with ‘low politics’, such as the reduction of trade barriers and technical co-operation, to deal with transborder problems whose solution was deemed – at least in the first instance – to be apolitical.

What became known as ‘neofunctionalism’ was an attempt both to synthesize these competing frameworks and to focus on processes at work in the specific case of regional integration in Western Europe. Haas shared the supranational ideals of Mitrany, yet he was also interested in the specific institutional means by which the existing states in the region could transcend nationalism and participate in the creation of new forms of international organization. Whereas Mitrany was somewhat vague on how the process of integration was to take place, Haas developed a model that did not rely on normative assumptions either of altruism or that the growth of economic interdependence would be sufficient to generate demands for closer intergovernmental co-operation.

Haas defined integration as ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’. He argued that such a process was easier to achieve in a regional context such as Western Europe, particularly in light of its history and shared democratic values in the postwar era. Unlike Mitrany, he acknowledged that it would be difficult either to separate...
technical from political issues, or to avoid conflicts between states if the gains from co-operation were unequally distributed. Consequently, it was crucial to establish formal institutions that could impose and uphold agreements made by nation-states. Such bodies had to enjoy some autonomy from national governments if they were to be effective, and the whole process could not work unless states accepted both the rule of law (hence encroachments of state sovereignty would be difficult to reverse) and the principle of majoritarian decision-making.

Once the process had begun and institutions had been established on these principles, Haas was confident that state sovereignty would decline over time as co-operation in one sphere of activity ‘spilled over’ into others, and a bureaucratic process of decision-making evolved at a supranational, albeit at a regionally specific, level. As more and more actors became involved in the process, a form of ‘socialization’ would take place among elites, attenuating their loyalty to the nation-state in favour of a broader appreciation for the interests of the region as a whole. Despite his sensitivity to the political obstacles confronting the process of integration and his attempt to incorporate elite rationality and self-interest into his model, Haas still retained the functionalist idea that progress in more technical and economic issues would lead to greater political co-operation. However, he stressed that neofunctionalism – otherwise known as ‘federalism by instalments’ – depended a great deal on the ability of elites and political entrepreneurs to apply consensual knowledge to the solution of common problems.

The study of regional integration reached a high point in the early 1970s, after which it declined to the point at which even Haas himself acknowledged that it might be obsolete. It was inspired by two trends that failed to maintain their momentum as the decade progressed. On the one hand, there was no question that European integration seemed to be progressing towards some kind of European political union in the medium term. On the other hand, the 1960s were years in which the study of international relations in the United States was dominated by a desire to generate scientifically testable hypotheses based on the most rigorous selection and collection of empirical data. Haas’s work must be read in the context of the intersection of these otherwise unrelated phenomena. As European integration faltered in the 1970s, it became clear that there were a number of difficulties in applying his ideas to areas outside the West European context.

First, in the absence of a clearly defined ‘dependent variable’ (that which neofunctional models were trying to explain), it was not clear how to measure whether integration was progressing or regressing
over time. Since integration was seen more as a process than an outcome, the lack of specificity meant that the term suffered from some ambiguity, as it meant different things to different people.

Second, although Haas himself claimed to be engaged in a ‘value-free’ process of scientific investigation of the process, there is no doubt that he hoped the process would lead to a greater degree of supranationalism in West European politics, and thus he neglected the examination of those conditions and factors that could retard the process rather than accelerate it. Yet the concept of ‘spill-over’, if not properly managed, could in fact reduce the desire for greater integration among states. For example, the initial reduction of tariff barriers in the European Economic Community meant that profit margins of firms were more strongly affected by different systems of taxation among member states, and thus tariff reduction ‘spilled over’ into pressures for a common taxation regime. Yet when inflation in France rose dramatically relative to its neighbours in the late 1960s, the French government was unable to raise taxes to reduce domestic demand, and had to restrain trade to avoid a balance of payments crisis. This illustrates the potential weakness of partial measures, the unintended consequences of which can induce a political crisis if difficulties are not anticipated and planned for.

Third, it remains unclear whether European integration can proceed in the 1990s in the absence of attempts to make up what is often referred to as ‘the democratic deficit’. Unless there is a concerted attempt to develop democratic procedures of decision-making to secure the legitimacy and accountability of regional organizations staffed by technical experts and bureaucrats, a dangerous gap can develop between national citizens and regional organizations. This gap can then be exploited by political parties that are still nationally based, and used to attack incumbent governments at election time. The problems of moving towards greater monetary and political union in the contemporary European Union cast some doubt on the effectiveness, let alone the legitimacy, of automatic ‘integration by stealth’.

Finally, it remains unclear whether neofunctionalism is applicable to areas other than Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, in which case its relevance as a universal theory is somewhat limited. In terms of size, historical context and levels of economic development and growth among member states, Western Europe may be appropriate for the development of neofunctional processes. But if the efficacies of those processes are themselves dependent on fortuitous background conditions, it is unlikely that they can be replicated successfully elsewhere, even if they are successful in Western Europe.
For all these reasons, Haas became disenchanted with neo-functionalism in the 1970s. While he did much to advance the study of regional integration in Europe, Haas moved on to examine international organization at a global level, and his early work can be seen as paving the way for the rise in popularity of ‘regime analysis’, the study of international governance in the widest sense. At the same time, Haas has not lost sight of the importance of international organizations themselves, and in the past decade he has been a major contributor to debates revolving around the possibilities and desirability of various reforms to the United Nations. His work on the UN, exploring its empirical record in helping to maintain international peace and security, reveals the way he has learned from the failures of neofunctionalism in the 1970s.

In 1990, Haas published When Knowledge is Power, in which he bemoans the relative inactivity of many potentially important international organizations. He argues that they need to be reformed so that they can become ‘perpetual learners’, able to adapt to new challenges and problems in international society. Haas suggests that we should think of international organizations, such as the United Nations, as ends in themselves rather than as means to a specific end that always takes priority. If this were the case, then (like the American Constitution itself), international organizations could adapt to new issues and not be constantly evaluated in terms of their failure to achieve ends that may have been too ambitious to start with. He encourages us to think of progress in international governance as an open-ended groping for self-improvement, without a final goal, without a transcendental faith, but with frequent reverses and sporadic self-questioning about the trajectory of change… progress is a childlike, groping god, not a purposeful master of the universe. Progress is a secular god who tolerates the things people, nations, and other large human collectivities do to themselves and to one another.3

This is the context in which Haas has challenged those who believe that the United Nations must be reformed radically to deal with the emerging challenges of the twenty-first century. While he is mindful of the rise of global problems, such as the deterioration of the global environment and growing economic inequality between rich and poor, he is equally aware of the inherent limits to the United Nations in a world divided among over 180 sovereign states. Consequently, his biggest worry is that the end of the Cold War
has led to a dramatic increase in expectations about what the United Nations can achieve, a rise in hope fed by the inflated rhetoric of political leaders whose talk is not matched by either action or the necessary funds to implement sweeping reforms. As a result, the United Nations is in danger of decline as it becomes the prisoner of inflated goals.

This is consistent with the argument presented in a much earlier book, *Tangle of Hopes* (1969), where he proposed two models of ‘system transformation’. One depends on ‘autonomous internal change’, in which changes within states lead to new demands and policies. The other involves ‘feedback’, in which experiences with the performances of international organization lead decision-makers to new perceptions as to what can and cannot be done effectively, and thus to the formulation of new purposes to be pursued through those organizations. He argues in this work that the first of these means the powers of an organization will have difficulty keeping abreast of ‘the changing mixture of demands’ and thus will remain largely static. In the second case, however, if ‘feedbacks result in adaptive learning among elites, the result is likely to be a stronger system with more autonomous power’. One could argue, of course, that such ‘feedback’ may lead as compellingly towards disengagement as towards increasing interdependence, which seems to be taking place between the United States and the United Nations today.

To conclude, Ernst Haas’s scholarship is characterized by a rigorous adherence to the highest standards of empirical methodology combined with a humanistic commitment to greater co-operation among states in pursuit of world order. While his early work was profoundly influenced by functionalism and sought to discover means by which the nation-state might be transcended, he has become convinced of the need to pursue global order through the existing states system. In that sense, his work is characterized by a growing realism and a desire to convince others that if international organizations are to flourish in the years ahead, we should be modest in what we can expect from drawing up radical blueprints for reform. In the study of international organization, the best can be the enemy of the good.

**Notes**


**Haas’s major writings**


‘Words can hurt you; or, who said what to whom about regimes’, *International Organization* 36 (1982), pp. 207–43.


Further reading


STANLEY HOFFMANN

Stanley Hoffmann is an important figure in the study of French politics and comparative European politics, as well as American foreign policy and international relations theory. His intellectual mentor is the French thinker Raymond Aron, and he shares with Aron a tragic, liberal, Weberian outlook. As a student of American foreign policy and international ethics, Hoffmann has engaged in an ongoing argument with policy-makers as well as realists. Hoffmann’s values are liberal, and he strives to prescribe ways in which liberal values of individual freedom can be promoted in a world that constantly threatens to undermine them. In some ways, he is very similar to realists such as Kennan, Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. Like them, he has written long books and many articles on what is wrong with American foreign policy. Also, his analysis focuses, like theirs, on the often naïve preconceptions that American policy-makers harbour about foreign affairs.

Unlike the realists, however, Hoffmann does not believe that the answer is to try and educate Americans in the art of nineteenth-century European statecraft. He is a trenchant critic of realists, whose advice he believes only exacerbates the least desirable aspects of American practice. Instead, his work tries to persuade students and policy-makers alike of the sheer complexity of world politics, the ethical dilemmas of foreign policy, and the risks of applying inappropriate models of state behaviour. In some ways, Hoffmann can be
seen as an American version of Hedley Bull, who he admired and whose general outlook he shared. Unlike Bull, Hoffmann does not construct an identifiable theoretical edifice that would somehow synthesize the tensions between realism and idealism in the study of international affairs. Instead, he moves between them at the level of theory and foreign policy analysis. As he puts it,

[Like Aron, I tend naturally to think ‘against’ Utopians who tempt me into demonstrating (gleefully) that their recipes are worthless. Crass realists provoke me into trying to show that they have overlooked some exits.]

In light of the volume of work from someone who constantly articulates his views ‘against’ the theoretical and political currents of the day, I will focus on the fruitful tension between Hoffmann’s realism and idealism in his work on American foreign policy.

Stanley Hoffmann was born in Vienna in 1928, and he was raised in France in the 1930s. As a child in France, Hoffmann describes himself as a ‘little Austrian, partly Jewish, rootless pupil’ whose family suffered all the traumas associated with the rise of fascism and the invasion of France by Germany in May 1940. He remained in France during the years of the Vichy regime, living in Nice. The family returned to Paris in 1945, and Hoffmann enrolled at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques and the Paris University Law School. He graduated in 1948 and pursued his doctoral studies in international law. He spent a year at Harvard in 1951. After completing his doctoral thesis (which he describes as ‘quite unreadable’), Hoffmann returned to Harvard to take up an instructorship in the Department of Government in 1955. Today, Hoffmann is C. Douglas Dillon Professor of the Civilization of France at Harvard, where he combines his teaching and research interests in French politics and international relations.

Hoffmann has written three major books on American foreign policy. In 1968, he published Gulliver’s Troubles, Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy. This is a thorough examination of the changing international environment confronting US policy-makers in the late 1960s, as well as a perceptive analysis of the preconceptions of those policy-makers in reacting to their environment in the past. It is a large and ambitious book that attempts to integrate the internal and external constraints on American foreign policy. As with his other books on the same subject, Hoffmann is concerned to elaborate, often in great detail, the appropriate purpose of American foreign policy, and to establish
[w]hat the United States can or cannot do, given the kind of nation it is, in the kind of world we have. Purposes that go against the grain of a nation’s deepest beliefs or habits, or against the grain of the world in which it is trying to fulfill such purposes, are not sound. Power at a nation’s disposal ought to be used in full awareness of the external conditions that define which uses are productive and which are not, as well as of the domestic predispositions and institutions that channel national energies in certain directions or inhibit the country from applying them in other ways.  

Given the task he sets himself in his books, as well as his refusal to use theoretical models that he regards as unduly simplistic, it is no surprise that Hoffmann’s books tend to be rather long and, to be honest, hard to read at one sitting. He tends to reproduce the complexity of the world for his readers rather than simplifying it. Nonetheless, they do repay the effort. In this book, he argues that the contemporary international system (in the 1960s) is characterized by revolutionary dynamism, qualified or muted bipolarity, and ideological clashes. He distinguishes between three related levels of the system, each of which exhibits different structural attributes. Most fundamentally, the system is bipolar in terms of the nuclear destruction the superpowers can unleash, but the very restraints imposed by the nuclear stalemate have given the nation-state a new lease on life and have allowed, on a second systemic level, the emergence of political polycentricism. This, in turn, has encouraged the trend towards nuclear proliferation, which lends a multipolar attribute to the third ‘systemic’ level.

In light of such a complexity of relations within and across the systemic levels, Hoffmann diagnoses the peculiar national disabilities that make it so difficult for the United States to operate effectively to promote world order. The complexity of the world is especially challenging to the United States because of a debilitating set of attitudes that stem from the American ‘national style’ (a function of America’s past and principles) and American governmental institutions. The major institutional problem is the dispersal of power among and within the governmental structure and bureaucracy. Deficiencies in foreign policy ‘style’ are reflected in legalism, reliance on formulas, short-range planning and the conflict between quietism and activism.

In the last part of the book, Hoffmann argues that the United States should make a modest withdrawal from Europe that would allow the emergence of a ‘European Europe’, integrated along
confederal lines and protected by a Franco-British nuclear umbrella with American and Soviet guarantees. The programme is essentially a Gaullist blueprint for Europe. Aside from furthering the establishment of a relatively independent Europe, this programme would free up American resources for more urgent containment projects, such as the restraint of China. Hoffmann argues against overly relying on military force as an instrument of policy, but he recognizes that, in its absence, revolutionary forces are likely to undermine international order. In short, the book is an appeal for the United States to adapt to an increasingly ‘multihierarchical’ international system and to allow Eastern and Western Europe to emerge from the Cold War as part of a united political entity.

Hoffmann renews the appeal in his next book, Primacy or World Order (1978). He distinguishes between two cycles of American foreign policy after 1945: the Cold War cycle (1945–68), and what he calls the Kissinger cycle (1968–76). Hoffmann is particularly critical of his former colleague at Harvard, accusing him of failing to extricate Gulliver from overseas entanglements and of bringing to his office a set of realist dogmas with limited application in a world of growing interdependence, in which economic relations are just as important as military ones. The contradictions of Kissinger’s diplomacy arise out of the gap between abstract notions of the requirements of the balance of power and geopolitical reality. Hoffmann argues that Kissinger’s diplomacy was based on the illusion that the United States could enjoy primacy and world order, whereas for Hoffmann sees a tradeoff between them. He urges (once again) US policy-makers to conduct their rivalry with the Soviet Union at benign levels of parity and to abandon any attempt to achieve world order on the basis of imperial control.

Hoffmann’s third major book on American foreign policy, Dead Ends (1983), continues to develop familiar themes in Hoffmann’s writing: the growing complexity of the international system, the demands and opportunities of global interdependence, the multidimensional and non-fungible nature of power, the limited utility of military force, the relative decline of the United States, the weakness of American diplomacy, and the need for a ‘mixed’ strategy towards the Soviet Union. But at the heart of the book, a revised collection of a number of Hoffmann’s essays, lies his assertion that the foreign policies of Kissinger, Carter and especially Reagan have led to a series of ‘dead ends’. Whereas Kissinger’s grand design suffered from the fatal flaw of hegemonic pretension, Carter understood that the diffusion of power to new actors insistent on asserting themselves and on
rejecting neocolonial dependencies had created a world in which American leadership ‘without hegemony’ could be its only possible role. Furthermore, Hoffmann applauds Carter’s early emphasis on such long-term global issues as human rights, nuclear proliferation, arms sales and the law of the sea; in addition, he credits the administration with appreciating ‘that this ever more complex world could be neither managed by the superpowers nor reduced to the relationship between them’. But in its eagerness to reduce America’s traditional obsession with communism, Carter’s administration never offered a strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. This omission constituted ‘the hole in the doughnut’ of Carter’s world order outlook. It failed ‘to communicate…which Soviet activities were intolerable, and which were compatible with Washington’s conception of the global contest [and failed] to integrate its excellent intuitions and assumptions into a strategy’. In the angriest essay in the book, Hoffmann ridicules Reagan for his dangerous attempt to recreate a global containment strategy that once again reduces the world to an ideological and military confrontation between the superpowers, and for his dubious claim that the United States had merely lost the will to employ its power. In 1983, Hoffmann argued that Reagan’s nostalgia for the world of the 1950s would result in another dead end – alienated allies, a spiralling arms race and an obstinate Soviet Union.

Well, Hoffmann got the last point wrong, of course. The Soviet Union did capitulate. But the end of the Cold War and the short-term success of the Reagan/Bush administrations in bringing the Cold War to an end (which they did not anticipate any more than Stanley Hoffmann) does not invalidate Hoffmann’s arguments, nor should they detract from appreciating the broader wisdom of his commentary on American foreign policy, which extends over the past 30 years. Unlike his former colleague Henry Kissinger, Hoffmann has never openly sought to play a major role in the active formulation of American foreign policy, preferring to play the role of a concerned critic of its overall direction.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in addition to his ongoing commentaries on American foreign affairs, Hoffmann turned his critical attention to the difficulties and potential of reconciling the realist approach to international relations with the demands of liberal morality and ethics. His most well known book on this issue is *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics* (1981). This book consists of five essays, first delivered in 1980 as the Frank W. Abrams lectures at Syracuse University. Hoffmann addresses concerns that have been dismissed as peripheral or
inappropriate by some realists and that have often been handled in a ‘utopian’ fashion by liberals.

In particular, he examines three issues that have provided the grounds for so much debate between realists and liberals: the use of force, human rights and distributive justice. The first is focused primarily on war, particularly through an examination of Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars* and its critics. He delves into the thorny problem of what moral criteria statespersons might apply in the development of decisions involving the application of force. On the second topic, human rights, Hoffmann provides an impressive list of pitfalls for any universal definition of human rights and acknowledges the difficulties in promoting them as an explicit value in foreign policy:

The structure of the international milieu which limits possibilities for moral action, the conflicts of value systems which result in very sharp disagreements on conceptions of human rights and on priorities, the difficulties of assessment and evaluation are all manifest here and lead repeatedly to failure, or to confrontation, or to distorted uses of the human rights issues for purposes of political warfare at home or abroad.6

Despite these problems, Hoffmann argues that the United States would not be true to its conception of itself if it did not promote the pursuit of human rights, and he endorses a policy of liberal internationalism. At the same time he warns that such a policy must coexist with the realization that emphasizing political and civil human rights at the expense of economic and social rights can often appear as neocolonialism in another guise.

Since the end of the Cold War, Hoffmann has continued to publish widely on the themes that have concerned him for over 30 years as a student of international relations. These include the possibility of constructing a liberal world order in a pluralistic, anarchical environment, the responsibility of the United States as the world’s leading superpower, and the ‘dead ends’ of international theory as well as American statecraft.

Personally, I am not a great admirer of Hoffmann’s books, even though their arguments have been the basis of this summary of his work. The books are too long, and all too often contain innumerable policy guidelines whose connection to the underlying central themes is less than clear. On the other hand, I regard him as the finest essayist on the study of international relations and American foreign policy this century. Two volumes of his essays are available. The first was
published in 1965 and consists of a number of his revised lectures on war and peace delivered at Harvard and Geneva in the early 1960s; the second volume, appropriately titled *Janus and Minerva*, was published in 1987. As a whole they represent a body of thought on international relations that is remarkably consistent even as it has evolved over the years. They are, I think, required reading for any serious student of international relations. His essay on Kant and Rousseau remains unsurpassed as a comparative analysis of these classical theorists in the field, and his essays on the limits of realism in international relations theory remain as relevant today as when he first wrote them in the late 1950s and 1960s. At the end of the twentieth century, Hoffmann remains ‘an unhappy Sisyphus’ in the field. As he recently commented,

[t]he tension between morality and politics will always remain – because morality is always at war not only with egotistical or asocial interests, but also with the will to power and domination. In the world of international relations, it’s going to be an uphill struggle. Albert Camus wanted us to imagine a happy Sisyphus. In international affairs, this simply is not possible.7

**Notes**

5. Ibid., pp. 73–74.

**Hoffmann’s major writings**

Gulliver’s Troubles, Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy, New York, McGraw–Hill, 1968.
The Mitterrand Experiment: Continuity and Change in Modern France (edited with George Ross and Sylvia Malzacher), New York, Oxford University Press, 1987.

See also: Aron, Kennan, Morgenthau, Walzer

Further reading

ROBERT O. KEOHANE

In 1965, Robert Keohane completed his PhD dissertation at Harvard University on the politics of the UN General Assembly. The question
he tried to answer was whether institutions matter in explaining state behaviour, or could the latter be deduced solely from the distribution of power? Over 30 years later, Keohane is still examining this question, and the ways in which he has tried to answer it over the years have earned him a reputation as the leader of what David Long calls the ‘Harvard School’ of liberal international theory.\(^1\) Keohane’s thoughts on both the conditions under which states co-operate with each other and the role of institutions in facilitating co-operation have evolved from seeking to challenge the explanatory adequacy of the realist paradigm to a more nuanced accommodation with the insights of structural realism. Whether this constitutes progress or regress in the study of international organization remains a hotly debated issue, but there is no questioning the pivotal importance of Keohane’s work in raising it.

Keohane was born in 1941 and raised in Illinois. At the age of only 16, he enrolled in Shimer College, a small offshoot of the College of the University of Chicago. When he graduated in 1961, he pursued his doctoral studies at Harvard University. In 1965, he took up a teaching position at Swarthmore College. In 1969, after joining the board of editors for the journal *International Organization*, which has since become one of the leading journals in the field, Keohane began his remarkable research collaboration with Joseph S. Nye. He moved to California in 1973 to teach at Stanford University. In 1985, Keohane returned to Harvard, where he stayed for the next decade. In 1996, he was appointed James Duke Professor of International Relations at Duke University.\(^2\)

Keohane’s ongoing debate with realism started in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when he and Joseph Nye began to question some of realism’s allegedly core assumptions about international relations. In 1972, they co-edited *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. This volume brought together a number of scholars interested in the possibility that ‘transnational relations’ among non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, made it imperative to overcome the excessive concentration of political scientists on interstate relations. The book was edited in the context of the ending of the Vietnam War and the growing importance of economic issues in international affairs. In particular, the rise of OPEC, emerging tensions between Japan and the United States over their trade imbalance, and Nixon’s unilateral decision to abandon the Bretton Woods agreements on monetary stability, indicated that profound changes were taking place in world politics. Over the next few years, Keohane and Nye’s work evolved from a multifaceted description of an allegedly ‘interdependent’
world to a theoretical treatment of the consequences of complex interdependence for political leadership and regime maintenance and change.

The result of this evolution was *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977). The subtitle is important. The book is a direct challenge to what the authors perceive to be the core assumptions of realism, and it is the first book in the literature of the period systematically to present hypotheses on interdependence and test them against a great deal of empirical data. The basic argument of the book is that, in a world of interdependence, the realist ‘paradigm’ is of limited use in helping us to understand the dynamics of international regimes, that is, the rules of the game governing decision-making and operations in international relations on particular problems, like money, or between specified countries, like the United States and Canada.

Keohane and Nye begin by constructing two theoretical models, realism and complex interdependence. The former portrays international relations as a struggle for power. It is based on three core assumptions: states are coherent units and are the most important political actors; force is a usable and effective instrument of policy; and there exists a hierarchy of issues in world politics dominated by questions of military security. In contrast, under conditions of complex interdependence: actors other than states participate; there is no clear hierarchy of issues; and force is ineffective. Under these conditions, outcomes will be determined by the distribution of resources and ‘vulnerabilities’ within particular issue-areas, they will be unrelated to the distribution of military power, and transnational relations will be crucial factors in the decision-making process, including international bureaucratic coalitions and non-governmental institutions.

Having constructed their contrasting models, Keohane and Nye go on to describe and analyse major events in maritime and monetary affairs between 1920 and 1975, and explore in great detail the outcomes of numerous conflicts between the United States and Canada, and between the United States and Australia. They demonstrate that some issues and conflicts conform more to the assumptions of the complex interdependence model than to realism, and reinforce the need to focus on particular ‘sensitivities’ and ‘vulnerabilities’ of actors in specific issue-areas. They also argue that under conditions of complex interdependence, which they expect to become stronger in the future, it is difficult for democratic states to devise and pursue rational foreign policies. This is particularly true when the absence of a security dimension makes it difficult to determine a clear
rank-ordering of values. The proliferation of non-state actors and coalitions in the process of decision-making further complicates, and Keohane and Nye suggest that such problems are exacerbated in larger states in the international system.

The book was often cited during the so-called ‘third’ great debate in the Anglo-American study of international relations. The first debate was between realists and idealists in the 1930s, the second was between traditionalists and behavioural scientists in the 1950s and 1960s, and in the late 1970s, Keohane and Nye added their voices to the ‘inter-paradigm’ debate. Textbooks were written and courses were taught that portrayed the field as divided between realism, complex interdependence and radical Marxism. Each paradigm seemed to have its own agenda of issues, identification of key actors and theoretical models. And yet, between 1977 and the publication of After Hegemony in 1984, Keohane abandoned his attempt to portray ‘complex interdependence’ as a rival model to realism. There are, I think, three basic reasons for this.

First, as a number of writers pointed out, the portrait of realism contained in the 1977 volume was simplistic. Keohane and Nye had set realism up as a straw man. For example, no realist had ever argued that force was a usable and effective instrument of policy under any conditions and without qualification. As Stanley Michalak points out in his extensive review of the book,

Keohane and Nye do not ground their presentation of realism in a careful study of realist writings. Assertion after assertion about realism is not even documented by page references in footnotes, let alone any direct quotations. When Keohane and Nye quote from realists, these quotations are often out of context, largely irrelevant to the tenets imputed to realism, or of dubious validity.3

Second, the realists fought back. Without repeating the main arguments of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Krasner (covered elsewhere in this book), it is not true that the distribution of political and military power is unrelated to the condition of complex interdependence. For example, in his study on US raw materials policy, Krasner demonstrated the ability of the United States to pursue a consistent ‘national interest’ against the demands of domestic interest groups. He also showed a link between hegemonic power and the degree of complex interdependence in international trade. Kenneth Waltz, in his powerful articulation of the importance of the balance of power, showed that interdependence, far from rendering power obsolete, in fact
depended on the ability and willingness of the United States to pro-
vide the conditions under which other states could forego the com-
petition for relative gains and co-operate to maximize their absolute
gains from co-operation on trade and other issue-areas.

Finally, the Second Cold War of the late 1970s and early 1980s
undermined Keohane's and Nye's expectation that 'complex inter-
dependence' would expand and accelerate the obsolescence of
realism. By the early 1980s, Keohane acknowledged that his complex
interdependence model was not a clear alternative to realism. He
accepted many of the neorealist arguments linking the creation of
'regimes' in areas of trade, finance and the oil market to the presence
of American hegemony. He also conceded that power and inter-
dependence were not independent of one another. Indeed, it could
be argued that 'asymmetrical interdependence' (i.e. dependence) is in
fact a form of power relationship.

In 1984, Keohane published After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord
in the World Political Economy. The book is the culmination of
Keohane's attempt to synthesize structural realism and complex
interdependence. The hybrid product is known today as 'modified
structural realism' or 'neoliberal institutionalism'. Keohane tries to
determine how the international system might evolve towards stable
configurations of co-operation in spite of the decline of American
power relative to Japan and Europe since 1945. The theory of
cooperation is based on the functional utility of 'regimes' – principles,
rules, norms around which state expectations and behaviour converge
in a given issue-area – that assert the long-term, rational self-interest
of states in perpetuating co-operation despite shifts in the underlying
balance of power. He argues that such regimes are established primarily
to deal with political market failure. They lower the cost of
international transactions by delimiting permissible and impermissible
transactions, by combining transactions through issue linkage, thereby
enabling states to assemble packages of agreements, and by reducing
uncertainty.

In short, the maintenance of institutionalized co-operation among
states does not depend on the perpetuation of the hegemonic
conditions that are necessary to set regimes in place. Keohane then
tests his revised 'functional theory' of institutionalized co-operation
by examining the issue-areas of trade, oil and money. He finds that
the decline of American power is only part of the explanation for the
weakening of regimes in these areas. Even after 1970, when he believes
the United States ceased to be a hegemon, the advanced industrialized
countries have continued to try to co-ordinate their policies in the
world political economy. The world has not gone back to the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the 1930s, and international trade has not been sacrificed in favour of rigid blocs in Europe, the Americas and Asia.

Thus, Keohane’s intellectual path to answering the question at the back of his mind in the early 1960s has moved from a direct challenge to realism, to an attempt to accommodate its emphasis on the importance of power and self-interest in explaining the conduct of states. His answer is that, yes, power and self-interest are important, but writers such as Waltz, Gilpin and other structural realists exaggerate the degree to which the international system is anarchical. It is not. Despite the absence of a formal, legal hierarchy of authority at the international level, informal elements of governance exist in the form of regimes and ‘institutions’, ‘related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time’. They help states to overcome problems of collective action and market failures. In international relations, transaction costs are high and property rights are often ill-defined. States may not co-operate because they fear that others can renege on deals, or because they may not be able to monitor others’ behaviour. Institutions can be of great help in overcoming such problems. They allow the principle of reciprocity to function more efficiently by providing information about others’ preferences, intentions and behaviour. Thus, they allow states to move closer to the Pareto frontier. By altering the systemic environment, institutions facilitate changes in state strategies so that rational, self-interested states can continue to co-operate reliably over time.

Since the publication of *After Hegemony*, Keohane has continued to elaborate his neoliberal research programme, applying it to analyses of decision-making in the European community and the potential for greater co-operation in developing environmental regimes. Today, he is working on the role of domestic political factors in explaining the variation in compliance among states (and by particular states over time) to international agreements. In *After Hegemony*, he suggested that his systemic theory of international co-operation needed to be supplemented by a theory of learning within states, and we may expect the next stage of Keohane’s research to fill this important gap in the literature.

Critical reaction to Keohane’s work has been mixed. In one sense, there is no doubt that he has been a pivotal figure in inspiring a whole generation of graduate students to examine ‘regimes’ in a vast array of issue-areas in international relations. He has provided a theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses that others have used
to expand the empirical scope of international relations theory in the subfield of international political economy, which is now thriving in the discipline as a whole. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether his attempt to ‘modernize’ the liberal tradition and rid it of its traditional association with ‘idealism’ will succeed. In attempting to construct a positivist research programme of neoliberals, Keohane has attracted criticism from both sides of the fence, as it were.

First, many realists remain unconvinced that institutions really matter as much as Keohane thinks they do. For example, Joseph Grieco argues that even if the search for absolute gains from cooperation is facilitated by the existence of ‘regimes’, states remain what he calls ‘relative gains maximizers’. As he puts it,

> a state concerned about relative gains may decline to cooperate even if it is confident that partners will keep their commitments to a joint arrangement. Indeed, if a state believed that a proposed arrangement would provide all parties absolute gains, but would also generate gains favouring partners, then greater certainty that partners would adhere to the terms of the arrangement would only accentuate its relative gains concerns.\(^6\)

What matters most to states in particular issue-areas? The search for absolute gains, the achievement of which may be endangered by political market failures? Or are they equally concerned with the distribution of gains from co-operation among participants within a regime? In his scathing criticism of neoliberal institutionalism, John Mearsheimer argues that Keohane and his supporters have yet to surpass realist theories of war and peace, and have failed to demonstrate the crucial importance of institutions in reducing the likelihood of war among states.\(^7\)

Keohane’s work during the new millennium has focused primarily on the nexus between law and politics and the normative and structural dynamics of legal and political institutions. In a special issue of *International Organization*, Keohane collaborated with Anne Marie Slaughter, Kenneth Abbot and Andrew Moravscik on the concept of legalization. The systematic framework of legalization consists of three general variables: delegation, precision and transparency, each of which is designed to assess the causal effects of decision-making. The main problem with legalization, as the authors acknowledge, is the difficulty of identifying the causal effects of institutions (whether fairer trade practices reduce tension between and among member states of the World Trade Organization).
Moreover, among some liberals and ‘critical theorists’ in the study of international relations, Keohane has attracted rather different kinds of criticism. The convergence of international political economy around hegemonic stability theory, regime analysis and rational choice models of state behaviour has been criticized by Richard Leaver, among others, as a form of involution, not evolution. David Long, in calling for ‘the closure’ of the Harvard School, argues that Keohane’s project robs liberalism of its critical edge as an emancipatory project for individuals. Thus to some extent, Keohane’s project, which tries to build a bridge between realists and liberals, has failed to satisfy the former and has outraged some of the latter. But this may be the inevitable fate of bridge-builders in the ‘divided discipline’, where debates over the adequacy of alternative ‘paradigms’ are primarily normative rather than empirical.

Notes

**Keohane’s major writings**

*Transnational Relations and World Politics* (with Joseph Nye), Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1972.


*Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (with Helen Milner), New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996.


See also: **Haas, Ruggie, Waltz, Wendt**

**Further reading**


In 1986, when a major international concern was Ronald Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ programme and the risks this raised of turning the new Cold War into a hot one, Richard Rosecrance published *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. In it he argued that the classic geopolitical preoccupations of territory and military power, which dated from the Peace of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648, symbolizing the transition from the medieval to the modern era, were – at last – nearly obsolete. Despite the key exceptions of the (then) Soviet Union and the United States, trade had replaced territorial expansion and military might, he argued, as the key to international prestige, power and wealth. The balance of trade was supplanting the balance of power. What appeared to be a novel proposition in the mid-1980s has, with the end of the Cold War, become more broadly accepted. In the 1990s, Rosecrance has continued to develop and apply the argument he presented in 1986, building on the thesis and exploring its implications for peace and democracy in the twenty-first century.

Of course, the proposition was not entirely novel: Norman Angell made very similar arguments in the early years of this century. Unlike Angell, however, Rosecrance writes at a level of theoretical sophistication that reflects his long-standing academic interest in the development of international relations theory and, in particular, in the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, Rosecrance has the enviable ability (which he shares with Angell) to write for an informed general public, as well as fellow academics in
international relations. Whereas Angell was a journalist, Rosecrance has spent most of his career in a university setting, although he came to academia via the US State Department, working on the Policy Planning Council. At present, he is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at UCLA, and also the Director of its Center for International Relations. Although Rosecrance now teaches and writes at the university from which he received his BA in 1952, he has taught at a number of American universities. He was awarded his MA in 1954 from Swarthmore College and completed his doctoral thesis at Harvard University in 1957. Before taking up his present position, for many years Rosecrance was Carpenter Professor of International and Comparative Politics at Cornell.

Rosecrance established his reputation in the field in the 1960s and early 1970s for his work on systems theory. He combined his extensive historical knowledge of European statecraft since the eighteenth century with formal explanatory models to explain state behaviour and the stability of different historical systems. In 1963, he published *Action and Reaction in World Politics*, and a decade later, *International Relations: Peace or War?* (1973). The latter summarizes the historical analyses of the earlier work and elaborates on its general discussion of foreign policy-making. In *Action and Reaction*, Rosecrance is concerned with long-term developments in international relations and the way in which fundamental changes in both the nature of states and the international environment have altered the nature of relations between states. These themes have evolved throughout his career, and are reflected in his writing on interdependence, the balance of power, the adequacy of existing theories and the dynamics of the post–Cold War era.

In his first book, Rosecrance divides the history from 1740 to the present (*circa* early 1960s) into nine historical systems. In general, he uses the outbreak of war to delimit the end of one system and the beginning of another. Unlike those who use the term ‘system’ to refer to a continuous process of political relations at the international level, Rosecrance refers to what might be called the ‘diplomatic constellations’ or the patterns of power and diplomatic relations that characterize a given historical period. Major changes in these patterns, often accompanied by conflict, indicate the development of a new system. On average, each system lasts only for a couple of decades.

Rosecrance claims the stability of any system is determined by the relationship between four major variables or ‘determinants’. Interestingly, three of these refer to the actions of states that compose the system.
These are the direction which elite groups give to foreign policy (and the compatibility of direction and objectives between states), the degree of control of elites over foreign policy within their respective states, and the resources (‘persuasive skills, the quantity of mobilizable resources and the speed of mobilization’) which can be used in support of foreign policy. Of these determinants, he argues that the second is most crucial in explaining systemic stability. Four of the nine systems were in ‘disequilibrium’ when there were major changes in the security of tenure of national elites, suggesting that the latter often attempt to solidify support by aggressive behaviour in the international system. However, in the final analysis, the stability of any particular system depends most on the fourth determinant, the capacity of the environment to absorb or placate the objectives of states. In turn, capacity can be analysed in terms of the interplay between regulative forces (direct preventative action against disruptive policies) and more passive environmental factors.1

Rosecrance’s argument in the 1960s and early 1970s is a direct challenge to structural realism, according to which the international system can be treated as an entity separable from the interactions of the states within it, rather than a network of relations among sub-system actors. According to Rosecrance, it is not possible to isolate domestic from foreign policy in evaluating systemic stability. System-wide action is brought into play only in response to policy initiatives of member states. In Action and Reaction, Rosecrance leaves little doubt that he believes the chief causes of foreign policy behaviour lie within domestic political systems. Serious international instability and upheaval arise from the inability of the existing international system to cope with the disturbances from domestic causes. Thus, on the one hand, the wars of 1792–1815 can be explained by the attempt to export the domestic ideology of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France and, on the other, the need of conservative regimes to protect or restore their domestic positions.2

Similarly, the upsurge of nationalism and the wars of national unification, which destabilized mid-nineteenth-century Europe and led to the final collapse of the Concert of Europe, arose from the successful attempts of conservative elites to outbid their liberal opponents in domestic struggles for political power. The liberals had used democracy to rally the people against conservative rule, but the conservatives won back support by appealing to nationalism, thereby combining traditionalism and democracy. The environmental capacity of the system in Europe was limited by the absence of open territory, and the result was a great deal of unregulated conflict. The great age
of nineteenth-century imperialism, which began to develop after the collapse of the Concert of Europe, was directly related to it. Within Europe, Bismarck re-established a form of the Concert under Germany as a unilateral regulator. But a continuation of conservative–nationalist political control and a more general background of social and political unrest accompanied this. Even when more liberal governments achieved power, as in Britain and France, they could maintain themselves in office only by fulfilling nationalist expectations. At the same time, the international environment offered vast territories available for conquest outside Europe, where expansion had been made difficult by the rise of ‘national’ populations eager to defend the territorial integrity of ‘their’ states. Rosecrance argues that this is the fundamental cause of European imperial expansion. For as soon as the new extra-European territories available for conquest had all been taken, these mutual national antagonisms, which arose originally within states, turned back inward upon Europe, leading ultimately to the First World War. In his later book, and in response to criticism that he had exaggerated the degree to which international stability depended on domestic variables, Rosecrance modifies the force of his earlier arguments. He admits that there is no conclusive link between domestic upheaval and international violence and instability, but maintains his basic argument that the former will tend to promote the latter, and that nineteenth-century imperialism is a classic example of the close link between foreign and domestic policy.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Rosecrance shifted his focus and began to study the degree to which the international environment was changing and the consequences of such change for American foreign policy. The arguments of The Rise of the Trading State emerged in part from Rosecrance’s examination of the empirical data on the degree to which states were becoming more interdependent in international relations and the varying interpretations of this data by realists and liberals in the late 1970s. He believed that the data were ambiguous. There was some evidence that states were becoming more ‘interconnected’, in that one could identify increasingly common movements in such factors as prices in a number of countries. Rosecrance investigated the degree to which variations in wholesale prices, consumer prices, interest rates and wage rates showed similarities in the major industrialized economies from 1890 to 1975. Similarities in variation were established by correlating indices of the four factors, and he discovered that neither realists nor liberals were correct. The evidence was mixed, suggesting both sharp
discontinuities between phases of growth and diminishing interconnectedness over the past century. In 1981, in a critical review of Kenneth Waltz, Rosecrance argued that the international system could not be understood solely with the analytical tools of either realism or liberalism; we need both.

The future study of international politics will have to take account of the failure of [each]. Power and [the number of great powers] are sufficient criteria neither of international politics nor international stability. Instead, international politics exists on a continuum that ranges from Waltz’s extreme structural formulation at one end, in which all units are homogeneous, to an extreme formulation at the other, in which all units are heterogeneous. Neither is sufficient by itself and neither, like the model of pure competition in formal economics, applies consistently. Most cases exist toward the middle of a continuum.

Five years later, Rosecrance published his most well known book, *The Rise of the Trading State*. In it he rejects ‘monistic’ explanatory frameworks for the study of international relations. Instead, he proposes a ‘dualistic’ approach, suggesting that the international system is characterized by the presence of two worlds, the ‘military–political world’ and the ‘trading world’.

In part, Rosecrance was inspired by the experience of Japan. In the first half of this century, Japan rose as a political–military state, pursuing mercantilist policies of territorial expansion in Asia that were overcome (or ‘regulated’, to use the term from Rosecrance’s earlier work) only after a very destructive world war. In contrast, since 1945 Japan has become a trading state, relying on trade and specialization in the global division of labour to generate wealth and economic growth. Like Angell in the first decade of the twentieth century, Rosecrance supports a version of commercial liberalism, although unlike Angell he does not imply that interdependence will inevitably triumph over the logic of territoriality. However, on balance, he suggests that the future of international relations will be characterized by a shift in states’ priorities from the logic of military competition to the logic of trade and interdependence.

The reasons for this switch are very simple, and can be understood on the basis of rational choice. In the nuclear era, the costs of territorial expansion and military defence are rising exponentially, while the benefits are declining. Since the Second World War, the benefits of trade have risen in comparison with the costs, and those states
(such as Japan) that understand the advantages of trade are benefiting at the expense of states such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, as war has become more costly and dangerous, domestic support for militarism and high defence expenditure has declined. Finally, since 1945, the previous trend towards fewer states in the international system has been reversed. From the Middle Ages to the end of the nineteenth century, the number of states in Europe had shrunk from about 500 to fewer than 25. But after the Second World War, when European empires finally collapsed and decolonization proceeded apace, the number of states in the world grew to about 150 by the mid-1960s. After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are at present 192 member states in the United Nations, and that number may be closer to 200 in the mid-part of the twenty-first century. In this context, the importance of trade between states becomes crucial for their continued survival. In response to those who argue that similar optimistic predictions about the peaceful consequences of trade in the late nineteenth century did not prevent the First World War, Rosecrance argues that the logic of the trading system is much more powerful today than ever before. While he does not discount the possibility of nuclear war between the behemoths of the international system, the alleged ‘superpowers’, he argues that they are capable of change and can adapt to the requirements of the trading state.

Rosecrance’s key book was published when Reagan was still in power. Gorbachev had yet to embark on his policies of perestroika and glasnost, and many observers were still fearful that the ‘second Cold War’ of the 1980s could end in a nuclear holocaust. If anything, then, Rosecrance’s analysis has been strengthened by events over the past decade. The number of states has continued to rise, and both Russia and China are trying hard to join the capitalist trading system from which they were excluded for much of the Cold War era. The collapse of the ideological competition between communism and capitalism has been replaced by the hegemony of the world market as the only ‘civilization’ at the end of the twentieth century.

In his more recent writing, Rosecrance argues that we are now in the era of the ‘virtual state’. Although the process is not universal, and while less-developed countries still rely on land to produce foodstuffs and crops for export, capital, labour and information are more mobile factors of production than ever before. In this environment, developed states would rather compete in the world market than acquire territory. The ‘virtual state’ is one that does not try to increase its territorially based productive capability. Instead, like the headquarters
of a giant corporation, it invests in services and people rather than amassing expensive production capacity, and contracts out other functions to states that specialize in them. Equally, it may play host to the capital and labour of other states. To promote economic growth, the virtual state specializes in modern technical and research services, and derives its income not just from high-value manufacturing, but from product design, marketing and financing.

While Rosecrance continues to argue that his own version of commercial liberalism will dominate international relations in the future, he is not unaware of the continuation of the military–political world and the need for some ‘regulation’ of the new international system emerging from the Cold War. He argues that there is still a need for some version of the nineteenth-century Concert system. Today, the United States, Russia, China, Japan and the European Union must co-operate to ensure the stability of the system. Progress is not automatic, the balance of power is not a ‘self-regulating’ system, and the dynamics of global capitalism are likely to promote inequality between (and within) states, at least in the short term. Any coalition of states can be sustained only on the basis of three principles: ‘involvement of all, ideological agreement, and renunciation of war and territorial expansion, giving liberal democratic and economic development first priority’. In the absence of agreement on such principles, the benign consequences of the new system may not materialize, and Rosecrance is aware that there is an inherent tension between the demands of commercial liberalism in the 1990s and the prospects for democratic liberalism. In successful virtual states, the traditional demands of advanced democracies – high government spending, larger deficits and more social benefits – have to be subordinated to the demands of the international marketplace – low inflation, rising productivity, a strong currency and a flexible and trained workforce. The social instability that accompanied the recent collapse of many Asian currencies testifies to the difficulties of reconciling the demands of economic growth and political participation.

Despite these difficulties, Rosecrance remains convinced that the contemporary international system can be a stable one. In addition to the need for international regulation to deal with the complex problems of transition from one system to another, he has written a great deal on the need for the United States to adapt to the demands of change. In 1976, he edited a book entitled America as an Ordinary Country, in which he argued that the United States could no longer be expected to take on special responsibilities in the international system. It needed to become an ‘average’ state, the relative decline of
which required it to play the role of balancer in the international system, rather than the state to which others looked up for leadership. In 1990, he published *America’s Economic Resurgence*, a wide-ranging examination of the ways in which the United States needs to reform its domestic and foreign policies, particularly with Japan, if it is to take advantage of international systemic change in the next century.

**Notes**

2. Ibid., pp. 236–39.

**Rosecrance’s major writings**


See also: Keohane, Waltz
Further reading

Barry Jones, R.J. and Willetts, Peter (eds), *Interdependence on Trial*, London, Pinter, 1984.

Constructivism is a distinctive approach to international relations that focuses on the social interaction of agents or actors in world politics. For constructivists, state interaction reflects a learning process in which action shapes, and is shaped by, identities, interests and values over time. In contrast to other theoretical approaches, social constructivism explores the construction and regulative influence of international norms; it seeks, in other words, to link the fundamental institutional structures with state identity and interests. At the same time, however, institutions themselves are constantly reproduced and, potentially, changed by the activities of states and other actors. Institutions and actors are mutually conditioning entities.

According to constructivists, international institutions have both regulative and constitutive functions. Regulative norms set basic rules for standards of conduct by prescribing or proscribing certain behaviours. Constitutive norms define a behaviour and assign meanings to that behaviour. Without constitutive norms, actions would be unintelligible. The familiar analogy that constructivists use to explain constitutive norms is that of the rules of a game, such as chess. In this sense, constitutive norms enable the actors to play the game and provide the actors with the knowledge necessary to respond to each other’s moves in a meaningful way. States, moreover, have a corporate identity that generates basic state goals, such as physical security, stability, recognition by others, and economic development. However, how states fulfil their goals depends upon their social identities – how states see themselves in relation to other states in international society. On the basis of these identities, states construct their national interests.

In recent years, constructivism in international relations has assumed a far more central role in many theoretical debates. Indeed, for many it can now be considered one of the central paradigmatic...
approaches of international relations theory. There are arguably three principal strands of constructivism in international relations: a so-called ‘middle ground’; a self-reflexive approach; and a pragmatic, discursive strand. Alexander Wendt is perhaps the most notable constructivist of the ‘middle ground’ in international relations theory. His efforts to bring together rationalism and constructivism within a systematic framework have resulted in many crucial insights into the material dimensions and causal effects of socialization. The second approach derives largely from the writings of Friedrich Kratochwil, who argues for a self-reflexive, heterodoxical approach to constructivism. The third strand, in contrast, involves the application of Habermas’s communicative action theory to world politics.
FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL

Friedrich Kratochwil was raised in Germany and received his advanced training in international studies at Princeton University. He now teaches international relations theory and international law and organizations at the European University Institute. During the 1990s and the first few years of the new millennium, Kratochwil served as the first editor of the now well established and highly ranked *European Journal of International Relations*. Under his tenure, the journal quickly became one of the premier venues for publishing articles on constructivist and applied constructivist approaches to international relations. Indeed, one could argue that the *European Journal*, more than any other international relations journal, helped facilitate the rise of constructivism as a paradigmatic approach in international relations, and that it was Kratochwil’s constructivist approach that encouraged many to submit their contributions to the journal. Even more important has been Kratochwil’s open-ended constructivist approach, in which he has steadfastly chosen to engage the mainstream (rationalism) on issues of interpretation and alternative explanations, and insisted that constructivism remains an alternative, heterodoxical theoretical approach to international relations. This, however, has placed him at odds with many middle-ground constructivist approaches, which, as noted in the introduction to this section, seek to reconcile the scientific assumptions and ontological priorities of rationalism with constructivist tenets (the mutual constitutivity of agent and structure).¹

Thus, rather than embracing some of the scientific assumptions of rationalism, Kratochwil has elected to focus on the epistemological limits and problems of rationalism and, to a lesser extent, middle-ground constructivism. It is for this reason that many have come to regard his critique of rationalism as radical or deconstructionist. Both labels, however, are not entirely fair. In fact, Kratochwil’s approach is far less combative or uncompromisingly contested than it is discursive in nature. Indeed, his open-ended critique is neither deconstructionist nor post-Nietzschean, but partakes of immanent social theory rooted in the emancipatory project and its attendant guiding principles of rationality, history, justice and liberty. It would therefore be more reasonable to conclude that Kratochwil would agree most with Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit’s critical assessment of the compatibility between critical theory and constructivism: that constructivism can and should be reconciled with critical theory.² Certainly he would concur that it is the responsibility of social theorists to understand the changing
meaning of the concepts they use to explain and understand social relations.

In short, Kratochwil’s approach might best be summed up as follows: to ensure that we maintain an open-ended dialogue about what constitutes social knowledge or what reproduces social life in international relations. There is, in other words, a tendency within the social sciences to objectify thoughts, ideas and interests. Kratochwil’s overarching mission is to expose and interrogate these tendencies within constructivism itself, and within other international relations theories. If, then, Robert Keohane can be considered the principal gatekeeper of much of mainstream and alternative international relations theory, then Kratochwil might well be considered the gatebreaker, though not in the Nietzschean sense of value-breaker. By gate-breaker, we are referring to his aim of constructing reflexive self-understandings of international relations, that is, an open-ended approach that eliminates the ontological (or structural) constraints on our understanding of the world. Keeping an open mind in this sense is much like keeping the gates open, or eliminating the need for a gatekeeper to impose his or her own preferences as to what counts as practical knowledge in the discipline.

Kratochwil’s constructivist approach is shaped by two central tenets of critical social theory. First and foremost, social critical theory opposes positivist formulations of knowledge, that is, the idea that scientific knowledge of our social world is acquired through objective and positivist methods based on the separation of fact and value, or the objectification of facts for hypothesis-testing and explanation (of social behaviour). Second, critical social theory holds that concepts and theory can never be fixed per se. Rather, concepts remain contingent on our social experience and social change. As already noted, it is this notion of contingency, or the irreducibility of facts and social experience to any fixed construct (hegemony), that places Kratochwil either before or beyond middle-ground constructivism.

For Kratochwil, Wendt’s scientific realism constitutes an ambitious, albeit problematic effort to systematize constructivism. Here he argues that Wendt’s scientific realism confuses the difference between materialism and cognition/ideas and that his version of scientific realism is a disguised version of positivism. Yet the most significant problem with Wendt’s theory, as Kratochwil suggests, is that the variables of coercion, calculation and belief, and their grounding in three corresponding cultures (Hobbes, Locke and Kant), usher in what he calls a new orthodoxy, in which culture and ideas are reducible to material resources. This raises many questions regarding the problematic
relationship between causal and constitutive theorizing, including whether constitutive theorizing has become subordinated to causal theory (rather than being treated as independent, as Wendt insists); and if this ahistorical scientific framework of Wendt’s scientific realism restricts alternative approaches from shaping such a holistic approach. For Wendt, this may be the necessary tradeoff for social scientists in international relations; however, for Kratochwil it succeeds only in creating a historically impoverished theory that is neither sensitive to, nor convincingly accommodating of, postmodernism. At the very least, it calls into question whether the tradeoff is a wholesale abandonment of one of the (postmodern) theories it seeks to preserve and reconcile.

The purpose of social theory, then, is to question the practical reasons for making such tradeoffs in the first place. In what is largely regarded as his most influential work, *Rules, Norms and Decisions*, Kratochwil distinguishes between scientific and practical reasoning. He claims that reasoning about international rules and norms should represent a more open-ended and practically oriented approach. As Kratochwil puts it: ‘practical reasoning not only deals with issues of action but also investigates the formal properties of arguments which satisfy neither the conditions of induction nor those of deduction.’

Practical reasoning does not assume that knowledge can be reduced to ontology, and ontology to reason. Instead, the logical and contextual meanings of actions reflect the choices and reasons we make and the desire we hold to play by the rules. The important point to consider here is that knowledge can never attain some fixed and autonomous position in our social experience.

Yet it would be unfair to say that Kratochwil would openly endorse Ernesto Laclau’s conceptualization of social order in terms of undecidability, or some ‘in-between’ position that can never be fully understood. Nor would it be fair to say that Kratochwil is an anti-rationalist. Rather, Kratochwil’s approach to international relations seems more closely aligned, in this instance, with communicative action theory, and other social critical theories of the Frankfurt School. This alignment has earned Kratochwil some critics, including those who argue that his approach remains empirically challenged, or unsuitable to produce empirical knowledge that could validate his complex epistemological claims.

If, then, there is one predominant theme in Kratochwil’s work, it is that facts, structures, values are not autonomous, given units or entities. Postmodernists, as discussed in the Postmodernism section of this book, dismiss such autonomization by deconstructing the very power
relations and structures that are assumed to operate independently of an agent’s beliefs and actions. However, it is important to realize the tension between his and postmodernist claims: while Kratochwil may not endorse the undecidability or the indestructibility of difference, he does recognize the need for heterodox theory in international relations to challenge existing orthodox positions. Again, for Kratochwil the recurring question in international relations is this: why do we treat structures and facts as autonomous and fixed in the first place? And how does immanent social theory explain the limits and problems of theorizing about our globalizing world? There are two ways in which Kratochwil addresses these questions.

First, values are constitutive of the social reality we seek to explain and understand. In fact, as Kratochwil suggests, actors acquire their knowledge through their particular surroundings or social contexts: they act and form their own choices from their particular cultural understandings of the world. In this sense, international relations concepts such as anarchy, sovereignty and international norms represent the political and social means of understanding and describing this dynamic. As he states: ‘Precisely because social reality is not simply out there but is made by the actors, the concepts we use are part of a vocabulary that is deeply imbricated with our political projects.’ Kratochwil, like most critically engaged social theorists, remains committed to confronting and interrogating methodological assumptions of theories, as to do immanent social theory is to show that the constant flux of our ideas and thoughts is also simultaneously shaping social relations and knowledge. This is what it means to be a critical theorist, that is, to be self-conscious of the social genesis of facts and values.

In short, we must be self-conscious of the social order we are assuming, or are tying to establish. As mentioned above, practical reasoning calls into question the very idea that scientific knowledge can produce objective results. Because sentiment and emotions reflect loyalties to something, they must be accounted for in the process of understanding the exchange of ideas between and among actors. As Kratochwil states: ‘Here both a mistaken scientism and legalism have blinded us to the fact that issues of justice…depend on shared sentiments of resentment, as well as those of compassion. Similarly “trust” and the “pride” one feels when a (common) undertaking has succeeded, as well as sentiments of “loyalty” are important resources for solving collective problems.’ Invoking the constitutivity of emotions is only one mode through which we can begin to understand what Kratochwil
refers to as the ‘inter’ in international relations, or the in-between space in international relations theory.

Second, history does not follow a linear or teleological path, nor is it deterministic. History instead reflects a complex process in which forgetting about events often constitutes the reason for investigating our past. As he explains, ‘social theory cannot be disengaged from history since history not only incorporates the politics of things but historical reflection is...the precondition for a proper appreciation of action and agency’.8 Put differently, remembering events or things past constitutes a processual mode of historical knowledge, one in which the process of remembering reflects the acquisition of lost knowledge of things past. As he puts it: ‘By approaching history not in terms of the fixity of the past, but through the modality of remembering, individuals and collectivities can transcend the confinements imposed by seemingly autonomous systems and find new ways of mastering their destiny, that we attribute to it’.9

Kratochwil’s contribution to international relations is both complex and wide-ranging. Yet his radical critique of international relations theory remains crucial to developing heterodox theory in international relations. For many, this remains an overlooked component of constructing a reflexive, open-ended critical international relations theory. It may be fair to say that Kratochwil would remain critical of any approach that builds on a given or assumed social order.

Notes


5. Ibid., p. 12.

**Kratochwil’s major writings**


See also: Onuf, Wendt, Reus-Smit

**Further reading**


**Nicholas Onuf**

Nearly all scholars and students of international relations and political theory are very familiar with the ‘state of nature’ metaphor from Hobbes’s
The Leviathan, and/or the variants offered by Locke, Rousseau and other liberal theorists. Whether utilized in theorizing the origin of states or the social contract, or deployed metaphorically to describe international anarchy, the ‘state of nature’ is ubiquitous in social theory. While there are important variations, all forms of this metaphor describe the ‘state of nature’ as a pre-social world of atomistic individuals where life and property are vulnerable to predations from other atomistic individuals; industry is discouraged; and community, political or otherwise, is impossible. The creation of an authority – the Leviathan – allows an escape from this state of nature and the rest of the story to begin. The metaphorical dividing line between the state of nature and the hierarchical political state also serves, for many, as the demarcation between the organizing principles of the disciplines of international relations and political science/political theory. The state of nature is equivalent to anarchy and the recurrence of similar patterns of violence and distrust, while the political state allows for hierarchy, normative theory and history. Martin Wight famously used this distinction to explain ‘why there is no international theory’.¹

Now, how individuals move from being pre-social to agreeing to some sort of social order has always been a rich source of philosophical and political speculation. For Nicholas Onuf, however, the Hobbesian construction of the ‘state of nature’ is where many of our problems begin. For Onuf, there is no pre-social human endeavour; we are always, already deeply embedded in social practices, and the problem with much social theory is that it is (micro-)founded on a conception of autonomous individuals that is essentially pre-social. Onuf describes the forms of social theory committed to an atomistic, rational, maximizing individual as operating within the paradigm of liberalism, and argues ‘anarchy is liberalism carried to its logical extreme: the only limits on rational conduct are those imposed by material conditions’.² Onuf’s description of liberalism, then, subsumes theories of (neo)liberalism and (neo)realism within international relations. Due to the impoverished form of social theory resulting from this asocial foundation, Onuf rejects liberalism and offers ‘constructivism’ in its place. To those who would object that most of the discipline is founded on what Onuf broadly described as liberalism, and that to abandon it would require a wholesale recasting of international relations, Onuf’s ambitious response from World of Our Making is worth quoting at length:

The reconstruction of international relations requires that the discipline be stripped of its current pretensions. If this is taken as
abandonment of international relations (the discipline as it is) and the possibility of international theory (theory peculiar to international relations), then I agree. I do not agree that it means giving up on international relations as well. Rather it honors their importance and thus their place in the operative paradigm of political society. More than any other matters of politics, international relations are the subject of this book only because I have thought more about them. Such is the legacy of my discipline.3

Clearly, for Onuf there is no strong distinction to be made between a discipline of international relations and other forms of political theory. His call for a ‘reconstruction’ of the discipline is based on a different approach or theoretical framework he calls ‘constructivism’, a term he is widely credited with coining for the field.

Nicholas Onuf was born in 1941 and received his undergraduate and PhD degrees from Johns Hopkins University. While an undergraduate and graduate student he had a serious interest in international law, and his dissertation was entitled ‘The conscious development of international law’. It is perhaps not surprising that a scholar so taken with ‘rules’ and ‘rule’ would have come from a background in international law. Onuf taught at the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC from 1970 to 1994, until he moved to Florida International University in Miami, Florida. He co-chairs the Miami International Relations Group, a faculty and graduate seminar, with Vendulka Kubálková of the University of Miami. While Onuf’s scholarly interests in international relations and international law resulted in a number of articles and edited collections in the 1970s and 1980s, his ground-breaking World of Our Making appeared in 1989, offered a significant challenge for the discipline of international relations and, along with the work of Alexander Wendt, inaugurated an ongoing conversation around the perspective of ‘constructivism’ in international relations.

World of Our Making is Onuf’s most influential text and it launched his reputation as an important scholar of international relations. Before this ambitious book, one could already see a scholar interested in questioning the orthodoxies of the discipline. A good example is Onuf’s argument about the origins of the discipline’s understanding of anarchy. Every student of international relations is familiar with the realist argument that anarchy – the lack of a global sovereign or Leviathan – and its consequences can be seen in the works of Thucydides and Machiavelli. Part of the appeal of realism is its
ahistorical nature, the eternal recurrence of power politics. Onuf, drawing on the political theorist J.G.A. Pocock, argues that our contemporary understanding of anarchy is of much more recent origin. Essentially, Onuf argues that it was only with the rise of democratic regimes, and the attendant needs for legitimacy of the ruler, that our contemporary understanding of order inside the state evolved. And it was this conception of order inside the state that anarchy would be negatively defined against. Thus, with the birth of legal principles of rule inside the state, the lack of such legal principles outside the state gave rise to our contemporary accounts of anarchy. Before the rise of modern liberal political theory, the justification for order and authority was dependent on religious and other principles, and the 'problem of anarchy' was not anything like the contemporary account. In an article tracing the history of international legal order, Onuf argues:

In the Middle Ages the order–authority problem simply did not exist. The affairs of man obtained their order from a higher, authoritative order. Authority attested to the fact of higher order and assured mundane order. That order was imperfectly realized in human affairs cast no doubt on the perfection of its source or even the legitimacy of its less than perfect agents. It is this openly anti-empirical quality of medieval thought that lent itself to secular challenges and in due course invited the scientific revolution. International legal doctrine reflects the long decline of the medieval world view. Secular challenges to the premise of a higher order eventually prevailed, perhaps too thoroughly, by denying the existence of order at any level.¹

Onuf’s investigations are, of course, very concerned with how order occurs, operates and is defined. His World of Our Making was his audacious attempt to answer these questions about social order through the concepts of ‘rules’ and ‘rule’. Onuf draws heavily on the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens as well as the linguistic theory of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Onuf argues that agents (people) and structures (recurrent forms of social institutions) mutually constitute each other. This is a seemingly simple but very important point in understanding Onuf’s argument. Against the asocial and micro-founded, broadly construed liberalism that he is attacking, Onuf argues that structures matter. No individual is ever free of, or precedes, the social structures in which they live. At the same time, against some forms of structuralism, Onuf is arguing that structures are not ontologically
prior to individuals and they do not wholly determine the individual. Neither agents nor structures are ontologically prior or privileged in Onuf’s formulation. They mutually constitute each other.

Given the mutual constitution of agents and structures, how do humans make sense of the world they live in? According to Onuf, here drawing on Giddens, they use rules. Social practices are defined by rules – indeed, rules are in some sense the condition of existence for social interaction. Onuf uses Searle’s speech act theory to identify three types of rule. The first is ‘assertive’, where a claim is made about the world in the manner of ‘this is that type of thing’ or ‘X is Y’. The second is ‘directive’, where an agent is directed to do something, as in ‘do this now’. The third type of rule is ‘commisive’ or ‘commitment’ rules, where agents commit themselves to performing some act, as in ‘I will do that’. Utilizing these three types of rule, Onuf spends much of World of Our Making demonstrating that they allow us to see the mutual constitution of structures and agents, and are ubiquitous in social life.

These categories derive from a consideration of language as enabling people to perform social acts and achieve ends by making statements of assertion, direction, and commitment. Once aware of these categories, I encountered various formulations of them in many texts, classic and contemporary, to engage my attention. They are discernible in great theories from which international relations scholars have adduced the centrality of anarchy for international relations...Because these categories apply equally to rules and rule, I see them significantly supporting the rules–rule coupling as decisive for political society. Because they bear on the full range of human practices for which political society is the operative term, they are indispensable for sorting out the materials that close reading provides for the disciplinary construction project.5

Onuf then utilizes these three rules in the rest of the book, which is divided into two sections, on ‘rules’ and ‘rule’. Onuf claims ‘Whenever rules have the effect of distributing advantages unequally, the result is rule’.6 Using the three ‘rules’, Onuf finds all sorts of categories, relationships and formulations that help explain social life and, of course, international relations. He provides a ‘synoptic table’ at the back of the book, which is of some assistance but doesn’t exactly simplify his abstract and wide-ranging text, and one has to wonder if the ‘world of our making’ isn’t being forced into our three
categories a bit too often. Of course, Onuf is not the first Western theorist to be enamoured of things coming in threes, and perhaps the social construction of religion has something to do with that.

Onuf is convincing in his argument that anarchy, as conceptually deployed in international relations theory, is a thoroughly modern construct. Onuf’s argument about rules and rule constituting order suggests that he might be open to the English School’s interest in how order occurs under anarchy. Marlene Wind, in an insightful entry on Onuf in Masters in the Making, claims: ‘As Nick Rengger among others has noted, there is a rather obvious link between constructivism and the concerns of the English international relations tradition.’ Coming from a different direction, Ronen Palan, in an article that critiques constructivism in international relations, claims that Onuf’s work has affinities with poststructuralism that Onuf is unaware of.

Like many in IR, Onuf appears to confuse poststructuralism with its IR variant – and correctly rejects the latter. Unfortunately, in rejecting the IR variant of poststructuralism and by assuming that it is equivalent to poststructuralism in the social sciences, Onuf finds himself unable to connect to the very tradition that shares his fundamental assumption. The starting point of poststructural research is the notion that ‘what dominates (society) is the practice of language’. Discourse in Anglo-Saxon scholarship is commonly associated with language, but there are many other linguistic and non-linguistic forms of discourse. When Onuf says ‘constructivism begins with deeds. Deeds done, acts taken, words spoken – These are all that facts are’, Onuf does not know it, but he is in fact working with Lacan and Foucault’s notion of discourse. Indeed, replace the Lacanian schemata with Onuf’s rule and the language becomes almost identical.

Given Onuf’s deep knowledge of literatures surrounding law, political and social theory and international relations, it is probably fair to assume that Onuf recognizes the points of commonalities in his work and other perspectives, and chooses to maintain his distance. There is no simple way to determine why Onuf has maintained this distance, but a clue might be available in the task he set himself of ‘reconstructing’ International Relations as international relations. This may also help explain why the ‘constructivist’ work of Wendt, another scholar considered a ‘founder’ of constructivism, has received more attention. This may be because Wendt seems intent on developing
constructivist theory that allows a seat at the table of neopositivist international relations. Other more post-positivist and interpretive forms of constructivism have also generated enthusiasm in a way that Onuf’s systematic reconstruction has not. When you set out to reconstruct international relations and, arguably, social science, you are in danger of painting yourself into a corner. This is not a criticism of Onuf as much as an acknowledgement of the Herculean task he set for himself.

While World of Our Making and subsequent articles have garnered the most attention for Onuf, he has also written a book on republican thought entitled The Republican Legacy in International Thought. In this text, Onuf sets out to rescue republicanism from liberalism (or liberal internationalism). Consistent with arguments made in World of Our Making, Onuf claims that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the triumph of the liberal individual, and the liberal state, in legal thought and political theory, obscuring the legacy of republican thought. Onuf traces republicanism back to the Greeks, and argues that republican thought evolved around the notion of community and the common good. By exploring the history of republican thought, Onuf is able to demonstrate that important areas of international relations, such as sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and the democratic peace, have been deeply influenced by republican thought. Of course, what makes republicanism attractive to Onuf is how the individual and the community constitute each other. In a claim about how society is constituted, we can see how Onuf’s understanding of agents and structures animates all of his work. ‘Individuals make societies through their deeds, and societies constitute individuals’.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 27.
6. Ibid., p. 22.


**Onuf’s major writings**


See also: *Kratochwil*

**Further reading**


**CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT**

During the late 1990s, international relations constructivists sought to establish a so-called ‘middle ground’ of constructivism, which could reconcile the scientific assumptions of rationalism with the epistemological claims of social constructivism. Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* stands out as perhaps the most visible and ambitious example of linking socialization with state power. In
addition to this middle-ground constructivism, though, is the Habermasian constructivist strand, which emerged during the late 1990s. As one of the most prominent theorists of this strand, Thomas Risse sought to apply Habermas’s communicative action theory to world politics in order, as he states, to ‘bridge the gap between constructivism and rationalism’. Risse, for instance, argued that rationalism, and to a lesser extent, constructivism, required a discursive framework to explain the behavioural outcomes in international politics. For him, decision-making bodies in international institutions were not simply about strategy-making or strategic action, but rather, reasoned argumentation that explained why actors learned to trust and agree with one another. The starting point for this latter process was moral persuasion, or a common knowledge rooted in empathy and the motivation to agree with one another. Christian Reus-Smit’s constructivist approach is, in many ways, similar to this communicative approach, but in other ways it is arguably a more substantive application of Habermas’s ideas, which interweaves differing perspectives into a conception of historical change and social interaction in international relations. Perhaps a better way to describe his approach is to say that it reflects a rich and sophisticated integration of ideas drawn from the traditions of historical sociology, discursive theory and constructivism, which focus primarily on the evolutionary dynamics and discursive properties of political structures and norms in international society.

In any event, it should be stressed that his Habermasian-based strand of social constructivism retains much of Habermas’s own scepticism towards ‘hard’ science and functionalism (or functional theory). As mentioned in this book’s essay on Habermas, Habermas’s communicative action theory is a hermeneutical approach designed to uncouple systems from lifeworld (the repository of cultural values in society from which we endlessly draw to formulate our social opinions), that is, to explain the cognitive elements of social action and the formation of differentiated systems. But where Habermas can become bogged down in jargon and abstract theory, Reus-Smit tends to be far more clear-cut and explicative of the complex social and historical dimensions of international institutional norms and societies. It is precisely because of these qualities that his approach assumes considerable heuristic value and appeal as a critical, yet pragmatic approach to social and political relations and norms.

Reus-Smit’s interest in constructivism began during his studies as a graduate student at Cornell University during the 1990s. There he completed his PhD dissertation (which would later be turned into his
first book, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, 1999) under the direction of Peter Katzenstein, one of the leading constructivists focusing on domestic foreign policy in various regions. Reus-Smit would later go on to teach at Monash University, then at The Australian National University, where he currently serves as Professor and Chair of the Department of International Relations and Politics. Reus-Smit’s oeuvre is clearly less voluminous than that of other key thinkers in this book, and one might make the argument that his adviser Peter Katzenstein, who has published extensively on constructivism, is a more *a propos* choice. However, it is precisely his innovative foci and highly imaginative, brilliant synthesis of ideas over a relatively brief period that distinguishes his contribution to constructivism. It is this defining feature that we need to assess more closely, first by assessing his attempt to reconcile critical theory approaches with constructivist ones in international relations, before turning to his work on law and politics.

Reus-Smit’s early work explores the relationship between critical international theory and constructivism. One of the key arguments in a co-authored article (with Richard Price), ‘Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory and constructivism’, is that constructivism, in spite of its engagement with the mainstream ‘on issues of interpretation and evidence, generalizations, alternative explanations and variation and comparability’, remains compatible with critical international theory.² In fact, constructivism and critical theory, they point out, arose from the same tradition of social theory (Marxism) and thus share similar methodological objectives of assessing the social origins of practice and human agency. Bridging constructivism with critical theory, therefore, is not unreasonable, but in fact remains an overlooked task of integrating critical strands of thought in international relations theory and, in this case, of explaining the evolution of international structures and norms.

It is this unmet social task that lies at the core of Reus-Smit’s first book, *The Moral Purpose of the State*.³ Here he focuses on the evolution of international society, analysing the different practices and norms of different societies, including ancient Greece, the Renaissance city-states and the modern states system. He argues that while each of these societies of states was governed by differing institutionalized practices and values, the differing governing norms show how values and beliefs are constitutive of evolving political structures, or what he calls ‘constitutional structures’. Tracing the evolution of norms and rules in this manner shows just how norms and rules have been shaped by changing social and political forces and
values. Yet most constructivist approaches assume that norms, rules and institutionalized practices are constitutive of, and constituted by, given values and beliefs of agents. For Reus-Smit, the very constitutivity of norms and institutional practices is part of a discursive and historical process that, if framed properly, can address why some norms have become new standards of legitimacy. Indeed, as he explains, constructivists have ‘failed to pay sufficient attention to the discursive mechanisms that link intersubjective ideas of legitimate and rightful state action to constitutional fundamental institutions’.4 Adopting scientific and ontological assumptions to ascertain the constitutive and causal properties of norms and values only begs the question of how the rationalization of interests and values legitimizes norms historically. As Reus-Smit puts it: ‘historically different international societies, in which different ideals of legitimate statehood prevailed, have developed different institutional orders, with multilateral diplomacy and contractual international law only emerging in a world where liberal states, and their principles of governance, have been ascendent’.5 The question, then, is not simply how norms and moral principles regulate and constitute state identity and power, but how they have emerged out of negotiations, agreements within international institutions such as international law and diplomacy.

According to Reus-Smit, all international structures consist of what he calls the ‘deep constitutive values of the society of states’.6 These tend to be human values such as peace, understanding, freedom, justice, respect and dignity, all of which shape the decision to adopt and legitimize new rules, norms and institutional practices. The knowledge gained from institutionalizing these constitutive values characterizes social and moral progress. For Reus-Smit, in fact, when institutions emerge to administer procedural norms, they also promote procedural justice. This type of justice does not merely concern the impartial application of rules, but is the product of negotiation and ethical and political deliberation. Granted, state consent remains a formal requirement for the implementation of law and rules, but such consent also depends on states’ and individuals’ capacity to identify with the moral efficacy of such rules. Thus, in his view, constructivists need to show that the ‘prevailing ideas of legitimate state identity are inextricably linked to the nature of the institutions that states construct to facilitate coexistence and cooperation’.7

In explaining this evolving process, Reus-Smit distinguishes between ‘fundamental institutions’ and what we referred to earlier as ‘constitutional structures’. As he explains: ‘constitutional structures are the foundational cons, comprising the constitutive values that define
Because constructivism is about generative structures, or the values that assume a constitutive and regulative function, it is important to situate these values within what he calls ‘the Constitutive Hierarchy of Modern International Institutions’. Only by historicizing constitutional structures within this schema are we able to grasp and appreciate the constitutive link between state identity and moral norms, or the emergence of new standards of legitimacy.

This constitutive link is also discursive in nature. As already indicated, Reus-Smit’s discursive approach is based largely on Habermas’s communicative action theory. Since institutions provide a forum for discussion and deliberation, they involve ethical and moral claims to truth, or reasons that are compelling enough to persuade others that new rules and norms need to be institutionalized. Legitimization is thus a discursive process in which the struggle to reach reasonable consensus presupposes the recognition of a fair and just authority to implement such rules. It is in this way that moral persuasion helps to explain the constitutivity of values.

For Reus-Smit, the discursive nature of institutions also suggests the compatibility between the English School and constructivism. Here he argues that the English School’s agency-based normative approach, or its focus on collective moral goals and principles of international and world society, can and should be discursively derived. Indeed, the emergence of trans-advocacy networks (non-governmental organizations) reinforces not only the (somewhat fragile) solidarity of a world society; it also shows how negotiations, agreements and reasoned argumentation represent the politics of these increasingly autonomous institutions. To be sure, this autonomizing trend remains a complicated process of moral political development. As he states, ‘there is great risk that the new transnational normative politics will run into a profound legitimation crisis’. Indeed, for Reus-Smit, the discursive autonomy of many institutions involves an intricate set of political challenges, including the developing capacity to serve the best interests of justice and to address the needs of individuals and other groups. In the first chapter of his edited book The Politics of International Law, he discusses how the ‘discourse of institutional autonomy’ has resulted in impartial discretion or strong self-perceptions of these actors’ independence from the political. Yet such independence, as he explains, remains inextricably linked to the negotiations and discussions that define the very essence of the political, or the politics of international institutions. As he puts it: ‘the international legal order shapes politics through its
discourse of institutional autonomy, language and practice of justification, multilateral form of legislation, and structure of obligation'.

He thus concludes that such autonomy requires clearer conceptions of the discursive politics of these institutions and the discursively based political strategies to resolve local and global problems.

But critics of Reus-Smit’s nuanced analysis of politics and law might object that less autonomy can actually reflect the politicization of justice, and that, furthermore, greater autonomy is not merely a little-understood political dimension of institutions, but is also a potentially corrective one in terms of institutional effectiveness. In other words, just because we know that certain norms have evolved does not mean that such knowledge will explain the responsiveness of institutions, or their capacity to serve the best interests of international society. What is more, it is not clear if the discursive properties of such institutions favour the particular interests of states, or those most adept at debating or negotiating. Rather than promoting greater fairness, some institutions might well benefit these particular, entrenched interests, thereby raising the question of whether the cosmopolitan principles of institutions can play a constructive part in the legitimization of norms and rules. This, after all, is what represents the deep-seated tension in Habermas’s own political writings, which Reus-Smit often glosses over in favour of a more streamlined Habermasian-based constructivist approach.

Of course, it is quite possible, as Habermas seems to imply, that a strong global public sphere will emerge out of the legitimization process of international law. However, Reus-Smit’s social constructivism does not necessarily work in this direction, since it remains seemingly more content with streamlining its explanation of the historical evolution of new moral standards of legitimacy. Yet, to his great credit, Reus-Smit reminds us that the deep and appreciable constitutive value of norms, principles and rules will continue to shape institutional practices in an open-ended manner.

Notes


**Reus-Smit’s major writings**


See also: Kratochwil, Habermas, Onuf

**Further reading**


**JOHN GERARD RUGGIE**

In May 1997, John Gerard Ruggie was appointed assistant to the new Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, with special responsibility for drawing up plans to reform the UN budget and its
organizational procedures, and to mediate between the US govern-
ment and the world body. His appointment to such high office is just
reward for a scholar who has written widely about international
governance in a broad sense, and whose most recent book argues that
the United States must commit itself to the task of creating a new,
multilateral world order for the next century. It is also appropriate to
discuss his contribution to the study of international relations within a
category devoted to students of international organization, rather than
to try and fit him into any particular ideological orientation to world
politics. As Ole Waever observes in his more detailed examination of
Ruggie’s work, ‘Ruggie is a paradigmatic case of a non-paradigmatic
and therefore potentially “invisible” author’ in international theory.
His visibility is, therefore, ample testimony to his ability to move
across established faultlines in the discipline in search of theoretical
tools with which to illuminate the challenges and opportunities for
greater co-operation among states in an era of rapid change.

Ruggie was born in 1944 in Austria. His family emigrated to
Canada in 1956, and he moved to the United States in 1967, after his
graduation from McMaster University. He completed his MA at the
University of California (Berkeley) in 1968 and was awarded his PhD
from the same institution in 1974. He remained at the University of
California until 1978, when he moved to New York to teach at
Columbia University. In 1987, he returned to the west coast as
Professor of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of
California (San Diego), before going back to Columbia University in
1991 as John W. Burgess Professor of Political Science. He was elec-
ted Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs that same
year; he stepped down from his position in 1996 before taking up his
present appointment at the United Nations.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Ruggie was a leading contributor
to the debate over the degree to which the international system was
changing under the impact of interdependence, and the implications
of such change for international relations theory and practice. At the
time, the debate was between those who believed that the international
system was not undergoing systemic change – the structural or
‘neorealist’ school – and those who argued that realism was an
inadequate guide to understanding dramatic changes in international
relations as a result of transnational economic forces. The focus for
this debate was the publication of Theory of International Politics by
Kenneth Waltz (1979). He argued strongly that the scope and direc-
tion of economic interdependence is dependent on the distribution of
power in the international system. The political significance of
transnational forces is not a function of their scale. What matters are the vulnerability of states to forces outside their control, and the costs of reducing their exposure to such forces. Waltz concluded that, in a bipolar system, the level of interdependence was relatively low among the great powers, and that the persistence of anarchy as the central organizing principle of international relations guarantees that states will continue to privilege security over the pursuit of wealth.

On the other side of the debate were the liberals, notably Robert Keohane. Prior to the publication of Waltz’s book, they argued that the growth of transnational economic forces, the growing irrelevance of territorial control to economic growth and the international division of labour rendered realism obsolete. The collective benefits to trade would ensure greater co-operation among states and contribute to the decline in the use of force between them. Ruggie’s early work has to be understood in the context of the American debate between neorealism and neoliberalism and of the rise of hegemonic stability theory as a partial compromise between the two sides. Kenneth Waltz, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin and Richard Rosecrance are the key figures in this debate, and their work is described elsewhere in this book.2

In his critique of Waltzian neorealism, Ruggie argues that its rigid separation of ‘levels of analysis’, particularly between domestic, transnational and structural levels, is a barrier to understanding the complexities of change in the international system. He claims that both the medieval and the modern system are characterized by anarchy, but one could hardly claim much continuity between the two eras. The momentous change from one era to another can only be understood by examining how the very principles of differentiation among political units (the shift from heteronomy to anarchy) took place:

The modern system is distinguished from the medieval not by ‘sameness’ or ‘differences’ of units, but by the principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another. If anarchy tells us that the political system is a segmental realm, differentiation tells us on what basis the segmentation is determined.3

In other words, neorealism is far too static an approach. By separating the structure of the international system from processes among and within the units (states) that make up the system, it is unable to incorporate and thereby explain (let alone predict) change of the system. The only changes that neorealists focus on are shifts in the
distribution (or balance) of power among states. Ruggie returns to this theme in a later article, where he speculates on the sources of potential change from a modern system of separate sovereign states to some ‘postmodern’ future. He suggests that we lack even the appropriate vocabulary to speculate on epochal change, such as occurred in the transformation from the medieval to the modern era, but that we do need to get away from the false dichotomy between a world dominated by states and one in which states are replaced by some other entity beyond our capacity to imagine:

There is an extraordinary impoverished mindset at work here, one that is able to visualise long-term challenges to the system of states only in terms of entities that are institutionally substitutable for the state. Since global markets and transnationalised corporate structures (not to mention communications satellites) are not in the business of replacing states, they are assumed to entail no potential for fundamental international change. The theoretical or historical warrant for that premise has never been mooted, let alone defended.4

Ruggie himself does not offer a theory of epochal change, although he offers fascinating insights into its dynamics and dimensions from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century. What is important in understanding his work is the underlying theoretical concern with massive changes, and how the international system can cope without change bringing in its wake disorder and chaos. He implies that a key to managing change lies in our ability to ‘unbundle territory’:

[I]n the modern international polity an institutional negation of exclusive territoriality serves as the means of situating and dealing with those dimensions of collective existence that territorial rulers recognize to be irreducibly transterritorial in character. Nonterritorial functional space is the place wherein international society is anchored.5

A great deal of Ruggie’s work is concerned with one form of ‘institutional negation’ in the post-1945 era – multilateralism. He uses the term to refer to state behaviour that accords with certain principles; in other words, in a qualitative sense rather than the nominal definition according to which ‘multilateral’ refers to relations among three or more parties. Multilateralism is ‘a generic institutional form of modern international life’ that exists when states conduct their
relations with one another according to certain standards or principles. These principles embody three characteristics: non-discrimination, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. Non-discrimination means that states should carry out their treaty obligations without any contingencies or exceptions based on alliances, or on the idiosyncrasies of the circumstances at hand, or on the degree to which national interests are perceived to be at stake. The most often-cited example of such non-discrimination is the obligation of states to extend ‘most favoured nation’ status to all other states in the trading regime governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization.

Next comes the principle of indivisibility. In the context of military co-operation, states are required to meet their commitments to all other states in a collective security agreement. For multilateral security regimes, this refers to the requirement that peace be regarded as indivisible for and by each signatory to the treaty. Finally, continuity over time is an essential third characteristic. Episodic, single-shot instances of interstate coalition behaviour within the context of otherwise individually competitive or hostile relations among states do not qualify as ‘multilateral’. Instead, joint participation has to take place over an extended period of time and so comes to be predicated upon, and become the basis for, anticipations about the longer-run functioning of the collective. In other words, states extend what is sometimes called ‘the shadow of the future’. Iterated or repeated instances of co-operation in a multilateral setting can promote diffuse reciprocity among states and help to transform their sense of self-interest.

In the early 1980s, Ruggie argued that multilateralism was crucial to the stability of relations among states in the West after the Second World War. An extended period of co-operation and economic growth among states in Europe, the Americas, Japan and parts of Southeast Asia was made possible by the multilateral institutions set up at Bretton Woods. By 1944, Western democracies, following the trauma of the Great Depression that contributed to the Second World War, agreed on two sets of postwar economic priorities. The first was to achieve economic growth and full employment. This was reflected in the Beveridge Plan of Great Britain, the French establishment of a planning commission and the United States’ passage of the Employment Act of 1946. All these domestic plans were symbolic of a commitment to government intervention in the economy and the establishment of the welfare state. The second priority was the creation of a stable, liberal world economic order that would prevent
a return to the destructive economic nationalism and competitive currency devaluations of the 1930s.

The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 was charged with the creation of such a stable, liberal world economic order. A product of American–British co-operation, the ‘Bretton Woods system’ had a number of key features. It envisioned a world in which governments would have considerable freedom to pursue national economic objectives, yet the monetary order would be based on fixed exchange rates – based on a dollar/gold exchange standard – in order to prevent the destructive competitive depreciations and policies of the 1930s. Another principle adopted was currency convertibility for current account transactions. Massive and destabilizing capital flows, such as those of the 1930s and in the 1980s and 1990s, were assumed to be a thing of the past. The International Monetary Fund was created to supervise the operation of the monetary system and provide medium-term lending to countries experiencing temporary balance-of-payments problems. Finally, in the event of a ‘fundamental disequilibrium’, the system permitted a state to change its exchange rate with international consent.

Ruggie argues that the Bretton Woods system was a compromise solution to the conflict between domestic autonomy and international norms. It tried to avoid both the subordination of domestic economic activities to the stability of the exchange rate embodied in the classical gold standard, as well as the sacrifice of international stability to the domestic policy autonomy characteristic of the 1930s. He describes it as a ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’ – an attempt to enable governments to pursue Keynesian growth stimulation policies at home without disrupting international monetary stability:

Unlike the economic nationalism of the 1930s, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism...the essence of embedded liberalism [was] to devise a form of multilateralism that is compatible with the requirements of domestic stability.7

Ruggie’s book Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (1996) is a superb analysis of the history of the ‘embedded liberal’ compromise since Bretton Woods, examining the reasons behind its decline in the 1970s and 1980s, and arguing that it needs to be renewed for the challenges of the next century. He argues that despite spending six decades at the pinnacle of world leadership, the
United States is in danger of returning to some level of isolationism in the post–Cold War era. The best way to avoid this appalling prospect would be to emulate the policies of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, linking the United States’ aspirations with its own sense of itself as a nation. It does not need the spectre of a new geopolitical threat:

A multilateral world order vision is singularly compatible with America’s own collective self-concept. Indeed, the vision taps into the very idea of America itself...America’s multilateralist agenda reflects the idea...of a willed formation of an international community open in principle to everyone.8

Ruggie renews his criticisms of realism, according to which all that really matters is the geopolitical balance of power. He also chastises what he calls American ‘unilateralism’, according to which the United States should act unilaterally in foreign policy to protect its interests, whether they be economic (for example, in trying to liberalize the Japanese economy), political (in attacking China for its human rights abuses), or military (in ensuring that Iraq is effectively disarmed of its nuclear, biological and chemical arsenal). Ruggie believes that unless the United States demonstrates a renewed commitment to multilateral initiatives (such as the extension of NATO membership to Eastern Europe), its complacency may help to bring about the acceleration of global disorder.

For some, Ruggie’s views on ‘embedded liberalism’ and his criticism of neoliberalism suggest the inevitable turn to social constructivism. But in fact, as Ruggie reveals in the introduction to Constructing the World Polity, a collection of his most well known essays, that social constructivism has long defined his perspective on the discipline. Three apparent aims define his social constructivist project: to stress the functionality of collective intentionality, or its ‘deontic’ function of creating rights and responsibilities; to show how social constructivism, which he calls a ‘theoretically informed approach’, provides a realistic explanation of action by demonstrating how actors interpret their collective situation; and to show that social constructivism offers a ‘non-causal’ explanatory account of international relations.9 In drawing on the sociology of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, Ruggie argues that an alternative explanatory approach is needed to avoid the ontological limits of the methodological individualism of (neo-)utilitarianism. Social constructivism, in his view, offers a worthy alternative approach by focusing on the material and
ideational factors that shape and explain social action. In sum, Ruggie’s constructivist project might be best characterized in the following way: to define the analytical parameters of a social epistemology in international relations theory, so that international relations theorists can explain how actors acquire their knowledge, and how this social knowledge constitutes, and is constituted by, the rules and obligations of the international system.

Notes

2. See also the excellent selection of articles in Charles Kegley (ed.), Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, New York, St Martin’s Press, 1995.
5. Ibid., p. 165.

Ruggie’s major writings


See also: Cox, Gilpin, Keohane, Krasner, Waltz

**Further reading**


**ALEXANDER WENDT**

Most of us take it for granted that we know how to breathe. We do so instinctively. This knowledge is tacit. We don’t need doctors or scientists to teach us. Equally, scientists do not have to appeal to our tacit knowledge in explaining the physical processes to us. At a biological level, breathing is undoubtedly a complicated business, and a scientific theory of breathing will contain references to phenomena that we do not need to know about in order to continue breathing. We value scientific knowledge when something goes wrong. If we
stop breathing, or have difficulty breathing, then the scientist can use his or her technical knowledge to figure out what the problem is. Alexander Wendt’s work is invaluable for those who think that something is always wrong with the conduct of international relations, and that statespersons need instruction from social scientists in how to put it right. He reminds us of the need to take our subject matter seriously, not as a set of ‘things to be explained’ by reference to some independent ‘causes’ at a different level of analysis, but as a set of phenomena that cannot be adequately accounted for independently of their interpretation by the agents involved. In the study of international relations, he believes, understanding the tacit knowledge of those we study is of crucial importance.

Of course, this is obviously true the closer we focus our attention on particular events. Nobody would seriously deny that George Bush’s interpretation of the meaning of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 is of paramount importance if we want to explain the reaction by the United States to Iraq’s behaviour in 1990. Obviously, as part of that explanation during the crisis we could not rely entirely on the president’s state of mind. It is a necessary, not a sufficient or comprehensive, ingredient in a complex explanation. But what if we seek more general explanations for large-scale patterns of behaviour over time and space? Many students of international relations claim that the broader our empirical reference, the more abstract must our theories become, appealing less to the ‘intersubjective’ meanings among the participants in those empirical processes and more to the play of large structural forces. Wendt has devoted his research to criticizing this claim as at best one-sided, and at worst counter-productive. For if it is the case that ‘agents’ can do little to change the ‘structures’ that allegedly determine their behaviour, there is not much point in instructing them in the first place!

Since 1989, Alexander Wendt has taught at the Department of Political Science, Yale University. He was born in 1958 in Mainz, Germany. He was awarded his BA from Macalester College in 1982, and he received his PhD from the University of Minnesota. His work has, up to the present, been directed against those theoretical approaches that have dominated the North American study of international relations. It should also be pointed out that Wendt is primarily a meta-theorist or ‘second-order’ theorist rather than a ‘first-order’ theorist. As he puts it,

[t]he objective of this kind of theorising is also to increase our understanding of world politics, but it does so indirectly by
focusing on the ontological and epistemological issues of what constitutes important or legitimate questions and answers for international relations scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of the international system per se.¹

In a series of major articles, Wendt has developed what has come to be known as the ‘constructivist’ approach to the study of international relations. It emerged in the process of a critical evaluation of the two dominant theoretical frameworks of the late 1980s in the North American study of international relations, neorealism and neoliberalism. The prefix ‘neo-’ implies that they are somehow ‘new’ forms of old traditions of thought. It also indicates what they have in common. Despite substantive disagreements between neorealists and neoliberals, they share a commitment to ontological atomism and epistemological positivism. It is important to understand this shared commitment, since it is the foundation of inquiry that Wendt is concerned to reconstruct.

The phrases ‘how things really are’ and ‘how things really work’ are ontological creeds. The basic belief system of neorealists and neoliberals is rooted in a realist ontology. States exist in an anarchical international system, and the study of collective action among them ‘takes self-interested actors as constant and exogenously given, focusing] on the selective incentives that might induce them to cooperate’.² In addition to this commitment to the subject matter of international relations theory, neorealists and neoliberals practice an objectivist epistemology, which refers to the relationship between the inquirer and the object of inquiry. If there is a real world operating according to natural laws, then the inquirer must behave in ways that put questions directly to nature, so to speak, and allow the real world to answer back directly. The inquirer must stand behind a thick wall of one-way glass, observing the real world rationally. Objectivity is the ‘Archimedean point’ (Archimedes is said to have boasted that, given a long enough lever and a place to stand, he could move the Earth) that permits the inquirer to discover the way states behave without altering them in any way. But how can this be done, given the possibility of inquirer bias? The positivist answer is to recommend the use of a manipulative methodology that controls for bias, and empirical methods that specify in advance the kind of evidence necessary to support or falsify empirical hypotheses.

In contrast to what unites them at the level of meta-theory, neorealists and neoliberals disagree on a number of substantive issues: the implications of anarchy, the possibilities of international co-operation, whether states are motivated primarily by the pursuit of relative
gains vis-à-vis other states or by the pursuit of absolute gains in power and wealth, the hierarchy of state goals, the relative importance of state intentions and capabilities, and the impact of international institutions and regimes. The great bulk of contemporary theory, particularly in the United States, revolves around these issues within the shared meta-theoretical paradigm. Alexander Wendt is not uninterested in these issues, but he argues that they are discussed within a conceptual jail that begs crucial questions about the relationship between agents (states) and international structures.

In contrast to the conventional approaches, Wendt identifies himself as a ‘constructivist’. He defines constructivism as follows:

Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.

Wendt remains a ‘state-centric’ student of international relations, but he urges us not to take states and their interests for granted. Neorealists and neoliberals tend to do this because they rely implicitly on assumptions of methodological individualism in their research. This leads to a number of problems.

First, this approach takes the identities, powers and interests of states and reifies them or, as Wendt put it, treats them as ‘ontologically primitive’. Such reification precludes from the outset consideration of both the structural and institutional preconditions to action, as well as the character of the resulting structural outcomes. Although neorealists and neoliberals claim that they can explain the primary sources of conflict and co-operation in international relations on the implicit structure of anarchy, without a detailed social theory of state interests, they cannot. For example, we know that ‘cooperation under anarchy’ is possible in a world of positive-sum interactions, but not in a world of zero-sum interactions. The former is more likely to exist than the latter when state actors define their interests to include those of other states, that is, if they are other-regarding rather than strictly self-regarding. There is a great deal of literature exploring the internal logic of state strategies within these contexts, particularly using sophisticated game theory. But the literature cannot explain the sources of the precise game under consideration because its implicit
model of the international system lacks a theory of state preferences and action.

Second, rational choice theoretical conceptions of the international structure imply that it ‘constrains’ pre-existing state agents by altering the costs and benefits to them of different strategies. Much less attention is paid to the way international structures and institutions (in the broadest sense) help to constitute agents as empowered subjects capable of interacting meaningfully with each other.

Finally, an atomistic ontology of states in a condition of anarchy tends to imply that the latter is impervious to change. Its effects may be modified by co-operation, but the basic structure remains the same. Intentional conduct, particularly that aimed at altering the structure itself, enjoys little theoretical attention or legitimacy. This fails to recognize the way that individual states may not only reproduce the structure, but also potentially transform it.

In his path-breaking article on ‘The agent–structure problem in international relations theory’ (1987), Wendt rejects the main alternative to ontological atomism in the field, namely world systems theory. Concentrating on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, Wendt shows how he moves from structures (the world capitalist system) to units (the states in the world system), inverting the conventional procedure. This move, however, raises the quite different but related problem of reifying structures as ontologically primitive. The world capitalist system is taken for granted as an object of study analytically independent of the actions by which it is produced. As such, it fails to grasp that it is only human action that instantiates, reproduces and transforms institutions and the structural ‘constraints’ of social life. If neither atomistic nor ‘collectivist’ ontologies can capture the relationship between agents and structures without reification of one or the other, we need an ontology that overcomes the tendency to treat action and structure as the opposite sides of a dualism.

Drawing inspiration from, among others, Anthony Giddens in sociology and Roy Bhaskar in the philosophy of science, Wendt believes that students of international relations should adopt the main principles of ‘structuration’ theory. Agents (state actors) do not exist independently of the structures around them, but at the same time those structures do not exist independently of their reproduction (and possible transformation) by the agents. Hence the importance of paying attention to this co-constitution of agents and structures, which means refusing to overlook the way in which states interpret the meaning of what they do in favour of some underlying structural dynamic.
Social structures have an inherently discursive dimension in the sense that they are inseparable from the reasons and self-understandings that agents bring to their actions. This discursive quality does not mean that social structures are reducible to what agents think they are doing, since agents may not understand the structural antecedents or implications of their actions. But it does mean that the existence and operation of social structures are dependent upon self-understandings.\footnote{5}

At the level of epistemology, Wendt maintains that he is a scientific realist still, in the same way that positivists claim to be realist. The difference is that, while the adoption of an empiricist methodology reduces ‘the real’ to that which can be observed, he suggests that structures, which cannot be observed directly, are also real. The advantage of structuration theory is that it facilitates a methodological approach that tries to account for their influence on behaviour. For example, structural power may be at work when states do not act in ways that one would expect given the inequality of power and wealth in the international system, just as individuals may give their consent to political orders that are patently unjust. Erik Ringmar gives an example of the methodological innovations required to tap into the impact of structures on agents:

We need to make a hypothesis regarding what things would have been like if only structural power had not been present, and then measure the difference between this condition and the one presently at hand. The degree of genuine consent which people give...can be understood as the difference between the consent given under present conditions and what a person would choose to do...under conditions where structural power was not at play. In this way we may make an estimate of ‘real’ interests and ‘real’ identities.\footnote{6}

It should be noted that, up to now, Wendt has written as a critic. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, he has published articles and chapters in books that contrast his constructivism with what he argues are the dominant and erroneous approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism. His arguments on behalf of the constructivist research programme are mounted in the context of an ongoing critique of neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz and neoliberals such as Robert Keohane. Thus far, and this is not a criticism, but merely an observation, he has yet to generate an empirical (note: not empiricist)
research programme in the field. Nonetheless, he has some interesting ideas about the questions we should be asking in the study of international relations and, just as importantly, the questions that we should not be asking. Perhaps his most radical substantive argument is that we should give as much priority to the dominant representations of international relations in understanding state conduct as the distribution of material forces among states, whether they be military, political or economic. What matters, according to Wendt, are not the raw facts of material distributions of one kind or another, but their interpretation and signification by the actors themselves. Students of international relations tend to study behavioural outcomes associated with different distributions of power among states throughout history. Wendt argues that attempts to deduce patterns of stability and peace from this kind of analysis is inadequate in the absence of any theoretical examination of how states understand the nature and identity of threats from other states.

For example, during the Cold War, the distribution of economic power was anything but bipolar between the United States and the Soviet Union. On this basis, some scholars claim that the Soviet Union, at least in the early years after the end of the Second World War, was not a threat to the United States and its allies in Western Europe. It could be concluded that the United States deliberately exaggerated the extent of Soviet power to achieve its own economic ends, both domestically and within the broader capitalist economy. Such an interpretation, according to Wendt, is incompatible with the meta-theoretical assumptions of constructivism, according to which actors ‘act on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them, and meanings are socially constructed’. Rather than allow our interpretations of meanings and representations of international relations from the distribution of material forces, we should focus on the signification of their relevance to states before evaluating state behaviour.

To sum up, Alexander Wendt is a key thinker in meta-theory in the study of contemporary international relations. At least in terms of the ontological and epistemological dimensions of international relations theory, Wendt has done much to reveal and disclose the limits of the neorealist/neoliberal debate in the field. It remains to be seen how he (along with others inspired by his work) uses the insights of constructivism to shed light on the empirical study of world politics. Thus far, his work has been suggestive rather than conclusive. It is a useful warning of the dangers of reifying agents and structures in international relations theory, but whether it can fulfil the promise of a ‘post-positivist’ research programme remains to be seen.
In 1999, Wendt published his now famous book *Social Theory of International Politics*. The book posits a ‘thin’ constructivism, or holistic theoretical research programme that seeks to bridge the gap between rationalism and constructivism. ‘Thin constructivism’, while state-centred and ahistorical, consists of three broad sociological objectives: to focus on the material resources of state social behaviour; to anthropomorphize the state; and to show the overlapping properties of two modes of theorizing – causal and constitutive theorizing. Causal theorizing concerns the induction and derivation of truth from established facts and principles, while constitutive theorizing refers to the interactive properties of human agency and structures. Constitutive theorizing remains crucial to understanding the material factors of state identity. As he states: ‘the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas...only after the ideational conditions of possibility for power and interest explanations have been exposed and stripped can we assess the effects of materiality as such’.9

In the second half of *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt applies this theoretical distinction to formulate three modes of socialization: coercion, calculation and belief. These modes are derived from three cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. Hobbesian culture stresses survival and preservation; Locke’s ideas, in contrast, explicate the social and material properties of state interest, or rather how the maximizing of such interests can be linked with the promotion of natural rights (freedom, life and property). Wendt associates belief with Kant’s moral reasoning of the individual, or where Kant philosophizes how moral belief and commitment can be fashioned into moral imperatives that will guide our conduct.

Critics of Wendt’s approach insist that it takes social theory in the wrong direction. Wendt’s decision to ignore the social formation of identity, for instance, results in a historically impoverished social theory that can no longer explain the social evolution of norms and rules, much less the emerging influence of non-state actors. Many have also objected to Wendt’s anthropomorphic formulation of the state, arguing that treating the state in these terms (or vesting it with emotive qualities) conflates material and non-material influences. Despite these criticisms, *Social Theory of International Politics* remains the centrepiece of a new middle-ground constructivism in international relations, one that provides a new path for analysing the causal and constitutive links between socialization (identity) and state power.

More recently, Wendt has drawn on quantum theory to probe the limits of international relations theory. Here his primary aim is to suggest the possibilities of what he calls the ‘capacity for collective
self-consciousness’. Quantum theory, as he points out, is non-reductionist and non-deterministic, but has to be applied in a systematic manner to world politics. In his view, such theory holds important implications for developing a new non-foundational epistemology, which might help to further reconcile critical theory with mainstream approaches.

Notes


Wendt’s major writings

ALEXANDER WENDT


See also: Giddens, Keohane, Wallerstein, Waltz

**Further reading**


CRITICAL THEORY

The following thinkers are concerned with the sources of structural inequality inherent in the international system, as well as the ways in which it might be overcome. Often inspired by, but not limited to, the Marxist tradition of thought, they illuminate how international relations among states makes possible (and tends to conceal) the inequities of a global capitalist system. These thinkers are radical in two ways. First, they believe that theory and practice are not separate and autonomous realms of thought and action. Second, they are not content with international reforms that are limited to regulating relations among states, particularly if they rely on the capacity and will of the so-called ‘great powers’. They believe that both realism and liberalism serve to maintain the basic distribution of power and wealth. They think that we need to reflect critically on the historical conditions underlying inequality, the material and ideological forces that sustain it, and the potential for radical reform of the system in favour of a more just world order. If students are to remain faithful to the emancipatory social interest of promoting ‘human needs’ on a global scale, these thinkers urge them to explore the complex connections between a formal ‘anarchy’ among states and an economic ‘hierarchy’ among social and economic classes. The rigid distinction between politics within states and ‘relations’ among social classes must be dispensed with. These thinkers expand the scope of international relations to include the forces at work in ‘global society’, the practical achievement of which requires that we question our traditional allegiance to the sovereign state. Of course, none of these thinkers believes that the latter’s obsolescence is imminent, and they disagree on the relative potency of ‘new social movements’ as substitutes for Marx’s and Lenin’s transnational revolutionary working-class proletarians.
‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose.’ This is the sentence most often quoted from the writing of Robert Cox, whose work has become far more widely read in the 1990s than it was prior to the end of the Cold War. This is so for two reasons. First, Cox has published a great deal on the phenomenon of ‘globalization’ in international relations. Second, he is at the forefront of a growing number of scholars who he has inspired over the years, and who represent the emergence of post-Marxian ‘critical theory’ in the field. Cox’s path-breaking article on the nature of critical theory was published in 1981, and appeared to offer a radical alternative to neorealist positivism, which at that time dominated the study of international relations, particularly in the United States.

Cox himself started to write about international relations and the international political economy rather late in life. He was never socialized into the academic conventions of the discipline, and this gives his writing a certain freshness and originality that are very different from most theoretical contributions in the field. Cox’s world view has developed over many years, and has been shaped in important ways by his unconventional career. His biography is perhaps more crucial for understanding his approach to the study of international relations than for most of the key thinkers surveyed in this book.

Robert Cox was born in 1926 in Quebec, Canada, and raised in the city of Montreal. Although (or perhaps, because) his parents were both English-speaking conservatives, Cox became a keen student of radical politics in French Canada, but his interest in international relations did not begin until the end of the Second World War. When Cox completed his undergraduate degree at McGill University, he joined the International Labour Organization (ILO) at the United Nations, which was based at McGill during the war years. In 1945, Cox left Canada to take up his new appointment in Geneva. He remained with the ILO for the next 25 years, first as Principal Staff Officer and then as Chief of the Program and Planning Division. The experience of working with the ILO during the Cold War left an indelible mark on Cox. As he explains:

There were three inherently contradictory but essential bases for political survival in this context: (1) to maintain the support of the United States (especially to an American head who was recurrently being attacked as ‘soft on communism’ by Cold War hard-liners in the US labor movement and as a cover for
‘creeping socialism’ by the more reactionary elements of American business); (2) to maintain the principle of ‘universality’ which meant trying to make Soviet bloc membership acceptable to the West…(3) to achieve and maintain a reasonable degree of program coherence in a bureaucracy that was segmented into feudal-type baronies.

In the early 1970s, when Cox felt unable to sustain his intellectual freedom to write and publish his work as a member of the organization, he resigned from the ILO and took up an academic career based at Columbia University. In 1977, he returned to Canada to take up a post at York University in Toronto, where he remains as Professor of Political Science.

There are three crucial elements of Cox’s work that must be understood if one is to engage further with the writing of this theoretical iconoclast: his commitment to critical theory; the influence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi on his substantive arguments regarding world order; and his particular analysis of globalization in the late twentieth century.

First, Cox regards himself as a critical theorist. The term critical theory is no doubt inadequate to encompass all the alternatives that can be swept into this category of theory. Perhaps a more adequate label would be ‘ideologically oriented inquiry’, including neo-Marxism, some forms of feminism and other radical schools of thought. These perspectives are properly placed together, however, because they converge in rejecting the claim of value freedom made by more positivist forms of inquiry. Nature cannot be seen as it ‘really is’ or ‘really works’ except through a value window. Since values enter into every inquiry, the question immediately arises as to what values, and whose values, shall govern. If the findings of studies can vary depending on the values chosen, then the choice of a particular value system tends to empower and enfranchise certain individuals and groups while disempowering and disenfranchising others. Inquiry thereby becomes a political act.

This does not mean that critical theorists are in any sense relativists. Their concern with the phenomenon of ‘false consciousness’ discloses a belief in the possibility of ‘true consciousness’, and it is the self-appointed task of critical theorists to reveal the material and social forces that prevent people from achieving their ‘real’ interests in a world that manipulates their desires and limits their potential. The task of critical inquiry is, by definition, to raise people to a level of ‘true’ consciousness. This is a necessary, although not sufficient,
precondition for them to act to transform the world. Cox contrasts critical theory with what he often refers to as ‘problem-solving’ theory, a term used to describe theories that take for granted the persistence of the system whose internal dynamics they seek to explain. Critical theory focuses on large-scale historical change of the system itself, and the contradictions and conflicts that may provide the potential for emancipatory systemic change.

Cox’s most systematic attempt to construct a substantive critical theory of international relations can be found in his book *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (1987). The book provides the basic conceptual framework that Cox uses to examine the relationship between material forces of production, ideas and institutions in particular historical periods in international relations. The basic assumption of the book is that forces of production create the material base for social relations, generating the capacity to exercise power in institutions, but power and production are related dialectically. Power, in turn, determines how production takes place and is organized. The book is divided into three related parts.

In the first, Cox distinguishes between no fewer than 12 ‘patterns’ of production relations, which he calls ‘modes of social relations of production’. They include subsistence, peasant–lord, primitive labour market, household, self-employment, enterprise labour market, bipartist, enterprise corporatist, tripartist, state corporatist, communal and central planning. Each of these ‘modes’ is explored as a self-contained structure with its own developmental potential and ideational/institutional perspective. Social relations of production arise in three analytically distinct ways: the accumulated social power that determines the nature of production; the structure of authority that is shaped by the internal dynamics of the production process; and the distributive consequences of production. Cox demonstrates how these aspects of social relations are related to each other in a dialectical manner, and he is particularly interested in the ways in which contradictions and conflicts arise between them in particular historical phases.

Despite his panoramic survey of these patterns of production relations, Cox quickly focuses on two basic modes of development, which he calls capitalist and redistributive. Development is associated with, and made possible by, the generation of an economic surplus within a mode of social relations. Simple reproduction, in which the mode is merely reconstituted over successive production cycles, cannot produce meaningful development. Both capitalist and redistributive forms of development accumulate in order to grow, and both may organize production in similar ways to generate a surplus.
for further development. But the mechanisms and underlying rationale for accumulation in the two modes are different. Capitalism is based on the pursuit of profit in the market, while in redistributive societies what is produced is determined by political decision-making.

Cox argues that any meaningful comparison between capitalist and redistributive modes of development must be located in a global context, taking into account the relations among states within which these two modes are concentrated. For example, the initial dynamics and repression of redistributive development are explained in large part by the international pressures on regimes whose predominantly agricultural economies had to compete with leading industrial states in Europe and the United States. Although redistributive development began by combining central planning and communalism, more recent developments revealed different patterns of change in the Soviet Union and China. In the Soviet Union, communalism became totally subordinate to the requirements of central planning, while in China it has been dismantled in agriculture and replaced by forms of the enterprise labour market.

In the second part of the book, Cox surveys the development of the modern state system, and in particular the constraints imposed on states by the global political economy. Such constraints help to explain the transformation and contradictions of different modes of the social relations of production. While Cox stresses the importance of material forces of production in the determination of social relations, he also recognizes the key role played by states, and relations among states:

States create the conditions in which particular modes of social relations achieve dominance over coexisting modes, they structure either purposively or by inadvertence the dominant–subordinate linkages of the accumulation process...each state is constrained by its position and its relative power in the world order, which places limits on its will and its ability to change production relations.3

Cox’s world view owes a great deal to the work of the Italian communist writer Antonio Gramsci.4 In particular, he draws upon Gramsci’s ideas on hegemonic control in capitalist societies to explain the way in which dominant ideas about world order help to sustain particular patterns of relations among material forces, ideas and institutions at the global level. Gramsci always located his work in the Marxist schema, in which the ‘economic base’ sets the limiting
conditions for politics, ideology and the state. But the underlying thrust of Gramsci’s work is consistently away from simple forms of reductionism. What he centrally addressed was the complex nature of the relations between structure and superstructure, which, he argued, could not be reduced to a mere reflection of ‘economic’ conditions narrowly construed. His theoretical originality lay in the series of novel concepts that he used to expand and transform our understanding of politics. He was greatly preoccupied with the character of state and civil-society relations prevailing in relatively modern societies, especially capitalist democracies. Gramsci challenged the reductionist conception of the state as exclusively a ‘class’ state, an instrument of ruling-class coercion and domination. He insisted on the ‘educative’ role of the state, its significance in constructing those alliances that could win support from different social strata, and its role in providing cultural and moral ‘leadership’. Although the economic structure may be, in the last instance, determinative, Gramsci gave much greater autonomy to the effects of the actual conduct of the struggle for leadership, across a wide front and on a variety of sites and institutions. He argued that the role of the Communist Party was to engage and lead in a broad, multifaceted struggle for ‘hegemony’. A shift in socialist political strategy was necessary, away from an outright frontal assault on the state to the winning of strategic positions on a number of fronts. Socialist struggle was conceived as a ‘war of position’ in the first instance against the forces of capitalist hegemony in civil society and culture.

Thus, for Gramsci, and for Cox, hegemony at the global level is not to be equated with mere material or military dominance (as in realism), nor is it to be regarded as a desirable public ‘good’ (as in neoliberal institutionalism):

Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between objective material forces and ethico-political ideas – in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and superstructure – in which power based on dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups.5

In much of his writing, Cox is concerned with the rise and decline of hegemonic world orders over time. In his book, he distinguishes between three ‘successive structures of world order’: the liberal international economy (1789–1873); the era of rival imperialisms (1873–1945); and the neoliberal world order (post-1945). The third
and final part of the book focuses on the global economic crisis of 1973–74. He argues that the industrial and financial restructuring of the past 20 years has led to the weakening of labour’s autonomous collective social power and the increasing peripheralization of the labour force. This is the context in which Cox examines globalization in the late twentieth century. Drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi, Cox focuses on what he terms ‘the internationalization of the state’. By this, Cox refers to the process whereby national institutions, policies and practices become adjusted to the evolving structures and dynamics of a world economy of capitalist production.

Cox identifies three dimensions of this process. First, ‘there is a process of interstate consensus formation regarding the needs or requirements of the world economy that takes place within a common ideological framework’. Second, participation in the negotiation of this consensus is hierarchical. Third, ‘the internal structures of states are adjusted so that each can best transform the global consensus into national policy and practice’.6 He also identifies three historical stages in the process whereby the state has become increasingly internationalized. The first of these was characteristic of the 1930s, when states were strong relative to the world economy and protected their populations from it. The second occurred after 1945 with the establishment of the Bretton Woods system, which represented a compromise between the accountability of governments to the institutions of the world economy (particularly its sources of liquidity), and their accountability to domestic opinion for their economic performance and for maintaining the welfare state. The third stage involves the globalization of the state. It marks a restructuring of the relationship between the state and the world economy, and the national/international compromise in favour of the transnational institutions and networks of power that dominate the current world economy. The internationalization of the state marks a further erosion of its role as a buffer against the world economy and an intensification of trans-state sources of power, authority and decision-making.

Thus, Cox alerts us to an alternative perspective on the post-Cold War era to those most often discussed by realists and liberals. Changes in the balance of power between states and the alleged ascendancy of democracy over authoritarianism are subservient to what Cox calls ‘global perestroika’. He argues that the dramatic changes inspired by Gorbachev’s ‘revolution from above’ were by no means confined to the former USSR. Over a much longer period, a similar structural transformation has been taking place in the capitalist world, namely the disembedding of global liberalism. For Cox, the globalization of
capital, production and debt is not part of some inevitable trend to a postindustrial, postmodern world caused solely by exponential advances in the technology of manufacturing and communications. It has been enormously facilitated by a neoconservative hegemonic ideology of deregulation designed to disempower traditional oppositional forces, particularly the trade union movement. Its evisceration by the likes of Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s has contributed to

a revival of the nineteenth-century separation of economy and politics. Key aspects of economic management are therefore to be shielded from politics, that is to say, from popular pressures. This is achieved by confirmed practices, by treaty, by legislation, and by formal constitutional provisions.7

Thus, the dominant image of contemporary international relations for Cox is radically at odds with some of the more benign interpretations one finds in the field. He believes that our era of ‘hyper-liberal globalization’ is the site of some major contradictions and struggles: between the rhetoric of democracy and the ‘democratic deficit’ caused by the internationalization of the state; between the growing demands for international protection of the environment and the surrender of state authority to international corporate finance and business; and between the rhetoric of victory in the Cold War over socialism and the accelerating inequality both within and between states.

What is to be done? Cox calls for what he describes as a new form of multilateralism, which should not be limited to regulating relations horizontally between state elites. It should be conceived as:

The locus of interactions for the transformation of the existing order [on behalf of] an enlarged conception of global society… multilateralism must be considered from the standpoint of its ability to represent the forces at work in the world at the local level as well as at the global level.8

Since states have played a major role in facilitating the process of globalization, Cox argues that counter-hegemonic social forces should engage in a ‘war of position’. His thoughts on this are, for the moment, merely suggestive. He argues, for example, that the labour movement must mobilize at a global level and build alliances and coalitions with a variety of new social movements. Globalization ‘from above’ must be countered with ‘globalization from below’. Cox
recognizes that this will not be easy. It will be difficult for Western ‘progressives’ to unite with Islamic social movements to construct some kind of global counter-force. Nonetheless, he claims that the difficulties must be faced and overcome if the juggernaut of globalization is to be slowed down and even reversed.

The work of Robert Cox is, in conclusion, a major contribution to the rise of critical theory in the study of international relations. From his base at York University, he has inspired many students to rethink how we should study international political economy, and it is fair to say that Gramscian historical materialism is perhaps the most important alternative to realist and liberal perspectives in the field today.

Notes


Cox’s major writings


Approaches to World Order (with Timothy J. Sinclair), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. This book is an edited collection of Cox’s most important articles. For a complete bibliography of his work see pp. 537–44.

See also: Gilpin, Krasner, Keohane, Ruggie

Further reading
Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation, Boston, Massachusetts, Beacon Press, 1944.

ANDRÉ GUNDER FRANK

Frank is best known as one of the leading scholars of ‘dependency theory’ in the study of development. Dependency theory is a radical rejection of postwar diagnoses of and prescriptions for Third World development based on liberal modernization approaches, although today dependency theory has itself been absorbed into world systems theory by radical scholars in the study of international political economy.

Frank was born in 1929 in Germany, and his family moved to the United States in the early 1930s to escape Nazi Germany. He attended Swarthmore College, studying economics, and began a PhD at the University of Chicago in 1950. This took some years to complete as Frank began to question the economic orthodoxies of Keynesian theory and to attract the opposition of his supervisors. He eventually completed his doctoral dissertation on the comparative measurement of productivity in agriculture and industry in the Ukraine, and he began to focus on the shortcomings of conventional developmental thought. In the early 1960s, he left his academic post at Michigan
State University to live and work in Latin America (based in Chile), where he produced most of his original research, analysing the nature and dynamics of ‘development’ from a radical perspective.

Throughout the 1960s, Frank wrote prodigiously and his work became very popular in North America as the Vietnam War escalated. After the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile in a successful coup orchestrated by General Pinochet, Frank returned to Germany in 1973 to take up a position at the Latin America Institute of the Free University of Berlin. In 1978, he secured a professorship in the School of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia, where he began systematic research on the state socialist economies of Eastern Europe and continued his work on the history of global capitalism. For many years he taught and wrote at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands, and he is presently a member of the Graduate Faculty at the University of Toronto.

Frank’s work in the late 1950s and 1960s has to be understood as a reaction to and deconstruction of the conventional wisdom on the requirements for ‘development’ in the Third World. This orthodoxy was characterized by two key assumptions that Frank has done much to undermine. First, mainstream economics tended to equate economic development with economic growth, measured in simple static terms as an increase in gross national product. Problems and questions relevant to the dynamics of institutional development and to the transformation of values were kept outside the boundaries of analysis and policy formulation. In the post-Second World War era, it was often assumed that, since the ‘developed countries’ of North America and Western Europe were already developed, the challenge was for poor states to implement similar policies that would assist them also to achieve rapid growth. If a country grows, it will also ‘develop’. Thus, underdevelopment was defined by a comparison of rich and poor countries, and development meant bridging the gap by means of an imitative process until the ‘undeveloped’ became more like the ‘developed’.

Second, even those writers who questioned the equation of growth and development presupposed that obstacles to development were primarily internal to the country being studied, rather than external. In the 1950s, development thinking was dominated by Durkheimian assumptions of social change as increasing rationalization and consensus. This required the application of objective, impersonal judgements in the construction of human relationships rather than subjective ones. The sociologist Talcott Parsons distinguished between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ societies. In general, the latter tend to emphasize collective
interests over individual self-interest; relations between individuals based on particular ascriptive attributes rather than universal values according to which all are equal regardless of status; and societal obligations diffused throughout a network of groups rather than being specific to contractual obligations explicitly undertaken for limited periods and purposes.

Perhaps the most well known text in the modernization paradigm is Walt Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960). Rostow believed that traditional societies in China, the Middle East and medieval Europe shared a ceiling on the level of attainable output because the potential of science and technology was either not available, or not systematically applied. In order to develop or, in his words, ‘take off’, they had to be introduced to modern ideas of progress, education had to be available to the masses, financial infrastructure had to be established, and there had to be a pool of entrepreneurial individuals prepared to take risks for profit. Traditional societies could take off down the road to modernization only after a number of stages of industrialization, when incomes would rise to a point where people could consume beyond the basic necessities, the proportion of people in skilled or office jobs rose and surplus funds could be reinvested for future growth. In short, while economic growth was an important criterion for development, the latter involved a number of sequential structural and behavioural changes. Modernization came to be understood in terms of an ‘upward movement’ of the entire social and cultural system from one stage of economic evolution to the next, necessary for and related to ultimate democratization. In the context of the Cold War, the modernization paradigm provided a diagnosis and prescription that provided an alternative model of economic growth to that endorsed by the Soviet Union or China, and justified a massive expenditure of US aid to poorer countries to assist the process.

In his work on Latin America in the 1960s, Frank, along with other radical scholars such as Rudolfo Stavenhagen and Fernando Cardoso, turned much of the conventional wisdom on its head. He argued that the Parsonian dualisms were exaggerated and that there was no empirical evidence to back up Rostow’s claims concerning the stages of growth. Indeed, he claimed that ‘underdevelopment’, far from being a characteristic of countries and regions insufficiently integrated into the global economy, was in fact a consequence of their incorporation into what later became known as the capitalist world system.

In order to understand contemporary underdevelopment, we have to focus on the historical roots of ‘metropolis–satellite’ relations that
exist on an international level and within ‘underdeveloped’ nations; for the very same cities that are considered satellites on an international level are themselves the metropoles of the satellite nation. To briefly summarize his argument, it consists of a number of complementary propositions.

First, the ‘development’ of national and other subordinate metropoles is limited by their satellite status. Second, satellites experience the greatest amount of economic development when their ties to the metropolis are weakest, not strongest. Third, the areas that are the most underdeveloped today are, in general, those that have had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past. Fourth, commercial enterprises that had the power to respond to increased demand for the world market rather than the domestic market were those that were often established in satellite countries to take advantage of access to raw materials and low production/labour costs. Finally, economic institutions that today appear the most feudal were those that were successful in the past, but have since declined with the incorporation of the satellite into the world system. Thus, in order to understand the process of ‘underdevelopment’, we must see it as an epiphenomenal manifestation of the expansion of capitalism. Contrary to the modernization paradigm, capitalism is the disease rather than the cure. As for economic aid as a means to establish some of the preconditions for ‘take-off’, Frank argued the opposite. He argued that satellite states were in fact net exporters of capital to metropolitan countries, which exploited the satellites while pretending that their economic policies were ‘aiding’ them.

By the mid-1960s, Frank was a revolutionary who believed that positive change could only come about if the satellites, either together or separately, broke away from their incorporation into the capitalist world economy, and this in turn required radical political change within them. He was a strong supporter of the Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro, and also admired Mao Tse Tung’s radical economic reforms in China:

The upshot of all these theoretical and political reflections…was that continued participation in the world capitalist system could only mean continued development of underdevelopment. That is, there would be neither equity, nor efficiency, nor economic development. The political conclusions, therefore, were to de-link from the system externally and to transit to self-reliant socialism internally (or some undefined international socialist cooperation) in order to make in- or non-dependent economic development possible.1
In the 1970s, Frank clarified, revised and extended his analysis of the way in which the capitalist world system produced underdevelopment in the Third World, and the reader should refer to two major texts published towards the end of that decade for a summary of his work: Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (1978) and World Accumulation 1492–1789, also published in 1978. In these works, he distinguishes between three stages of world capitalist accumulation: mercantilism (1500–1770), industrial capitalism (1770–1870) and imperialism (1870–1930). He also synthesizes radical historical research to demonstrate the existence of long cycles of successive expansion and stagnation in the evolution of the world capitalist system. In the transition from mercantilism to industrialization, Frank argues that the triumph of the commercial revolution was a product of colonial conquest as well as the hugely profitable slave trade. This was the centre of two trade triangles, the Atlantic and the Oriental, joined together by the role that Europe (and Britain in particular) played in each. Thus, the industrial revolution was not simply a European phenomenon, for it also involved substantial transfers of colonial precious metals and raw materials to certain countries that comprised the funds later invested as capital with the onset of industrial and manufacturing capitalism. Thus, an accumulating position in the various triangular trades was critical in deciding whether a country would become a developing or an underdeveloping one in the course of the next 200 years.

Frank also analysed the role of growth and stagnation, over long cycles, of the accumulation process in world history. Stagnation and crisis were, he argued, the consequence of the limitations of productive forces, which over time tended to run up against decreasing returns to scale. The ensuing depressions led to a predominance of ‘internal’ pressures within individual countries to reorganize production: the successful, such as England, managed to establish their dominance over other countries in the next phase of the economic cycle. Frank argued that the United States became a developing rather than an underdeveloping country for two main reasons. On the one hand, it benefited from a substantial mercantile accumulation of money through its key position in the Atlantic trade triangle of the eighteenth century. On the other, the colonizing power, Britain, treated its colony with benign neglect, allowing local yeoman farming to develop and generate surplus funds to finance further growth. By contrast, Frank devoted a great deal of attention to British colonial policies in India. There, he stressed the way in which the British exploited peasants via the taxation system, and organized production
almost exclusively for the export of raw materials and the import of British manufactured goods. This was all part of his broader contention that underdeveloping countries become such owing to their particular position in a global expansionary capitalist system.

In situating ‘the development of underdevelopment’ within a much broader historical analysis of the evolution of global capitalism, Frank argued that the very meaning of ‘development’ has to be understood as a product of a very specific historical period, namely the post-1945 ‘long boom’ era as seen from the perspective of Latin America. Now that this era is over, we need to shift our attention from the problem of development within a specific contemporary period to try and understand the successive phases of development within a much broader historical context. Only this will enable us to study the process of combined and uneven development of capitalism on a global scale, as it has impinged on particular countries at particular times.

Over the past decade or so, Frank has devoted himself to the continued analysis of the world capitalist system, although his ‘pessimism of the intellect’ remains undiminished. In terms of his own ideals, he still values ‘development’ not as a simple expression or outcome of economic growth, but as a multifaceted process of economic, social and technological change by which human welfare may be improved. In turn, human welfare is itself complex, and should not be seen merely in terms of the capacity to consume more goods, regardless of the impact on, for example, the environment. In the late twentieth century, Frank is no longer very confident about the prospects for socialism, particularly if a socialist process is confined to one particular country. Nonetheless, he argues that although the binary divide between traditional and modern societies was always a mythological construction of liberal political economy in the 1950s, today we are seeing the emergence of a new form of dualism, between those regions and sectors that are integrated into the global market economy and those that are systematically (and increasingly) marginalized from it. This is not a process that can be represented geographically by comparing the fate of different countries, for it transcends territorial borders to include/exclude particular regions and sectors of the global economy within so-called ‘developed’ countries.

In light of the failure of ‘really existing’ socialism to ‘de-link’ from the global market, Frank has joined those who see some progressive potential in what have become known as new social movements arising from those marginalized from the global capitalist system. Of course, it remains to be seen whether such movements, based on
gender or the environment, can either achieve their limited aims or unite to represent a broader counter-hegemonic force in contemporary world politics. Frank himself sees them as an essential part of the pursuit of a more participatory civil democracy at the global level.

**Note**

1. André Gunder Frank, ‘The underdevelopment of development’, *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives* 10 (1991), p. 28. This is an excellent autobiographical essay in which Frank relates the way in which his life and work have developed since the 1950s.

**Frank’s major writings**


See also: Cox, Wallerstein

**Further reading**


STEPHEN GILL

Stephen Gill is a leading scholar of neo-Gramscian international relations and international political economy, although confining his thought to any discipline or subfield unfairly diminishes the breadth of his work. That his doctoral degree was awarded in sociology gives us a sense of this breadth. His theoretical and conceptual contributions have built on the path-breaking work of Robert Cox, and Gill is certainly a scholar who embraces and celebrates a normative commitment in his work. He is known for his innovative approach to international relations and international political economy, global power and global governance. One of Gill’s first contributions to the field was The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems, and Policies (with David Law, 1988), a survey of international political economy that uniquely, for its time, gave serious attention to the entire theoretical spectrum of the field, including variants of Marxism and game theory, as well as making novel arguments about the structural power of capital. These structural arguments moved away from one-dimensional notions of Dahlian ‘A has power over B’ to recognize the structural power provided by capital’s increasing ability to play one country off of another (provided by the increasing mobility of capital and finance). Gill’s next book, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, was a theoretical and empirical investigation of transnational hegemony. His later work would introduce a variety of new concepts, the most important being ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ and the related ‘new constitutionalism’ and ‘market civilization’.

Gill is currently a Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University in Toronto, Canada, where Cox finished
his career. Gill was born in 1950 and raised in Leeds, England. He claims the experience of the British class system during his youth had a profound impact on him, and has written ‘(t)his system helped forge a sense of injustice and resistance to illegitimate power that have been driving forces in much of my intellectual and political work’.1 While Gill was a graduate student, he obtained a full-time position at Wolverhampton Polytechnic (now University), and completed his doctorate degree in sociology at Birmingham as a part-time student. It was at Wolverhampton that Gill claims he developed a ‘sociological perspective’ on world order as well as working with David Law (with whom he would later publish a book). After a brief stop at Manchester University, Gill emigrated to Canada and began an appointment at York University in 1990, as, he says, ‘an intellectual refugee from Thatcherism’.2

Gill’s *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* develops themes that have been a staple of his work. The primary theme of the book is an exploration of changes in American hegemony (in the Gramscian–Coxian sense) and a general challenge to the notion that American hegemony was somehow in relative decline during the 1970s and 1980s. Rather, Gill argued that American hegemony was being transformed by what we would today call globalization or globalism – the increasingly globalized movement of capital and the ideological commitment to a relatively open and liberal international order by the dominant states (with a special role for the United States) and class fractions. In his argument, Gill made frequent use of the Gramscian concepts of hegemony, historic bloc, organic intellectual and state–civil society (Gramsci’s extended or integral state), but did not shrink from engaging with the more mainstream perspectives of international relations by addressing realism, liberalism and their ‘neo’ variants. By emphasizing the more complex notion of hegemony from a Gramscian perspective, Gill argued that the ideological and cultural aspects of hegemony (absent from realist and liberal versions of hegemony) showed a relatively more powerful United States.

Gill investigates the Trilateral Commission not as a site of secret power or conspiratorial global dominance, but as a site of elite consensus-building around economic and foreign policy, precisely the sort of place one would expect to see the ideological work of hegemony being undertaken. The Trilateral Commission is a private council established in 1973, with the assistance of David Rockefeller and other foreign policy elites, to promote co-operation between the United States, Europe and Japan, and is not unlike any number of
private councils centred on foreign policy. These councils tend to have elite memberships that broadly represent the status quo (though they can be sites for intra-elite conflicts), with members commonly moving back and forth across professional lines of the academy, law, media, business and government. What was unique about the Trilateral Commission was its formation as a concerted attempt to promote co-operation around a transnational liberalism over and against the more state-centric realism of the Nixon–Kissinger years. Gill argued that the Trilateral Commission was comprised of ‘organic intellectuals’ who endorsed a broadly transnational liberalism and dialectically both reflected and helped reconcile some of the emerging conflicts around domestic versus international capitalist class fractions. Gill states ‘The Gramscian metaphor of the organic intellectual helps to capture the theoretical–practical activity which is central to the reconciliation of these sometimes contradictory processes of American and transnational hegemony.’

Gill places considerable emphasis on what he calls the ‘Gramscian metaphor’ of the ‘organic intellectual’, a concept that is important to understand in order to have a full appreciation of Gill’s work. Gramsci made a distinction between ‘traditional intellectuals’, who viewed themselves as autonomous and separate from the political and ideological conflicts of their time, and ‘organic intellectuals’, who recognized their role as public intellectuals helping to articulate and justify the ideological representations of the dominant class. While Gramsci argued that both types of intellectual were affected by ideology, the crucial distinction lies in the fact that organic intellectuals are fully conscious of their important role in theorizing, popularizing and justifying ideological positions that represent the interests of the dominant class, but in a fashion that makes an appeal to all. Thus, Gill places special emphasis on the elites of the Trilateral Commission as organic intellectuals who are representing the class fraction of capital that seeks a transnational liberal order.

During the 1990s, Gill elaborated on the themes of his first book in a series of journal articles and book chapters, a summary of which is available in his most recent book, *Power and Resistance in the New World Order* (2003). In these works, Gill offers a concept that captures much of the power dynamics of globalization and neoliberalism under the term ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. In his own words:

The concept of discipline advanced here combines macro- and micro-dimensions of power: the structural power of capital (including the broad capacity to shape expectations, material

STEPHEN GILL
constraints and incentives); an ability to promote uniformity and obedience within parties, cadres, and organizations, especially in class formations associated with transnational capital…and particular instances of disciplinary practice in a Foucauldian sense. Thus, ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ is a concrete form of structural and behavioral power, combining the structural power of capital with ‘capillary power’ and ‘panopticism’.5

Gill borrows ‘capillary power’ and ‘panopticism’ from Foucault. Capillary power refers to Foucault’s claim that power is best understood through its constitution of subjects and observed through micropractices, the quotidian stuff of everyday life. Panopticism refers to Foucault’s discussion of the Panopticon, Jeremy Bentham’s prison design where inmates would feel they were being watched at all times but could not observe who may or may not be watching them. Foucault used the Panopticon as a metaphor for how subjects are disciplined by internalizing ‘the gaze’, the sense that they are potentially observed at all times, thus disciplining themselves. Gill’s sense of disciplinary neoliberalism combines his observations about the structural power of capital, exemplified by the ‘new constitutionalism’, with the much stronger claim that neoliberal values of the individual, the market, privatization, commodity exchange, etc., are becoming pervasive and working their way through to the micropractices of everyday life for the overwhelming majority of the planet.

The ‘new constitutionalism’ is how Gill refers to the increasing number of legal instruments, treaties, laws and institutions that progressively secure ever larger parts of social life for the logic of neoliberalism and away from any kind of democratic control. According to Gill:

Disciplinary neo-liberalism is institutionalized at the macro–level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms: the ‘new constitutionalism’. This discourse of global economic governance is reflected in the policies of the Bretton Woods organizations (e.g. IMF and World Bank conditionality that mandates changes in the forms of state and economic policy) and quasi-constitutional regional arrangements such as NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Agreement] and Maastricht, and the multilateral regulatory framework of the new World Trade Organization. It is reflected in the global trend towards independent central banks, with macroeconomic policy prioritizing the ‘fight against inflation’.6
With regard to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular, Gill is one of many scholars who have charged that a kind of market fundamentalism pervades their decision-making process, and that structural adjustment programmes seem designed, through ‘conditionality’, to punish states that have strayed from neoliberal economic orthodoxy. Defenders of the IMF would argue that one should not ‘shoot the messenger’, that less developed countries with balance-of-payment problems got themselves in trouble first, and that they are always free to decline help from the IMF. However, it is the concept of the ‘structural power of capital’ provided by Gill that would answer conditionality is something not merely desired by the IMF, but looked to as a seal of approval by private investors upon whom most less developed countries are dependent. Similar arguments could be made with relation to multilateral trade deals, the World Trade Organization or the independence of central banks. Attempts to ‘democratize’ these sites by providing more democratic accountability, transparency and/or democratic selection of leadership would most assuredly bump up against the structural power of capital and its ability to ‘strike’ or exit a country or region that seems unable to ensconce these institutions away from democratic decision-making.

Gill refers to ‘market civilization’ as a historical structure that relates to culture and civil society:

By market civilization, I mean a contradictory movement or set of transformative practices that entail, on the one hand, cultural, ideological and mythic forms understood broadly as an ideology or myth of capitalist progress. These representations are associated with the cumulative aspects of market integration and increasingly expansive structures of accumulation, legitimation, consumption and work, largely configured by the power of transnational capital. On the other hand, market civilization involves patterns of social disintegration and particular, exclusionary and hierarchical patterns of social relations.7

So for Gill, market civilization refers to the microlevel instantiations of neoliberal ideology, the way in which neoliberal values of the individual, property, privatization and hierarchy become pervasive globally. Examples include, echoing Karl Polanyi, the increasing commodification of areas of social life such as healthcare, health insurance, religion, leisure, the patenting of human genes and other life forms. Gill also cites the panopticon effect at work in the enormous amount of data collected on individuals as market agents – their
credit history, spending habits, demographic information and worthiness for insurance risk, as well as the increasing forms of electronic monitoring in the workplace and public space. He also claims ‘(t)he Internet in some significant ways facilitates this sorting, categorization and evaluation process, as well as acting as a kind of offshore cyberspace beyond the reach of many national regulation and taxation structures’. Gill, in locating part of his analysis in micropractices, borrows a form of analysis from Foucault, but Gill also claims that Foucault’s locating of resistance at the microlevel is unsatisfying. Gill argues ‘where Foucault represents a cry of outrage at the taming of the individual and a purely defensive strategy of localized resistance, historical materialism goes much further in an attempt to theorize and to promote collective action to create an alternative form of society – even from within a prison (where Gramsci sketched his notebooks)’.

So, how do we assess the import of Gill’s work for international relations? To be sure, Gill and all those working within the neo-Gramscian framework are vulnerable to a number of criticisms. As discussed in the Gramsci entry in this volume, the Germain and Kenny critique of this school holds that taking the concepts Gramsci used to analyse a particular extended state (Italy in the early to mid-twentieth century) and reformulating them for an analysis of world order cannot be done without significant violence to the concepts in question. From a more orthodox Marxian perspective comes the critique of neo-Gramscian international relations/international political economy as granting too much autonomy to the state and too much analytical power to the role of ideology. Still others have argued that neo-Gramscian scholarship puts too much emphasis on the one-way flow of causality from the global to the state/local. All these critiques, however, seem willing to embrace the normative commitment of neo-Gramscian scholarship and would probably place themselves on the ‘critical theory’ side of the divide that Cox suggests in his typology of ‘problem-solving theory’ versus ‘critical theory’.

Gill is most vulnerable to the mainstream of the discipline on methodological grounds. Although much of his work has an empirical element, he is most certainly not engaged in attempting to falsify his hypotheses. For example, Gill’s argument about the importance of councils such as the Trilateral Commission in the formation of a transnational capitalist class can only be suggestive, as it falls outside the demarcation criteria provided by Popper as a testable proposition. Further, Gill is vulnerable to the claim that such councils and other private associations may not be as important as he implies, as it is exceedingly difficult to provide empirical evidence of their ability
directly to determine outcomes. Of course, a great deal of contemporary social science would be called into question if we determine that Popper’s demarcation question was the proper criterion for our endeavours. And in fairness to Gill, he is methodologically aware enough to confront these criticisms head-on in his work. In *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*, he defends his work from the charge of relativism by asserting the methodological criteria for theory relevance as ‘scope, consistency, and reflexivity’, and not surprisingly he argues that transnational historical materialism, on these grounds, is analytically superior to the mainstream traditions of international relations. In *Power and Resistance in the New World Order*, Gill devotes an entire chapter to questions of epistemology and ontology, and directly addresses the mainstream of the discipline. He approvingly cites Gramsci’s rejection of positivism in favour of a dialectical analysis and claims, ‘(s)imilar and quite fundamental criticisms can be made of the explanatory usefulness of the prevailing positivist approaches to the study of International Political Economy, such as its ahistorical nature; its lack of a dynamic, dialectical quality; the narrowness and incompleteness of its abstractions which are confined, almost tautologically, to the relations between theoretical abstractions (i.e. unitary rational actors called states); the tendency to extreme parsimony in explanation relative to the infinite complexity of its object of analysis, that is the international system’. While it is up to the reader to decide if Gill’s characterization of the discipline is fair, as well as the overall merits of his work, it is hard to deny that he has enriched the discipline of international relations with his own brand of historical materialism.

**Notes**

2. Ibid., pp. 1–9.
5. Ibid., p. 130.
6. Ibid., p. 131.
7. Ibid., p. 118.
8. Ibid., p. 193.

**Gill’s major writings**


See also: Cox, Gramsci

**Further reading**

Pasha, Mustapha Kemal and Murphy, Craig (eds), International Relations and the New Inequality, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI

Antonio Gramsci was, above all, a theorist and advocate of social revolution, but could equally be credited a journalist, activist and communist. Whatever his influence while alive, his posthumous impact on political theory and international relations continues to grow. Gramsci’s work was not widely available in English until the 1970s, and it is fair to say his legacy is an actively contested one. His considerable impact on international relations owes much to the work of Robert Cox, who developed an analytical framework for international relations and international political economy by reformulating key Gramscian concepts. Cox’s reformulation of Gramsci has inspired an increasingly diverse and wide-ranging scholarship. This Gramscian-inflected international relations and international political economy has developed to the point where some have even suggested that Gramsci’s work has been taken entirely out of context, in that Gramsci was essentially a theorist of the early twentieth century whose analysis of state and civil society is not sufficiently elastic to treat contemporary international politics and global order. However, this is decidedly a minority opinion and, as argued below, there is considerable textual warrant within Gramsci’s oeuvre to legitimate the use of Gramscian concepts to theorize power-generating social relations and processes operating within and across subnational, national and transnational scales.

Antonio Gramsci was born in Sardinia in 1891 and died in Rome in 1937, succumbing after years of poor health greatly exacerbated by nearly a decade of imprisonment under Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy. Gramsci had a relatively impoverished childhood, and his youth and adult life would be marked by poor health caused by a childhood accident. He won a scholarship to study at the University of Turin in 1911, and it was in Turin – the heart of the Italian automobile industry – that Gramsci became increasingly involved in radical labour
politics. He wrote for socialist newspapers on topics ranging from party politics to literary and theatre criticism, and joined the Italian Socialist Party, from which he would later break and help form the Communist Party of Italy. Gramsci would become his party’s representative to the Comintern and spend two years in Moscow and other European countries before returning to Italy in 1924, where he thought he had immunity from arrest as a Member of Parliament. After Mussolini’s fascist regime came to power in 1922, the Communist Party was under severe pressure, and although Gramsci was entitled to immunity, he was arrested in 1926 and later sentenced to 20 years in prison. He would die shortly after being released from custody in 1937.

It was during his decade in prison that Gramsci produced the volume of writing that later would become known as *The Prison Notebooks*. The fact that Gramsci wrote his most influential work from custody presents special challenges in understanding his work, although it must also be said that his imprisonment freed him from the influences of party politics and Soviet influence/control of the Comintern. Censorship by the state authorities meant that Gramsci would have to write in a more abstract fashion (for example, using the phrase ‘social group’ instead of ‘class’), as well as forcing Gramsci into a dependence on prison authorities to allow writing and reading materials. He was greatly aided in acquiring reading material by his friend, the economist Pierro Sraffa, who opened an account for Gramsci in a Milan bookstore. Gramsci’s relatively young death also meant that he would not edit the rather fragmentary notebooks, leaving to scholars the difficult task of assessing Gramsci’s intentions for his work.

Antonio Gramsci, at first sight, seems an unlikely candidate to be included in a text of key thinkers in international relations. Admittedly, his interests were not solely focused on international relations, especially not if one’s understanding of the field is limited to realist and/or liberal traditions. However, Gramsci’s critical theoretical leverage comes in his critique of both the Hobbesian logic of realism, wherein ahistorically situated territorial units exist in a dark world of conflict and self-help, and the Smithian logic of liberalism, in which co-operation can lead to mutually beneficial exchange and peaceful interactions between states. Gramsci’s critique of these logics, and the simplest conceptual entry to his thought, rests within his concept of hegemony. Of course, hegemony is a familiar term for international relations scholars. Whether in the arguments about the necessity of a hegemonic power within ‘hegemonic stability theory’, or simply a
referent for a preponderance of military and economic power in a
global or regional system, hegemony is a common term. For Gramsci,
hegemony meant something much more complex, which encompasses
these meanings but goes far beyond them.

Hegemony is arguably ‘the central organizing concept’ of The
Prison Notebooks.¹ For Gramsci, hegemony is the ability of a dominant
class to secure consent from the dominated, its ability to exercise
‘intellectual and moral leadership’, to convince the dominated their
interests are the same as those of the dominant class. To understand his
use of hegemony, it is critical to recognize that Gramsci’s theorization of
the capitalist state encompasses both the political state apparatus,
which can use coercion if necessary to achieve the interests of the
dominant class, and civil society (the sphere of the putatively ‘private’,
including the economy, religion, parties, clubs and other non-state
institutions), wherein much of the work of eliciting consent to
domination occurs. For Gramsci, civil society was more than just the
sphere of ‘egoistic’ self-seeking and private behaviour. It was a vital
site of popular contestation that offered the possibility of transcending
the apparent public–private divisions of modern capitalism. Gramsci
used the term ‘historic bloc’ to refer to the particular constellation of
forces that utilizes hegemony, and theorized that for advanced
capitalist countries, it would be necessary to develop a counter-hegemony
in order to secure power for the dominated. That is, power was not
located in the state apparatus, but instead in the extended state that
includes civil society, and revolution could not be achieved merely by
seizing the reins of the state apparatus. Hegemony is produced and
reproduced through a historic bloc, the reach of which extends
throughout society. In The Prison Notebooks, Gramsci explains how
the Western, capitalist state must be understood in the extended
sense, in contrast to the relatively undeveloped Russia of the
Bolshevik Revolution:

In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and
gelatious; in the West, there was a proper relation between
State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy
structure of civil society was revealed. The State was only an
outer ditch, behind which stood a sturdy system of fortresses and
earthworks...²

What was so novel about Gramsci’s theorization of hegemony was
its dynamic reformulation of crude base→superstructure formulation
of Marxism that considered the economic base as determining, in a
one-way causality, the epiphenomena of the politics, law and culture. Gramsci rejected this form of ‘economism’ in favour of recognizing the interplay of base and superstructure, or perhaps more accurately, he rejected the base—superstructure metaphor entirely in favour of the more complex notion of hegemony. By doing so, Gramsci helped fashion an open-ended form of historical materialism (or Marxism), which rejected economic determinism and teleological forms of historicism, and identified the previously marginalized (in the sense of epiphenomenal) terrain of culture and ideology as a site of vital struggle. Gramsci uses a military metaphor to theorize how politics changes in this conception. He refers to the necessarily antecedent ideological political activity required to establish a counter-hegemonic project as a ‘war of position’ that must be done before a frontal assault on the state, a ‘war of manoeuvre’.

Given his interest in culture and ideology as critical sites of political struggle, it is not surprising that Gramsci would reject simplistic notions of ‘false consciousness’, where the dominated are simply unaware of their true interests, and instead argue that ‘all men are philosophers’, in that each is situated in a particular historical setting and makes sense of a complex world through recourse to ‘common sense’. For Gramsci, common sense does not have the same connotation as ‘good sense’, but rather represents a kind of fragmentary and often contradictory amalgam of popular, religious and cultural beliefs. Common sense functions like a world view that, although fragmentary and not systematic, reflects hegemonic ideology. Gramsci argued that in order to challenge the hegemony represented in common sense, a counter-hegemonic project ‘must be a criticism of “common sense”, basing itself initially, however, on common sense in order to demonstrate that “everyone” is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and making “critical” an already existing activity’. Thus, Gramsci finds within each individual elements of both hegemonic ideology and the capacity to utilize their common sense in order to engage in critical reflection upon that ideology.

By jettisoning the teleological and deterministic readings of Marx, Gramsci laid the theoretical groundwork that inspired a prodigious amount of scholarship in literary criticism, cultural studies and political theory, most of which elaborates Gramscian concepts in analysing the state and civil society within a particular (extended) state. In terms of the discipline of international relations and its subfield, international political economy, Robert Cox was almost singularly
responsible for inaugurating an entire school of thought through his utilization of Gramsci to theorize ‘social forces, states, and world orders’. Essentially, Cox deployed Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to theorize hegemonic world orders, keeping much of the analytical content but at a different geographical scale. Cox’s 1981 *Millennium* article ‘Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory’\(^4\) has become a classic in the field, and was a key article in the popular *Neorealism and its Critics*, edited by Robert Keohane.\(^5\) A full treatment of Cox is available in this volume, and readers wishing to have a full appreciation of Gramsci’s impact on international relations should familiarize themselves with Cox’s work.

Building on Cox’s pioneering work of extending Gramscian concepts to a global object of inquiry were a number of scholars working broadly within the discipline of international relations and the subfield of international political economy. Stephen Gill of York University merits his own entry in this volume, and is fully discussed there. Among Gill’s key contributions were his pioneering work on transnational hegemony, the Trilateral Commission and development of the concept of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. Gill edited an important collection of Gramscian-inspired scholarship, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (1993),\(^6\) which helped to broaden the audience for Gramsci within international relations. Among the authors contributing essays in this volume is Mark Rupert of Syracuse University, whose *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power* (1995)\(^7\) offers a systematic analysis of precisely how a particular historic bloc of the US state, capital and labour as a junior partner forged a hegemonic project of global liberalism that was more or less generalized throughout the Americas, Western Europe and parts of Asia. Paying special attention to the particular form of ‘productivist’ ideology that emerged around Fordist production techniques in the American automobile industry, Rupert was able to document empirically how Fordism functioned as hegemony, as the ideological cement, that imparted a uniquely American form to the liberal global order anchored by the United States during the Cold War. Equally important, Rupert demonstrated that under a variety of pressures, the Fordist accommodation in the United States had begun unravelling in the latter part of the twentieth century. Given this unravelling, Rupert’s next book, *Ideologies of Globalization*, extensively utilized Gramsci’s notion of ‘common sense’ to understand better how particular ideological articulations were deeply influenced by changing economic circumstances.
Cox, Gill and Rupert are three of the most prominent Gramscian scholars of international relations and international political economy, but their work by no means captures the diversity of thought of those within the discipline who owe a debt to Gramsci. A testament to the growing strength of the Gramscians in this field is the number of critiques levelled against this form of scholarship. Bieler and Morton (2004) provide a nice summary of the different critiques from various quarters. One of the most recent and direct attacks on the legitimacy of Gramscian international relations was offered by Germain and Kenny in the *Review of International Studies*. They argue that Gramsci’s conceptual inventory was developed by analysis of particular state conditions that are not easily appropriated for a different historical epoch; that the key Gramscian international relations step of theorizing global hegemony and global civil society (begun by Cox) is entirely inappropriate given Gramsci’s analysis of a particular state and civil society; and that Gramsci’s complex theoretical and conceptual works cannot be taken up cavalierly by contemporary scholars without historicizing them. A later issue of *Review of International Studies* features rebuttals by Rupert and Craig Murphy, but the most extensive and rigorous rejection of Germain and Kenny’s critique was offered by Adam David Morton in *Review of International Political Economy*. In a compelling defence of a careful use of Gramsci’s ideas ‘in and beyond their context’, Morton develops an immanent critique of the Germain and Kenny position by emphasizing three points: there is no privileged singular reading of Gramsci, but there is also not a limitless or infinite number of readings; only an ‘austere historicism’ would shackle ideas to the immediate context in which they are produced; and Gramsci’s own works reveal that a Gramscian perspective requires us to think both ‘in and beyond’ the context of an idea’s provenance. Morton carefully marshals a considerable amount of evidence to make the case that Germain and Kenny’s own critique of Gramscian international relations fails on Gramscian terms.

The future of Gramscian international relations scholarship will probably produce more controversy about historicizing Gramsci’s ideas, and how far Gramscian-inspired scholarship can be taken in international relations. In concluding, it should be recognized that whatever the merits of Gramscian international relations, the discipline is unquestionably richer from its existence. Challenging the ahistorical recurrence of the same of realism, the perhaps too-easy co-operation of liberalism, and recognizing the importance of ideas such as constructivism while rooting them in a theoretical tradition that demands attention to another form of anarchy – that of material...
production in capitalist states – has brought new questions to the ongoing conversation about international relations. A final point about Gramscian international relations is worth mentioning. While many of its proponents would be able to cite any number of forms of analytical leverage that it provides, it is undeniable that a key attraction of this perspective is its unabashed normative commitment to a politics of human emancipation/liberation. From Gramsci’s attention to the ‘theses on Feuerbach’ to Cox’s claim that ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, the normative element of Gramscian international relations is for some its greatest attraction, and for others its greatest flaw.

Notes


Gramsci’s major writings


See also: Cox, Gill

Further reading

JÜRGEN HABERMAS

Jürgen Habermas remains one of the most influential philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. His theory of communicative action lies at the core of many discursive theories of institutional development and cosmopolitan ethics. In recent years, Habermas himself has turned increasing attention to international politics and the volatile tension between realpolitik and cosmopolitan justice. While he has yet to set forth a theory of international politics, his views on Kosovo and Iraq suggest some degree of scepticism towards the current cosmopolitan democratic order (as embraced by David
Held and Daniele Archibugi, for instance). In his view, the network of global institutions still lacks the developed instruments and norms to forge and reinforce solidarity (on par with constitutional state democracies). Yet, in stressing the continued institutional developments at the global and transnational levels, he also remains optimistic that a legal cosmopolitanism will eventually emerge.\(^1\) It is this optimism that has for so many years characterized his own commitment to rationality and democracy.

Habermas’s commitment was undoubtedly shaped by his upbringing during the Nazi era. It was of course the Nazis who championed the triumph of the German will and undermined civil and political rights. The devastating results of their grand, full-scale attack on the Enlightenment principles of freedom and equality instilled Habermas with uncompromising conviction to defend reason and rationality. Habermas received his advanced training at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (‘Frankfurt School’), where, by the late 1950s, he assumed a full-time professorship. As the most influential second-generation critical theorist of the Frankfurt School, Habermas believed that first-generation theorists, notably Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, had failed to defend reason against the reifications of consumer society. In fact, his primary goal, as we shall see, was to recover the progressive elements of reason within an intersubjective framework (hermeneutics or interpretation). In working towards this goal, he initially focused on the public and private elements of reason, or how opinion formation combined with reasoning to foster a spirited and critical discussion in many educated circles.

In his first book, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas focused on the emergence and activities of the early bourgeois democratic publics and/or discussion groups during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here he argued that rising awareness of public issues constituted the early seeds of the public autonomy of individual citizens. But rather than resolving problems, public autonomy engendered new-found tensions between this autonomy (consent of the governed) and the public right to exercise authority (legitimacy). How, in other words, should this right be exercised in a way that would best serve the interests of the people?

In *Legitimation Crisis*, Habermas addresses this question by examining the relationship between the state apparatus and civil society.\(^2\) His argument is that the crisis in legitimation is not merely about the state’s inability to enforce its will (via Weber’s conception of the monopolization of violence), but rather the conversion of the popular will through democratic procedures and rules. The democratic state,
in other words, cannot simply rely on its enforcement and welfare provisions to extend and maintain its authority; it must legitimize its authority through reasoned argumentation. The question that this priority raises is the following: how should the cognitive dimension of social action reinforce the democratic solidarity needed to further legitimize the external authority needed to safeguard citizens’ social, economic and civil rights? The crisis in this sense is made all the more apparent by the fact that the welfare state was never designed to be democratically inclusive. State welfare in fact is only meant to stabilize the conditions for democratic participation. It does not, however, circumscribe the democratic process, which, in Habermas’s view, remains an open-ended process shaped by deliberation, argumentation and the ethical self-understanding of its citizens. The democratic process, in other words, is non-deterministic: \textit{contra} Marx’s determinism and structural forces, it is not reducible to proletarian interests and social action (\textit{praxis}).

In his great work \textit{The Theory of Communicative Action}, Habermas theorizes that cognition and communicative reason constitute the core elements of critical social theory. His two-volume \textit{magnum opus} is based on several in-depth critiques of Weber, Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer, with perhaps the most notable being Weber’s societal rationalization thesis. Here Habermas builds on his earlier thesis of legitimization crisis, arguing that Weber’s structures of consciousness lacked the cognitive dimensions needed to steer social theory through and beyond the reification of these structures. For Habermas, the cognitive dimension of social action refers to the capacity of individuals and peoples to reach consensus through the constituent elements of communicative action, namely deliberation, argumentation, empathy and debate.

One of his underlying claims is that human cognition (science) and philosophy were never properly reconciled. Here he claims that Adorno had engendered a critical disjuncture between science and philosophy and exhausted the possibilities of the structural consciousness. As he states:

But the conceptual apparatus of instrumental reason is set up to make it possible for subjects to exercise control over nature and not to tell an objectivated nature what is to be done to it. For this reason, it does not provide the explicative tools needed to explain what the instrumentalization of social and intra-psychic relations means from the perspective of the violated and deformed contexts of life.
For Habermas, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason surrendered rationality to a deep-seated scepticism of scientific progress. It was precisely this ‘surrender’, as he explains, that reflected their disregard for speculative reason and the discursive features of social differentiation and societal rationalization.

Nonetheless, one of the key building blocks of Habermas’s communicative action theory is the distinction between communicative and strategic action. According to Habermas, strategic action and its constitutive elements of calculation and design remain in constant tension with the ethical and moral claims to truth. Validating these claims (moral, truth, ethical, strategic) requires us to persuade others that our opinions and ideas are worth considering and instituting. Such claims, often couched in terms ‘universal pragmatics’, are based on the speech act, which refers to our doing something in what we say.

The speech act consists of three attendant functions: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. The locutionary act, as defined by John Austin, refers to the propositional content of an utterance; the illocutionary act involves the acts that are being performed in saying something; and the perlocutionary act characterizes the external effect generated from what has been said. Following Austin’s and Searle’s interpretation of the speech act, Habermas explains how Austin’s three distinctions of the speech act are teleologically based, since the illocutionary acts are meant to generate conscious or intentional effects on the speaker interpreting the utterance. Perlocutionary acts therefore constitute a subclass of teleological actions. According to Habermas, they are acts whose content is shaped by the intentional striving of a goal. In this sense, Austin, according to Habermas, failed to see how our learning capacity serves as a type of steering mechanism. Nor did he show how ‘acts of communication or speech acts function as a coordinating mechanism for other actions’.

The performativity of speech acts is a crucial element of what Habermas refers to as ‘the struggle to reach consensus’. As Habermas insists, ‘the very medium of mutual understanding abides in a peculiar half-transcendence. So long as participants maintain their performative attitudes, the language actually in use remains at their backs’. Yet one of the problems with Habermas’s consensus theory, as Thomas McCarthy notes, is that it fails to deal adequately with the difference between an utterance that is true, and one in which rational consensus dictates that a statement is true. In other words, how precisely do we know what is true, when consensus can either be true or false?
For Habermas, when we struggle to reach consensus, we also apply or draw from our existing cultural understandings of the world. These cultural understandings exist prior to, and are communicated through, our exchange of ideas, thereby reflecting a repository of cultural understandings. Habermas refers to this repository as ‘lifeworld’: a holistic and creative social force that is constantly shaping our views and determining how we rationalize. This rationalization process can take many forms, but generally it reflects the differentiation of systems functioning, or the implementation, enforcement and reproduction of rules, norms and principles through institutions and political structures. When the existing social institutions or mechanisms fail to respond to our interests and needs, this unleashes novel social forces and pressures such as well organized social movements. As Habermas puts it: ‘the rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a heightening of systemic complexity which becomes so hypertrophied that it unleashes system imperatives that burst the capacity of the lifeworld they instrumentalize’.8

By the early 1990s, Habermas would begin to devote much of his attention to the political and economic processes of EU integration (adoption of a single European currency or Central Monetary Unit). In so doing, his unstated aim was to apply communicative action theory to EU integration, that is, to situate it in the constitutionalization of EU law. Two of the central themes of this process were legitimization and constitutional patriotism. In his essay on ‘Citizenship and national identity’, Habermas argued that immigration and economic globalization had begun to challenge the constitutional patriotism of national polities.9 The erosion of national identity raised the question of whether the political loyalties of domestic polities could provide the basis for solidarity at the transnational level. In his later writings on the EU constitution, Habermas would argue that an EU constitution – one modelled after the framework of the US constitution – could foster the needed solidarity and identity to promote an EU polity.

In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas analyses one of the fundamental components of a democratic polity: the legitimization process of the constitutional state. Here he explains how democratic constitutions and participation consist of both a ‘legally mediated solidarity’ and a ‘secular source of citizenship’. As he puts it:

Each and every person should receive a three-fold recognition: they should receive equal protection and equal respect in their integrity as irreplaceable individuals, as members of the political community. This idea of self-determining political community has assumed a
variety of concrete legal forms in the different constitutions and political systems of Western Europe and the United States.\textsuperscript{10}

Thus, when state lawmakers and leaders of the constitutional state debate and pass a bill, they also legitimize the rules of procedure by bringing together the enactment of this bill with the will of the people. It is this legitimizing source of power of the legal process that Habermas calls the communicative power of the constitutional state.\textsuperscript{11} For him, the application of law must ultimately stabilize societal expectations (order) through democratic procedure. In this way, procedural neutrality, or the application of procedures, is the converted product of several levels of deliberation and reasoning.

Still, the legitimizing processes at the global level remain comparatively weak and undeveloped. This is not to say that they will continue to remain weak; only that more institutional norms and procedures are needed to reinforce the fragile democratic solidarity at the global level. Habermas’s pragmatic and sobering position has, in certain respects, placed him at odds with many of the idealist cosmopolitan thinkers of critical international relations theory. Many of these thinkers stress either strong notions of democratic and moral cosmopolitanism at the global level, or the need to soften Habermas’s own proceduralism in order to promote greater sensitivity to difference.\textsuperscript{12}

To be sure, Habermas’s recent political writings on Kosovo and Iraq reveal a rather strong ambivalence towards the emergence of a global civil society. On the one hand, globalization has engendered many benefits and opportunities for social movements and citizens to channel their demands to higher political authorities. On the other hand, the political and legal institutions of the global community, while forming a novel network of global justice, still lack developed legitimization processes to foster the needed loyalties and commitments for global citizenship. It is crucial to stress, therefore, that Habermas’s ambivalence stems from his own convictions concerning the strong nationalist loyalties to the constitutional state. As already noted, constitutional patriotism, or the evolution of loyalties of national citizens to their constitutional frameworks, has not materialized in any strong form at the global level (and to a lesser extent the transnational, EU level). The development of global citizenship takes time, of course, and requires stronger enforcement mechanisms to interlink democratic procedures with democratic solidarity. For cosmopolitan nationalists, for instance, this idea requires us to take more seriously the dynamics of national communities when formulating the possibilities of solidarity at the global level.\textsuperscript{13}
In addition to these cosmopolitan debates, Habermas has also figured prominently in mainstream international relations debates. Thomas Risse, for instance, has argued that communicative action theory explains how international agreements and institutional norms are shaped by reasoned argumentation. Communicative action, as he explains, involves empathy and ethical and moral claims, which, in turn, constitute a common knowledge (or anarchy as lifeworld) of actors that helps to explain behavioural outcomes. In this manner, strategy/power offers one mode of explanation, while reasoned argumentation offers another to assess these outcomes. Risse’s application of Habermas’s theory is arguably the most concrete and effective application to international politics of Habermas’s ideas. In recent years, well established journals such as the Review of International Studies have published special issues regarding the further application of Habermas’s ideas to international politics or the development of a pragmatic critical theory of international relations theory. There is little question that formulating a more cohesive Habermasian-based international relations approach will remain a strong priority for many critical international relations theorists. It is this unstated objective that makes him arguably the most important contemporary foundational theorist of critical theory in international relations.

Notes

3. There has been much scepticism as to whether Habermas can still claim to be a Marxist, much less champion a convincing reconstruction of Habermas.
5. Ibid., p. 295.
10. Ibid., p. 496.
11. Communicative power, in this sense, is routinely channelled through the system of different branches and principle of democratic state, and in the process converted into administrative power.


**Habermas’s major writings**


See also: **Linklater, Reus-Smit**

**Further reading**


ANDREW LINKLATER

Mark Hoffman has aptly described Andrew Linklater’s work as a ‘ground-clearing exercise’.1 Over the past two decades, Linklater has attempted to construct an intellectual and practical project within a discipline whose very autonomy in the social sciences is a barrier to that project. While there are indications that the boundary between the study of international relations and other disciplines is increasingly blurred, it is ironic that some of the arguments mounted against a separate discipline of international relations are also inimical to Linklater’s vision. In other words, Linklater has been engaged in a dual critique. First, he has argued that the sharp division of labour between political theory and international relations is unnecessary and itself in need of explanation. Second, he has had to confront another (arguably more dangerous) challenge to his project in the form of postmodernism. So far in his career, the balance between criticism and constructive engagement with both the theory and practice of international relations has been heavily tilted towards criticism, hence the term ‘ground-clearing’. In the future, we may expect this to change, as Linklater’s work itself moves forward and other, younger scholars take up the challenge of responding to his agenda. That agenda is, as we shall see, extremely ambitious and demanding.

Andrew Linklater is presently Professor of International Relations at the University of Keele in Staffordshire, England. He joined the Department of International Relations at Keele in 1993. Linklater studied politics and international relations at Aberdeen University and political philosophy at Oxford before completing his PhD in international relations at the London School of Economics in 1978. Over the next 15 years Linklater worked in Australia, and he has taught at the University of Tasmania and at Monash University in Melbourne. In 1991, he established the Centre for International Relations at Monash.

The main themes of all Linklater’s work can be found in his ambitious doctoral dissertation, which he first published in 1982 as Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. This book is required reading for anyone interested in the philosophical assumptions of ‘critical’ theory in the study of international relations. The book was inspired by the work of the British Committee on the Theory of International Relations, which took as its point of departure Martin Wight’s definition of international theory as ‘a tradition of speculation about relations between states [and] a tradition imagined as the twin of speculation about the state to which the name
“political theory” is appropriated. Linklater approaches, as did the Committee, one of the long-standing problems of international theory – the dichotomy of obligation for ‘man qua man’ and ‘man qua citizen’ – with a compelling historical account of the (allegedly inadequate) philosophy that has addressed the problem as well as a unique solution of his own.

The basic argument of the book is that the distinction made in modern international theory between, on the one hand, mankind/ethical universality, and on the other, civil society/ethical particularity, may be overcome. The distinction itself is a crucial support for the academic division of labour between political theory and the study of international relations. It also corresponds to the ‘real world’ insofar as, while we are all members of the human race and feel that we have obligations to each other as human beings, we are also citizens of separate states. Consequently, our human obligations have little purchase on our conduct, and Linklater is concerned with the various philosophical arguments that have been proposed throughout history to justify this state of affairs.

Those feelings and beliefs, he argues, are based on a fundamental human interest in autonomy, which cannot justify the political division of ‘man’ into separate sovereign states. Linklater’s major aim, therefore, is to recover and refine the universalistic strain of political theory embodied in the work of Kant. This will set the stage for a transformation of human consciousness, encouraging people to think more compassionately about their obligations to ‘foreigners’. In the Kantian tradition, ‘men’ are substituted for ‘citizens’ as the proper subjects of moral concern, and the image of the international system as a ‘realm of recurrence and repetition’ is replaced with a progressivist account of historical development.

In his defence of the Kantian tradition, Linklater engages in a detailed critique of the major Enlightenment theorists including Pufendorf, Vattel and Gentili. His basic criticism of social contract theory is that it presupposes, without explicit justification, the territorial boundaries of the modern state in delimiting the scope of whatever social contract the theorist is concerned to justify or criticize. Throughout the text, Linklater criticizes political theorists for failing to question what he regards as the morally arbitrary significance of geographical borders. ‘The theory presupposes what it requires to establish, the legitimacy of the sovereign association and the rationality of the division of mankind into separate sovereign states.’

Linklater argues that the Kantian tradition is the best starting point for international political theory. Unlike his predecessors, Kant does
not subordinate the demands of reason to the contingencies of nature and custom. As Linklater puts it,

Kant’s project begins by establishing the ends which men have an unconditional duty to promote as rational beings with the capacity to escape from the world of natural determination; and he proceeds to argue for a radical transformation of the political world in the direction of that condition in which all human beings live in conformity with the imperatives grounded in their common rational nature.4

Linklater then proceeds to describe in some detail the basic elements of Kant’s thought and the ways in which his progressivist account of political ethics offers an alternative to the dominant realist image of international relations. But Linklater is fully aware that Kant’s ‘rationalism’, his belief that it is possible to legislate the content of the categorical imperative to treat individuals as ends in themselves (not as means) on the basis of reason alone, is vulnerable to what he calls ‘the historicist critique’. He accepts the argument that ‘Kantian rationalism’ fails to give an account of the historical condition of its emergence as a product of Western intellectual culture, and he also accepts the Hegelian argument that reason itself is embodied within vastly different forms of life rather than present in one, single, universal form in the minds of pre-social individuals...historicism must be deemed an important advance beyond the abstract position of rationalism, even though it throws the...bases of international political theory into confusion.5

Linklater wants to save Kant’s ethical cosmopolitanism from the charge of relativism, and he does so by appealing to what he calls ‘philosophical history’. We are able to transcend the rationalist source of freedom by tracing its growth through history. Drawing on the work of Hegel and Marx, Linklater argues that, while freedom is always valued in varying ways in particular cultural contexts, it is possible to construct ‘ideal types’ of relations between societies in history, and to trace the historical development of human reason. Or, at least, this seems to be what Linklater wants international political theorists to do. He argues that instead of maintaining the academic division of labour between political theory and the study of international relations, we should
look beyond the inside of societies to the way in which groups, estranged from one another, come to recognize the possibility of relations based upon equality and justice; [we] can include an examination of their recognition of the possibility of overcoming their particularism, which issues from estrangement and results in relations of a necessitous character, in the course of discovering and applying universal principles within an inclusive society.\textsuperscript{6}

In \textit{Men and Citizens}, Linklater does not go into much detail about exactly how this ought to be done. Indeed, it is fair to say that since 1982, when his book was first published, he has not proceeded very far along the road. That is, he \textit{implies} a theory by which the nation-state may be transcended without subordinating the liberty of individual citizens to some supranational organization, but quite what the theory might be, and what the mechanisms of transformation would look like, remain unclear. Hence the term ‘ground-clearing exercise’ is an appropriate description of his work thus far. This is not a harsh judgement, since it remains the case that there is a great deal of ground to be cleared. Since 1982, Linklater has engaged in a sustained critique of theoretical logics and social practices of exclusion and heteronomy in the history of interstate relations as well as within international relations theory.

As part of that critique, Linklater suggests that it may be possible to move beyond the established ‘paradigms’ in the study of international relations by examining the ways in which each focuses on particular problematics at the expense of others that are privileged within allegedly ‘competing’ paradigms. This is the basic argument of his second major book, \textit{Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations} (1990). Realism gives us an account of international politics as a struggle for power based on the absence of any overarching political authority among states. But it privileges necessity at the expense of freedom, telling us little about how we may ‘emancipate’ ourselves from this condition. Marxism, on the other hand, says little about the sources of war that arise from the competition among states. We need to ‘move beyond’ both, and Linklater is very supportive of those historical sociologists who have mapped the rise of the state in the context of the transnational social and economic forces of capitalism, development and industrialization. As I point out in my summaries of the work of Giddens, Mann, Tilly and Wallerstein, however, while it is true that they look at the state in the context of ‘domestic’ \textit{and} ‘international’ relations – indeed, they are concerned with how these categories come into being in a
historical sense – there is precious little in their work that engages with what Linklater calls ‘the practical project of extending community beyond the nation-state’. Before looking at a major problem with Linklater’s ‘critical’ approach to international relations, it may be useful to summarize his agenda for the field. Linklater has issued several ‘manifestos’ on behalf of critical theory over the past decade, and they all call for a direct focus on the problem of community in world affairs and the nature, development and changeability of principles of moral inclusion and exclusion.

In thematic terms, the agenda of critical theory as the ‘next stage’ in the evolution of the study of international relations has at least three aspects: the philosophical–normative, the sociological, and the practical. The philosophical aspect focuses on the rationales for the dominant principles of moral exclusion and inclusion in social life, not least the principle of sovereignty providing for the inclusion of citizens and the exclusion of ‘foreigners’. It tends to be concerned with reasons for preferring the state, as opposed to the society of states, or the community of humankind as the appropriate vision of community. In recent times, however, critical theorists have sought to broaden the terms of debate by focusing on other principles of inclusion and exclusion in world affairs associated with class, race and gender.

Linklater is somewhat concerned with the rise of postmodernism in this context. While he admires the way in which Foucault’s work, for example, draws our attention to the complex relations between power and knowledge in modern institutions, he believes that we must not lose the capacity for universal moral judgement in exaggerating the importance of ‘difference’ and respect for ‘the other’. The sociological aspects of critical international theory are concerned with the historical changeability of principles of moral inclusion and exclusion. Working from the philosophical premise that human moral capacities are not to be presupposed (contra Kant) or viewed as given, but must be accounted for within a theory of history, Linklater identifies three forms of social learning: learning how to cope with conditions of conflict or strategic rivalry; learning how to manage technological and economic change or technical–instrumental rationalization; and moral–practical learning. Linklater argues that the history of humanity suggests a contingent capacity to transcend particularistic limitations on freedom, and even the whole spectrum of forms of exclusion. The third thematic aspect of critical international theory is practical, or as Linklater puts it, ‘praxeological’, to examine practical opportunities to intervene in international relations.
in order to widen the scope of moral obligation across territorial boundaries.

What is one to make of all this? It should be noted that Linklater writes at a high level of abstraction, and his work is not easily digested at one sitting. Since much of his writing is pitched at the level of meta-theory, the last aspect of his agenda is probably the least developed dimension of his overall project. Indeed, one can detect an ambiguity in his writing between the need to transcend the state system (emphasized in his earlier work) and a tendency to accept the state system as a medium of change and reform. The latter is emphasized in his more recent work on the ethical possibilities of ‘good international citizenship’ in Australian foreign policy.9

The major problem with Linklater’s work is that it needs to recover the early emphasis on political theory, rather than the later emphasis on the philosophy of history and sociology. As I have briefly sketched the trajectory of Linklater’s work, it begins with a critique of attempts to justify two separate spheres of moral obligation, the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’. It then moves on to examine ways in which two influential paradigms, realism and Marxism, impede the systematic study of ascending ‘scales of types’ of societies and relations among them. Finally, it consists of a number of agenda-setting articles for a ‘post-positivist’ interdiscipline of international relations inspired by the Frankfurt School of critical theory and the work of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. Throughout his own work, Habermas has sought to reconcile respect for the achievements of the modern constitutional state with the Marxist critique of the socially destructive and anti-democratic dynamics of capitalist development. But it could be argued that the focus on Habermas as a source of inspiration for critical international theory militates against the ‘praxeological’ dimension of Linklater’s project. The point is well put by Robert Jackson:

[Linklater] provides no philosophical basis [for adjudicating] cases of conflict between cultures, which are bound to arise and which arguably constitute fundamental moral dilemmas of international society. Habermas and Foucault, wedded to sociological theory, are of little assistance in dealing with normative predicaments. A ‘comparative sociology of moral codes’ based on historical case studies is no way around the problem. Unless one opts for relativism one must resort to some standard of conduct, such as basic needs, human rights, the common good, and so forth. It is not a solution merely to argue for recognition and respect for the
'other' and his, her or their inclusion in the sphere of equality and entitlement. For inclusion only postpones the unresolved problem of determining which facet of the others’ conduct ought to be recognised and respected, and which not. Even if everybody is included in the community one must still prohibit certain forms of behaviour inimical to it. Exclusion and inclusion ultimately is not about class, sex, race, caste, nationality, and other sociological categories; it is about human conduct.10

In recent years, Linklater has deepened his analysis of the role of norms in civilizing world society. In particular, he has focused on the evolution of principles, most notably the universalization of the harm principle, or the problem of harm in world politics. Drawing on Martin Wight and Norbert Elias, he argues that implementation of human rights treaties reflects the rather rapid sociological evolution of the harm principle into the international realm. These documents have, in turn, expanded the role of international authorities in civilizing world society, and created new moral and ethical possibilities of promoting global citizenship. Linklater, though, does offer an important caveat: that while these evolutionary tendencies help attest to increasing global interconnectedness, they have yet to place us in the so-called post-Westphalian era.11 State power, in other words, can still block the enforcement and implementation of these norms, and thus restrict the evolution of universal principles. Still, Linklater remains surprisingly optimistic post-9/11. In a recent essay he has sought to challenge Habermas’s proceduralism by formulating a so-called ‘dialogical politics’. Here he claims that critical international theorists need to find new ways of linking discursive ethics with a politics that is more sensitive to identity, that is, where difference is not necessarily subordinated to procedure.

Notes

4. Ibid., p. 99.
5. Ibid., p. 130.
6. Ibid., p. 166.

**Linklater’s major writings**

‘Marxism and international relations: antithesis, reconciliation and transience’, in Richard L. Higgott and James L. Richardson (eds), International Relations: Global and Australian Perspectives on an Evolving Discipline, Canberra, Australian University Press, 1991, pp. 70–79.
Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations (with John Macmillan, eds), London, Pinter, 1995.
Theories of International Relations (with Scott Burchill, eds), Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996.
The Transformation of Political Community, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press, 1997.

208

*See also:* Beitz, Cox, Giddens, Habermas, Mann, Walzer, Wight

**Further reading**


The origins of the English School can be traced back to the late 1930s. Unlike theories rooted in the behaviouralist tradition or positivist theory, the English School represents a synthesis of normative and rationalist approaches. It is, in other words, a school of thought that focuses on the moral, political and social properties of international society and investigates the emergent characteristics of world society. The term ‘international society’ implies that, despite the absence of a central authority, states exhibit patterns of conduct that are subject to, and constituted by, legal and moral restraints. If this is the case, then international relations cannot be understood adequately as a manifestation of power politics (as realists argue), so it may be unnecessary radically to transform the international order to achieve global peace and justice (as radicals claim). For Martin Wight, the theory of international society represents an alternative to realism and idealism in the study of international relations. Hedley Bull claims that the ‘institutions’ of the society of states (war, the great powers, international law, diplomacy and the balance of power) are crucial in maintaining international order. Although the name of the school was not officially coined until the early 1980s, the school continued to evolve in the 1960s and 1970s, with the writings of Hedley Bull, John Vincent and Martin Wight. In perhaps his most well-known work, *The Anarchical Society*, Bull analysed the nature of the moral and normative rules and constraints of international order and decision-making. Within the English School, theorists have traditionally been labelled as either solidarist or particularist. Solidarists prioritize collective security and cosmopolitan right in their analysis, while particularists emphasize the normative value of state sovereignty, or rather the incentives that arise from asserting and preserving state sovereignty through co-operation. By the 1980s and 1990s, the solidarist strand would assume an arguably more prominent role in English School
thinking, especially in the context of the debate on the collectivist goals of humanitarian intervention. Solidarists such as Tim Dunne and Nick Wheeler have challenged the particularist version of humanitarianism advocated by Vincent, by stressing the (collective) responsibility to protect the rights of severely abused peoples. This debate would generate increasing discussion of whether the distinction between solidarism and particularism could explain the complex transition from an international to world society, or whether the English School would need to become more analytically rigorous or methodologically pluralistic to explain the changing normative dynamics of the international system and world society (the role of non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors). Whether one agrees with the recent efforts to design a systematic English School theory, such efforts do call attention to the possibilities of establishing a more methodologically diverse and analytically rigorous English School theory.
HEDLEY BULL

Hedley Bull is best known to undergraduates on the basis of his most frequently read text, *The Anarchical Society* (1977). It is a rare example of a textbook with an argument, and its popularity with both teachers and students stems from one of the chief characteristics of Bull’s thought and published work, a meticulous concern with order. As J.D.B. Miller has observed, ‘[he] saw things very sequentially. Many of his articles begin with a series of numbered questions that he proceeds to answer in sequence, the whole forming a logical entity of impressive power.’ Order in international relations was one of Bull’s central concerns. What is it? What are the most appropriate theoretical tools to use in studying it? How does it vary over time and space? How can international order be reconciled with the promotion of justice, if at all? These are the central questions that much of his work is devoted to answering.

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of his main book is its systematic examination of the concept of ‘order’ on the basis of very clear definitions and theoretical categories. Bull defines order in general as a pattern of activity that sustains some elementary social goals in society, such as maintaining security for its members against arbitrary violence, ensuring agreements are kept and protecting property rights. He then adapts these goals to the peculiar characteristics of international society, where they appear as the preservation of the sovereign states that are its members, and peace as the normal condition of coexistence between them. Bull makes an important distinction between an international system and a society. The latter is characterized by a consensus among states that they share some common interests and conceive themselves as being related to each other in the context of common rules and institutions. Bull argues that although international society lacks an overarching sovereign, international relations is more than a site of constant patterns of competition among states pursuing their self-interest.

The rest of his text is a careful examination of the ‘institutions’ of international society, which should not be reduced to international organizations, but which refer to ‘sets of habits and practices shaped toward the realization of common goals’. They include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war itself (under certain conditions) and the managerial function performed by the great powers. He is careful to distinguish between the roles such institutions play in undermining international order and in maintaining it, since he recognizes that the ‘element’ of international society is only
one of three competing ‘elements’ in world politics, the others being the elements of a Hobbesian state of war and those transnational loyalties that cross territorial borders and often undermine them (such as ideology). Each chapter painstakingly analyses the role of each institution, how that role has changed over time and how we should evaluate that role in light of our more pressing moral concern with what he calls ‘world order’. This is more fundamental and primordial...because the ultimate units of the great society of mankind are not states...but individual human beings...This is the moment of international relations, but the question of world order arises whatever the political or social structure of the globe...if international order has value, this can only be because it is instrumental to the goal of order in human society as a whole.³

As a textbook, Bull’s The Anarchical Society is still required reading for most students of international relations. As an argument, however, it is less convincing. Despite Bull’s attention to detail and the rigour of his analytical distinctions, the book illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the influences that led to its writing, and these can be traced to Bull’s personal and intellectual background.

Hedley Bull was born in Sydney in 1932. He graduated from the University of Sydney in 1952, having taken honours in philosophy and law. At this time, one of the great influences on his thought was the Australian philosopher John Anderson. He instilled in his students a critical rigour with an equal concern for the big issues in social and political life, which could only be understood on the basis of a due regard for their historical context. Bull moved to Oxford in 1953 and graduated with a BPhil in politics before taking up an assistant lectureship at the London School of Economics. There he began teaching international relations, as well as listening to the famous lectures of Martin Wight. From Wight he learned that the history of ideas in the study of international relations could be understood as a continuing dialogue between realists, revolutionists and rationalists.

The legacy of Martin Wight was profound, for he provided the three ‘schools of thought’ that Bull later drew upon in delineating competing ideas regarding the nature and value of international order and international society. Unlike Wight, who used his categories for pedagogical purposes and refused to identify himself with any single one, Hedley Bull clearly attempted to articulate and defend rationalism, or what he called a neo-Grotian approach to the theory and
practice of international relations. Wary of the constant dangers of anarchy and the presence of power politics, yet sympathetic to the cosmopolitan appeal of a putative ‘world society’ that would give priority to justice for individuals rather than states, this approach sought to mediate between the extremes. Bull himself did so by postulating international society as a real but fragile normative order, thereby undermining the realist tendency to equate system and society, while holding out the hope that such a normative order could be expanded to reflect more cosmopolitan concerns in the future. Bull’s approach was fundamentally a moderate one, and this sense of trying to mediate between extremes comes through in much of his related work on intervention, the history of international society, and the potential of arms control in mediating between the search for strategic superiority during the Cold War and the opposing desire for complete disarmament.

In 1958, Bull became a member of the newly established British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, and he spent some time in the United States to observe and participate in the growth of the discipline at institutions such as Harvard and Chicago. There he became absorbed in issues of nuclear strategy and, after returning to England to the Institute for Strategic Studies, he completed his major text, *The Control of the Arms Race* (1961). This led to work for the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit in the Foreign Office, after which he returned to Australia in 1966 as Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University. He went back to Oxford in 1977 to take up the Montague Burton Chair of International Relations and remained there until his untimely death from cancer in 1985.

Prior to the publication of *The Anarchical Society*, Bull’s name was best known for his ferocious attack on the behavioural (or ‘scientific’) approach to the study of international relations that dominated many American universities in the late 1950s and 1960s. One can see the influence of Martin Wight in Bull’s 1966 article, which drew a clear (and somewhat polemical) distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘scientific’ theory. Just as Wight had argued that the philosophy of history is the analogue of political theory in the study of international relations, Bull claimed that the foundations of teaching and research lay in philosophy, law and history, rather than the vain attempt to discover ‘laws of behaviour’ among states as the basis for developing reliable predictions for the future. As far as he was concerned, there were very strict limits to the applicability of quantitative or behavioural methods of analysis.
Although Bull’s arguments need to be understood in the context of a somewhat overheated debate over the future of research methods in international relations, as well as his concern with the exaggerated emphasis on the role of game theory among nuclear strategists, they also affirmed his belief that the subject matter of international relations had at its core the intersubjective understandings and intention of actors whose conduct the theorist seeks to comprehend. Consequently, theory and practice could not be divorced from one another, the former functioning as a more or less useful ‘instrument’ to explain a ‘given reality’. Furthermore, he argued that while the classical tradition acknowledged the interdependence between explanation and evaluation or moral judgement, the so-called ‘scientists’ drew an artificial distinction between them and attempted to subordinate the latter to the former.

Consequently, his theoretical concepts never strayed too far from the meaning they acquired in the dynamic world of diplomatic discourse. Thus, the concept of a ‘great power’, for example, is never defined exclusively on the basis of observable and measurable indices. Its meaning is infused with normative significance that not only presupposes a broader discourse of social interaction, but also embodies and endows the actors so defined with particular rights and responsibilities towards other states. Similarly, despite the ambiguity of the term ‘balance of power’, it cannot be reduced to a merely descriptive term for the distribution of coercive capabilities, but also discloses a principle of conduct, a societal institution and a goal to be maintained in international society.

Curiously, despite his support for the promotion of normative theory in the study of international relations, Bull himself attempted to distinguish between order and justice, claiming that the latter is an inherently subjective ideal. He therefore offers no ‘private vision of what just conduct would be, [or] any philosophical analysis of the criteria for recognizing it’. While he elaborated on various notions of justice put forward by others and embodied in demands for just change (particularly by Third World states), and examined their compatibility with the maintenance of international order, he refrained from endorsing any one of them. Towards the end of his life, Bull became increasingly concerned with the question of world order and the increasing fragility of the main institutions of international society. There were two main reasons for this concern.

First, Bull became increasingly critical of the United States and the Soviet Union. The decline of détente in the 1970s and the resurgence of the nuclear arms race in the early 1980s had weakened their right
to be regarded as responsible managers of international society as a whole. This decline was particularly regrettable since, of all the institutions of international society, only the great powers are also actors. If they do not fulfil the roles Bull attributes to them, then it is difficult to see how the other institutions can function to prevent the collapse of international society. In the 1980s, he castigated the United States, in particular, which:

> through its belligerent statements and preparations for renewed military intervention, its policies evidently fashioned to express moods rather than to achieve results, its inability to withstand domestic forces of chauvinism and greed, has done much to undermine its own position as the leader of the West and to accentuate the ugliness of the face it turns towards the Third World.6

Second, Bull described the history of international society in terms of the expansion of its geographical scope, a process that accelerated dramatically with decolonization and the creation of over 100 new states, as well as the weakening of the cultural consensus that had underpinned the society of states in the past. The institutions of international society were exported from Europe to the rest of the world. Their strength depended upon new members having a stake in sustaining them. Bull worried that any ‘revolt against the West’, particularly if it were based on widespread perceptions of economic neocolonialism and growing inequality between rich and poor, would damage the very institutions that needed to be reformed, on the basis of enlightened self-interest, by those who benefited most from them.7

Since Bull’s death, and in light of the end of the Cold War, both the questions asked by Bull and the way he tried to answer them have been the source of renewed interest in his work, as well as that of others associated with the ‘English School’ of international theory. Even so, it is possible to identify some limitations to this approach. Two, in particular, are worth noting.

First, Bull tended to conflate international order as an empirically dynamic state of affairs within the states system (a fact) with order as a value by which to judge international society against alternative institutional structures. Was order a quantity (more or less), or a quality? At times he suggested that order varied across time and space, yet shied away from providing any criteria by which such variation could be measured. At other times, he suggested that the society of
states as a whole was to be valued because it was the source of international order. If this were the case, then it remains puzzling why order in general was not the value against which Bull judged the merits of international society and its institutions, rather than distinguishing between order in general, international order in the society of states, and world order as a cosmopolitan value.

Second, it is somewhat unfortunate that Bull failed to transcend Wight’s presentation of the three traditions of international thought (realism, rationalism and revolutionism). If one is to locate oneself within the rationalist or neo-Grotian tradition, it is important to debunk realist and revolutionary claims. Bull did not do this. Consequently, the reader is unsure whether to choose between traditions on the basis of their competing representations of world politics, or whether each somehow ‘captures’ certain elements of a complex world. The problem with the latter stance, as R.J. Vincent points out, is that ‘one…is always shifting according to the ground taken by others’.8

Notwithstanding such difficulties, and even if Bull himself failed to provide persuasive answers, the big questions he asked remain pertinent today. To invoke the very different vocabulary of the political theorist Jürgen Habermas, at the core of Hedley Bull’s work there was ‘a constitutive interest in the preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of action-orienting mutual understanding’.9 If the Cold War is not to be replaced by a new ‘clash of civilizations’, and if the problems of international order continue to increase in scope and complexity, then how the society of states should and can be reformed in the service of world order is perhaps the most crucial question of our time.

Notes
3. Ibid., p. 22.
7. See in particular Hedley Bull, Justice in International Relations (the Hagey Lectures), Ontario, University of Waterloo, 1983.

**Bull’s major writings**


‘The Grotian conception of international relations’, in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (eds), Diplomatic Investigations, op. cit., pp. 51–73


Justice in International Relations, Waterloo, Ontario, University of Waterloo, 1984.


See also: Nardin, Vincent, Wight

**Further reading**


Barry Buzan

If there ever was a more fitting label for Barry Buzan, it would have to be an ‘enlightened realist’. Perhaps no other mainstream theorist has done more to advance the discipline in the area of international theory and security. Until the mid-1990s, much of Buzan’s work focused on the limits of neorealism and the broad processual parameters of structural realism. Yet in the past few years, he has emerged as one of the foremost thinkers in the English School and in international security studies. His contributions to these two areas continue a trend of critical inquiry in which he has sought to work beyond the limits and problems of existing theoretical paradigms through the (re)construction of rigorous analytical frameworks. Buzan’s contributions in this respect are not merely deliberate and concerted efforts to fit the globalizing world into international relations theory, and vice versa. Rather, they reflect an evolving and profound engagement with the concepts and theoretical methods that have shaped our normative understanding of the international system.

In his co-authored book The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, Buzan, along with Clive Jones and Richard Little, constructed the broad parameters of an alternative approach to neorealism: a structural realism that focuses on the diversity of autonomous institutions within the international system. According to them, there are several logics of anarchy in which different types of interaction, ranging from democratic peace to international politics, ‘define the different effects and consequences of structure’. In their view, neorealism focuses on one logic of anarchy: where the effects of an anarchical structure generate competitive and conflictual modes of state behaviour. Yet the diversity of interactions within and across systems suggest a complex and diverse array of causal effects on the
behaviour of states. Analysing these pressures and effects of structures requires analysis of the international system in processual terms, that is, as an evolving, dynamic mode of interaction. The emphasis he places here on the processual and normative aspects of structures is important not only for challenging the structural limits of realism, but also for broadening analysis of the normative parameters of international security issues.

By all accounts, Buzan’s collaborative research (with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde) on securitization remains arguably his most innovative work.3 Securitization addresses the limits of security studies, in particular the narrow focus on military threats to international security. It seeks to investigate the security risks of non-conventional issues, such as AIDS and the environment (global warming), and enquires into why these non-conventionalized security risks have risen to the level of emergency threats. According to Buzan et al., such existential threats reach the object referent (the object of grave concern) through agreement or intense public discussion of the issues. As he and the others note, securitization is ‘to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat…’.4 In effect, securitization is an intensification of politicization, albeit one that opposes politicization by placing the actors involved above the politics of bickering or geopolitical interests. As Buzan et al. put it:

securitization operates along a political spectrum, ranging from the non-politicized (meaning politicizing the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue is part of public policy) to the politicized, to requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely some other form of communal governance to be securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)’.5

Securitization also employs the speech act (John Austin’s work on linguistics in the 1950s) to analyse the cognitive and emotive dimensions of security issues. Essentially, the speech act refers to the performative element of saying or uttering something. In short, we act through our words; which is to say, we do things in saying things. For instance, if I say that I ride my bike more because of the recent increase in global temperature, then I am also doing something about global warming. For Buzan, the speech act breaks down into three
units: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. When public discourse on an issue such as AIDS leads to new emergency measures – beginning with the acceptance that it constitutes a global crisis – these new measures assume an important role in redressing an imminent threat to a country’s security or the preservation of its way of life (object referent). Here Buzan et al. distinguish between a ‘securitizing move’ and securitization. As they point out, ‘while a threat may exist, the actors must accept it as such’. When something is presented as an existential threat to a referent object, the actor must be willing to commit him- or herself to redressing the issue in an exigent manner. Otherwise, such intention remains an active gesture or formal intention to securitize.

Securitization, therefore, might help to further explain Buzan’s wider embrace of sociological theory to address the limits of English School theory. Buzan proposes that English School theory remains underdeveloped, lacking the analytical rigour to explain the structural and normative properties of the international system. One of his central claims is that the English School has failed to devise an adequate working distinction between international and world society. Martin Wight, for instance, theorized that international society could be defined principally in terms of a balance of power and the moral constraints of the international system. In his view, international society constituted an evolving society whose dynamics and dimensions reflected years of conflict, competition and bargaining, and explained the preferences for different theoretical approaches to international politics.

Hedley Bull, by comparison, focused on the transnational implications of the co-ordination of EC policy, arguing that the constitutionalization of the EC (through treaty law) represented a growing trend towards stronger international enforcement, or a new world order in which states had become more willing to delegate their sovereignty to international institutions. Bull’s conception, according to Buzan, failed to arrive at a concrete working definition of world society. More importantly, it reflects the broader failure among contemporary English School theorists to analyse the role of economic integration and other sociological developments in international society.

The crucial problem with the English School is that the division between pluralists and solidarists has prevented the school from achieving the needed theoretical precision. In fact, as Buzan states, the distinction between solidarism, or as he defines it, a ‘wide-ranging set of norms, rules, and institutions, covering both coexistence issues and
co-operation in pursuit of shared interests, including some scope for collective enforcement’,\textsuperscript{10} and pluralism (the particular goals of equal sovereign states pursued in terms of self-interest) has actually detracted from the goal of formulating systematic English School theory. Some of the limits include the ambiguous and unresolved tension between coercion and universal norms, and the failure to explain the dynamic transition from international to world society.

In Wight’s view, enforcing universal human rights constitutes the source of ineluctable tension between the ideals of the inter-human domain or global civil society (e.g. universal reason, tolerance, equality and inclusivity) and state coercion. In his view, ‘the essence of the matter is whether individual rights/world society necessarily conflict with states’ rights/international society, or can be in harmony with them…whether solidarism can progress to the point where it calls into question the state system’.\textsuperscript{11} This is also why, as he points out, world society remains an ‘incipient ontological foundation’: ‘the dustbin of theories and ideas…an incoherent mix of cosmopolitan morality and universalist values’.\textsuperscript{12}

The question that arises, then, is whether the English School can in fact become more systematic, as Buzan proposes. Again, for Buzan the lack of analytical rigour requires not only further integration of sociological theories, but also more conceptual precision. Here, for instance, he distinguishes between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ forms of solidarism to show the degrees of shared values and norms, and the moral constraints imposed by the interstate system. John Vincent’s later writings on humanitarian intervention can, for instance, be classified as a ‘thin’ form of solidarism, which stopped short of endorsing a universal principle of intervention, or universal norm of humanitarian intervention and/or collective enforcement. Thick solidarism, in contrast, focuses on the moral violability of state sovereignty, and stresses how severe violations of humanitarian norms constitute a breach in international law (legitimizing).

This need for great conceptual precision is the main reason Wendt’s constructivism or scientific realism proves so instructive of the limits of English School theory. As this book’s essay on Wendt shows, there are three main modes of socialization of his social theory of international politics: coercion, calculation and belief. Each of these modes is intended to explain causal and constitutive properties of the international system. In drawing on Wendt, Buzan believes that the English School cannot only draw on Wendt’s theory, but also see it as model theory. This is not to say that Buzan wishes to subordinate the normative theory of the English School to structural
theory, nor that the normative and structural cannot be properly juxtaposed within one overarching, grand theory. Rather, it suggests that English School theory, if it is to become truly systematic, will need to follow an analytical and normative path, in which the structural and analytical concepts of the international system help to frame the precision and impact of normative ideas and institutional rules and norms.

Critics of Buzan’s approach argue that his revisionist account, while helpful in moving beyond the Euro-state-centric framework, raises several important issues. First, it is not clear whether his structure-based approach provides an adequate explanation of the evolution of institutional norms and influence of non-state actors in the international system. If institutions do possess constitutive power in this sense, then how does this constitutive power emerge within the international system? Does the English School allow us to move beyond the limits of rationalism by providing a space for, or link to, historical sociological theories to explain the emergence of norms and rules?

Second, greater conceptual rigour does not necessarily resolve the issue of how international society should be defined in an increasingly globalizing world. The question this issue raises is as follows: how can international society be retained within the agent approach? Should English School theory be moving towards an agenda-based normative theory, in which there is synthesis between the two above-mentioned tracks? As one can see, these are normative questions that seem to require a self-conscious or reflexive structural approach. As Tim Dunne argues, Buzan’s emphasis on structure fails to offer a convincing roadmap of how the structural and normative can and should be synthesized. If global, non-state actors constitute an important source of power in the international system, then how should we assess the points of synthesis within the various social and legal contexts? This question, as Dunne suggests, requires further sociological analyses of the mutual constitutivity of agency and structure (the International Criminal Court).

Ultimately, Buzan’s criticism turns on the following challenge: ‘How does the English School want to understand its position within IR theory more narrowly, and within the social sciences and humanities more broadly?’ The answer Buzan offers is that the English School can and should begin to draw on constructivism and sociology to develop a rigorous analysis of world society. His optimism surely cannot be underemphasized. In fact, his continuing objective is to show that the English School can and will become grand theory, a meta-theory that is equally as overarching and reflexive as Wendt’s.
Notes


2. Ibid.


5. Ibid., pp. 23–24.

6. Ibid., p. 28.


10. Ibid., pp. 8, 21.

11. Ibid., p. 121.

12. Ibid., pp. 9, 149.


15. Ibid.

See also: Dunne, Wight, Bull, Wendt

Buzan’s major writings


Further reading


TIMOTHY DUNNE

Tim Dunne is a leading proponent and theorist of the English School tradition of international relations. His work has helped to reinvigorate the English School tradition. It is a bit too pat to explain the English School as a comfortable middle-ground between the pessimism of realism about the eternal recurrence of interstate violence and the too-easy optimism of liberalism/idealism based around notions of gains from co-operation. When the discipline is framed as a continuum between two poles, it is easy to cast one’s lot somewhere between the two. Dunne’s work helps us appreciate the possibilities of ‘international society’ in a way that highlights the contribution of the English School that is not so dependent on this middle-ground. His more recent engagement with the work of Barry Buzan also provides a cautionary note about the dangers of the English School, in Buzan’s more analytical formulation, moving down the slippery slope towards positivism.

One of Dunne’s most important contributions is his Inventing International Society (1998),1 where he traces the history of the English School, and in doing so makes some important claims about where it has been and where it is, or should be, going. Dunne’s familiarity with the thinkers and texts of the tradition make his book a valuable introduction to the English School. For example, Dunne compellingly argues there are three important characteristics of the school that help define its boundaries and unique approach, with the caveat that these boundaries are not hard and fast. Dunne refers to these ‘as “preliminary articles”, a starting point for thinking about a genealogy of the English School’.2 These preliminary articles are: self-identification with a particular tradition of inquiry; an interpretive approach; and international theory as normative theory.

Dunne argues that the English School can be defined as an epistemic community, and that its practitioners self-identify with the
tradition. He claims that this self-awareness really begins with the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, a British version of an American group set up with the organizational and financial assistance of the Rockefeller Foundation. While the American Committee was thoroughly realist, the British Committee’s membership of theorists such as Wight, Butterfield and Bull helped lay the foundation for what we now refer to as the English School. Dunne devotes two chapters to a discussion of the British Committee, offering both analysis and presentation of a considerable amount of archival research. This valuable archival research and attendant historiography is one of the key contributions of Dunne’s book. It also allows for a more contextual understanding of some of the important works associated with the Committee. For example, Dunne argues that Wight’s canonical essay ‘Why is there no International Theory?’ has been read too definitively as demarcating a sharp division between the domestic and international, while Wight’s real aim was a theoretical ground-clearing that helped frame a need for international theory that could help uncover the reasons for order in an anarchical world of states. These sorts of questions helped motivate the work of the British Committee, and ironically led to the normative cast with which the English School is associated.

Dunne argues that the English School is interpretive by citing the importance of ‘rationalism’ against the two poles of realism and revolutionism (the three Rs of international relations, in Dunne’s words). Here Dunne refers to Wight’s and Bull’s work, citing the importance of classical ideas derived from writing about diplomacy, international law and the balance of power. This ‘Grotian’ tradition of the rational pursuit of order among states is important ‘because it provides the most compelling answer to the central question for English School international theory, namely, “what is international society?”’ Thus, for Dunne, there is an irreducibly interpretive element to the English School, because defining international society cannot be accomplished by deductive propositions about how states behave under anarchy. Rather, it requires interpreting the meaning of those who, at least partially, define international society through their actions. Dunne approvingly cites E.H. Carr’s claim in The Twenty Years’ Crisis that ‘the facts about capitalism are not, like the facts about cancer, independent of the attitude of people towards it’. It is worth mentioning Carr here, as Dunne sees many similarities in Carr’s work and the English School tradition, and seems intent on reclaiming Carr from realism (and/or other traditions) while claiming that the development of the English School begins with Carr. While it is a stretch
to place Carr within the English School tradition (especially as Carr had moved on to his work on Soviet history during the formative years of the English School). Dunne joins others in trying to rethink Carr, a testament to the richness of and continuing interest in The Twenty Years’ Crisis. It is also important to note here that interpretive understanding set the English School on the traditionalist side of the ‘second debate’ against behaviouralism. It also suggests that any attempts to move the English School in a positivist direction will probably meet difficulty, in that interpretive understanding, by definition, blurs the strict separation of subject and object.

Dunne’s third ‘preliminary article’ is the English School’s definition of international theory, and hence international relations as a discipline, as normative theory. Citing Martin Wight as the father of the English School, Dunne claims that Wight’s work on the British Committee ‘sought to interrogate the ethics of rationalism, the belief that the society of states may not be perfect but is not the worst of all possible worlds’. While it is clear that there is a normative element to the English School’s understanding of international society, there has been some divergence concerning how this is understood. Dunne explains that within the English School tradition, two different accounts have emerged to explain the common values that states adhere to. One account is the ‘thin’ morality of pluralism, where states have differing conceptions of morality within their own societies but can agree to the particular norms of international society that allow states to co-operate for mutual advantage. Dunne clearly prefers the ‘thick’ morality of the ‘solidarist’ position because of the ethical problems associated with the pluralist position.

Since states are the legitimate containers for cultural difference, the task for international society is to formulate norms and procedures which ‘separate and cushion’ the units in the states system. This leaves the English School open to the criticism that it is too complacent, neglecting the empirical evidence that far too many states behave inwardly like ‘gangsters’ rather than ‘guardians’ of the well-being of their citizens. Recognizing that the ethical defense of pluralism begins to break down if it enables repressive governments to hide behind the norm of sovereignty, the solidarist wing of the English School see the society of states as having the potential to enforce universalist ethics such as respect for human rights. The extent to which the collectivity of states has the moral resources within it to enforce new standards of international legitimacy built upon world-order values, is a
theme which critical international society theorists have taken up in recent years. Central to this project is the ongoing dialogue between staple English School texts and the growing body of social and political theory which has facilitated a greater understanding of the relationship between citizen and community, justice within and between states, and the historical and social construction of collective identity.8

Other than the introductory, concluding and two British Committee chapters, Dunne’s *Inventing International Society* is comprised of chapters on Carr and four foundational English School theorists: Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. Dunne argues there is an ‘emerging consensus’ around these four scholars as the ‘legitimate founders’ of the English School. Although there will continue to be debate about who should occupy pride of place in such an inventory, as well as who should be left out, each of Dunne’s chapters on the ‘founders’ of the English School provides a concise and insightful overview of their work, as well as placing them in context relative to the evolution of the school. Dunne’s concluding chapter, among other things, seeks to situate the English School within the discipline as a whole. Invoking Keohane’s problematic methodological division between ‘rationalists’ and ‘reflectivists’, Dunne claims that the English School has too often been left out of the various forms of ‘critical theory’ that make up the reflectivists. Dunne also argues that the English School shares an ‘affinity’ with constructivism, claiming that Wendt’s description of constructivism (states as principal units, social structures as inter-subjective and state identities as important to social structure) is quite similar to the English School approach. While Dunne is certainly correct to note these similarities, the breadth of constructivist approaches is sufficiently wide to share affinities with many approaches, depending on which constructivism is being deployed. Dunne’s recognition that some critical theorists, like Linklater, have found the English School ‘congenial’ demonstrates that Dunne’s project of helping us define and understand the English School tradition is probably just as important as ascertaining the school’s compatibility with other approaches.

Dunne has recently engaged in a debate about the future of the English School that helps situate him within what is currently a vibrant tradition. In a recent issue of *Millennium*, Dunne joins Emanuel Adler in critiquing Barry Buzan’s important book *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social*
In From International to World Society? Buzan argues for a more analytically and conceptually rigorous English School that will also allow more explanatory power around previously slighted areas such as economic globalization. Buzan essentially takes the familiar three English School categories of the Hobbesian ‘international system’ (the beginning and end of much mainstream international relations), the Grotian ‘international society’ and the Kantian ‘world society’, and refashions them. Buzan concentrates on the problematic boundaries between ‘international society’ and ‘international system’, and develops a theoretical approach that helps make sharper analytical distinctions between the three. While Dunne admires the theoretical breadth and rigour of Buzan’s approach, he expresses concern about the attempt to move towards an analytical approach that studies norms but does not actively engage in the interpretive understanding of their formation and evolution.

In Buzan’s text, analytical rigor is privileged over normative evaluation and critique. Such a position is vulnerable to the criticism that even if we could accurately arrive at the ontology of international society in terms of a sophisticated series of categories and reformulations, these will only ever amount to a theoretical ‘first cut’. The trickier question – which no model can capture – is which kinds of institutional orders are better at delivering certain moral ends. At this point we see that the is/ought distinction that underpins Buzan’s analysis comes unstuck. Our understanding of international society and world society is intimately connected to what moral values and purposes we ascribe to social relations. The meta-values of international society constitute the range of possibilities for the actors. I do not see how we can be agnostic about the moral purposes of international society (preferably revealed by a complex account of how such values were transmitted by states, institutions, and non-state actors). It is precisely this quality that has attracted many of the ‘next generation’ to the work of Bull in particular.

Dunne is perceptive to note that many scholars with a normative bent are attracted to theoretical perspectives that encourage, or at least license, a normative approach. The burgeoning number, and vitality, of post-positivist or ‘reflectivist’ approaches to international relations are testament to the appeal of forms of political science that allow their practitioners to be political, in a manner of speaking. And it is clear where Dunne would like to see the English School go, or at
least what he would like it to preserve. As evidenced by his interest in understanding\textsuperscript{11} and promoting\textsuperscript{12} human rights, Dunne is decidedly dedicated to carrying on the tradition of his third ‘preliminary article’ of the English School – the English School as normative international theory.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Rationalism here is not to be confused with the much later debate about methodology within international relations between ‘rationalists’ and ‘reflectivists’.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Ibid., p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 182.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. Ibid., p. 11.

Dunne’s major writings


See also: Bull, Buzan, Wight

Further reading


JOHN VINCENT

John Vincent died suddenly on 2 November 1990. He was only 47 years old, and barely a year had passed since his appointment as Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. His death was not only a personal tragedy for those who knew him; it was also a great loss to the so-called ‘English School’ in the study of international relations. The questions Vincent asked, and the rigour of his intellectual inquiry, are both particularly relevant in the post-Cold War era. It would be fascinating to observe the way Vincent would have responded to the renewed attention being paid to two issues that were always uppermost in his work. The first is the issue of ‘intervention’ in the theory and practice of international relations, on which he published his first major book in 1974. Just before his death, he revisited some of the arguments of that earlier work, and one can observe a marked shift in his thinking. The second is the issue of human rights in world politics: what they consist of, the degree to which progress in their observance can be measured, and the difficulties inherent in attempting to promote human rights in international diplomacy.
John Vincent was born in 1943. Christopher Hill describes him as a ‘late developer’ who did not do particularly well at school and found it difficult to gain a university place. Hill observes that ‘his outstanding qualities only really emerged as a postgraduate, and even then his star did not rise until his late thirties’. He spent his undergraduate years at Britain’s oldest Department of International Relations at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth. He then studied at the University of Leicester (MA in European Studies) and the Australian National University (PhD), where he was supervised by his mentor, Hedley Bull. Before succeeding Susan Strange as Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the LSE in 1989, Vincent taught at the University of Keele as well as Oxford University. He edited the prestigious journal *Review of International Studies* for three years prior to his professorial appointment in London.

In his excellent review of Vincent’s work, Neumann characterizes him as a ‘card-carrying member’ of the English School of international relations, inspired by the work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull in particular. Neumann suggests that members of the School are concerned with five issue-areas in the theory and practice of international relations. First, they are interested in the comparative analysis of ‘international systems’ over time and space, particularly in terms of diplomatic practice and culture. Second, they share a predilection for analysing international relations within what Hedley Bull called the ‘society of states’. This, in turn, leads to an emphasis on the role of volition rather than necessity in accounting for interstate behaviour. As Alan James observes,

> A society…is subject to and expressive of the wishes and whims of those who…make it up. It reflects the actions and reactions of its constituents, or members. And those members…will be influenced by their calculations, hopes, purposes, beliefs, anxieties, fears, and all the other elements of the human condition…this is why the term society, with its voluntaristic connotations, is so much more apt than system to sum up the collectivity of states.

Third, members of the School are engaged in a constant debate over the degree of change within the society of states. Is there any evidence that its membership is expanding to include actors other than states? Does the legitimacy of the rules, which bind states together, depend on their acknowledgement by state elites alone, or does it require the support of a broader constituency? What is the relative
balance between ‘pluralism’ and ‘solidarism’ in international society? Are its institutions (described at length in Bull’s famous text) consistent with a culture of procedural consensus among states, or are they changing in a more solidarist direction, to promote greater homogeneity within states as well? Fourth, the shadow of Wight’s famous trilogy of international thought weighs heavily on the minds of all members of the English School. His division of ‘patterns of international thought’ among realists, rationalists and revolutionists continues to influence both the way in which members of the school present the main body of ideas about international relations, and the way they position themselves within that body. Finally, the tensions between the requirements of international order and cosmopolitan justice are a constant concern for writers such as Vincent. Of course, it would be quite wrong to suggest that those identified as part of the English School agree with each other on substantive issues. All that can be said is that they agree on the central questions to be asked and work within a broad tradition of thought in their search for answers.

Vincent himself did not embrace a consistent set of answers to the key questions raised above, but this should not be seen as a sign of weakness. Rather, in engaging with the theory and practice of issues such as intervention and the role of human rights in international society, he embodies the way in which competing values and concerns can coexist fruitfully within the mind of one thinker. In one of his most well-known phrases, Vincent was suspicious of ‘the whole enterprise of treating great thinkers like parcels at the post office’, and no doubt he would have cast a critical eye on the way in which I have categorized the key thinkers in this book:

Carr’s realist critique is followed by a chapter on the limitations of Realism. The realist Martin Wight of *Power Politics* is different from the rationalist Martin Wight of ‘Western Values in International Relations’. Morgenthau’s account of international politics as a struggle for power includes a treatment of the balance of power as a stabilising factor in the politics of states, and even of the importance of a moral consensus on which the stability of a system in the end depended.⁵

Within Vincent’s own work, one can trace a subtle progression from a strict support of a pluralist interpretation of the society of states to a more solidarist one. Unlike most people, he became more radical as he got older, not less. This may have had something to do with his
growing dissatisfaction with the intellectual legacy of his early mentor, Hedley Bull, although Bull himself was moving in a similar direction towards the end of his life. That movement explains the apparent contradiction between the central arguments of his two major books, *Nonintervention and International Order* (1974) and *Human Rights and International Relations* (1986).

The first book, which grew out of Vincent’s doctoral work under Hedley Bull, reflects the sombre rationalism of his former supervisor. Written in the context of the ongoing Cold War between the superpowers, Vincent was not primarily concerned with the issue of humanitarian intervention. In the early 1970s, there was an embarrassing gap between the injunctions of international law against intervention and its flagrant abuse by the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course, intervention is something that states often see in the actions of others, but never in their own. This might suggest that it is no more than a term of abuse and that, if we want to understand international relations and the way states really behave, we need spend a little time over the idea of non-intervention. However, as Vincent points out, widespread condemnation of a form of behaviour in international society usually attests to at least some normative force in the principle that is being broken. And states generally do what they can to avoid a convincing charge of hypocrisy. Non-intervention as a cardinal rule of the society of states therefore repays study, particularly if, like Vincent, one believes that it is a desirable rule that needs supporting, rather than being paid cynical lip service.

Vincent argues that the core of intervention (as opposed to mere ‘interference’, a normal activity in international relations) is the use of coercive means to alter the behaviour, or perhaps change the government, of a target state. The threat or use of force ‘in the domestic affairs of another state’ is precisely what the rule of non-intervention prohibits. Despite the perception of many scholars in the early 1970s that some kind of transnational world society was in the making, Vincent argues that the legacy of the modern state system still weighs heavily upon us. Although he begins his study with an analysis of the legal development of principle of non-intervention, the character of the legal system impels him to devote the bulk of his work to the political arguments underlying compliance – or non-compliance – with the principle.

Vincent outlines four archetypal arguments concerning the principle of non-intervention, tracing them to Richard Cobden, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant and Joseph Mazzini. Despite the passage of time, their arguments are still important in locating the key positions
taken today on whether, and under what conditions, the blanket prohibition of state intervention under international law should be relaxed. Basically, Cobden stated the most uncompromising theory of non-intervention – one founded on the partiality of states in defining universal notions of right and on the relative efficiency of non-intervention in serving material interests of people over the long run. Vincent notes that a basic assumption undergirding Cobden’s view was that transcending interstate relations are a plethora of relations between peoples. Goods, people and ideas are to cross frontiers freely, thus reducing the incidence of state conflicts and eventually binding nations together. Hence coupled with his stern doctrine of non-intervention was a liberal world vision, which provided for the interdependence of peoples. Vincent then shows the ways in which Mill, Kant and Mazzini, while accepting much of Cobden’s vision, provided in varying degrees for exceptions to the rule.

For example, Mill supported the doctrine of limited humanitarian intervention to protect lives and property (of the intervening state) from barbarous acts of violence, as well as to end deadlocked civil wars, and he also promoted the idea of counter-intervention to uphold the rule of non-intervention. Kant eroded the limitation on intervention even further by his notion that stable rules of international conduct depend on a radical revision of international society into a collection of republican regimes. In his vision of world order, the league of states would possess a right of intervention as an international organization. Mazzini completes the liberal evolution against non-intervention. He argues that the rule is merely an instrument of the great powers to protect their client regimes in other countries while they restrict the very processes that Cobden hoped would reduce the need for intervention.

Having outlined the classical arguments concerning non-intervention, Vincent explores the historical record since the French Revolution, including the contemporary record of the United States, the United Nations and the Soviet Union. Vincent’s account overwhelmingly reinforces the view that international anarchy, and what Morgenthau once referred to as ‘nationalistic universalism’ by the great powers, should temper any attempt to develop rules of intervention. He argues that such attempts are more likely to give good conscience to disruptive states than to restrict blatant interference motivated by strategic self-interest. What, then, is Vincent’s solution? In 1974, he opts for Richard Cobden. Unable to accept rules for legitimate intervention, despite their normative appeal, he gives no alternative other than rigorous adherence to norms of non-intervention. There is
no real alternative as long as the principle of sovereignty remains central to the constitution of international society. If there is to be any international law among states that acknowledge no higher authority than their own, it can only be on the basis of formal equality, regardless of the substantial inequality in the distribution of military and economic power. Like Hedley Bull, Vincent believes that no vision of cosmopolitan justice can be achieved without order, and unlike, say, Richard Falk, he argues that international law should not be seen as an agent for transforming international society:

Between a naturalism careless of state practice and a [legal] positivism that would simply render any and all state conduct as the law, international law has to find a middle way. In the present case, it is not clear that a middle course of humanitarian intervention has been traced between a virginal doctrine of non-intervention that would allow nothing to be done and a promiscuous doctrine of intervention that would make a trollop of the law. Until that course can with confidence be traced, it is perhaps nonintervention that provides the most dignified principle for international law to sanction.7

Vincent was not happy with this conclusion, and the rest of his academic career was devoted to exploration of the extent to which the conditions that justified his conclusion were undergoing change.

Neumann divides Vincent’s research into two categories. The first is concerned with the cultural dimensions of international society. In a series of articles published over a ten–year period from the mid-1970s, Vincent explores the potential for a more ‘solidarist’ society of states, in which shared cultural values could provide the basis for greater homogeneity within states, as well as the possibility that the universalism of Western culture is constrained by its cultural particularity.8 The second, and related, category of research is an explicit focus on human rights. His book Human Rights and International Relations (1986) remains one of the most thorough attempts to work through the complexity of debate on the subject. It is divided into three parts.

The first is a masterly conceptual analysis of human rights in political theory, in which Vincent identifies the main areas of contention over the idea of human rights, their content and their scope across human cultures. The second is a comparative analysis of how these areas of contention have been manifested in relations between the First, Second and Third ‘Worlds’ of international diplomacy. Finally,
Vincent engages with the whole issue of implementation. Even if it were possible to achieve some conceptual consensus on a list of universal human rights that includes those concerned with political and civil rights as well as economic ones, how could such a consensus inform the conduct of foreign policy? It is not possible in a short summary such as this to do justice to Vincent’s comprehensive treatment of the range of debate on the subject. Suffice to say there is a definite shift in his thinking from the earlier work on non-intervention.

Whereas the first points to the importance of the rule of non-intervention, in 1986 Vincent takes the view that basic rights ought to be met, and that the very existence of the global poor is the worst offence against these rights in contemporary world society. What appears to be a contradiction, however, is on closer inspection consistent with the Cobdenite view that the society of states ought to promote human rights within states in order to justify the norm of non-intervention. This is a theme that Vincent pursues in one of his last publications before his untimely death, as part of a critique of Michael Walzer’s arguments against intervention:

[The] ‘moral standing of states’ position is less an ethical defence than a prudential defence of non-intervention. It might be better characterized as a sociological defence...given the fact that states themselves have tended to defend the principle in terms of prudence. However, if this weak moral defence is to become fully-fledged it needs to be based on a theory of the good state, not just an account of relations among states in whose goodness we have no great interest.9

It has to be said that Vincent himself did not engage in the project of justifying ‘the good state’. But it is interesting to note that he continued to believe in the need to do so despite the end of the Cold War, which many believed to be the harbinger of a new international system in which ideological differences between states would disappear. Vincent warned against such complacency. The end of bipolarity does not mean the end of power politics, even if it is difficult to see any challengers to the might of the United States in the short term. Similarly, the end of the ideological competition between capitalism and socialism did not mean the end of ideology per se. In 1990, Vincent observed with some foresight that ‘the new shape of the international system looks like the very old nationalist shape but now relatively unconstrained by the export of doctrines...of the superpowers’.10

238
In short, Vincent refused to take much comfort from the end of the Cold War in the context of his broader interest in the degree to which the society of states is, or is not, evolving in a more cosmopolitan direction. But he made an important contribution to the field in arguing (successfully, in my view) that the survival of the existing society of states depends on such progress. In its absence, the rules of international society are little more than a rationalization of great power dominance. Without international justice, there can be no viable long-term order. Without order, there can be no peaceful progress towards a more just world. Vincent helps us understand that the ‘middle way’ between ‘realism’ and ‘revolutionism’ cannot mediate between them unless it transcends both, and assists in the realization of a world in which the legitimacy of states in their external relations is inextricably linked to the legitimacy of rule within them. We still have a long way to go to achieve his vision of world order.

Notes

7. Ibid., pp. 348–49.

Vincent’s major writings


'Change and international relations', Review of International Relations 9 (1983), pp. 63–70.


See also: Bull, Walzer, Wight

Further reading


MARTIN WIGHT

Martin Wight (1917–72) was the leading theorist of what has become known as the English School in the study of international relations. Wight himself published very little in his own lifetime. As Hedley Bull notes, ‘[h]is writings…comprise one sixty-eight page pamphlet, published in 1946 by Chatham House for one shilling and long out of print, and half a dozen chapters in books and articles’.1 Most of his work was published posthumously by his wife Gabriele, with the assistance of the late Hedley Bull and, after his death, Brian Porter. This includes his three major books: Systems of States (1977), Power Politics (1978) and International Theory: The Three Traditions (1991).
The third book in the series consists of Wight’s famous lectures delivered in the 1960s to his undergraduate students at the London School of Economics, where Martin Wight spent most of his academic career. He also taught for a short time at the University of Sussex in the early 1960s, but he will mostly be remembered for the influence he had on colleagues and students at the LSE.

In the late 1950s, Wight played a leading role in setting up the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics with the noted English historian Herbert Butterfield. In 1966, the Committee published *Diplomatic Investigations*, in which Wight wrote one of his most influential articles entitled ‘Why is there no international theory?’ His argument (fully fleshed out in the lectures published in 1991) was based on the proposition that ‘the most fundamental question you can ask in international theory is, what is international society? just as the central question in political theory is, what is a state?’ This assertion rested on his belief that ‘if political theory is the tradition of speculation about the state, then international theory may be supposed to be a tradition of speculation about the society of states, or the family of nations, or the international community.’

Having posed the central question, Wight went on to argue that international theory ‘is marked, not only by paucity but also by intellectual and oral poverty’. There simply were no international equivalents in the Western tradition to the corpus of texts by Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Mill and Rousseau. The reason for this is double-edged, according to Wight. On the one hand, Western political theorists have traditionally focused almost exclusively on the state as the site of progress and the ‘consummation of political experience’. On the other hand, Wight also notes:

> A kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being theorised about. The reason for this is that the theorising has to be done in the language of political theory and law. But this is appropriate to man’s control of his social life... international theory is the theory of survival.

Thus, there is no self-contained body of international theory as Wight conceives it. Instead, he distinguishes between three very broad historical traditions of thought, ‘as embodied in and handed down by writers and statesmen’. Before briefly looking at these in terms of how and why they answer the central question of international theory, it should be noted that Wight is extremely careful to emphasize just how broadly his typology is constructed in order to cover and
simplify a vast range of philosophical, legal and historical literature, as well as to codify an analogous range of political practice:

If we speak of these three types of international theory as patterns of thought we approach them from a philosophical standpoint. We shall be likely to note the...logical coherence of the complex of thought and how acceptance of any one unit-idea is likely to entail logically most of the others, so that the whole is capable of being a system of political philosophy. If we speak of them as traditions of thought...we are likely to notice illogicalities and discontinuities because exigencies of political life often override logic. We shall find all kinds of intermediate positions.5

With this caveat firmly stated, Wight articulated the distinguishing characteristics of what have come to be known as the three Rs – realism, rationalism and revolutionism – in terms of how and why they answer the central question.

At one extreme is realism. According to this tradition, international society is a contradiction in terms. In the absence of a contract between states, they are in a pre-societal state of nature. As between individuals, this is a state of war. Wedded to Hobbesian assumptions, this tradition views international politics as a zero-sum struggle for power, and peace as the fragile outcome of mutual insecurity and existential deterrence. The state is the highest form of political authority, and its interests preclude embodying any consideration for those of other states, apart from that dictated by prudence and the rational pursuit of egoistic self-interest in a hostile environment. International politics is the perpetual realm of violence, survival and strategic necessity.

At the opposite extreme lies revolutionism, the classical forebears of which are Dante and Kant. This tradition teleologically posits an international society of humankind, prevented from its full realization by the epiphenomenal states system, the pathological dynamics of which are contrary to the real interests of the true members of that society. Conceding realism’s scepticism regarding an international society of states, the revolutionist tradition of thought and action is wedded to a perfectionist view of humankind in a historically contingent process of struggle towards the civitas maximum. Rather than surrendering to, or morally glorifying, the necessities of survival in a self-help system, revolutionists demand that it be radically revised. 'Hence the belief, common in varying degrees to the Huguenots, the Jacobins, Mazzini, President Wilson and the Communists, that the whole of diplomatic history has groaned and travailed until now, and
that the community of [humankind], like the kingdom of God…is at hand. As these illustrations demonstrate, neither the precise political arrangement of the future, nor the means of transforming the present one, are determined a priori. There are as many different routes to salvation as there are justifications for its necessity. What unites revolutionists of every stripe is their rejection of the existing political system and their demand for its radical overhaul.

If Wight’s distinction between realism and revolutionism has much in common with E.H. Carr’s earlier presentation of realism and utopianism, he differed from Carr in asserting the existence of a third tradition of thought that Carr had allegedly ignored. Wight argued that what he called the rationalist tradition lies between the two extremes of realism and revolutionism, and is defined against them. It is informed by the metaphysics of Locke and Hume, rather than Hobbes or Kant. Adherents to this tradition argue that the pre-contractual state of nature is neither substantively chaotic nor blissful, and that both the above traditions err by postulating human nature in atomistic terms, with social behaviour determined by a static and asocial ‘nature’. Rather, human beings must be understood as social animals, in continual interaction with others. Forms of social life, at any level of human aggregation, are best understood by tracing the historical evolution of their customs and norms. As articulated in and codified through authoritative, societal institutions of governance, these provide the principles of conduct through which societies are regulated by the reciprocal rights and obligations of their constituent members.

For Wight, therefore, the absence of a world state, and the coexistence of a plurality of sovereign states, do not necessarily condemn international politics to a state of war and render meaningless the notion of an international society. Nor is anarchy a barrier to social and economic intercourse among its members. However, it must be understood as a unique society, the autonomy of which severely weakens appeals to the ‘domestic analogy’ in understanding its basic characteristics and dynamics.

Martin Wight’s ‘trialectic’ of international thought is extremely eclectic, not simply because of his refusal to delineate these ‘traditions’ with any philosophical or analytical precision, but also because of his deep personal reluctance either to transcend them, or to locate his own views consistently within the parameters of any single one. Timothy Dunne, in his excellent review of the English School, notes that in Martin Wight’s early work on international politics, particularly his book Power Politics, ‘there was no dialectic in Martin Wight’s realism, only power. The early writings of Wight betray a tragic view of the
inevitability of power politics untouched by human will. Later in his life, however, he confessed greater sympathy for the rationalist tradition, although he always refused to categorize himself as a rationalist. ‘When I scrutinise my own psyche’, he once wrote, ‘I seem to find all these three ways of thought within me.’ One reason for this is that, according to Wight, each of the traditions was a codification of one of three sociological conditions that constituted the subject matter of international relations. These were international anarchy, understood as the absence of government in an international system of sovereign states; habitual intercourse, apparent in the practice of diplomacy, international law and other institutionalized forms of interdependence; and moral solidarity, or the latent community of humankind, the global society of men and women that lies behind the legal fiction of statehood. In his lectures to students, the three traditions were a superb set of pedagogical tools with which to organize the discussion of war, national interests, diplomacy, the balance of power and international law. As very loose ‘traditions’, no single great writer on international relations could be classified safely within one of them, and Wight was aware that different elements of the traditions coexisted within not only himself, but others as well. Furthermore, it was possible, although somewhat self-defeating, to draw distinctions within each tradition. Thus, one could distinguish between ‘soft’ revolutionists, such as Kant, and ‘hard’ revolutionists, such as Lenin. He also described pacifism as a form of ‘inverted revolutionism’, an acknowledgement of the world as the realists described it combined with a stubborn refusal to participate in power politics.

It is difficult to evaluate Martin Wight’s work. On the one hand, he must be acknowledged as one of the founding fathers of the view that realism and idealism (popularized in the work of Carr, Morgenthau and Herz, among others) did not exhaust the history of international thought, and that rationalism (sometimes known as the ‘Grotian’ school) deserved to be taken seriously in its own right. Certainly, this view has been shared by many scholars who Wight inspired in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly Hedley Bull. In his masterly analysis of the discipline, Steve Smith identifies Wight’s three categories as one of the ten most influential ‘self-images’ of the discipline in the twentieth century.

On the other hand, Wight’s work is not without its problems, and two in particular are worth noting. First, there has been a great deal of debate over the epistemological status of the three traditions. There are, after all, many ways to subdivide the discipline of international relations. Carr suggests two schools of thought, Wight expanded this to three, James Mayall employs five, and Nardin and Mapel divide
the field of international ethics among no fewer than 12 traditions of inquiry. What makes Wight’s system of classification more useful than others, particularly if the categories keep breaking down and if, as Wight clarifies in his lectures, it is wrong to force particular thinkers into one exclusive tradition? In his critique of the entire English School, Roy Jones points out that:

[If] the three R’s do denote modes of perception, comprehension, and action, from what, or where, do they spring? If they issue from the mind of Martin Wight are they not open to radical revision? There was more than one side to Machiavelli after all. Could it be that Wight’s scheme had some metaphysical significance?...To do political theory is a first order activity, it is not simply classifying and commenting on the actions and dicta of statesmen and others.

In other words, in the absence of any attempt to defend the metaphysical significance of the three Rs, it is not clear why they should be of much help to anyone not endowed with Wight’s own ability to employ them with such historical subtlety and erudition. Wight himself was pessimistic about our ability to transcend the three Rs, or about the ability of one of them to triumph over the other two, but he was reluctant to defend this position explicitly.

A second problem with Martin Wight’s work is that, despite his interest in normative questions in the study of international relations, the very way in which he defined the field foreclosed the possibility of bringing it into the broader arena of Western political theory. Chris Brown makes this point very clearly in his excellent text *International Theory: New Normative Approaches*. He claims that Wight’s characterization of politics mixes up two analytically separate concerns. The first is the nature of justice; the second is the organization of the state. If we were to study international justice through the lens of Western political theory, and invoke Western theoretical categories to illuminate its meaning and organizational implications, the three Rs would have to give way to a more illuminating discourse between communitarian and cosmopolitan visions of world order. By defining political theory in a particularly misleading way, Wight cut himself off from the sources of inspiration to shed light on the normative dilemmas of war, state sovereignty and the maldistribution of global wealth.

Despite these problems, Martin Wight still deserves to be read as someone who has written widely about the cultural and moral dimensions of international relations, and his work is a constant
reminder that what may appear to be new disputes in the field about contemporary issues are in fact extensions and manifestations of very old arguments, albeit couched in a different idiom.

Notes

3. Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no international theory?’, in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, London, Allen & Unwin, 1966, p. 18. See also p. 260 of International Theory: The Three Traditions (Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds; Leicester/London, Royal Institute of International Affairs/Leicester University Press, 1991), in which Wight declares that the traditions ‘are not like three railroad tracks running into infinity. They are not philosophically constant and pure…They are, to vary the metaphor, interwoven in the tapestry of Western civilization. They both influence and cross-fertilize one another, and they change, although without, I think, losing their inner identity.’

Wight’s major writings


International Theory: The Three Traditions (Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds), Leicester/London, Royal Institute of International Affairs/Leicester University Press, 1991.

See also: Bull, Carr, Nardin

**Further reading**


Richard Ashley and Robert Walker draw our attention to the ways in which knowledge and power are inextricably connected in the theory and practice of contemporary international relations. They describe themselves as self-imposed ‘exiles’, on the margins of the academic discipline, probing its conditions of possibility and the limits to its authoritative knowledge claims. For them, students of international relations are forever in search of an elusive ideal, some philosophical foundation beyond the play of power from which to account for and recommend reforms to the practice of statecraft. For them, the modern distinction between theory and practice is replaced by ‘dis-course’, a term which blurs the dichotomy between reality and its textual representation. Ashley, in particular, is engaged in a project of disciplinary ‘deconstruction’, exposing the strategies by which particular discourses of power/knowledge in the field construct oppositional conceptual hierarchies and allegedly repress dissent. The language we use to describe the world we live in does not mediate between the self and our environment. This is a modern conceit that relegates important epistemological issues to the background, concerning how we legitimate our fundamental ontological beliefs regarding the scope and dynamics of our field of study. Robert Walker sets his critical sights on the discourse of ‘sovereignty’, which is taken for granted by many students in the field, but which also regulates our sense of time, history and progress. As these thinkers refuse to engage in empirical or normative analysis based on modern notions of reason and truth, they confine themselves to illuminating the dark side of modernity. In particular, the figure of Max Weber looms large in Walker’s work. He suggests that the ‘iron cage’ of modernity is manifested in the study of international relations, which limits our ability to imagine the political possibilities of radical change.
Richard Ashley has taught at the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University since 1981, where he has established his reputation as a leading voice over the past two decades in the post-modern/poststructural movement in (or rather, against) the discipline of international relations. He received his BA from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1977. In 1985, he won the Karl Deutsch Award of the International Studies Association.

Ashley’s reputation is based on a series of articles and chapters in edited collections. His contribution to the discipline is best understood at the level of meta-theory rather than theory per se. Alexander Wendt has written that

[t]he objective of this type of theorizing is...to increase our understanding of world politics, but it does so indirectly by focusing on the ontological and epistemological issues of what constitute important or legitimate questions and answers for IR scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of the international system [itself].

Jarvis, in his important study of Ashley’s work, distinguishes between two phases: the heroic phase, in which Ashley works within the epistemological boundaries of modernity and the Enlightenment; and a later subversive phase, during which he seeks to undermine and call into question the criteria to which most students of international relations appeal in their search for truth, as well as the way in which they conceptualize the scope of their subject matter.

Ashley’s first book was an orthodox examination of the triangular balance of power between China, the United States and the Soviet Union, in which he examined the different rates of technological, economic and population growth among these great powers over time. The book was firmly located within a conventional ‘balance-of-power’ framework, albeit one that adopted a dynamic perspective over time and did not equate the meaning of power with the ability to project military force abroad. Since the publication of that book, however, Ashley has devoted a great deal of attention to the meta-theoretical premises that inform conventional international relations theory. In particular, he argues that the latter is dominated by an instrumentalist logic that is inseparable from its political effect, namely complicity with hierarchical and oppressive global power structures.
An instrumentalist logic is based on a number of assumptions about the nature of reality, the function of theory, and the role of the scholar *qua* theorist. First, it presupposes an ontological distinction between subject and object, which renders ‘reality’ as a sphere of experience uncontaminated by perception or mediated by language and interpretation. Reality exists independently of observing, speaking and acting subjects. Second, the function of theory is to explain fundamental and enduring patterns of activity in its subject matter. It does this by providing plausible interpretations of testable hypotheses that take the form of ‘if/then’ statements. Hypotheses are the crucial link between the ‘data’ of experience and the theoretical framework in light of which the data become meaningful. Finally, not only is theory an *instrument* of discovery, it may also be useful if we want to intervene and change patterns of behaviour, rather than merely being able to predict them within particular parameters. For Ashley, these premises constitute a form of ‘technical rationality’ that conceives of life as so many more or less discrete problem situations...defined in terms of certain given purposes or needs, certain obstacles to or limits on the realisation or satisfaction of these, and certain means by which the obstacles and limits might be overcome.3

Ashley argues that technical reason robs theory of any critical evaluative role, and its hegemony in the discipline has meant that most students tend to assume that it exhausts the scope and meaning of reason as a potential emancipatory ‘tool’. Consequently, the role of the social scientist is little more than a technician, helping to solve ‘problems’ within a given issue-area but failing to question the conditions that give rise to the problems in the first place. In contrast to this ‘positivist’ conception of theory, Ashley supported a more ‘reflective’ social science that would examine the structural/epistemological practices that give rise to the problems themselves, arguing for a radical attempt to confront those structures rather than allowing them to frame and delimit the ‘solutions’. His major articles, published in the first half of the 1980s, are all variations of a philosophical critique against the epistemological premises of technical rationality as it was manifested in debates over realism, world order modelling and the dominance of economic methods (particularly rational choice theory) in the study of international relations.

At the same time, while Ashley pursued his critical analysis of conventional international relations theory, he did so in pursuit of an
emancipatory ideal of freedom and autonomy for all those who were oppressed by the power structures that most students of international relations relied upon to manage whatever ‘problems’ arose on the agenda of international relations. This is clearly evident in his debate with John Herz in the article on ‘Political realism and human interests’, where he invokes Jürgen Habermas and his notion of ‘knowledge-constitutive interests’ in the human sciences. In addition to our technical interest in controlling our environment and our practical interest in maintaining mutual communication and understanding, we have a transcendental interest in ‘securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness’.4

It would be somewhat simplistic to characterize Ashley as a utopian thinker, however, since he has retreated somewhat from a research project that seeks to enlighten us on precisely those ‘constraints’ and ‘relations of domination’ so that we may free ourselves from them. Like so many members of the radical left that have been influenced by the work of French poststructuralists and, in particular, Michel Foucault, Ashley no longer finds sustenance in the intellectual legacy of modernity either to inform our values or to provide guidance for how they may be achieved in any concrete institutional set of arrangements.5 Nonetheless, Ashley was successful in focusing attention on the metaphysical and epistemological premises of orthodox international relations theory. He has drawn attention to the determinism of neorealist theory, particularly that of Kenneth Waltz, and he revealed many problems in applying microeconomic methodologies to the study of world politics. Ashley is a key figure in the so-called ‘third debate’ of the 1980s, which is concerned less with the adequacy of competing frameworks of analysis than with the problematic nature of the criteria that inform our standards of judgement and evaluation.

Since the mid-1980s, Ashley has moved away from his radically ‘heroic’ phase into a more ‘subversive’ critique of international relations theory. This is consistent with his adoption of Foucault’s conceptualization of the interdependence between power and knowledge in social life. Modern conceptions of power treat it as a fungible resource that can be possessed and transferred from one agent to another. In contrast, Ashley sees power as a network of disciplinary practices which help to constitute our identity as constructed selves. In this context, it is wrong to believe that revolutionary struggle in the name of ‘class’ or ‘race’ can possibly emancipate us from power.
Rather than replace one meta-narrative of progress with another, Ashley has taken up the stance of the ‘dissident’, not seeking to replace hegemonic discourses in international relations, but undermining them so that practices might be resisted or disabled; boundaries might be put in doubt and transgressed; representations might be subverted, deprived of the presumption of self-evidence, and politicised and historicised; new connections among diverse cultural elements might become possible; and new ways of thinking and doing global politics might be opened up.

Ashley wants us to stop thinking about power as a property that can be possessed or dispossessed. It is located in ‘micrerelations’, which constitute networks of power, and can be exercised ‘from below’ as well as ‘from above’. This way of thinking is quite alien to traditional realist accounts of the ‘balance of power’ among ‘the great powers’ employing ‘power’ to protect existing interests and using it instrumentally to sustain or improve their status in a rigid hierarchical system.

In light of what he has written about the discursively constructed nature of truth and reason, however, Ashley’s work since the late 1980s has not sought to occupy a privileged standpoint from which to evaluate theory or practice in international relations. After all, if truth is a function of power and vice versa, on what foundation can Ashley base his critique? Instead, Ashley has limited himself to a more modest task – to explore the complicity of international theory with the problems it claims to try to solve. This is the strategy of his deconstructive ‘reading’ of realism in international relations, particularly neorealism. He urges us to read realist texts not as attempts to mirror a given reality of separate territorial states coexisting in an anarchical environment. Instead, we should read them as so many attempts to endorse the sovereign territorial state as the container of political community, which delimits the scope of our freedom and structures our identity as members of discrete national communities. This is what he means by engaging in a ‘double reading’ of ‘the anarchy problematique’ that constructs an entire discipline to comprehend a non-place of international relations. The association of anarchy with the absence of order and authority is possible only on the basis of a prior association between territorial sovereignty and order/community. This is, of course, a theme that is also pursued in the work of Robert Walker and Martin Wight, but Ashley urges us to dwell on
the intellectual/political practices that sustain this dichotomy, rather than merely accept it as the (pre)condition of international theory.

Richard Ashley’s work is, then, that of a critical theorist, although not on behalf of an ideological agenda that allows one to categorize him in any of the traditional paradigmatic boxes of international relations. For although it would be tempting to call him a radical of sorts, his radicalism is not tied to any particular project on behalf of any named group of people. He describes himself as one who is radically estranged from both the discipline and the territorialized communities whose interactions it claims to represent, rather like the nomadic figure of the itinerate condotiere in early modern Europe,

a stranger to every place and faith, knowing that he can never be at home among the people there…[with] a disposition to conduct himself ‘virtually’, that is, according to a general ethos or art of life in which one endlessly struggles amidst contingency and chance to somehow make it possible to live an inherently virtuous ideal in effect. One may also say that the work he performs, though it be a work of territorialisation, is never fixed to any territory, ever nomadic, ever ready to move on in search, not of a destination, not of an end, but of whatever localities might be made the object of a strategy, an art of life, a way of problematising self and selves.⁷

It is difficult at this stage to evaluate Richard Ashley’s contribution to international theory, as he rejects the conventional criteria that are usually used to make such an evaluation. His work has attracted the support of a large number of (mainly younger) scholars in Britain and the United States, as well as the opposition of those who see Ashley’s subversion as a potential threat to the integrity of the discipline. It has to be said that Ashley’s prose style, while almost poetic at times, is often dense and difficult to grasp for those unfamiliar with European continental philosophy and the vocabulary of poststructural analysis.

Perhaps the most serious criticism of Ashley’s work, and of others inspired by it, is the charge of anti-foundational relativism. Although Ashley’s work has to be seen in the context of an ongoing critique of positivism in international relations theory, that critique has taken place just as the boundaries between political theory and the study of international relations have begun to break down. Today, the study of international ethics is no longer a marginal activity in the discipline. As Mark Neufeld observes, the ‘third debate’ in international relations has made scholars much more ‘reflective’ about what he calls
'the inherently politiconormative dimensions of paradigms and the normal science traditions they sustain'. Indeed, Ashley is in part responsible for this transformation in the discipline. On the other hand, his totalizing critique of modern reason excludes him from participating in the renewal of normative international relations theory. As Neufeld puts it, ‘postmodernism is better suited to undermining the role of reason in toto than to expanding the notion of reason beyond the confines of positivist episteme in a way consistent with reflexivity’. It remains to be seen how Richard Ashley will respond to recent critiques of his work that accuse him of substituting one form of technical realism with a relativistic, and indeed nihilistic, celebration of ideals that sound attractive in the abstract, but that may not be compatible with each other, in which case we need ‘reasonable’ criteria to adjudicate among them. It may be that Ashley’s contribution has been to help pave the way for the resurgence of ethics in international theory, even though he can no longer participate in that resurgence. However, it is still too soon to conclude that Ashley will now retreat from his critics, who are happy to endorse the study of international relations as a post-positivist arena of inquiry, but reluctant to ‘burn up in the heat of hyper-reflexivity’.

Notes


**Ashley’s major writings**


See also: **Walker, Waltz**
Further reading

Jarvis, Darryl, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, Columbia, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press, 1999.

DAVID CAMPBELL

David Campbell is currently Professor of Cultural and Political Geography in the Department of Geography at Durham University, UK. Campbell received his PhD from the Australian National University, where he studied under Jim George, and has held academic positions at the University of Newcastle, Keele University and Johns Hopkins University. The fact that one of the 50 key thinkers in international relations has an academic appointment in a geography department suggests that he is not a conventional academic. Campbell can be fairly described as a leading scholar of poststructural/postmodern international relations. Although labels often negate as much as they define, and have a politics all their own, Campbell acknowledges that his work ‘incorporates many of the key achievements of “poststructuralism” (meaning the interpretative analytic of “postmodernism”), especially the rethinking of questions of agency, power, and representation in modern political life’.1 He also forthrightly acknowledges that he views his work as ‘part of an emerging dissident literature in international relations’.2 Of course, Campbell is a dissident due to his embrace of the ‘interpretive analytics’ of such intellectual iconoclasts as Foucault and Derrida, and having the temerity to utilize these analytics to interrogate concepts such as the state, sovereignty and foreign policy – concepts at the core of the discipline that are generally seen as unproblematic by mainstream practitioners.
Campbell’s most influential work is *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (first published in 1992, with a revised edition in 1998). In *Writing Security*, Campbell offers a sustained analysis of how US foreign policy is affected by the (re)production of US identity. Borrowing from Judith Butler’s arguments about how the body is disciplined, Campbell argues ‘the state’ is similar to ‘the body’ in that it has ‘no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality’ and that the identity of any individual state is not given in some founding act, but is regularly reproduced and regulated through a discursive economy.3 Thus, just as individuals have identities that are formed around various binaries of inside/outside, self/other and normal/deviant (among many others), so are states performatively constituted through discourse. To be clear at the outset, Campbell’s argument about the importance of discourse is in no way a denial of an external reality, or that there is some sort of simple opposition between the discursive and the real, or even worse, that states, war and political violence are somehow all in our heads. Rather, Campbell is arguing that meaning and identity are regulated through discourse – that states are both real and discursive – and without a better understanding of how discursive economies legitimate some forms of identity while rendering others illegitimate, the field of international relations is radically incomplete. Campbell’s use of the term ‘writing’ when referring to security is to emphasize this point about discourse, not to argue there is only language or the text. By putting the term ‘writing’ in front of ‘security’, he no doubt provokes those who view international security as the furthest point from Derridian deconstruction, but he is making the important point (for Campbell) that there is no getting outside or around discourse.

One could argue that identity is at the core of the nation-state concept, in that a nation is an ideational concept, while a state can be (not unproblematically) defined geographically. Campbell argues that much of the instability in state identity is derived from this paradoxical relationship. Citing Benedict Anderson’s notion of the nation as imagined community, and Charles Tilly’s arguments that states precede nations, Campbell argues for an understanding of ‘national-states’ as opposed to nation-states, with the unending work of reconciling the ideational content of national identity with the territorial exigencies of the state. In Campbell’s dramatic phrasing,

This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are
(and have to be) always in a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.⁴

Campbell makes an important distinction between foreign policy and Foreign Policy. He reserves the lower-case foreign policy for the discursive economies that surround self/other and inside/outside identities. The capitalized Foreign Policy refers to the state practices conventionally understood as foreign policy, but dependent on the discursive economies of otherness that make up Campbell’s concept of foreign policy. Thus, the representations of foreign policy operate as the conditions of existence for Foreign Policy, where states are performatively reproduced. Foreign Policy also operates as a disciplining, boundary-making and policing activity. Campbell’s Writing Security takes a long, historical sweep of US history to argue that while America is not entirely unique, it is perhaps the paradigmatic case.

No state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity, and no state is free from the tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for a political community to come into being, an alignment that is a response to, rather than constitutive of, a prior and stable identity. Yet for no state is this condition as central as it is for America. If all states are ‘imagined communities,’ devoid of ontological being apart from the many practices that constitute their reality, then America is the imagined community par excellence.⁵

Campbell goes into considerable historical detail to demonstrate that US Foreign Policy was a reflection of the internal dynamics of American ‘foreign policy’, the unending struggle over American identity. For example, Campbell argues that the Cold War cannot be understood as merely the United States’ reaction to the legitimate threat of Soviet military power. Anticipating likely critics, Campbell acknowledges that Soviet military forces were very much real and potentially dangerous, but that fact alone does not explain why the Cold War emerged when it did, and the particular way it transpired. Campbell argues that immediately following the Second World War, the United States was in ferment as various sectors tussled over how far the New Deal policies would go in redefining America. As this threat to received American identity was taking place internally, the Soviet Union was increasingly constructed as a dangerous and different other that America would define itself against. Here, Campbell is not offering any form of economistic explanation, and he explicitly
denies that such a goal is his desire. Instead, the economy is one site among many others where the foreign policy of identity politics takes place. Campbell argues that a variety of forms of identifying dangerous enemies, within and without, resulted in the Cold War being written as it was. For Campbell, it was the foreign policy and Foreign Policy of creating, containing and protecting against the dangerous and different other that wrote the text of the Cold War.

One of the earliest conflicts of the post-Cold War era was the first Gulf War, where a US-led coalition ousted Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Campbell writes about the conflict in *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War*, and furthers some of the points made in *Writing Security*. Campbell argues that the Gulf War was made possible essentially by the sovereignty problematic, where the ethical norm of sovereignty allowed the United States to go to war with the ‘moral certitude’ of the defender of sovereignty. By constructing Iraq (the other) as devoid of respect for the norm of sovereignty, it was able to construct Iraq as the immoral, dangerous and different other that stood in opposition to the moral USA. Through an analysis of the war, Campbell claims we can see how ‘principle’ and ‘morality’ lead to violence.

Reading *Writing Security*, with its emphasis on the United States, might cause a reader to wonder how much of Campbell’s analysis translates to other nation-states. Campbell helps to answer this in a footnote unhelpfully tucked away in the back of the revised (1998) edition, which discusses reactions to the first edition (1992).

In chapter 5 of this book I called America ‘the imagined community par excellence,’ though in chapter 6 this was qualified to an extent with the observation that, while ‘America is not exceptional in combining nationalism, eschatology and chauvinism…America is an intensification of this structural quality’ whereby the *aporia* in identity has to be overcome. Although this has been singled out by John Ruggie in his account of identity and United States foreign policy, I think Iver Neumann is correct to observe that ‘it makes little sense to insist that the United States would be imagined more than other collectives.’ Although I would maintain that the absence for the United States of the ‘mythical foundations of authority’ (to use Derrida’s phrase) available to other collectives in their efforts to secure identity and identify security intensifies the representational crisis, this does not make one ‘more imagined’ and the other ‘more real’ for, as Balibar observes, only imagined communities are real.
Campbell analyses another national imaginary in his (1998) *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia.* In this text, Campbell more systematically explores the contradictions of national imaginaries by organizing his argument around the Derridian concept of ontopology. Derrida defines ontopology as ‘an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the *topos* of territory, native soil, city, body in general’. Campbell argues that our modern understanding of political community, or more accurately our representation of political community, posits an exact match between the territorial boundaries of a state and the ‘boundaries’ of the national imaginary. In other words, the norm of community, derived from its dominant representations in terms of national states, does not allow the multicultural or multi-ethnic, thereby forcing community into a homogeneity that excludes difference. Thus, the violence in Bosnia was not in opposition to norms of community, but a point on a continuum that contains all national states. Further, all national states are in some sense forced to engage in the more or less violent maintenance of borders and the national imaginary. Bosnia and America are similar, according to Campbell, in that they both are engaged in a simultaneous negotiation of Foreign Policy through foreign policy. They are both constituted through an internal and external logic of representation. Campbell describes the topic of *National Deconstruction* as ‘meta-Bosnia’ in that no *a priori* Bosnia is possible. We only have the meta-Bosnia as performatively constituted through the various discursive economies surrounding Bosnia. The same can be said for America, or any other state.

The concluding chapters of the first edition of *Writing Security* engaged in speculation about how America would secure its identity against a dangerous and different other, with the Soviet Union no longer available to fulfil the role. Campbell offered the possibility of threats from narco-terrorism and an economically powerful Japan as likely suspects. In the revised edition, the chapter on Japan is replaced with an epilogue, in which Campbell defends poststructural/postmodern approaches to international relations. Although the new epilogue is a spirited and well argued defence of these approaches, Campbell could have also acknowledged that by the late 1990s, the economic threat from Japan was simply implausible, given the economic difficulties within which the country remains mired. A more forthright acknowledgement of having been wrong on this front would have been welcome, but perhaps Campbell sidesteps this acknowledgement as it would have made the
dangerous and different other less contingent and more predicated on material processes.

Criticisms of Campbell can be divided into two categories. The first would be those who simply dismiss Campbell due to his commitment to postmodern/poststructural perspectives. In the epilogue to the revised edition of *Writing Security*, Campbell dedicates considerable space to rebutting these critiques and defending the merits of his approach and the contributions available to the field. Campbell invokes Foucault’s ‘What is Enlightenment’ commentary on Kant’s ‘Was ist Aufklärung’ to argue that Foucault’s (and Campbell’s) questions and perspective are the very essence of the critical tradition at the heart of the Enlightenment. Although these sorts of debate about ‘rationality versus postmodernism’ frequently generate more heat than light, Campbell is effective in demonstrating that there is a whiff of anti-intellectualism in the easy dismissals of the ‘post’ perspectives.

A second category of critique takes Campbell seriously and reads his work carefully, not shrinking from engagement. Mark Laﬀey offers an excellent example of this form of critique by arguing that Campbell’s emphasis on the performative and representational leaves out ‘other logics that constitute the social’,¹¹ Utilizing an open-ended historical materialism, and referencing feminist historical materialists, Laﬀey argues that Campbell’s rejection of ‘totalizing’ Marxism is too dismissive of a tradition that does not always rely on economistic class determinism. The larger point that Laﬀey makes, and it is an important critique of Campbell generally, is that the sort of politics that ﬂow from Campbell’s perspective must necessarily exclude analyses of capital as a global organizing principle or agent.

Laﬀey’s critique of Campbell points to a general problem with Campbell, Ashley, Walker, Der Derian and other scholars of international relations who can be described as postmodern/poststructural in their approach. While the notion that these perspectives ineluctably lead to some form of debilitating, apolitical, anti-foundational relativism is not terribly convincing, there is an important question about the politics that ﬂow from these approaches. There is a general sense that these approaches are consumed with the critical, and, for understandable reasons, often lack what we could call a ‘positive moment’. Campbell does oﬀer what he calls a ‘political prosaics’:

(B)ecause of the continued hegemony of spatial modes of representation, specifically the geopolitics of the level of analysis, international relations is unrealistic. In an effort to point the way to modes of representation that could possibly be considered
more adequate, the argument here suggests a form of inquiry, which might be termed ‘political prosaics’ concerned with the transversal (instead of transnational) character of politics in an anarchical world (as distinct from anarchy) is worth pursuing.¹²

The question remains in the attempt to avoid universals and totalizing narratives: is recasting the politics of identity, representation and signification sufficient to disrupt the dominant narrative? And if so, can this really produce a politics that limits the violence that Campbell finds produced the sovereignty problematic?

Campbell’s most recent work has taken his interest in representation and signification in the direction of visual culture and international politics. Specifically, Campbell is interested in the representation of atrocity, famine and war by various forms of media (photography, video, etc.). One example of this interest is his involvement in the ‘Imaging Famine’ research project.¹³ This project seeks to interrogate how particular representations of famine have had particular political effects (for example, the role of NGOs in producing photographs of people, usually helpless-looking children, in famine zones). He is also working on a research project investigating ‘The Visual Economy of HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue’ for the AIDS, Security and Conflict Initiative.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 4.
5. Ibid, p. 91.

13. www.imaging-famine.org

**Campbell’s major writings**


**Further reading**


**MICHEL FOUCAULT**

Michel Foucault (1926–84) was one of the most important and influential philosophers and social theorists of the twentieth century. He was arguably the most influential social theorist of the modern era, if we are to judge his impact by breadth and depth within the social sciences. While his work was, and remains, controversial in terms of its overall theoretical and political implications for Enlightenment values, it is simply undeniable that his work revolutionized the way we discuss power-knowledge, normal/deviant and a variety of social institutions, from prisons to hospitals to the liberal state. Foucault’s impact on international relations was relatively late, given the influence his work had in other social sciences from the 1970s.
Defining Foucault in ‘disciplinary’ terms is even more difficult than for most social theorists, given Foucault’s intense interest in how discursive economies define individuals in particular ways. Foucault made enormous contributions to philosophy, history, anthropology, sociology, political science and cultural studies, but the breadth of his work resists identifying him primarily with one discipline. His name is nearly synonymous with postmodernism and poststructuralism, but he consistently made it a point to not accept either label, and generally rejected identifying his work with any particular political or academic perspective. Perhaps it is best to let Foucault speak for himself about the arc of his career. In an essay written near the end of his life, Foucault describes his work:

I would like to say…what has been the goal of my work during the last twenty years. It has not been to analyze the phenomenon of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made into subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects.

Foucault goes on to elaborate these three ‘modes of objectification’, and by briefly discussing them here we can begin to provide a sense of Foucault’s work and its import for the discipline of international relations. The reader should be warned, however, that this attempt to condense the complex and subtle nature of Foucault’s work into a few pages can offer only the briefest outline. Also, each of these modes overlap in Foucault’s work, and should be understood as analytical distinctions.

The first mode refers to Foucault’s work represented by *The Order of Things*, *The Birth of the Clinic* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. In these early works, Foucault was interested in how the human sciences created disciplines – relatively coherent systems of study independent from each other – and how these disciplines objectified their objects of inquiry. What was particularly interesting for Foucault was the manner in which disciplines changed, sometimes abruptly, in how they defined their object of inquiry. In these early works, several aspects of Foucaultian analysis are apparent. First, Foucault rejects the idea that there is any logical or rational progression to these human sciences. They are not merely the products of the search for the truth of their area of study, but instead exhibit arbitrary modes of objectification that can abruptly change trajectory. Another, sometimes vexing,
characteristic of Foucault is evident here. He does not offer any sort of direct causality about how these changes come about. Although Foucault acknowledges the importance of epochal shifts such as the French Revolution being reflected in forms of scientific classification, it is not clear how, and who precisely is responsible for these seemingly arbitrary changes.

A second mode, and perhaps what Foucault is most known for by the public at large, is what he refers to as ‘dividing practices’. These are the practices, again not done by any particular agents, which divide people between normal and deviant in such familiar binaries as sane/mad, well/sick, innocent/guilty (prisoners), normal versus deviant sexual practices, etc. Through empirical/archival research, Foucault argues that these dividing practices are historically, and by implication currently, arbitrary. What was once seen as deviant is now normal, and vice versa. In works such as Discipline and Punish,6 Madness and Civilization7 and the aforementioned The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault shows how these arbitrary dividing practices have evolved over time, sometimes changing abruptly, and by demonstrating their arbitrary nature he challenges the liberal justification for the ‘humane’ practice of treating prisoners, ‘the insane’ and other ‘deviants’ in particular ways. Foucault shows that ‘humane’ and ‘rational’ treatment is often an insidious form of control (discipline). Foucault famously cited Bentham’s Panopticon, an idea for a prison built so that the prisoner is always potentially being watched by authority, as a good example of the paradox of this sort of ‘humane’ system. ‘Dividing practices’ also refers to other forms of control, such as the spatial organization of humans in social institutions and the systematization and routinization of social practices.

While the first two modes in some sense bracketed ‘the self’, Foucault’s third mode refers to how subjects ‘turn themselves into a subject’ given the former two modes of constitution of the self. This third mode is best represented by Foucault’s three-volume History of Sexuality,8 in which, for example, he argues that the ‘repressive hypothesis’, whereby eighteenth-century European sexual practices were understood to be repressed, not talked about and generally avoided, is wrong. Rather, Foucault argues that sex was increasingly seen as the way to understanding the self and was thereby discursively omnipresent – in and through prohibitions, the confessional, the doctor’s office, the psychoanalyst’s chair, etc. This mode also allowed Foucault to investigate how disciplinary practices and other modes of domination were internalized, how individuals would police themselves by internalizing ‘the gaze’ (the view of authority/normalcy/discipline).
Foucault’s influence on international relations is derived not so much from these three modes of analysis, but from how he went about them. Of particular importance are his methodologies of archaeology and genealogy, and the concept of discourse. Archeology was the earlier term Foucault used to describe, and emphasize, the empirical and historical nature of his investigations of the human sciences. An archeological analysis does not seek to demonstrate the truth or falsity of a way of ‘objectifying’ the object of inquiry, but instead seeks to understand precisely how it occurred, and what were the conditions of its existence. Archeology is more neutral concept than genealogy. Foucault later made less use of the term ‘archaeology’ and began to use ‘genealogy’, particularly ‘genealogy of knowledge’, inspired by Nietzsche’s ‘genealogy of morals’. With genealogy, Foucault was interested in how particular ‘truth claims’ or ‘regimes of truth’ achieved their status, and how other claims were defeated or displaced. To determine this, Foucault was particularly interested not only in the displaced truth claims, but also in local forms of knowledge that escaped the institutionalized or dominant truth claim.

All three of Foucault’s ‘modes’, as well as his methods, are dependent on his particular use of the concept of discourse. In the broadest sense, discourse refers to language/words/text. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault defined discourse in a particular way. He argued that speech acts take their meaning from the ensemble of other speech acts within a discursive formation. The discourse around a particular concept or term is not just whatever words are used to describe it, but is dependent on the authoritative descriptions of that term. The authority to define the term comes from discursive relations of power and knowledge. The key here is that, for Foucault, there is no ‘outside’ discourse, no ultimate or real truth. Thus, terms such as ‘madness’ or ‘insane’ can mean many different things, depending on the discursive formation they are deployed within. Foucault is not interested in what is the real truth about whether or not someone is insane, but instead in how the term comes to be defined in the way it has, how other meanings have been displaced, how the meaning of the term has evolved, etc.

Foucaultian concepts have been used by a variety of international relations scholars in important ways. There are two book-length projects that critically interrogate the core international relations concept of ‘sovereignty’, with explicit and extensive use of Foucault. Cynthia Weber’s (1995) Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange utilizes Foucault (and Baudrillard, hence the ‘simulating’) to show that there are no ‘true’ sources of sovereignty,
arguing instead that sovereignty is ‘produced’ discursively through ‘intervention’, the ‘other’ of sovereignty. When states violate sovereignty through intervention, as they often do, ‘the form of a justification in effect participates in the constitution of both the state as a sovereign identity and the interpretive community to which the state’s justifications are directed’. Another prominent example of a Foucaultian-inspired treatment of sovereignty is Jens Bartelson’s (1995) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty.* Bartelson uses Foucault’s method of genealogy of knowledge to trace the historical constitution of sovereignty, noting the discontinuities occurring around the three periods of the Renaissance, the Classical Age and Modernity (not by coincidence, and not noted by Bartelson, the same three periods of rupture that Foucault discusses in *The Order of Things*). Bartelson argues that ‘the concept of sovereignty has been not only constitutive of what modern politics is’ it is also ‘what modern political science is all about’. Yet sovereignty resists a simple, stable definition. Following Foucault, Bartelson seeks to understand sovereignty in light of the different discursive formations within which it has been deployed, and argues that sovereignty is a kind of Derridean ‘parergon’ or frame around which other representations are made possible, such as separating domestic from international, the familiar ‘inside/ outside’, etc. As it functions as frame, it is difficult to define in a stable fashion. That is, it cannot be easily framed, so its meaning is unstable over time.

Most international relations scholars are familiar with the works of Richard Ashley, David Campbell, Jim George and R.B.J. Walker. Each of these scholars has acknowledged a debt to Foucault in one way or another. Richard Ashley deconstructs realism and neorealism, paying special attention to how concepts such as ‘anarchy’ and ‘sovereignty’ are constituted in and through disciplinary discourses. Consistent with Foucault’s dictum, ‘My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous’, Ashley sees danger lurking everywhere in mainstream international relations. David Campbell’s work is deeply influenced by Foucault, clearly evident in his analysis of how ‘national states’ are discursively constituted through the construction of dangerous and different others. Jim George’s *Discourses of Global Politics* discusses Foucault in relation to the discipline, as well as using Foucaultian analysis to indict the discipline’s reliance on realism and, for George, its many errors, silences and omissions. R.J.B. Walker’s *Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory* utilizes Foucault, among others, to deconstruct the realist discourse around inside (sovereignty) and outside (anarchy). Walker argues that the
realist construction of inside–outside is a thoroughly modernist resolution of the self–other relationship in modern spatial configurations. Other influential international relations scholars influenced by Foucault include, but are certainly not limited to, James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro.

Foucault’s effect on international relations has been significant, but it has not come in isolation from other influences in postmodern and poststructural thought, especially Derrida. This point is brought home in an important article by Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: discourse, liberal governance and the limits of Foucauldian IR’, about the limits and the dangers of uncritically appropriating Foucault’s concepts within international relations. Selby argues

Within IR, Foucault has been applied and employed in three distinct ways: to support critiques and deconstructions of realist international theory; to analyse discrete discourses and practices of modern international politics; and to develop novel accounts of our contemporary global political order. My argument...is that the first and the third of these usages are especially problematic. Pressed into service against IR realism, Foucault’s main emphases, insights, and concerns have consistently been overlooked – or, worse, misrepresented. No less problematic, when translated and ‘scaled up’ to inform analyses of the current world order, Foucault’s work becomes less an interrogation of liberalism than a prop to reworked liberal accounts of the international arena. This is not to deny that interesting and insightful things have been said using Foucauldian perspectives about the discourses and practices of modern international politics. It is rather to argue that there are limits to the use of Foucault in theorizing international and world politics; and, as a corollary to this, that if Foucault is to be used effectively within IR, then his insights need to be situated within a framework...which is cognisant of the structural dimensions of power, as well as the specificity and irreducibility of the international.

Selby’s claim is that Foucault’s work was highly empirical, differed considerably from the more philosophical-textual analyses of Derrida and other French poststructuralists, and generally took European societies/discursive formations as his object of inquiry. Thus, Selby argues that, just as Germain and Kenney have taken neo-Gramscians to task for ‘scaling up’ Gramsci’s work to the international or global level based on particular national questions, we should be
sceptical of those who would do the same with Foucault. Selby is certainly correct to argue that significant differences exist between Foucault and other French poststructuralists, and that Foucault’s empirical/historical methods and chosen objects of inquiry provide a challenge to ‘scaling up’. But one would also have to question the ‘limits’ that Selby suggests international relations scholars should observe around Foucault. In an interview, Foucault once remarked ‘I would like my books to be like surgeons’ knives, Molotov cocktails, or galleries in a mine, and, like fireworks, to be carbonized after use’.²⁰ Whatever our standards in the academy, it seems that Foucault was concerned with the ‘disciplinary’ boundaries others may put on his own work.

A final point needs to be made about Foucault and the reception of his work. It is common to hear straw man arguments about Foucault and other forms of poststructural thought involving an abandonment of the Enlightenment, reason and standards, and/or charges that deconstruction and critical interrogations of triumphalist, modernist claims somehow lead to a paralysing and dangerous relativism. While it is certainly valid to argue that postmodern/poststructural approaches add little to international relations, it seems to fly in the face of Enlightenment values to shun a form of inquiry because it might be ‘dangerous’.

Notes

2. Michel Foucault, ‘The subject and power’ in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds), Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1982, p. 208.
10. Ibid., p. 5.

**Foucault’s major writings**


**Further reading**


Rob Walker writes in circles. Over the past 20 years, he has written a large number of chapters in edited collections and journal articles (some co-authored with Richard Ashley), which call into question most of the assumptions that students bring to the study of international relations. He does not suggest that these assumptions are right or wrong, he merely enquires into what may be called the conditions of their possibility. Although I have classified him under the label ‘postmodern’, he would be suspicious of such a move. No doubt he would also question my intent in placing him so that his work can be tamed by a discipline whose ritual debates he has made it his business to deconstruct as an expression of modernity.

Walker was born in 1947, in Reading, England. He graduated from the University of Wales in 1968 with a BA, and moved to Canada to pursue his graduate studies. In 1977, Walker received his PhD from Queen’s University in Ontario, and since 1981 he has taught at the University of Victoria in British Columbia, Canada. He has been a visiting fellow at the Australian National University and at Princeton University.

Perhaps the best way to approach his work is by describing it as meta-theory, although not in the sense that he wishes to prescribe ways in which students of international relations might improve their empirical understanding. Indeed, he is reluctant to confess that he is a student of international relations. His interest in the discipline or academic field of international relations arises not from its ability to generate a better understanding of its subject matter, but from Walker’s curiosity about that which makes international relations possible in the first place:

What IR tells us is not quite what it is so often claimed to tell us. It does not tell us very much about how the world is, though it
does tell us a great deal about the conditions under which we are able to claim to know what the world is and what its future possibilities are. Even as a phenomenon that demands explanation, it is certainly a good guide to where and who we think we are.1

As a glimpse into Walker’s style of writing, this quote is a good example of his strategy. Rather than write about the world, Walker writes about the ways others write about what they think the world is or should be. Given his concern, or perhaps ‘obsession’ is the right word, with presuppositions and assumptions, the reader can come away from an ‘encounter’ with Walker feeling somewhat frustrated. Most theoretical texts in the field assume that ‘theory’ consists of a set of explanatory or normative generalizations about patterns of behaviour or types of conduct in the ‘real’ world. The tasks of empirical theory are to determine and classify these patterns and to specify the conditions under which they are likely to occur, change or cease altogether. The fact that such patterns exist and can be discovered beneath the contingent elements of historical practice makes a theory (as opposed to a narrative history) possible. ‘Theory’ is thus a tool, or instrument, to facilitate our understanding of ‘reality’. Theories are intellectual frameworks that make the world meaningful. Theoretical utility is, in turn, a function of explanatory power, which can be evaluated according to criteria such as internal logical consistency in the use of concepts, empirical verification of operational propositions and empirical support for hypotheses derived from the theory, and parsimony.

Walker does not agree. He rejects the conventional Popperian dichotomy between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, according to which epistemological questions are privileged over ontological ones. For Walker, practice is already ‘theory-laden’. The world of international relations is primarily a conceptual one – a world of meanings – in which action is filtered through, and made possible by, institutionalized processes of interpretation on the basis of which other actions are initiated in the actual world. We have no direct access to the ‘actual world’, except through its discursive construction by participants and observers alike. Thus, Walker is certainly postmodern insofar as his work reflects the interpretation of the terms ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ provided by Zygmunt Bauman.2 For Bauman, and for Walker, they stand for differences in understanding the social world and the related nature, and purpose, of intellectual work. A modern disposition assumes that some ontological principle of ‘order’, as
associated patterns of social conduct, exists to be discovered and explained, and thus is susceptible to manipulation and control. But in the typically postmodern view of the world, order does not precede practices, and hence cannot serve as an outside measure of their validity. Each model of order makes sense solely in terms of the practices that validate it. Thus, for example, ‘ethics is not a repository of [theoretical] principles awaiting application; it is an ongoing historical practice. And far from being devoid of ethical principles, the theory of international relations is already constituted through accounts of ethical possibility.’

If one is looking for a term more specific than ‘postmodern’ to approach Walker’s work, it could be summed up as a ‘discursive practices approach’. In contrast to the conventional interpretation of theory as a more or less useful instrument, it emphasizes the discursive construction of reality. Language is seen as part of a system for generating subjects, objects and worlds. Individuals and groups do not ‘exist’ in any meaningful fashion independently of their linguistic construction. This recognition of the constitutive role of language and discourse gives rise to a radically new conception of power, which is inherent in the linguistic practices by which agents are constructed and become empowered within particular discourses. As Doty explains,

[a] discursive practice is not traceable to a fixed and stable centre, e.g., individual consciousness or a social collective. Discursive practices that constitute subjects and modes of subjectivity are dispersed, scattered throughout various locales. This is why the notion of intertextuality is important. Texts always refer back to other texts which themselves refer to still other texts. The power that is inherent in language is thus not something that is centralized, emanating from a pre-given subject.

Walker is fascinated with the texts of international relations theory, which he sees as particularly ripe for deconstruction as the discipline is made possible by a series of conceptual and linguistic dichotomies – realism versus idealism; hierarchy versus anarchy; theory versus practice; ethics versus international relations; and, most significantly, politics versus international relations. Despite all the literature urging, and sometimes celebrating, some kind of integration between political theory (a discourse of progress) and international relations (a discourse of survival), Walker explores in some depth the ways in which political theory and the study of international relations, far from being
separate academic fields, constitute each other as a condition of possibility.

In his book *Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (1993), Walker circles around the concept of state sovereignty, which he believes will be far harder to ‘transcend’ than many students believe. Walker claims that the principle of state sovereignty is ‘crucial’ (one of his favourite words) in appearing to resolve a series of modern antinomies between self–other, identity–difference, universality–particularity and unity–diversity. In brief, his argument is that:

*The principle of state sovereignty is less an abstract legal claim than an exceptionally dense political practice. As a response to the problem of proliferating autonomies in a world of dissipating hierarchies, it articulates a specifically modern account of political space, and does so through the resolution of three fundamental contradictions. It resolves, in brief, the relation between unity and diversity, between the internal and the external and between space and time. It does so by drawing on the philosophical, theological and cultural practices of an historically specific civilisation driven by the need to realise yet also control those moments of autonomy that emerged in the complex transitions of early-modern Europe.*

Thus, we enjoy the fruits of community as rights-bearing citizens within the state. To those outside the state, our obligations are to ‘humanity’, a pale reflection of natural law. Within the state, ‘historical progress’ is conceived along a temporal dimension, while the arbitrary spatial division of international politics guarantees its continuation as a sphere of necessity rather than freedom. Within the state, the universal rights of citizenship are — in principle — available to ‘all’, yet that same universality depends on the ability of the state to exclude ‘outsiders’. Walker explores the political significance of state sovereignty at some length, arguing that in the absence of any ‘post-modern’ resolution of these contradictions, the appeal of sovereignty is far from dead.

Walker’s work is important in undermining the belief that state sovereignty will soon be transcended as a constitutive principle of international relations. He acknowledges the growing weakness of its discursive power in an era of alleged ‘globalization’, but he claims that there can be no substitute as long as we have yet to discover some postmodern means to overcome the contradictions of the modern world. His work is also important for those who believe it is possible
to resolve long-standing ‘great debates’ in the field while retaining some autonomous identity for the ‘academic discipline’ of international relations. Walker believes that the condition that gives rise to the discipline is a barrier to resolving the dichotomies within it. At the level of praxis, he argues that much of the talk about ‘new’ social movements is exaggerated. As long as such movements (constituted on the basis of gender, or concern for the environment) fail to offer new answers to the questions to which state sovereignty responds so effectively, they will not differ from ‘old’ social movements, and probably suffer the same fate.

Finally, Walker’s work helps us to appreciate the limits of so many debates about the adequacy of ‘realism’ in the study of international relations. Walker has done much to restore the historical importance of Max Weber in the realist tradition, but he has also written a great deal undermining the view that there is anything but a rudimentary similarity between any two ‘realists’ in international relations theory.

Notes

5. Ibid., p. 302.

Walker’s major writings


See also: Ashley

**Further reading**


Until the 1980s, despite the inroads of feminism in other social sciences, the role of gender in the theory and practice of international relations was generally ignored. Today, this is no longer the case, as a number of feminist thinkers have turned their critical sights on a field that, up to now, has been gender-blind. However, it was inevitable that feminist critiques of the state and the gendered nature of political theory would manifest themselves in the study of international relations at some point. With the end of the Cold War, the return of ‘identity politics’, and the sustained criticisms of positivism in the field during the 1980s, the opportunity for examining the role of gender has been seized upon by a number of feminist thinkers. At the empirical level, Cynthia Enloe’s work reveals the role of women in sustaining international relations, even though this role is performed in the background and on the margins of international relations theory. Jean Elshtain is a political theorist whose contributions to international relations stem from her deep understanding of the role of gender in framing dominant conceptions of the state in Western thought. In particular, she sheds much light on the way in which conceptions of the appropriate roles of men and women are expressed in the theory and practice of war. J. Ann Tickner’s work focuses on the role of gender in shaping the way we study international relations. She argues that the inequality between men and women is reflected in the way we think about ‘security’ and ‘stability’ in international affairs. Unless the experiences of women are considered in determining what is included in, and excluded from, the study of international relations, our understanding remains radically incomplete.
Jean Bethke Elshtain, like so many of the thinkers described in this book, is difficult to categorize within the established paradigms of international relations. In part, this is because she refuses to locate herself within them, preferring to step back from the discipline and enquire into the conditions of its possibility as an autonomous academic field. Although it would be appropriate to call her a ‘feminist’, she is very critical of some feminist schools of thought, which, she argues, perpetuate the lack of understanding between men and women. In light of her most recent work on the fate of democracy in the United States, it would also be appropriate to see her as part of the ‘communitarian’ movement, but she also makes gestures towards the need for a stronger international ‘civil society’.

First and foremost, Elshtain is a political theorist particularly interested in the role of gender in shaping the way we comprehend ‘politics’, whether domestic or international. She has traced the way in which political theory is infused with ‘gendered’ understandings of the distinction between the public and the private sphere, the nation-state and war. Much of her work reveals the role of gender in shaping not only the way we conceive and talk about international relations, but also the way we act in international relations. This is part of a larger purpose, to transcend the intellectual and political practices that perpetuate how men and women think about themselves and the possibilities open to them.

Elshtain was born in 1940, in the irrigated farm country of northern Colorado. She grew up in the small village of Timnath (population 185). Her father was the Timnath schools superintendent, and Elshtain was the oldest of five children in the family. In high school, Elshtain was national vice-president of the Future Homemakers of America, and demonstrated a talent for public speaking, winning numerous speech prizes. After high school, she went to Colorado State University to study history, later transferring to the University of Colorado, where she earned her BA in 1963. By this stage she had got married, had three children and divorced her husband. In 1973, Elshtain was awarded her PhD from Brandeis University and joined the Department of Political Science of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst as an assistant professor. She became an associate professor in 1976 and a full professor in 1981. In 1988, Elshtain was appointed Centennial Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University (and the first woman to hold an endowed Chair at Vanderbilt). In 1995, she became the first Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of
Social and Political Ethics in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago.

Elshtain’s work on international relations emerged from her examination of the role of gender in informing the division between the public and private spheres in political theory. In Public Man, Private Woman (1981), she explores the way this distinction is conceived in the history of political thought in order to trace the evolution of the meaning of ‘politics’. She argues that there is a dramatic change in the way the two spheres are conceived with the decline of ancient Greece and the rise of Christianity, but gender remains crucial in demarcating the two spheres. The book established the importance of gender in informing the way in which ‘the political sphere’ is identified and associated with allegedly ‘male’ characteristics. The gendered construction of the difference between domesticity and the political sphere remained the focus of her work as she turned towards international relations.

Women and War (1987) is Elshtain’s most well known book, partly because it is one of the first in a wave of feminist literature that has been published over the past decade. It is also a very unusual book because it is so unconventional. In a sense, it is not even about war per se. There is no attempt to sort through the debate over the ‘causes of war’ in the international system or the appropriate policies to reduce the incidence of war. Instead of the usual question ‘what is the cause of war?’, Elshtain is interested in some of the perceptual lenses that make war possible in the first place. She is particularly concerned with how such perceptions are related to the construction of gender roles in society, and the reasons for the lack of attention paid to the relationship in the Anglo-American tradition of international theory. In essence, the book is an imaginative historical account of the traditional ‘myths’ that have informed the relationship between men and women and determined their role in war. She describes the two dominant myths as ‘Man the Warrior’ and ‘Woman as Beautiful Soul’.

The book is also unusual in that Elshtain injects herself into the narrative and tells the reader of her own life story, relying heavily on her diary for the years 1956–72. Her aim is to ‘delineate, first, my encounter as a child and citizen-to-be with the larger, adult world of war and collective violence as it filtered down to me through movies and my family’s experience; and then the witness I have borne myself, since my teens, as student, mother, and political theorist’.

The personal narrative interweaves with the broader historical argument in such a way that the reader becomes complicit with Elshtain’s
'search for a voice through which to traverse the terrain between particular lives and loyalties and public duties'.

The first part of Elshtain’s study traces in broad strokes the development of civic virtue in ancient Greece as inevitably armed, consistent with her analysis of the public/private split portrayed in her earlier work. Along with the development of armed civic virtue as a major strand in Western culture, she examines the ‘other’ Christian tradition of attempts to ‘disarm civic virtue’. This emerges in early Christian pacifism, and the Christian doctrine of the ‘just war’ can be seen as an attempt to mediate between both aspects of Western culture.

With their aims of constraining collective violence, chastening realpolitik, and forging human identities, the current heirs of [just war] thinking assume (1) the existence of universal moral dispositions, if not convictions – hence, the possibility of a non-relativistic ethic; (2) the need for moral judgements of who/what is aggressor/victim, just/unjust, acceptable/unacceptable, and so on; (3) the potential efficacy of moral appeals and arguments to stay the hand of force. This adds up to a vision of civic virtue, not in the classical armed sense but in a way that is equally if differently demanding.

Just how demanding is illustrated by the potency of the myths in facilitating war. In the second part of the book, Elshtain sharpens the focus of her study, pointing up the contrasting traditional myths and stories, according to which women are seen as life-givers, men as life-takers. Once again, the metaphors are telling. Within, and in addition to, the dominant myths just mentioned, Elshtain categorizes women variously as the ‘Ferocious Few’, who exemplify Spartan motherhood (her example is the Spartan mother whose primary concern and question are about the outcome of the battle, and only secondarily about her son’s fate in battle), and the ‘Noncombatant Many’. It is the latter classification that provides the dominant image of women and war, even though stories of female fighters are not lacking.

Elshtain then shifts her focus of attention to the construction of male identities in the perpetuation of mythic discourses about war. Similarly to the traditional myths controlling our images of women and war, some established patterns for thinking about ‘fighting men’ also exist. She discusses three such prototypical male characters, the ‘Militant Many’, the ‘Pacific Few’ and the ‘Compassionate Warrior’. In this context, she describes the limits that gendered roles place on
men and women. Male soldiers ‘man’ the battle fronts, and female parents keep the home front. Because these roles are so central to the construction of our identity, she suggests that we will be unable to reconstruct relationships between men and women unless we also reconstruct our thinking about war.

In her conclusions, Elshtain suggests that we need to destabilize the myths that help to perpetuate war. She emphasizes the need to develop ‘alternative images of citizenship’ to those traditionally associated with armed civic virtue. We need ‘to create social space through experiments in action with others [that] would free up identities, offering men and women the opportunity to share risks as citizens’.4 Although Elshtain does not develop this point at any great length, the value of Women and War lies in its portrayal of the epistemological problems of approaching the study of war as males and females in Western culture.

Elshtain has written a great deal on the ways in which the study of international relations marginalizes gender. Her primary target, as one might expect, is realism. Students of international relations tend to take the state for granted as a ‘given’, and then focus on relations among states in an allegedly anarchical environment, deriving alleged patterns of state behaviour from the structural characteristics of the international system. Not only does such an approach avoid asking important questions about the social construction of the state itself, it also conceals the role of gender in framing the way in which ‘we’ study international relations. The subordination of ethics to ‘science’, and the general ignorance of the complicity of political theory in constructing the dichotomy between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, are two characteristics of the study of international relations, particularly in the United States, that Elshtain condemns.5

One of the most refreshing aspects of Elshtain’s work is that she takes gender seriously, as the social construction of women and men. As Adam Jones notes in his critique of feminist contributions to the study of international relations, ‘very occasionally, one comes across a work – I think of Elshtain’s Women and War – that explores the ambiguities of gender construction, and the diversity of women and men’s lived experiences, in a balanced manner’.6 She spends little time on the naïve view that women are inherently more peaceful than men and that, if only there were more women in positions of political power, the world would be a more peaceful place. Elshtain points out that women in positions of national leadership, such as Queen Elizabeth I and Margaret Thatcher, have hardly proved to be pacifists. She notes also that an assumption that women are naturally
opposed to war has been used as an anti-feminist argument for sparing women the nastiness of the vote or political participation. What struck Elshtain most clearly during the writing of *Women and War* was the theme of sacrifice in the war stories that she encountered:

Texts...[that] laid the blame for war...on the doorstep of male aggressivity grew less and less believable...a relief, then, that my own son was probably not a beast lurking and awaiting the chance to bare his fangs and shed some blood, not his own.6

This is why it is overly simple to tag Elshtain with the label ‘feminist’, whether in praise or condemnation. Indeed, she has done much to undermine the view that there is a unified ‘feminist’ movement, and she worries that the label not only creates the illusion of unity among women, but also undermines the need to discover ways of engaging in ‘civic virtue’ that transcends gender:

A polyphonic chorus of female voices whose disparate melodies are discernible sounds now in the land. Among the many voices are latterday Antigones (‘Hell, no, I won’t let him go’); traditional women (‘I don’t want to be unprotected and men are equipped to do the protection’); the home-front bellicist (‘Go, man, go and die for our country’); the civicly incapacitated (‘I don’t rightly know’); women warriors (‘I’m prepared to fight, I’d like to kick a little ass’); and women peacemakers (‘Peace is a women’s way’). Each of these voices can be construed as the tip of a pyramid descending on either side to congeal into recognisable social identities that sometimes manifest themselves as [feminist] movements.8

Equally, Elshtain is critical of some feminists who proclaim that ‘the personal is political’. While she condemns the gendered construction of the private/public divide, she notes that the radical feminist attempt to politicize the private realm is itself a patriarchal strategy, but one that merely inverses the traditional hierarchy between men and women.9

In their excellent analysis of her work, Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin–Fat suggest that Elshtain’s project is twofold: a commitment to the method of social constructivism and the political need to ‘reconstruct the social with an appreciation of the intractability of discursive formations’.10 Unfortunately, what it might mean to ‘reconstruct the social’ is somewhat vague in her writing. At times she appeals to what she calls a ‘politics sans sovereignty’, which gestures in the direction of
some strengthening of global civil society. But the vision remains vague and poorly articulated. No matter. Elshtain is a key thinker in contemporary international relations, in that she tells us not how to get from here to there, but what it means to be ‘here’. By demonstrating the way in which war remains a gendered discourse in Western culture, Elshtain’s work opens up the study of international relations so that students of either sex can appreciate the political implications of what is, after all, only an accident of birth.

**Notes**


**Elshtain’s major writings**


*Meditations on Modern Political Thought: Masculine/Feminine Themes from Luther to Arendt*, New York, Praeger, 1986.


CYNTHIA ENLOE

Cynthia Enloe is Research Professor in the Department of Women’s Studies and International Development, Community, and the Environment at Clarke University, where she has taught since 1972. She began her academic career as a student of ethnicity and political development in Southeast Asia. Since the early 1980s, she has been a central figure in the attempt to reveal the importance of gender in the theory and practice of international relations. Her method of writing is a particularly novel one, which aims to expose the multiplicity of roles that women play in sustaining global economic forces and state politics.
interactions that she argues depend on women’s ‘private’ relationships with men. Her work is sometimes classified as a version of feminist empiricism in international relations theory, which is concerned primarily to study women and the role of gender, and to disclose the limits of the dominant frameworks of analysis in the field. For although it has become standard practice to divide the field of international relations among different ‘paradigms’, Enloe argues that none of them is adequate if we are concerned to explain the role of gender in constructing our political identity and to examine its effects in international relations.

Her work needs to be read, therefore, with due acknowledgement of the fact that the way we think about international relations is constricted by existing paradigms. They limit not only our perceptual field (what we ‘see’ as the most important actors and relationships), but also our conceptual field. Intellectual horizons help to define what we consider relevant to study, and as such they are indispensable. They are also constraining. When we exclude certain parts of reality from our consciousness, we do so not only as individual thinkers or as an inevitable consequence of some universal laws of human perception, but also as social beings. What counts as ‘relevant’ is actually defined as such by social (and, Enloe would argue, gendered) rules of exclusion. These rules are often unspoken, and we learn them as part of our socialization in a field that is dominated by male scholars. The reader will note, for example, that apart from the four key thinkers presented within this particular section of the book, there are no women among the remaining 46! Ironically, it is very difficult to explore that which is ‘normally’ excluded from our attention. Yet it is precisely the ability to focus on that which we normally ignore that may help unravel the tacit yet rudimentary foundations of the international order. Examining the social context and dynamics of mental exclusion helps to reveal the subtle yet most powerful form of social control, one that affects not only the way we behave, but also the way we think.

Moreover, those who are often excluded from our sphere of attention are not random individuals and groups, but usually members of specific social categories, which makes it absolutely critical that we be aware of the epistemological trap of taking our socio-mental horizons for granted. The latter are not static; they may shift over time, so those social groups that are excluded from the political and moral order may be included at a later time. For example, only 200 years ago, granting women political rights in England seemed ludicrous. Before they could be granted such rights, they had to struggle to
be ‘seen’ and acknowledged as citizens equal to men. Enloe’s work has to be understood as part of that struggle in the study of international relations.

For example, in her most well known book, provocatively entitled *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* (1990), Enloe asks an initially simple question that leads in unexpected directions and to complex conclusions. What happens to our understanding of international politics if we treat the experiences of women’s lives as central to our analysis? In attempting to answer this question, she focuses on seven major arenas of gendered international politics: tourism, nationalism, military bases, diplomacy, and the female labour force in agriculture, textiles and domestic service. She shows how women’s participation and involvement facilitate tourism, colonialism and economically powerful states’ exploitation of weak states. The role of women in the international sex tourism industry, their ability to travel safely, and the use of their images in developing tourism are essential to the workings of the international economic system. In her view, ‘that tourism is not discussed as seriously by conventional political commentators as oil or weaponry may tell us more about the ideological construction of “seriousness” than about the politics of tourism’.1

The maintenance of the international political economy, however, is dependent upon stable political and military relations among states. In turn, the creation of stable diplomatic and military communities has been the responsibility of women, as wives, girlfriends, prostitutes and hostesses. Military recruitment needs have provided the opportunity for women to join the armed services in some states, and also enabled male military recruits to bring their wives with them on long-term overseas assignments. In her discussion of the sexual politics of military bases, Enloe focuses on the contribution of women in creating unobtrusive military communities in foreign countries, and in stabilizing the lives of military personnel stationed abroad. Similarly, she studies international diplomacy by focusing on the wives of diplomats, detailing the responsibilities, problems and advantages of women married to diplomats, and demonstrating how their unpaid labour services help to develop and sustain an atmosphere conducive to diplomacy.

In her examination of women as consumers and textile, domestic and agricultural workers, Enloe reveals the extent to which the international economy depends upon the work of women. Her case study is the creation and development of the international banana market, which she claims was gendered at its outset. Particular kinds of work were explicitly defined as ‘male’, leading to association with
a corresponding masculine identity. Women were targeted as consumers in Europe and the United States. Women’s work in the banana economy is invisible but crucial in processing and packing. She engages in similar types of analysis of the textile and clothing industries, as well as the international domestic service industry. In case one might think that these case studies are marginal to the ‘real business’ of the international economy, it should be noted that Philippine women working abroad as domestic servants annually contribute more to the national economy than do the national sugar and mining industries.

Enloe also explores the moral ambiguity of ‘self-determination’ struggles in light of her focus on women’s experience. On the one hand, nationalist struggles for political independence are waged in the name of freedom from colonial control. But Enloe points out that nationalism can develop without affecting patriarchal structures within the colony, and indeed can develop new forms of indigenous sexism. In particular, armed struggle can have a particularly pernicious influence on women’s chances for feminist liberation.

Militarisation puts a premium on communal unity in the name of national survival, a priority that can silence women critical of patriarchal practices and attitudes; in so doing, nationalist militarisation can privilege men.  

Women also play a crucial role in perpetuating colonialism as well as being among its victims, and Enloe examines the role of European women as ‘civilizing’ forces, as schoolteachers and nurses.

In her next book, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (1993), Enloe pursues her quest for answers to the question ‘where are the women?’ This time she focuses on gender relations and their role in maintaining militarization during and after the Cold War. Once again, she sets out to uncover the forms of masculinity and femininity and the relationships between men and women upon which Cold War militarism relied. She also examines the gendered implications of demilitarization in the post-Cold War era, warning against optimistic hopes for a ‘peace dividend’ that ignores gender. Her method is similar to that of her earlier work, drawing upon specific stories of women’s and men’s lives around the world to support broader points about gendered militarism, and how it draws upon gendered notions of danger, security and work to continue. She argues that two prominent approaches to understanding militarism, defined as a process whereby a society becomes controlled or
dependent on the military or military means, fall short by excluding the ways in which gender and identity are related. State-centred and capitalism-centred approaches should be more fully developed to incorporate the gender dimension of militarization. The book opens up the scope of Cold War politics in a number of ways, as Enloe uses the locations and experiences of women to draw connections between militarism, nationalism and the Cold War. She also expands the geographical scope of the Cold War to take the reader beyond the machinations of the two superpowers, and prefer to focus on American women soldiers, the varied impact of women in the military for gay and lesbian rights groups, white women careerists, African-American women soldiers, and feminist congresswomen.

Enloe argues that women’s family relationships as mothers, wives, girlfriends and prostitutes form the necessary foundations for the ‘high politics’ that is the staple diet for most students of international relations. A good example of this is her analysis of the Gulf War in 1991. Rather than focus on the actions and mindsets of George Bush, François Mitterrand and Saddam Hussein, Enloe studies the war from the perspective of a Filipina maid working in Kuwait City. The Filipina domestic workers migrated from their own impoverished country to the economically powerful Gulf states. Once they had joined the nearly 30,000 domestic servants in the Middle East, they had little power to resist rape and abuse from their employers or, in the case of workers in Kuwait, by occupying Iraqi troops.

Thus, Enloe’s search for the answer to the question concerning the location and role of women in international relations takes her far away from the usual agenda of questions for students in the field, but she regards the new and old agendas as inextricably connected with one another. Global economic forces and the high politics of war and diplomacy among the great powers shape women’s daily lives. On the other hand, the conduct of foreign affairs depends in large part upon women’s allegedly ‘private’ relationships with men, as well as the social construction of gender in perpetuating militarism in the modern world. Thus, she argues that

international relations analysts underestimate the amount and varieties of power operating in any inter-state relationship and mistakenly assume that the narrative’s ‘plot’ is far more simple and unidirectional than it may in truth be. Taking seriously the experiences and responses...of people living voiceless out on the margins, down at the bottom, is one of the most efficient ways I know of accurately estimating [the amount and varieties of power].

291
Enloe extends this methodological conviction in her two most recent books, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives* (2000) and *Globalization and Militarism: Feminists Make the Link* (2007). In *Maneuvers*, Enloe continues and deepens her interest in the gendered processes of militarization by examining ‘militarized women’ in chapters on the historically forgotten ‘camp followers’ (women, including wives, who accompanied military camps), prostitutes, rape victims, wives, nurses and soldiers. By extending the concept of a military manoeuvre to include the necessary ‘manoeuvre’ of militarizing women in various ways, Enloe once again demonstrates that the rarely studied and often quotidian practices of women are essential aspects of contemporary security studies. In her own words, ‘(m)ilitarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas’. As ever, her work here is fascinating and engaging, and explores how women (and much else) become militarized. *Globalization and Militarism* is part of a Rowman & Littlefield series of texts on Globalization and Enloe’s entry is laudable for its accessibility. By connecting globalization and militarism via feminism, Enloe demonstrates the flexibility of her empirical/historical method.

In addition to disclosing the role of gendered relations in practice, Enloe’s work challenges the way in which we study international relations. It is characteristic of much of international relations scholarship to value theoretical distance between subject and object, as well as theoretical parsimony. According to this conventional approach, the value of theory as a tool of analysis is that it enables us to simplify our subject matter, and focus selectively on key actors and relationships. As Craig Murphy points out, the work of Enloe and other feminists in the field forces all of us to think about the ways in which gender bias in the study of international relations limits what we consider to be reliable sources of knowledge and the criteria for its evaluation:

The critiques conclude that International Relations tends to over-value (1) a distanced and disinterested attitude toward its subjects, (2) the perspectives of the powerful, and (3) the specific means it uses to close scholarly debate. In contrast, the new literature emphasises the value of (1) allowing greater connection to subjects, (2) engaging the perspectives of the disadvantaged, and (3) avoiding closure.

It remains to be seen how feminist scholars, and indeed the broader ‘agenda’ of questions on gender and international relations, help to
recast the field as a whole. On the one hand, Enloe’s work has done much to unsettle the dominant paradigms, and she has exposed the limits of any framework of analysis that fails to see the complex ways in which power is gendered. On the other hand, it is not clear whether the old agenda of questions and conceptual tools can adapt to the new problematic, or whether it must be changed radically. After all, Enloe acknowledges that not all women are victims of patriarchy and male power. She recognizes that women such as Margaret Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick reinforce patriarchy by making international conflict less ‘man-made’ and more ‘people-made’. In addition, she has engaged in perceptive analyses of the role of women in perpetuating power structures in the practice of, for example, colonialism, and their occupation of seats of power in middle-management positions in international organizations. This suggests that, although Enloe and other feminists often attack realism for its ‘malestream’ bias, there may be some truth in realist arguments about the ubiquity of conflict between rival communities as a consequence of the environment in which they coexist, regardless of the power relations between men and women within them. The relationship between race, class, gender and national factors in the construction of identity, and their effects on international relations, remains hotly contested in the field. Although Cynthia Enloe has done much to draw our attention to the role of gender, just how it will be incorporated into the broader study of international relations has yet to be determined.

Notes


**Enloe’s major writings**


*See also: Elsahtain, Sylvester, Tickner*

**Further reading**


**CHRISTINE SYLVESTER**

The principle of parsimony, sometimes referred to as Ockham’s razor, is often prescribed as a necessity in theory construction. After all, the world is complex enough without unnecessarily complicating our attempts to model particular aspects of it. The work of Christine Sylvester is anything but parsimonious in pursuit of knowledge about international relations (and much else), and international relations is arguably much the better for it. Whether she is exploring what can be
learned about security and co-operation from Zimbabwean women farmers, bringing abstract expressionist art and its importance to the Cold War into the discipline, or theorizing about the heretofore ‘invisible’ women of the Kennedy White House in order to better understand what was missing in Allison’s¹ account of the Cuban missile crisis, Sylvester continually finds novel locations and innovative perspectives to cast new light on the discipline. Christine Sylvester is currently Professor of International Relations and Development at Lancaster University, UK. Prior to joining Lancaster in 1995 she had appointments at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, the Netherlands, and Northern Arizona University in the United States, in addition to numerous visiting positions. She is a peripatetic scholar both in the physical sense of where she works, and in that her scholarship frequently invokes travel and movement as heuristic devices.

Sylvester’s Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (1994)² marked a full-scale engagement of feminist theory with international relations theory. She begins with a theoretical survey of the perspectives of feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, feminist postmodernism and postmodern feminism. Roughly, feminist empiricism refers to the standard conception of empirical science with the important recognition that women have largely been left out as objects of inquiry. Feminist standpoint theory, most often associated with Harding, is a perspective that argues women have particular truths by virtue of their subject position as women. Sylvester’s distinction between feminist postmodernism and postmodern feminism warrants her own words.

Feminist postmodernism is the name given to an epistemology that reflects the postmodern turn in western philosophy and its posture of radical skepticism about ‘the self, gender, knowledge, social relations, and culture [understood by] linear, teleological, hierarchical, holistic, or binary ways of thinking and being’ (Flax, 1987: 633–34), be that group elite white ‘men’ or western feminists. It overlaps but is not be confused with something else, a postmodern feminism that combines elements of skepticism, particularly about the social formation of subjects, with elements of a standpoint feminism that have us acknowledging and interpreting what subjects say.³

Sylvester then re-reads the three ‘great debates’ of international relations theory (realism versus idealism, historicism versus behaviouralism
and positivism versus post-positivism) in light of the debates within feminist theory. Through this analysis, Sylvester demonstrates how international relations has ignored feminist theory, but also how international relations theory is deeply gendered. From epistemology, ontology and methodology to object of inquiry, the discipline, according to Sylvester, has been built upon masculinist conceptions and exclusionary logics. Many of Sylvester’s arguments about gender and international relations will be familiar to those who have read other feminist international relations scholars. What is new and interesting from this work is Sylvester’s innovative deployment of two distinct, but related, concepts – homesteading, and empathetic co-operation. In Sylvester’s words, homesteading refers to ‘processes that reconfigure “known” subject statuses…in ways that open up rather than fence in terrains of meaning, identity, and place’. Homesteading consciously invokes the intimate space of the home, with all its gendered activities, conflicts and compromises, and movement. Sylvester claims that homesteading historically had a ‘Janus-faced’ quality in that the positive side of homesteading, such as new beginnings and new knowledge in new places, was balanced by the negative implication of often forgotten populations who were displaced. Thus, homesteading offers theoretical possibilities for international relations (and feminism, for that matter) by questioning the ‘known’, reconfiguring international relations, but it should be undertaken cognisant of how often homesteading is required because of the displacement of women and others from the theoretical terrain.

One prominent example of ‘feminist homesteading’ by Sylvester is her analysis of Greenham Common in the UK in the early 1980s, where a group of (mostly) women protestors made an encampment to protest against the US deployment of nuclear missiles. Although the protest did not succeed in stopping the deployment, Sylvester argues that the actions undertaken there were successful in calling attention to the issue (as the protest became a national media event) and, more importantly, demonstrated that important political and social agents were engaged in international relations, but not being theorized or studied by those who define the discipline.

It [Greenham Common] also demonstrated that a good peace camp could be like a good anarchic system, in the sense that the absence of governed places can make it possible to redefine politics to include activities we do not often study as IR, and people we think of as having no place there. This anarchy contrasts with
the pseudo-anarchy of much IR theorizing, which governs all spaces with the sovereign voice of ‘man.’ Alexander Wendt (1992) suggests that anarchy is what stakes make of it. I think it is what we make of it, and some of us can make it responsive to alternative homesteadings. Rather than throw out anarchy as a false projection of masculine autonomy from ‘women,’ we can rehabilitate it to study breakdowns in the gender places of IR, where those evacuated from sight can negotiate their own standards and politics.5

Sylvester utilizes a similar analysis with a Zimbabwean women’s co-operative and its interaction with two Greek women residing in Harare, showing how our notions of anarchy, co-operation, domestic and international become scrambled when homesteading allows us to analyse the seemingly mundane and quotidian practices of those who the discipline does not generally ‘see’. An important point here is that Sylvester is not trying to demonstrate that core concepts of the discipline (e.g. anarchy) should be abandoned, but that these concepts should be opened up, rethought and retheorized from a more holistic perspective. Whether that actually makes the concepts more useful or not is a decision for each to make on their own, but Sylvester should be commended not only for bringing feminism to international relations, but also for trying to bring international relations to feminism.

The other methodological concept Sylvester prescribes is ‘empathetic cooperation’, which Sylvester sees as a way of emphasizing co-operation by avoiding the privileging of a particular narrative, voice or theory. According to Sylvester, ‘(e)mpathy leads to listening to the excluded, listening to their sense of the good, knowing that they will present a fractured and heavily contested discourse because they have been simultaneously inside and outside a master narrative’.6 Again, Sylvester is not trying to replace international relations with feminism, but instead trying to improve international relations by opening up the discipline.

The empathetic cooperative gaze can divest IR’s nostalgic gender settlements of power by infusing them with the knowledges that come from listening to and engaging canon-excluding and canon-including subjectivities. In listening, one becomes somewhat like a Kuhnian confronted with anomalies and one shifts – not to a better and more encompassing theory, a sturdier home – but to a place of mobile subjectivity where basic questions can be rephrased in many tones. For example, instead of specifying how
to study states through the voice of feminist theorizing, we ask how shifts in identity politics change our sagas of political authority and territory.  

Here Sylvester is echoing Kathy Ferguson’s use of the term ‘mobile subjectivities’ to describe the movement ‘across and along axes of power (which are themselves in motion) without fully residing in them’.  

As in the quote above, Sylvester’s use of ‘homesteading’ and ‘empathetic cooperation’ continually point to the tension between her adoption of elements of standpoint feminism and postmodernism. Her claim is that she is a postmodern feminist, as opposed to feminist postmodernist, and that this allows a more sympathetic account of subjectivities, while always being wary of how these subjectivities are constituted. Sylvester could easily be accused of trying to have it both ways with an approach that takes whatever is at hand and does not exclude much. However, a more sympathetic account would take note of Sylvester’s consistent commitment to bringing together disparate voices, literatures and even modes of expression, in the hope that we might learn something, even if it is only how the familiar looks from a different perspective. A good example is the recurrent theme of a painting elephant (yes, you read that correctly) in Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era. Sylvester refers to an Asian elephant in the Phoenix zoo who ‘paints’ on canvas and creates ‘works of art’. Sylvester encourages us to think about how these paintings reconfigure ‘elephant’ as ‘artist’, and although playful, she is pushing us to do the same with a lot of other ‘known’ categories. Her point is that feminist theorists working in this manner become ‘el(l)ephants’, transforming boundaries and reformulating international relations.  

Sylvester’s most recent book is Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey, an excellent overall introduction to her work. Here she presents a collection of previously published essays along with new introductory material, all arranged around the theme of her journey through feminist international relations. She begins with an overview of the debates within international relations, and more specifically feminist international relations, before moving on to a discussion of three luminaries in the feminist international relations firmament. Sylvester chooses Jean Bethke Elshtain’s Women and War, Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases and Ann Tickner’s Gender and International Relations as ‘classics’ of feminist international relations, in order to demonstrate their importance both for Sylvester and for the field. This is a most intriguing chapter, as Sylvester delves
deeply into the personal lives of each author while she explores the influence of each book. We learn about Elshtain’s childhood interest in war, and how her role as a mother and academic affected her work. We are given access to aspects of Enloe’s personal life, and fittingly, given Enloe’s use of anecdote in her own work, Sylvester shares an anecdote about how Enloe helped invigorate an international relations conference by asking a presenter ‘When was the last time you were surprised?’ We also learn about the challenges faced by Tickner as she made a career for herself after entering graduate school late, and that she was married to a ‘big man’ of international relations (the late Hayward Alker). While some might ask what relevance these personal details have for the works being discussed, Sylvester makes many connections between the personal experiences of these authors, and herself, and the resulting work. In fact, each of the essays produced in the rest of the book contains amusing personal accounts of how a particular essay came about, and they often shed light on questions a reader would have about how this topic came to Sylvester. Obviously, feminists have long been arguing that ‘the personal is political’, but Sylvester does an exemplary job of demonstrating that the personal is theoretical, so to speak. A final point about Sylvester’s discussion of Elshtain, Enloe and Tickner is warranted. While the influence of these three canonical works is a testament to the burgeoning tradition of feminist international relations, Sylvester herself has acknowledged how the canon of international relations is problematic for its exclusions. It is ironic that Sylvester has done some ‘homesteading’ in lauding the foundational nature of these works, but she does not acknowledge how choosing these three authors and texts, and not others, may have displaced other worthy authors and texts.

The remainder of Feminist Theory and International Relations is divided into three sections entitled ‘Sightings’, ‘Sittings’ and ‘Citings’. In these chapters, she divides her work into different aspects of views of feminist international relations (sightings), the often overlooked ‘sites’ where international relations is in fact happening, and attempts to inscribe or ‘cite’ feminist theory into international relations. The ‘Citings’ section includes a discussion of what international relations can learn from the arts and humanities, and their respective disciplines. Sylvester’s current work focuses on the importance of art for international relations. For example, her essay ‘The art of war/the war question in (feminist) IR’ seeks to bring feminism, art and war together in ways that might inform each and, in Sylvester’s familiar way, find new forms of knowledge by bringing together seemingly
incommensurable perspectives. In the essay, she uses a familiar method from the visual arts – collage.

The method I will propose is collage, an art making technique that encourages us to question established relations of all sorts by visualizing new, unexpected, and seemingly impossible ensembles…a collage reworks and remakes reality, revealing connections and tangencies that the viewer might not have noticed or thought much about before. It is not a fantasy of reality remade, but the actual remaking of ‘it’.12

Sylvester has taken her homesteading to new areas by including art in general, particular works of art and even museums as fruitful places where international relations is happening, or in her clever reversal, ‘relations international’ are happening. Those predisposed to look for international relations (or relations international) in unexpected places will no doubt look forward to Sylvester’s forthcoming book, with the appropriate title of *Art/Museums: International Relations Where We Least Expect It* (2008, Paradigm Press).

Before concluding, it should be noted that Sylvester has also done a substantial quantity of work around gender and development. She has spent a considerable amount of time in Zimbabwe, and has written about development policy as overly top-down and problematically premised on abstractions of development recipients. Sylvester argues that we need to understand these subjects in all their complex humanity, and she utilizes empirical field work along with feminist and postcolonial theory in an attempt to do so. An interesting example of this work is her ‘development poetics’,13 where she uses poetry and a non-traditional writing style to bring home the problematic construction of ‘the other’ that so many in the development literature, including herself, engage in.

Sylvester’s work can be challenging, but it is worth the effort. For those who view international relations as first and foremost about states and their interactions, Sylvester will seem like a scholar from another discipline entirely. For anyone who welcomes critical approaches to international relations, Sylvester is a breath of fresh air. At the end of the day, that is the real problem with feminist international relations and the discipline as a whole. There remains far too little engagement between feminist international relations and mainstream international relations scholars, and that is a shame, as there is much to be learned from more engagement. As Sylvester demonstrates, feminism can learn from international relations as well. While the
issues she writes about are very serious indeed, her style is irreverent and often entertaining. International relations would serve itself well by engaging in a little more of Sylvester’s ‘relations international’.

Notes
3. Ibid., p. 52.
4. Ibid., p.2.
5. Ibid., p. 193.
6. Ibid., p. 165.
7. Ibid., p. 213.
10. Ibid., p. 39.
11. Ibid., p. 40.

Sylvester’s major writings
‘The art of war/the war question in (feminist) IR’, *Millennium* 33 (2005), pp. 855–79.

See also: Enloe

Further reading
J. Ann Tickner is a past president of the International Studies Association (2006–07) and Professor of Political Science in the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. She has also taught at the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts. Her approach to the study of gender in international relations may be classified as ‘standpoint feminism’. This variety of feminist scholarship argues ‘for the construction of knowledge based on the material conditions of women’s experiences, [which] gives us a more complete picture of the world...since those who are oppressed have a better understanding of the sources of their oppression than their oppressors’. Yet Tickner’s perspective, which alerts us to the many ways in which the conventional study of international relations can marginalize gender, and is itself often gendered, is not designed to privilege women over men. She is a feminist whose work on gender is designed to pave the way for the transcendence of gendered inequality in the theory and practice of international relations. As part of that quest, Tickner’s work must be situated within the context of the rise of ‘identity politics’ and new social movements in the late 1960s, which also gave rise to what is now known as ‘second-generation feminism’.

The rise of ‘identity politics’ in the West was characterized by an emphasis on group differences rather than commonality. As far as the emergence of second-generation feminism is concerned, which as a movement has lasted much longer than many other social movements of the era, there was also a growing feeling that the achievement of formal political and civic rights for women was inadequate. Feminists began to examine the deep-seated ideological structures that place women at a disadvantage in relation to men. The phrase ‘the personal is the political’ reflected the view that the traditional distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ spheres was untenable. Feminists called for the acknowledgement of patriarchy within the family and the liberation of women in all spheres of social and political life.

In her own work, Tickner has pursued both these goals, defending the view that women have knowledge, perspectives and experiences that should be brought to bear on the study of international relations, and attacking the many ways in which men’s experiences are projected as if they represented some universal standpoint. It should be pointed out that Tickner’s work is always situated within a deep understanding of the literature she is criticizing, which makes her arguments accessible to more traditional students in the field.
J. Ann Tickner is best known for her book *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (1992), which points out how the field of international relations is gendered in such a way as to privilege associations with masculinity and to marginalize women’s voices. As in the work of Elshtain, Tickner argues that realism is heir to a long tradition of thought that associates nationhood and citizenship with military service and with male characteristics. The concept of military security has long shaped definitions of national security.

Tickner also analyses how the major Western traditions of realist, liberal and Marxist thought have all drawn from culturally defined notions of masculinity, emphasizing the value of autonomy, independence and power. Those traditions have formulated assumptions about behaviour, progress and economic growth in ways that render women invisible. For example, liberalism’s atomistic individualism, instrumental rationality and focus on the market economy are based on male experience, while the Marxist focus on class conceals how gender divides labour and power, not only in the public sphere of production, but also in the private sphere of reproduction. Moreover, the gender domination associated with these traditions has been linked to the domination and exploitation of nature.

Having analysed the masculinized, geopolitical version of national security, Tickner then articulates her own goals. She suggests that the world may be moving away from a system characterized by political conflicts between nation-states and towards a system more threatened by domestic and environmental disorder. Older definitions of national security are perhaps becoming increasingly obsolete and dysfunctional, enhancing rather than reducing the insecurity of individuals and their natural environment. Thus, attaining peace, economic justice and ecological sustainability, she suggests, is inseparable from the project of gender equality. For example, as subsistence providers in the Third World, women must work harder when food, water and fuel resources deteriorate.

In building a new conception of national security, Tickner makes some practical suggestions, advocating changes in the hierarchies where policies are made. She wants more women in positions of power, and greater value accorded to mediators and care-givers rather than soldiers and the diplomats of *realpolitik*. Although she tries to avoid essentializing the ‘masculine’ or the ‘feminine’, she does seem to accept the argument that women have developed cultural characteristics that make them more amenable to mediation, co-operative solutions and caring for others. But this is not based on any inherent
superiority on behalf of women, simply on the fact of their experience of inequality. Ultimately, and most importantly, she seeks to transcend gender. Her goal is not to replace a masculine definition of security with a feminine one, but to erase constructions of gender difference and to create a concept of security that is non-gendered.

To that end, Tickner has tried to promote greater understanding between men and women in the study of international relations. Since this is crucial if gender is to be studied more systematically within the field, and not just by women for women, it is worth paying some attention to her thoughts on the matter. In an article that would become the starting point of an important debate about feminist international relations (between Tickner, Marianne Marchand and Robert Keohane), Tickner draws our attention to three types of misunderstanding commonly encountered in the field:

[F]irst, misunderstandings about the meaning of gender; second, the different realities or ontologies that feminists and nonfeminists see when they write about international politics; third, the epistemological divides that underlie questions as to whether feminists are doing theory at all.\(^2\)

The first misunderstanding is based on a false perception that feminists are interested only in ‘male-bashing’. Tickner claims that feminists in the field use the term ‘gender’ in a socially constructivist sense. It refers to the social institutionalization of sexual difference, and is a concept used by those who understand not only sexual inequality, but also much of sexual differentiation, to be socially constructed. She points out that gendered social life is maintained by three main processes: ‘assigning dualistic gender metaphors to various perceived dichotomies, appealing to these gender dualisms to organise social activity, and dividing necessary social activities between different groups of humans’.\(^3\) Thus, gender is of as much concern to men as it is to women. Since gender relations are often unequal in favour of men, it is understandable that women, who have been marginalized in the field (both as students and as the focus of study), should be at the forefront of attempts to introduce gender into the discipline.

The second misunderstanding arises from the fact that many feminists cannot but challenge the ways in which ‘malestream’ international relations is conceptualized. Whereas many feminists are interested in the social construction of gender at all levels of world politics, the conventional image of the world in the discipline is one of asocial states competing for power and influence. Given the
commitment by feminists to some kind of emancipatory ethic, they tend to be equated with the ‘idealist’ tradition in the field. However, many feminists are extremely unhappy with the way in which Western cosmopolitanism in the Kantian tradition tends to universalize the experience of men. Thus, feminists spend a great deal of time and energy in criticizing the dominant schools of thought in the field, rather than trying to locate themselves within its categories.

A third source of misunderstanding lies in the suspicion with which feminists view the way most students in the field engage in ‘theory’. The study of international relations in Britain, the United States and other Western countries is steeped in the intellectual tradition of the Enlightenment. Tickner believes that this tradition is itself a gendered product of masculine attributes that value the use of disembodied reason to understand and evaluate the social world:

While most feminists are committed to the emancipatory goal of achieving a more just society…the Kantian project of achieving this goal through Enlightenment knowledge is problematic because [it] is gendered. Feminists assert that dichotomies, such as rational/irrational, fact/value, universal/particular, and public/private, upon which Western Enlightenment knowledge has been built…separate the mind (rationality) from the body (nature) and, therefore, diminish women as ‘knowers’.4

Tickner then goes on to illustrate how all three forms of misunderstanding manifest themselves in debates about security, contrasting feminist approaches such as her own with predominant frameworks in the field. It should be pointed out that she does not resolve the misunderstandings that she so clearly explains. Instead, her important article sets out to clarify the underlying source of the divisions between feminists and other scholars in the discipline, and shows how a feminist approach can expand the discourse on security in a productive manner. Whether or not Tickner’s goal of promoting greater dialogue between men and women on the role of gender is successful remains to be seen.

Tickner’s article in International Studies Quarterly is entitled ‘You just don’t understand: troubled engagements between feminists and IR theorists’, and her insightful analysis of the ontological and epistemological gulfs between feminist and mainstream international relations led to invited responses by Marianne Marchand and Robert Keohane. The exchange between Tickner and Keohane is a very useful representation of the continuing problem of two traditions talking past
each other. Essentially, Tickner’s description of the differences between mainstream and feminist international relations led Keohane to respond that ‘(c)riticism of the world, by itself, becomes a jeremiad, often resting implicitly on a utopian view of human potential. Without analysis, furthermore, it constitutes merely the opinion of one or a number of people’.\(^5\) Keohane then goes on to suggest that feminist international relations needs to develop falsifiable propositions to test because ‘scientific method, in the broadest sense, is the best path towards convincing current nonbelievers of the validity of the message that feminists are seeking to deliver’. Tickner’s response to Keohane could have easily invoked her previous title of ‘you just don’t understand’. That is because Keohane essentially asks feminist international relations to become like mainstream international relations. While he acknowledges the contributions of feminist (and other forms of critical international relations), his ultimate argument rejects methodological pluralism in favour of the unitary method of developing testable hypotheses. Of course, this is precisely the problem for Tickner and others who reject (neo)positivist methodology. Although Tickner would like to ‘continue the conversation’,\(^6\) it is unlikely that mainstream international relations will be reconstructed on the grounds she would like. Nor is it likely that feminist international relations will adopt the ‘scientific method’ to gain new converts. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what that would look like, Keohane’s suggestions notwithstanding. Regardless of the continuing divide, Tickner’s work remains a foundational part of feminist international relations, and an important resource for students and scholars of international relations.

**Notes**

3. Ibid., p. 614.
4. Ibid., p. 621.
Tickner’s major writings


‘What is your research program? Some feminist answers to international relations methodological questions’, International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), pp. 1–21.

See also: Elshtain, Enloe, Sylvester

Further reading

International political theory is a normative theory that focuses on international ethics and foundational political problems. The extension of political theory to the international realm represents a longstanding tradition, but in this case it can be traced to Charles Beitz’s *International Political Theory*, which for many remains the founding text of this subfield. International political theory focuses on a number of thematic areas of study, including justice, global distribution of resources, equal respect, just war theory, universal human rights, political freedom, peace and political responsibility. Ethics, for instance, can be broken down into three categories: meta-ethics, which studies moral judgement; normative ethics, or what makes a judgement right or wrong; and applied ethics, which analyse conduct in particular circumstances. International political theory also encompasses a broad range of theoretical perspectives and approaches, including cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, critical theory, sociological theory and even postmodern theory. Cosmopolitanism remains the prevalent school of international political theory, accounting for a wide range of political theoretical analyses of global ethics and responsibility. Still, the marriage between international and political theory has not been easy. Tensions between international political theorists and political theorists remain, the most well known example being the debate between Beitz and Rawls. John Rawls, for instance, never accepted Beitz’s formulation of a global original position. In fact, in *The Law of the Peoples* Rawls adopted a realist utopian view that was based on the fundamental difference between cosmopolitan principles and state sovereignty. *The Law of Peoples*, however, has helped reignite debate about what it means to theorize about international justice and ethics. Is international justice, in other words, simply about a state’s responsibility to uphold its international obligations and international norms?
Most of the liberals in this section of the book are empirical theorists. Although they are motivated by liberal values of individual freedom, political equality and democracy, they are concerned primarily with the ways in which international relations promote or impede those values. Beitz is an important theorist who is interested in the justification of the values themselves, and the problem of how to give individuals reasons to behave in accordance with them on a global scale. In other words, he wants to elaborate principles of justice that are desirable in themselves, and to which we can reasonably conform, given that individuals and states are motivationally complex. His book *Political Theory and International Relations* (1979) is an attempt to pursue two basic goals of political theory – the elaboration of an ideal of collective life, and a persuasive argument as to why we should try to promote it. As Thomas Nagel points out, ‘[a]n ideal, however attractive it may be to contemplate, is utopian if real individuals cannot be motivated to live by it. But a political system that is completely tied down to individual motives may fail to embody any ideal at all.’ These two dimensions of Beitz’s project are inextricably connected to each other, as he is just as concerned to avoid the tag of ‘idealism’ as he is to defend his liberal principles.

*Political Theory and International Relations* arose out of Beitz’s doctoral work at Princeton University in the mid-1970s. This was an interesting period, both intellectually and politically. On the one hand, political theory in the United States was emerging from a long period of slumber and marginalization in light of the dominance of positivism and behaviouralism in American political science. ‘Values’ were often associated with the emotions or ‘preferences’ of individuals, relegating morality to the realm of ‘opinions’. The dominant political philosophy in the academy was utilitarianism, which asserted the seemingly simple principle, ‘maximize social welfare and happiness’. This principle coexisted with the liberal intuition that the rights of individuals should not be sacrificed for the sake of social welfare, but those who believed in such rights lacked systematic philosophical arguments against the prevailing utilitarian wisdom. On the other hand, in the study of international relations there were signs that the dominant framework of realism was inadequate for studying a world of ‘complex interdependence’. Writers such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were claiming that the image of ‘power politics’ among self-contained states, if not entirely obsolete, was inappropriate for analysing important issues and emerging trends in international
political economy. Actors other than states, such as multinational corporations and transnational social movements, needed to be examined in their own right. The distribution of military power was increasingly irrelevant, they argued, while the image of ‘anarchy’ was being replaced by what Wolfram Hanreider called a ‘new convergence’ of international and domestic political processes. The politics of economic distribution was often as important as, and sometimes more important than, the politics of military security.²

The renaissance of political theory in the United States was due in large part to one man, John Rawls, and his book A Theory of Justice (1971). Beitz took advantage of the moment and claimed that the ‘principles of justice’ elaborated by Rawls could perform the two functions of political theory on a global scale, now that ‘realists’ had allegedly lost one of their main arguments against the integration of political theory and international relations. The latter was no longer an arena of ‘continuity and necessity’ in the form of power politics, while (or so Beitz believed) the collective ideals of liberal political theory could be defended in terms of universal self-interest. To understand the reasons for Beitz’s argument, a brief summary of Rawls’s book is required. Rawls provided a unique method for discovering principles of justice that protected individual rights. He then developed principles of justice that defended not only the traditional list of civil and political liberties, but also a more equal distribution of income, wealth, education, job opportunities, healthcare and other ‘goods’ essential to secure the wealth and dignity of all, including the disadvantaged.

The method Rawls used to generate his principles of justice is based on the social contract tradition employed by Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant. But instead of postulating certain characteristics of ‘human nature’ to fix the terms of the contract, Rawls suggests the idea of an ‘original position’. This is a hypothetical situation in which a ‘veil of ignorance’ deprives us of knowledge of our natural talents, moral views and place in the social order, so that we can rationally choose principles of justice that are not biased in our own favour. Not knowing your own religion, you will choose a principle of religious toleration to govern society. Ignorant of your social class, you will choose principles that guarantee fair equality of opportunity and maximize your life chances if you turn out to be one of the least advantaged citizens. Every ‘rational’ person will choose these principles, because there is nothing to distinguish us from each other in the original position, where we are all rational choosers. Here we are ‘free and equal moral persons’, led by our sense of ‘justice as fairness’ to develop principles binding on each of us, and on society as a whole.
The political substance of Rawls’s theory attempts to integrate socialist criticism into liberalism. The first principle of justice is equal liberty, giving priority to securing basic liberal freedoms of thought, conscience, speech, assembly, universal suffrage, freedom from arbitrary arrest and the right to hold property. The second principle of justice is divided into two parts. First, there is the ‘difference principle’. Social and economic inequalities are justified only if they increase benefits to the least advantaged citizens. The second part requires fair equality of opportunity for all, equalizing not only job opportunities, but also life chances, irrespective of social class. Thus Rawlsian justice is liberalism for the least advantaged that pays tribute to the socialist critique. The difference principle prevents the poor from falling so long as it is possible to raise their life prospects higher. Similarly, fair equality of opportunities goes beyond classical liberalism in requiring compensatory education and limits on economic inequality.

The importance of Rawls in the history of political theory is now acknowledged. Beitz claims that he is equally important in the study of international relations, despite the fact that Rawls himself says very little about the subject. He does not ignore it, but argues that at a global level, the consequences of proceeding from an original position among states would generate ‘familiar’ principles already contained in international law:

The basic principle of the law of nations is a principle of equality. Independent peoples organized as states have certain fundamental equal rights. This principle is analogous to the equal rights of citizens in a constitutional regime. One consequence of this equality of nations is the principle of self-determination, the right of a people to settle its own affairs without the intervention of foreign powers. Another…is the right of self-defence against attack, including the right to form defensive alliances to protect this right. A further principle is that treaties are to be kept…but agreements to cooperate in an unjustified attack are void ab initio.³

Rawls himself is ambiguous in failing to distinguish between nations and states. Either way, Beitz sees no reason to confine the original position to individuals within a nation or a state. He defends a radically cosmopolitan conception of international justice against what he calls a ‘morality of states’ conception. The rights of states are themselves derivative from the rights of human beings, and Beitz sees no reason to confine the second principle, pertaining to distributive
justice, to relations among citizens within the territorial borders of the sovereign state.

From a moral point of view, territorial boundaries are arbitrary, the consequence of historical contingency rather than ethical deliberation. He is somewhat sceptical, therefore, of the principle of ‘self-determination’ being limited to those states that happen to exist at any particular moment in history. Who is the relevant ‘self’? What is the scope of ‘self-determination’? Political ‘autonomy’ for particular groups, or fully fledged sovereign statehood? What counts for Beitz is the ethical primacy of individuals, not the murky ‘shared’ characteristics of groups:

The idea that states should be respected as autonomous sources of ends, and hence should not be interfered with, arises as an analogue of the idea that individual persons should be respected as autonomous beings. But the analogy is faulty. The analogue of individual autonomy, at the level of states, is conformity of their basic institutions with appropriate principle of justice…the principle of state autonomy…cannot be interpreted correctly without bringing in considerations of social justice usually thought to belong to the political theory of the state.4

If Beitz is right, and Rawlsian principles of justice are indeed appropriate at a global level, then much of what passes for the study of international ethics must be rethought completely. Indeed, Beitz is very clear on this point. The Hobbesian analogy between individuals and states, which most students are taught in their first undergraduate lecture on international relations, is wrong. He devotes a great deal of space in his book to relentlessly exposing the extent to which the study of international relations is fundamentally flawed, since Rawls provides us – at last – with universal principles of justice that ought to be implemented at a global level. What is more, they can be, or at least the condition of interdependence makes it more possible to do so now than ever before, and Beitz makes a strong case on contractarian grounds that ‘persons of diverse citizenship have distributive obligations to one another analogous to those of citizens of the same state. International distributive obligations are founded on justice and not merely on mutual aid.’5

With one book, Charles Beitz succeeded in awakening a new generation of students to the value of political theory for international relations. He was able to use Rawls to rebut epistemological arguments that equate morality with emotions or custom (ethical scepticism),
and he could appeal to economic interdependence to attack substantive arguments about international relations being an inappropriate realm for applied ethics (what might be called ethical impossibility). In many ways, Political Theory and International Relations is therefore a very important book for students of political theory and international relations. It seeks to integrate two subfields in political science that have traditionally evolved along separate tracks. Martin Wight had argued that political theory was confined to the state, and that the closest analogue to political theory in the study of international relations was the philosophy of history. If Beitz was right, that situation was about to change.

To some extent, the situation has changed, thanks in part to Beitz. But it would be wrong to suggest that his argument has been widely accepted, and that one can simply move on to consider the complexity of the details of global distributive justice along Rawlsian lines. To be sure, just how one would go about implementing the distributive principle at a global level is a daunting task in itself. Of course, Beitz acknowledges that his theory should be seen as an ideal to which individuals and states ought to aspire, and towards which they should be motivated to work. It is not a fault of the theory that such a gap exists between its injunctions and contemporary practice, although Janna Thompson gives some idea of what would be involved:

There is, for one thing, no world political body capable of taxing rich individuals for the sake of the least well-off; no world body capable of ensuring that resources actually benefit needy individuals. To make this theory practical it seems that we need, at the very least, an organisation capable of administering and enforcing a universal system of social distribution.6

Needless to say, we have nothing of the sort in the world today, and it is doubtful whether distributive justice can ever be achieved along Rawlsian lines without more drastic restraints on global capitalism than either Rawls or Beitz would be prepared to accept. The reason is that political interventions in the ‘free market’ would undermine other values that liberals hold dear, such as freedom from state (or supranational) coercion, and the right to hold property.

One could, then, conclude that Beitz has succeeded in integrating political theory and international relations, even if the task of achieving his practical goals is immense. However, the theory itself has been subject to a number of criticisms, which need to be considered
by those who support the kind of cosmopolitan vision Beitz has articulated. Two, in particular, stand out.

First, it may be that Rawls has good philosophical reasons for being reluctant to endorse a global version of his theory of justice, quite apart from the obvious difficulties of implementation. If he succeeded in placing a discourse of rights back into political theory and dislodging the intellectual dominance of Benthamite utilitarianism, Rawls now concedes that the original position is not as innocent as it first appeared to be. This is in response to the views of ‘communitarian’ political philosophers who have attacked the ‘abstract universalism’ of the veil of ignorance. It is argued that the theory rests upon a mistaken and incoherent conception of people as unencumbered by shared, socially determined and ‘constitutive’ ends. In more recent essays, Rawls denies that his theory presupposes any metaphysical conception of the person. As a ‘political’, rather than a metaphysical, theory it aims to achieve a consensus among citizens of a pluralistic democracy who can nonetheless stand back from their social practices and reflect on their reasonableness. If that is the case, there are good reasons for limiting the scope of the theory to particular societies like the United States. Rawls thinks societies should be thought of as ‘cooperative ventures for mutual advantage’, and it is difficult to see how one could characterize the globe in such terms. As Chris Brown points out,

World ‘society’, so-called, is not a society in this sense because it does not co-operatively create a surplus that has to be divided; thus principles of distributive justice are not required on a world scale because there is nothing to distribute. Individual societies do not cooperate but they do have to co-exist. International justice is about this co-existence.7

So perhaps Rawls is right to exclude the second principle of justice from the international arena, and Beitz is mistaken to imagine a global ‘veil of ignorance’ generating anything but a lot of noise. It is hard enough to imagine consensus within national societies on a list of ‘basic goods’ to distribute, let alone global society.

A second criticism of Beitz is the way in which he appeals to international interdependence to justify his theory. There are a couple of problems. First, if the appeal is supposed to justify calling international society a ‘cooperative venture’, the power of the appeal is subject to change. Interdependence, after all, is a variable in international relations, not a constant. As Andrew Linklater notes, ‘any…
theory which specifies interdependence as the key to its development generates very substantial limitations; for it would be a regional theory and perhaps even an ephemeral one. Would the theory have greatest application in those regions that were most ‘interdependent’? If so, then as Brown points out, Beitz’s theory ‘works best where it is least needed and most irrelevant’, within areas such as Western Europe rather than between Western Europe and the Third World.

These are powerful criticisms directed at both elements of Beitz’s project – its appeal to philosophical universalism in justifying political and economic rights, and its empirical claims regarding the scope of the theory in international relations. Nevertheless, although Beitz has acknowledged the force of these criticisms, his work remains of value as a bold attempt to integrate political theory with the study of international relations. While it fails to offer an escape from the conflict between particularism and universalism in the study of international ethics, the legitimacy of the quest itself is now acknowledged to be a legitimate one in international relations. Political Theory and International Relations is an important book, which helped to shift the nature of debate in international relations in a new direction. Beitz was quite right to observe that ‘such systematic moral debate about international relations as has taken place has been between adherents of international scepticism and the morality of states. However…the more pressing issues are those that divide the morality of states from a cosmopolitan morality.’ Charles Beitz is presently Professor and Dean of Faculty at Bowdoin College in the United States. He has taught political philosophy and international relations at Princeton University and Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania. He is also a member of the editorial board of the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs.

Notes

5. Ibid., p. 128.

**Beitz’s major writings**


See also: Wight, Walzer

**Further reading**


**DAVID HELD**

David Held is Professor of Politics and Sociology at the Open University in Britain. Over the past 20 years he has written widely
on political and social theory in the modern era, focusing on the nature of democracy and on its prospects in an era of ‘globalization’. His work is a useful corrective to that of Fukuyama, who argues that the ‘end of History’ occurs when ‘liberal democracy’ is the only legitimate form of governance in international relations. It can also be seen as an important contribution to the practical implementation of critical approaches to the problem of global governance beyond the territorial limits of the nation-state. Held seeks to integrate what he views as the most important contributions of both liberalism and Marxism to the promotion of human freedom and equality, assesses the difficulties of achieving the goal of human autonomy in the post-Cold War era, and offers practical proposals to achieve cosmopolitan democracy in the twenty-first century. In his view, globalization is a threat to democracy as well as an opportunity. The inadequacy of the nation-state as the container of democratic forms of government requires the extension of democracy into the international arena. This summary of his work discusses each element of his overall project.

Held first argues that democracy provides the means by which it may be possible to integrate the best insights of liberalism and Marxism. It may be useful to summarize Held’s understanding of the liberal and Marxist projects. He reduces each to a small number of key elements to emphasize the ways in which they appear to be incompatible with each other. Liberalism is hostile to state power, and it emphasizes the importance of a diversity of power centres in society, particularly economic ones. Marxism, on the other hand, is hostile to the concentration of economic power and private ownership of the means of production. Liberals believe in the separation of the state from civil society as an essential prerequisite of a democratic order. Marxists, on the other hand, believe in the eventual restructuring of civil society and the abolition of private ownership as an essential prerequisite of true democracy. Liberals argue that the most desirable form of the state is an impersonal structure of power embedded in the rule of law. Marxists argue that the liberal idea of ‘neutrality’ cannot be achieved in the context of capitalism. Liberals emphasize the importance of separating the private and public spheres. The former is a realm of protected space in which individual autonomy and initiative may flourish. Marxists argue that freedom without equality is not worth having. Liberals see the market as a mechanism for co-ordinating the diverse activities of producers and consumers. Marxists believe that in the absence of careful public planning of investment, production will be anarchic, wasteful and remain geared to the pursuit of profit, not need.
On the face of it, it is difficult to see any means of reconciling liberalism and Marxism. But Held argues that they share a number of concerns, which he expresses as a commitment to the principle of autonomy:

> Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the rules by which they live; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them throughout their lives.²

By extracting what he claims is common to each political ideology, Held believes that it may be possible to integrate them if one can also acknowledge their respective limits and flaws. To some extent, the weaknesses of one are reflected in the strengths of the other. Once this is acknowledged, it may be possible to appreciate the potential complementarity of liberals’ scepticism about political power and Marxists’ scepticism about economic power. Held suggests that the key to integrating these apparently irreconcilable doctrines lies in the implementation of radical democracy, at the level of civil society as well as the state. Held is a great advocate of participatory democracy at all levels of political life. However, while he has much to say about the virtue of participatory democracy, he shies away from indicating what the desired outcome of democratic deliberation should amount to. He does not believe that capitalism either can be or should be overcome, or at least he recognizes the political price that would be paid for such an abstract goal. In order to mitigate its inherent inequalitarianism, he believes the state should play an active role in managing the economy.

On the other hand, he is suspicious of state power, and agrees with the liberal claim that the distinction between the public and the private domain should be preserved. In order to exploit the strengths of liberalism and Marxism, he thinks that ‘civil society and the state must become the condition for the other’s democratization’.³ Thus, although he supports the maintenance of representative democracy at the level of the polity, the precise boundary between the state and civil society is one that must be negotiated in ‘a multiplicity of social spheres – including socially owned enterprises, housing cooperatives, [and] independent communications media and health centres’.⁴ This is an argument that recurs throughout Held’s work, the emphasis on democracy per se as a public good, the inherent value of which transcends competing perspectives on the appropriate role and purpose of government:
Democracy is, I think, the only ‘grand’ or ‘meta’-narrative that can legitimately frame and delimit the competing narratives of the contemporary age. The idea of democracy is important because it does not just represent one value among many, such as liberty, equality, and justice, but is the value that can link and mediate among competing prescriptive concerns...democracy does not presuppose agreement on diverse values. Rather, it suggests a way of relating values to each other and of leaving the resolution of value conflicts open to participants in a political dialogue.5

With the end of the Cold War, Held’s interest in exploring the potential for ‘democracy’ to synthesize the best of liberalism and Marxism has shifted to focus on the threats posed to democracy by the forces of economic globalization. This term embraces a variety of phenomena, such as the development of a global economy in which global economic actors operate in conjunction with increasingly integrated capital and finance markets, global information processes and the increasing awareness of global environmental problems. Conceptually, globalization is a process that not only undermines, and sometimes overrides, the nation-state, but more importantly, that also calls into question the importance of territory per se. Power and influence flow between many actors, of which the nation-state is but one, who are increasingly defined independently of any territorial reference. In this context, Held argues that we are confronted with a strange paradox at the end of the twentieth century. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a celebration of the victory of ‘democracy’ over communism. On the other hand, there is little recognition of the variety of democratic systems in theory and practice, as well as the enormous challenges posed to the future health of democracy by globalization.

Held suggests that political theorists are prevented from contributing to the new global agenda by their statist predisposition to view the state as a ‘community of fate’. They have assumed that a ‘symmetrical and congruent’ relationship exists between political decision-makers and the recipients of their decisions. In principle, politicians are supposed to be accountable to the citizens who elect them, and who are the major ‘recipients’ of political ‘outputs’. Because democratic theory has not questioned the arbitrary role of territorial borders in determining the relevant constituencies of sovereign states, it is unable to respond adequately to the challenges of the late modern era. With the increase in global interconnectedness, states are finding
it difficult to control activities within and beyond their borders. Their range of policy instruments, particularly for the purpose of macro-economic policy, is shrinking, and states cannot solve a growing number of transnational problems unless they co-operate with other states and non-state actors. Held argues that states find themselves enmeshed in a host of collaborative arrangements to manage transnational issues, the result being a growing disjuncture ‘between, on the one hand, the formal domain of political authority [states] claim for themselves and, on the other, the actual practices and structures of the state and the economic system at the national, regional and global levels’. He identifies four such ‘disjunctures’ that are worthy of note. First, and most obviously, the formal authority of the state does not correspond with the actual system of global production, distribution and exchange. Second, states are increasingly enmeshed in international ‘regimes’ of co-ordinated agreements to regulate transnational forces and issue-areas. This has given rise to a number of important organizations and decision-making bodies that have enormous power, but over which there is little democratic accountability, such as the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund. A third arena is that of international law, which has expanded in the postwar era to bestow new rights and obligations on states and individuals that diminish the effective sovereignty of the territorial state. Particularly in Western Europe, individuals can appeal to the European Court of Human Rights and even initiate legal proceedings against their own government. Finally, Held reminds us that, in the security arena, there continues to be a disjuncture between democratic accountability and the operation of alliances such as NATO.

In short, the assumption of state sovereignty that informs contemporary democratic theory is obsolete. Held is severely critical of Fukuyama’s thesis that, with the end of the Cold War, we have arrived at the philosophical ‘end of History’. He criticizes him on three counts. First, Held argues that Fukuyama treats liberalism as a unity, and ignores distinctive differences between different models of democracy. Second, Fukuyama fails to consider tensions between liberalism and democracy. Finally, Fukuyama fails to question whether liberal democracy can continue to flourish in the context of globalization. Held argues that, in order to reassert and extend democratic control, we need to think of democracy in a cosmopolitan rather than a national context. The challenge is not how one might replicate particular models of democracy between states with very different cultures, economies and political systems. Rather, the
challenge is to correct the ‘democratic deficit’ between the limited scope of contemporary democracy and the dispersion of political authority away from the formal centres of national governance. Held’s recipe for rethinking the democratic project in the 1990s is similar to the prescriptions he offered for transcending liberalism and Marxism in the mid-1980s. The key features of his model for cosmopolitan democracy are as follows:

(1) The global order consists of multiple and overlapping networks of power including the political, social and economic.

(2) All groups and associations are attributed rights of self-determination specified by a commitment to individual autonomy and a specific cluster of rights. The cluster is composed of rights within and across each network of power. Together, these rights constitute the basis of an empowering legal order – a ‘democratic international law’.

(3) Law-making and law enforcement can be developed within this framework at a variety of locations and levels, along with an expansion of the influence of regional and international courts to monitor and check political and social authority.

(4) Legal principles are adopted that delimit the form and scope of individual and collective action within the organizations and associations of state and civil society. Certain standards are specified for the treatment of all, which no political regime or civil association can legitimately violate.

(5) As a consequence, the principle of non-coercive relations governs the settlements of disputes, although the use of force remains a collective option in the last resort in the face of tyrannical attacks to eradicate democratic international law.

(6) The defence of self-determination, the creation of a common structure of action and preservation of the democratic good are the overall collective priorities.

(7) Determinate principles of social justice follow: the modus operandi of the production, distribution and exploitation of resources must be compatible with the democratic process and a common framework of action.7

How should we assess Held’s contribution to international relations theory? It has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it is refreshing to read a political theorist who takes international relations seriously, and refuses to accept the traditional distinction between politics within the state and international ‘relations’ between states. He is quite right to question this traditional dichotomy within
political science. Furthermore, his work on models of ‘liberal democracy’ is useful in reminding us that there is no single model ‘for export’, so to speak, so we should be cautious in celebrating the alleged victory of democracy in the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, I would suggest that there are two flaws in Held’s defence of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’.

The first is the underdeveloped defence of democracy itself at a philosophical level. Held argues that democracy is the best ‘meta-narrative’ because it transcends substantive disagreements about particular political goods. One might argue that this view has a number of problems. Why does it follow that if individuals and groups disagree on how to rank substantive ideals such as political liberty and economic equality, they either will or should agree to debate the merits of each in a democratic fashion? Held does not answer this question; he tends to assume that ‘reasonable’ people will agree on neutral procedures to decide the ranking of political goods in the absence of any substantive consensus. Will they? Should they? In his analysis of the relationship between philosophical pluralism and political liberalism, George Crowder identifies a major difficulty in using the former to justify the latter:

The mere fact that values are ‘plural’ [in that there is no common currency to compute their respective merits] tells us...we must choose but not what to choose. It gives no reason not to embrace values that have, by themselves or in combination with others, illiberal implications. We have no reason, as [philosophical] pluralists, not to prefer order and hierarchy to liberty and equality.8

It is incumbent on Held to justify his defence of democracy as a legitimate meta-narrative more clearly, particularly if he wants to promote it as a global value.

Second, Held’s work is part of a solid, left-liberal, social democratic tradition. He wants to preserve the distinction between the state and civil society, as well as the basic values of political and economic liberalism. At the same time, he not only wants to curb the undemocratic and inegalitarian consequences of global capitalism, but to do so by a radical transformation of the allegedly obsolete Westphalian system. One might argue that Held cannot have it both ways. In the absence of a far more radical curtailment of the global ‘free market’, it is highly unlikely that any of the political changes that he desires will come about. This is not a criticism of Held’s ‘utopianism’ per se. As Alex Callinicos notes:
The eclipse over the past twenty years of any distinctive social-democratic policies, in the face of the resurgence throughout the West of laissez-faire economics, poses the question of whether the two constraints Held places on his project – preserving the separation of state and civil society and regulating capitalism – are in fact compatible.9

Having said that, it remains the case that Held is an important exception to the ‘liberal triumphalism’ that sounded so loudly in the immediate post-Cold War era. Whatever the achievements of liberalism in the modern world, Held reminds us that much remains to be done if these achievements are to be preserved and shared more widely in the international system.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 231.
3. Ibid., p. 236.
4. Ibid.

Held’s major writings


New Forms of Democracy (with Christopher Pollitt), London, Sage in association with the Open University, 1986.


See also: Cox, Fukuyama, Linklater, Ruggie

Further reading


**TERRY NARDIN**

Professor Terry Nardin teaches international political theory at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. There are two reasons for including him in this section on theorists of international society. The first is that his work differs in interesting ways from other members of the English School examined in this book (Bull, Vincent, Wight); the second is that he bases his interpretation of the nature of international law among states on the philosophical foundations of the late English political philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901–90). Oakeshott was a Professor of Politics at the London School of Economics at the time when Martin Wight was delivering his famous lectures on international political theory there. To my knowledge, Nardin is the only writer on international society to use Oakeshott’s work to justify his interpretation of the particular character of relations among states, and in order to understand Nardin’s work it is necessary to begin with the work of his intellectual mentor.
Oakeshott was arguably the most important English political thinker of the century. He developed a concept of civil society of great subtlety, and examined some of the major questions raised by the development of the modern state. He also greatly influenced the way in which the history of political thought is studied and taught. Although some of his work was extremely complex, most of what he wrote displays a notable elegance of style, particularly his essays. He was a nonconformist in the sense that he denied many of the orthodoxies of the age. Despite his reputation as a conservative, he was also quite radical on particular issues. He was, for example, a vocal defender of elitism in universities, arguing that they should not be confused with technical schools, but should uphold rigorous academic values pursued for their intrinsic worth.

Oakeshott was also very sceptical about the alleged virtues of the modern state. His view of human conduct is that it is constituted by intelligent agents responding to contingent situations in pursuit of their wished-for goals, and doing so in the context of a multiplicity of practices. These fall into two separate categories. They may be ‘prudential’, prescribing instrumental behaviour designed to achieve a given purpose. Or they may be ‘moral’, governed by rules that are not instrumental and that do not specify action. For example, the principle that individuals should act honestly does not direct what should be said or done in a particular situation. This distinction is reflected in the two categorically distinct modes of human association that Oakeshott discerned, and that he called universitas and societas. The former is an association of people united in the pursuit of a common objective, such as a football team. Its practices are thus ‘prudential’ in nature, designed to realize an end. In contrast, societas is a ‘moral’ relationship between free agents who severally acknowledge only the authority of certain conditions that are necessary to association and action, but that otherwise leave those involved to pursue their own goals.

These two concepts, together with their associated ‘vocabularies’, are, Oakeshott believed, the pole around which European reflection about the modern state has turned. It may be regarded as a ‘teleocracy’, a joint endeavour to seek the satisfaction of a collective, substantive set of goals, in which case the role of government is to manage the purposive concern, whatever it may be. Or its practices may be limited to a framework of conduct that does not specify any such goal, and that offers simply a ‘negative gift’, the removal of some of the circumstances that might otherwise frustrate the achievement of whatever individuals seek. ‘Civil association’, a society conceived in
this latter way, offers no salvation (as through the promised securing of a common end), but simply the organization of human affairs such that no-one who is able is prevented from seeking ‘the good life’ after his or her own fashion.

Terry Nardin uses this framework explicitly in justifying a unique interpretation of international society. His book *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* (1983) takes up Oakeshott’s basic distinction between ‘civil association’ and ‘enterprise association’, and applies it at a global level, although he alters the terms slightly, referring to the distinction between ‘purposive’ and ‘practical’ association throughout the book. The latter refers to ‘a set of considerations to be taken into account in deciding and acting, and in evaluating decisions and actions’.¹ Nardin simply replicates Oakeshott’s modes of association at the international level, so that states fulfil the role that Oakeshott delegates to individuals within civil society. For Nardin, international society is best seen as a practical association made up of states each devoted to its own ends and its own conception of the good. The common good of this inclusive community resides not in the ends that some, or at times even most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue but in the values of justice, peace, security, and coexistence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices.²

In applying Oakeshott’s distinction to international society, Nardin presupposes what Oakeshott was concerned to prevent, that is, the subordination of *societas* to *universitas* at the level of domestic politics. Nardin departs from his mentor in assuming the battle between these ‘modes of conduct’ to have been lost within the territorial boundaries of the modern state. Nardin does not make such an argument explicit, but it is logically consistent with his overall framework.

Thus, we should not understand the society of states, and international law, as a purposive association. There are no shared purposes among all states, each of which pursues its own vision of the good life on behalf of its citizens. This is not to deny that states do have some shared purposes, and give their consent to be bound by agreements to achieve them in some substantive manner. But the society of states and its core institution of law are not matters for consent among states. The content of particular treaties may be matters of consent and negotiation, but as Brown puts it, ‘[w]hat is to count as a treaty [and] how states become committed to treaties are matters that are logically prior to the content of any particular treaty’.³ These logically
prior matters belong to the realm of ‘authoritative practices’ in international law. Nardin claims that the society of states has to be understood as constituted by such practices, which are themselves the condition of possibility for purposive co-operation among states. States cannot abandon participation in such practices without also abandoning their status as members of international society so construed.

Nardin’s approach to the analysis of international society is very different from the ways in which Wight, Bull and Walzer conceive it. He dispenses with the need to defend international society as a ‘good thing’ against the claims of realism and revolutionism, which is the starting point of Wight and Bull. In so doing, his approach is arguably superior to theirs. Within the English School, the value of international society is articulated within an alleged tradition or pattern of thought, the very identity of which is defined against that which it is not. The _via media_, as Forsythe notes, defines itself by rejecting each extreme. To the ‘Realists’ it said that moral restraints both did and should apply to states. To the ‘Universalists’ it said that [politics among states] need not be shunned or overturned. It is a kind of double negative rather than something positive.4

Nardin avoids all the problems associated with this conceptualization of international society as a _via media_. He does not see international civil society as one of a number of competing ‘elements’ in international relations, as Bull does. Nor does he believe that the authoritative practices of international society mediate between realism and revolutionism, as Wight sometimes argues. In fact, Nardin simply ignores such claims. He is not worried about the dilemmas of reconciling order and justice in international society because it is already a just order, where justice refers to the procedural rules of coexistence between states. International society is thus presented as fragile _Gesellschaft_, which permits a plurality of domestically generated _Gemeinschafts_. In light of the obvious diversity, both of ethical traditions and of the values embodied in and expressed by the plurality of states in the world, the only rational response is to acknowledge and cope with ethical relativism as a consequence. ‘Relativism…concludes from the evidence of disagreement that we acknowledge the existence of many truths, each determined by whatever standards are used to define and measure truth.’5 This does not deny the possibility that some meta-ethical criterion of truth exists – Nardin is certainly not a moral sceptic – only that we have yet to discover what that criterion might be.
The consequences of Nardin’s approach to international society are, without much doubt, conservative. International society is a procedural societas. It protects the common interests of states in stable coexistence, but it is undermined if states or any other actors attempt to transform it into a purposive association. Justice is about impartial rules, which impose obligations on all states with equal force, regardless of the distribution of power and wealth among them. As Brown points out,

[t]he rule...that forbids the expropriation of foreign owned assets without compensation...is impartial because a Bangladeshi corporation operating in the United States would be as entitled to its protection as an American corporation operating in Bangladesh, and from Nardin’s perspective the fact that Bangladeshi corporations are thin on the ground is neither here nor there.6

Nardin is opposed to any attempt to burden international society with common purposes, such as the obligation to achieve some kind of distributive justice between North and South. In the absence of agreement over what this might mean, attempts to implement it will result in failure and undermine the tenuous consensus on procedural justice that is already in place. Similarly, Nardin is opposed to international legislation that would permit intervention in the internal affairs of states. Justice requires ‘the independence and legal equality of states, the right of self-defence, the duty of nonintervention, the obligation to observe treaties, and restrictions on the conduct of war’.7 It is in the common interests of states to uphold this limited conception of justice, which is the precondition of their coexistence.

There is no doubt that Nardin’s austere view of international justice, while it is conservative in its political implications, is also quite a radical departure from the English School, many of whose members (such as John Vincent, for example) worry about its inability to incorporate elements of cosmopolitan justice and argue that its survival depends on such incorporation, however difficult this might be to achieve. Nardin argues precisely the opposite case. If it does attempt to become some kind of purposive association, it will grow weaker over time, not stronger.

This does not mean that he is uninterested in the promotion of human rights at a global level, however. He does mention their importance, but consistent with his Oakeshottian framework, he emphasizes the primacy of political and civil rights over economic and social rights:

To insist on respect for human rights is to demand that the policies and laws of a community reflect the principles of impartiality
with respect to persons and their ends inherent in the idea of practical association.  

The strength of Nardin’s approach to the study of ethics and international society lies in its rigorous adherence to the consequences of adopting Oakeshott’s famous dichotomy between two ideal types of human association. Whether or not it is a persuasive approach depends very much on the validity of applying the distinction to international relations by treating states as if they were individuals. All the criticisms that Nardin has received stem from this single assumption. For if it is the case that states should not be assumed to contain autonomous visions of ‘the good life’, then the whole framework rests on very shaky intellectual and moral foundations. As Simon Caney points out, ‘he has to establish that (a) states have inherent moral value and should therefore be respected, and (b) it is more important to respect states than the human beings or communities that compose them’. Unless Nardin can achieve both tasks, it is not clear why it makes sense to think that Oakeshott’s distinction is of much help in thinking about the ethics of international society. States are not individuals. They may not contain any semblance whatsoever of the good life for their citizens. One thinks of Cambodia under the rule of Pol Pot, for example. Are there not limits to political and ethical diversity that should be acknowledged in international law? At least Michael Walzer, whose approach to international ethics presupposes that the legitimacy of state rights is dependent on a moral ‘fit’ between states and the communities they protect, admits of some exceptions to the rule of non-intervention.

Nardin’s thoughts on the relationship between human rights and state rights have shifted since the publication of *Law, Morality, and the Relations of States* in 1983. In 1986, he published an article that is critical of Walzer’s attempts to derive the rights of states from fundamental human rights and at the same time place strict limits on permissible instances of intervention in international relations. Nardin argues that it is quite possible to justify intervention in the internal affairs of states on grounds of human rights violations, and at the same time impose stringent consequential constraints on the ethical propriety of intervention that would still make intervention very hard to justify in practice:

1. Armed intervention to protect human rights [can] be undertaken only after other, less drastic, remedies have been tried and have failed;
2. The intervention must in fact be likely to end the abuse it is intended to remedy;
(3) The human rights violations must be sufficiently serious to merit the cost in terms of human life that intervention will incur;
(4) The anticipated disruptive effects of humanitarian intervention on international stability must be minimal.\textsuperscript{11}

Unfortunately, while these criteria ensure the difficulty of justifying intervention even if human rights violations are an appropriate rationale for considering whether to intervene, Nardin’s acknowledgement of the link between state rights and human rights undermines the purposive/practical distinction that he relies upon to justify his conservative approach to international society.

It suggests that the right of states to enjoy the privileges of membership in international society is conditional rather than absolute. It also weakens the arguments for international society based on ethical and cultural diversity. As Brown points out, ‘if diversity entails that states have the right to mistreat their populations, then it is difficult to see why such diversity is to be valued’.\textsuperscript{12} Caney suggests that if ethical and cultural diversity is to be respected, this could in fact justify intervention against states that fail to respect cultural, religious and ethnic diversity within their territorial borders.\textsuperscript{13} He also argues that Nardin’s attempt to distinguish between, and give a higher priority to, political and civil rights rather than economic and social rights is not persuasive, as the latter are as important as the former in enabling individuals and states to engage in any kind of association, purposive or practical.

In short, Terry Nardin’s project is a distinctive contribution to the study of international society. His approach is radically different from those of the other members of the English School, both in its philosophical premises and in its normative implications. It remains unclear, however, whether it avoids the difficulties and dilemmas that Bull, Vincent and Wight confront in their writing. Nardin assumes that the members of international society, like individuals, are worthy of respect and independence. But it is clear that many of them are not.\textsuperscript{14} In the absence of a clear defence of the analogy, then, the edifice of Nardin’s theory of international society rests on insecure foundations. Despite his best efforts, the debate over whether the society of states is a ‘guardian angel’ or a ‘global gangster’ will continue for some time to come.\textsuperscript{15}

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 19.
8. Ibid., p. 276.
11. Ibid., pp. 93–94.

14. On this point, see Robert Jackson’s distinction between states and quasi-states in the international system. Jackson argues that there has been a fundamental shift in the status of state sovereignty in international law over the past 200 years. Whereas in the nineteenth century, international law bestowed the rights of sovereignty on entities that could demonstrate the capacity to provide basic political and economic goods to their citizens, the process of decolonization, itself inspired by the norm of racial equality, has given rise to the phenomenon of negative sovereignty. Today, many states enjoy the privilege of belonging to international society without the capacity to provide basic goods to their citizens. See Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

**Nardin’s major writings**


See also: Bull, Vincent, Walzer, Wight
Further reading


JOHN RAWLS

John Rawls, who passed away in 2002, spent much of his academic career at Harvard. He is widely credited with reviving political philosophy, and the social contract tradition in particular. His most celebrated work, Theory of Justice, published in 1971, provides a conception of justice as fairness that is designed to apply to a single society, and is distinguished by a pronounced individualism. Here he focuses on the initial choice situation, or what he refers to as the original position. In the original position, parties place themselves behind a veil of ignorance that deprives them of knowledge about their particular attributes or circumstances. People behind the veil of ignorance do not know their race, gender, talents, social position or values. In addition, they lack knowledge about the particulars of their society.

Rawls views these traits and circumstances as arbitrary from a moral point of view: inappropriate as a basis for principles of justice. Implicit in the veil of ignorance is the principle that everyone should be entitled to the same rights regardless of their particular circumstances. The purpose of this thought experiment is to compel people to place themselves in the circumstances of others and to consider the fundamental interests that everyone shares. Individuals in this original position seek to maximize their interests by means of two principles: an equal liberty that secures everyone an extensive set of rights and liberties, and distributive justice that Rawls calls the difference principle. The difference principle states that:

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.¹

The difference principle permits inequality only as long as that inequality most benefits those in society who are among the least advantaged in terms of their share of social goods. If these least advantaged do not benefit most, then the inequalities are unjustified and an egalitarian distribution is preferable. These two principles of justice as fairness are crafted to maximize the well-being of individuals. Because of this, Rawls argues, individuals would prefer justice as fairness to other options, such as utilitarianism, which seeks to maximize society’s total satisfaction without regard to the welfare of those individuals within the society, or the pursuit of particular values that individuals might not share once the veil of ignorance has been lifted.

The critical issue facing theorists and practitioners today is whether distributive justice can and should be derived from the constitutional structures of nation-states. Classical accounts of distributive justice, for instance, posit that each person belonging to society should receive social benefits in proportion to their capacity to contribute to the overall common good. Modern conceptions of distributive justice, in contrast, stress the disinterestedness of the observer of social virtue, or rather the autonomy of all individual citizens in society. In doing so, they eliminate the relative equality of classical conceptions of distributive justice (socialized, presumed inequality) and their attendant presuppositions (biases) of one’s capacity to contribute to the common good.

Curiously, Rawls’s theory of justice devotes little, if any attention to the question of justice across borders. The few statements that he does make with regard to international justice suggest that he envisioned a two-stage approach by which principles for international justice would be chosen after principles of domestic justice. Moreover, Rawls’s devotion to maximizing individual rights and freedoms at the domestic level underscore the expectations that justice at the global level would include similar principles that would maximize the well-being of all individuals, irrespective of nationality. Thomas Pogge, for instance, found an original position of states to be at odds with Rawlsian individualism, and instead imagined a worldwide original position in which all individuals would be represented.² In his view, individuals in Rawls’s original position would seek to maximize their share of rights, liberties and material resources by means of a globalized
version of justice as fairness. This would assure similar life prospects for all individuals, irrespective of where they were born.

Still, justice as fairness is not without its critics. Communitarians, for instance, find some of Rawls’s conceptions to be devoid of content. Michael Sandel, for example, objects to Rawls’s use of the veil of ignorance to deprive individuals of knowledge about their conceptions of the good, and the communities out of which these conceptions grow. Sandel referred to the Rawlsian self as ‘unencumbered’ by community ties or values; detached from the very moral sources of values that determined both an individual’s and community’s sense of justice. Despite their critique of the liberal idea of the self, and the Rawlsian formulation of this idea in particular, communitarians fail to offer a genuine alternative to Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness. In this sense, the liberal–communitarian divide is more a question of degree than of a genuine dichotomy.

It should be stressed here that Rawls’s work is by no means a dismissal of communitarian thought. Rather, it is a critical attempt to accommodate communitarianism. In *Political Liberalism*, for instance, Rawls argues that parties may endorse liberal justice for reasons having to do less with a commitment to liberal justice, and more with their own particular values. In this way, parties within society may support something like justice as fairness by means of an overlapping consensus. Kukathas and Pettit characterize this shift in Rawls’s thinking as part of a transition from a moral or Kantian phase to a political phase, in which Rawls confronts the challenges posed by pluralism and a diversity of values. At the same time, though, Rawls treats the case of transnational justice as exceptional. While he proposes the radically individualist and redistributive justice as fairness for the domestic context, he sees international relations as governed by more conventional principles of international law. Here we need to emphasize two very controversial moves in regards to defending Rawls against his cosmopolitan critics.

First, as already noted, the parties in Rawls’s international original position are peoples, rather than states or individuals. While individuals and their wellbeing were at the core of justice as fairness, individuals play no role at the international level. With the exception of the obligation to honour human rights, only peoples have rights and duties at the international level. This is a radical change from the domestic level, at which *The Law of Peoples* (1999), his principal work on international justice, has been subjected to intense criticism from cosmopolitans, who have claimed that the notion of peoples is too strongly linked to the statism of international relations. His idealistic
vision of justice and fairness therefore does not translate into a cos-

mopolis per se. Rather, it constitutes what some have labelled as a 'realist utopian' vision of international order.

The principles underlying the Law of Peoples, and the statist con-
text to which they apply, grow out of Rawls’s own tacit account of justice across borders. While Rawls’s treatment of justice in the domestic and international contexts differs, these differences are attributable largely to differences in international and domestic society. Where individuals are the primary moral agents within the single society, public culture at the international level is undeniably statist. It is in this international public culture that Rawls situates the Law of Peoples, which contains principles for states rather than individuals. These principles, however, raise important questions for normative theorists in international political philosophy: To what extent, for instance, does Rawls’s analogy between peoples and persons hold? Why does Rawls attribute the wealth and poverty of states to social choice, eliminating redistributive duties, when he refuses to make a similar choice at the domestic level? Why is there no role for individual interests at the international level, when these interests drive his account at the domestic level?

These are questions that raise very real issues for the Rawlsian account of justice at the international level. Indeed, liberal cosmopolitans, such Charles Beitz and Alan Buchanan, have claimed that their cosmopolitan positions (a globalized distributive justice) are more faithful to the individualism of A Theory of Justice. Because they see the individual as morally prior to the state, they object to an account of international justice that accords a morally privileged position to the state. Instead, they favour an account of global justice in which individuals and their interests are the ultimate bearers of rights and moral assurances.

The second move concerns Rawls’s rejection of egalitarianism at the international level. Peoples do not owe one another duties of economic redistribution as do individuals under the difference prin-
ciple. Instead, decent peoples – those communities that possess liberal or decent political institutions – owe other communities only a duty of assistance in terms of establishing their own decent institutions. This assistance will not necessarily take the form of economic redis-

tribution. Rawls, as suggested earlier, stresses that poverty is not the problem. In his view, burdened societies may be unable to establish decent political institutions because of a lack of know-how, or the lack of a political culture that encourages good governance. Or alternatively, societies may be burdened precisely because they lack
decent political institutions. Yet once these institutions have been established, any obligation that the better-off owe to the disadvantaged terminates.

This conception of burdened societies also underscores Rawls’s extension of the original position to international relations, in particular to liberal and non-liberal states. His liberal and non-liberal distinction turns on his conception of international human rights, which he conceives in the following terms: ‘Human rights…is a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society’. Rawls sets forth three conditions for understanding the importance of basic human rights in a society of peoples: their fulfilment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political institutions and its legal order; their fulfilment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples, for example by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military force; and they set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.

In this way, he derives his formulation of the Law of Peoples from a basic or minimalist conception of human rights. Only the above-mentioned rights can be said to play some minimal role in the formulation of a conception of justice or the common good, regardless of whether one belongs to a democratic or decent non-liberal society. Cosmopolitans have been quick to criticize this claim, arguing that it allows respect and tolerance to be extended to intolerant regimes that restrict gender rights and unduly deprive their citizens of social and economic rights. Those sympathetic to Rawls’s minimalist threshold of human rights argue that it provides us with a reasonable set of expectations for what non-liberal societies can do to reform their systems, consistent with international standards of fairness and equality. As David Reidy points out:

True, Rawls’s basic human rights fall well short of the full list included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the two Covenants or other human rights documents or treaties. Nevertheless, they are not insignificant. Their realization would go a long way to eliminating the worst of human suffering, requiring a world within which all peoples were constituted as something like Kant’s constitutional republics or Hegel’s ethical states. Further nothing in Rawls’s account of basic human right precludes the realization through political undertaking and positive law of additional rights as universal human rights.
As this passage suggests, the Law of Peoples is not merely a limited reaffirmation of basic human rights; it also presupposes the evolving commitments to human rights. This point is important to stress, as Rawls, while permitting the Law of Peoples to extend to non-liberal states through a reasonable conception of tolerance and civility (rational group interests), treats state co-operation as a key element of an increasingly tolerant international society. His limited defence requires us first and foremost to respect all differences; and second to guard against the severe abuses of innocent civilians by not ruling out humanitarian intervention as an option of last resort. If, in other words, states fail to fulfil their responsibility to refrain from harming their own citizens, then intervention of some kind will be needed to protect the innocent civilians. This exception remains crucial for promoting what Rawls calls the ‘society of peoples’, or the co-operative ties between peoples of different states.

Liberal and illiberal societies, then, comprise the principal features of this society of peoples. Rawls refers to illiberal societies as decent hierarchical states, or as an associationist form of society in which the members are ‘viewed in public life as members of different groups and each group is represented in the legal system by a body in a decent consultation hierarchy’. A decent hierarchical society consists of co-operative and morally responsible members of groups that can uphold and promote a just rule of law, where the judiciary is ‘guided by a common idea of justice’. Rawls’s second criterion of the original position, therefore, is designed to show the extension of such respect and tolerance to decent, non-liberal societies. In according equal respect and tolerance to illiberal societies, Rawls suggests that those illiberal societies that respect the basic civil and political rights of its citizens can and should be included in a society of peoples. But again, a society of peoples constitutes a limited, minimalist conception of co-operation among peoples and states; it is not intended to serve as the framework for a global society or citizenship.

Still, this minimalist conception of international justice does make it possible to arrive at stronger notions of the common good at the international level, or what Rawls would refer to as an overlapping consensus, in which, as he points out, ‘society’s politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with citizen’s essential interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements’. But whether an overlapping consensus adequately justifies Rawls’s minimalist conception of international justice, his realist utopia will undoubtedly continue to offer a crucial, countervailing theory to cosmopolitan visions of justice.
Notes


**Rawls’s major writings**


See also: Beitz

**Further reading**


MICHAEL WALZER

Michael Walzer is most well known among students of international relations for his book Just and Unjust Wars, first published in 1977 (the second edition appeared in 1992, with a preface on the Gulf War). The book emerged out of Walzer’s reflections on the Vietnam War, and it represents an ambitious attempt to modernize a very old tradition of thought about the ethical limits to the use of force between states, known as ‘just war theory’. The reason for placing Walzer in a category devoted to theorists of international society is that the latter theory provides Walzer with the basic principles and moral limits to restrict the reasons to which states may legitimately appeal in going to war (jus ad bellum), as well as restraints to their conduct once war has begun (jus in bello). Since the end of the Cold War, Walzer has applied his theory to the issue of humanitarian intervention in the context of intra-state (or civil) wars.

Michael Walzer is one of the leading political theorists of the postwar era, and his work in the study of international relations is only part of his broader interest in contemporary political theory. He was born in 1935, in a small steel town, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and by the age of 12 was publishing his own broadsheet about union strikes and political campaigns. Today he is co-editor of Dissent, the leading magazine of the American Left. He is also contributing editor to The New Republic. He is a member of the board of governors of the Hebrew University and a trustee of Brandeis, where he received his BA degree. He was a Fulbright Scholar at Cambridge University and also studied and taught at Harvard, where he earned his PhD. Since 1980, Walzer has been a permanent member of the faculty of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.

Walzer’s first book was in the history of political thought on the English revolution and puritan radicalism. He moved on to write essays about contemporary issues in American politics during the 1960s, such as political obligation, civil disobedience and conscientious objection during the Vietnam War. Just and Unjust Wars
can be read as an attempt to mediate between realism and pacifism in evaluating the conduct of war in the modern era. Walzer proceeds first by arguing that statesmen always have some choice over whether or not to go to war and how to fight wars, and then by arguing that we need to resuscitate the just war doctrine of the medieval era. His challenge is a formidable one.

The medieval Christian doctrine was intended to define the moral boundaries of war so that one could distinguish between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars. War was thus accepted, subject to certain conditions, within the ambit of Christian ethics. According to the intentions of its scholastic founders, from Thomas Aquinas to Francisco de Vitoria, the distinction was intended to help restrict war by obliging the Christian princes to wage only wars that could be justified on solid moral grounds and fought with legitimate means. The entire doctrine was set in the framework of the res publica christiana and presupposed the existence of a secure and stable auctoritas spiritualis endowed with international legal power: the Roman Catholic Church. The doctrine was supposed not only to restrict war, but also to distinguish the wars waged between Christians from ‘feuds’ (struggles between princes and peoples such as the Turks, the Arabs and the Jews – all of whom refused to acknowledge the cosmopolitan authority of the Church). The crusades and missionary wars authorized by the Church were ipso jure ‘just wars’, independently of the fact that they were wars of aggression or defence. Any war, however, waged upon Christendom was ipso facto an unjust war, in which the enemy was an infidel, an outlaw and a criminal.

Thus, the first challenge Walzer sets himself is to establish the foundations of a modern version of just war theory in a secular, modern context. Originally, the just war theorists elaborated on the rules governing international relations by starting from the idea that all people and nations participate in a world community indirectly ruled by God and directly governed by Natural Law. This outlook laid emphasis on the duties individuals and state had to the social wholes through which they were fulfilled, rather than on the rights each had as an independent equal in relation to other independent equals. Walzer argues that contemporary just war theory must be based on the modern notion of the primacy of individual rights. ‘The correct view’ is that ‘states are neither organic wholes nor mystical unions… [that] individual rights underlie the most important judgements that we make about war’.1 In a crucial passage from the book, Walzer justifies the separation of rights of states from a more fundamental concern with human rights, as follows:
The rights of states rest on the consent of their members. But this is consent of a special sort. State rights are not constituted through a series of transfers from individual men and women to the sovereign…what actually happens…[is that] over a long period of time, shared experiences and cooperative activity of many different kinds shape a common life…most states do stand guard over the community of their citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of their defensive wars.²

By linking human rights to state rights in this way, Walzer argues that territorial integrity and political sovereignty can be defended in the same way as individual life and liberty. The appeal to human rights is the basis on which Walzer elaborates the ethical limits on the conduct of war once it has begun – limits that impose obligations on both sides, it should be noted. These are concerned primarily with non-combatant immunity and the use of proportionality in the application of force. As for *jus ad bellum*, in addition to the link established between human rights and state rights, Walzer appeals to what he calls the ‘legalist paradigm’, a set of principles shared by the member states of international society. It consists of six key propositions:

1. There exists an international society of sovereign states.
2. This international society has law that establishes the right of its members – above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defence by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society.
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.
6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.³

After having defined the rules of his legalist paradigm, Walzer argues for the necessity of their partial violation in light of the defence of state rights on the basis of human rights. Particularly worthy of violation is the fifth rule. In fact, Walzer considers it morally legitimate to launch a military attack against an independent state not only for ‘pre-emptive self-defence’, but also in order to:
(1) support secessionist movements that are fighting for ‘national liberation’; (2) balance the intervention of other states in a civil war with a counter-intervention; (3) rescue populations threatened with enslavement or massacre, as in the case of the Indian invasion of Bangladesh.  

The second challenge that Walzer tries to meet is the practical difficulties of implementing his version of just war theory in the context of modern warfare. In a spirit of prudence, Walzer candidly admits that nuclear weapons ‘explode the theory of just war…our familiar notions of jus in bello require us to condemn even the threat to use them’. A nuclear deterrence strategy that keeps entire civilian populations as permanent hostages defies any conceivable principle of non-combatant immunity. But he maintains that this consequence of our military technology may fall under the category of military necessity, and must not obliterate our adherence to the moral limits on conventional warfare. To discover those limits, Walzer deploys some striking wartime examples that demonstrate why utilitarian arguments (attempting to define the limits by an appeal to a strict economy of violence) fail to explain what we perceive to be the strictness of non-combatant immunity. He then proceeds to show how reflection based on the rights of individuals can make the rules of warfare more reasonable and orderly, and how those rules can be recast as military techniques alter. He clarifies the moral significance of modern submarine warfare, blockades and terrorism, as well as guerrilla fighting. The distinctive strengths of Walzer’s analysis result from his method of moving back and forth between closely reasoned moral argument and concrete historical cases that illustrate the principles under examination. He narrates over 50 such cases, ranging from Thucydides’ story of the dialogue on Melos, to the Allied bombing of German cities, to My Lai.

In the preface to the second edition of the book, Walzer reflects on the 1991 Gulf War in light of his theory. Overall, he supports the American justification of the war, although he criticizes some of the rhetoric from the Bush administration on the imminence of a ‘new world order’ after the end of the Cold War, as well as the idea that the Gulf War was some kind of victory for democracy. Walzer believes that the United States and its allies were right not to march on Baghdad once Kuwait’s sovereignty was restored. Consistent with his communitarianism, Walzer points out that liberation from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein is not an American responsibility. It is up to the citizens of Iraq, and those in Kuwait also, to rid themselves of
despotic rule. In Walzer’s view, Saddam Hussein’s genocide against the Kurds and the Shi’ite Muslims in Iraq does not make him comparable to Pol Pot or Idi Amin. As for the conduct of the war, Walzer condemns the policy of destroying the infrastructure of Iraq, which he argues failed to distinguish adequately between military and civilian targets. He also criticizes the air attacks on fleeing Iraqi soldiers at the end of the war, as the soldiers no longer posed a real threat to American or other allied troops. As for those who condemned US policy as a ‘war for oil’, Walzer acknowledges the existence of mixed motives in the minds of statesmen, but he adds that the selectivity of US policy against aggression is not a good reason to abandon the theory.

It would be a good thing, obviously, if every act of aggression were condemned by the UN and then resisted...by a coalition of states. But this is no reason to oppose [a particular] resistance – as if, having failed to rescue the Tibetans, we must now fail to rescue the Kuwaitis, for the sake of moral consistency. States [are] unreliable agents, and that is why the argument about war and justice is still a political and moral necessity.6

Before considering a couple of major criticisms of Walzer’s attempt to ‘recapture the just war for moral and political theory’, two aspects of his approach should be noted.

First, in terms of method, Walzer is committed to what he refers to as ‘the path of interpretation’ or ‘social criticism’ in moral philosophy, as opposed to the path of ‘discovery’ (as in some versions of moral realism) or ‘invention’ (strict contractarianism). For Walzer, the best approach to moral philosophy is to engage in a dialectical conversation with the moral codes that inform our existing obligations and conduct. Arguments in moral philosophy are interpretations of the morality that exists in society (domestic or international), and the art of social criticism is to reveal the gaps between our conduct and the ideals that we acknowledge ought to govern our conduct. As he wrote in 1987,

What we do when we argue is to give an account of the actually existing morality. That morality is authoritative for us because it is only by virtue of its existence that we exist as the moral beings we are. Our categories, relationships, commitments and aspirations are all shaped by, expressed in terms of, the existing morality.7
Second, Walzer is committed to a project of reconciling our commitment to universal rights based on abstract principles of what it means to be a human being, with our commitment to particular rights and social goods that vary across particular cultures and issue-areas. In this sense, Walzer is a liberal communitarian.

Both sets of commitments are evident in *Just and Unjust Wars*, but they are best illustrated by reference to two later books. For example, *Spheres of Justice* (1983) is a sophisticated argument for a communalist and pluralistic liberalism. Walzer argues for what he calls ‘complex’ as opposed to ‘simple’ equality, that is, a notion of distributive justice based on different rules of distribution for different social goods, rather than one rule requiring equal holdings of everything for everyone. Politics, the economy, the family and the workplace are each different ‘spheres’ having different principles of distribution. The requirement of justice is that the integrity of each sphere should be maintained against encroachment from the others and, most obviously, that the polity or the family should not be corrupted by the dominance of money. In an implicit critique of John Rawls and other neo-Kantians, Walzer asserts that the various principles of justice in each sphere are local rather than universal: principles of justice should be based only on the latent communal understandings of a particular population with a historical identity.

Similarly, in his most recent book, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (1994), Walzer claims that all moral terms such as ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ have meanings that can be understood through ‘thick’ (local) and ‘thin’ (universal) accounts. The context and purpose of the argument decide the appropriate use of the moral term. Although Walzer claims that he has always supported the notion of plurality and ‘difference’, he does not want to give credence to the idea that different cultures are incommensurable, or their differences insurmountable. Differences between fundamentally dissimilar cultures can be reconciled through the use of commonalities. Although he believes we can no longer develop foundational theories of human rights, for example that aim at identifying universal cultural values, his *liberal* communitarianism is dependent on a certain form of ‘iterated universalism’ that he sees substantiated in his notion of ‘moral minimalism’. The function of the latter is to facilitate a unity, a sense of solidarity between cultures whose ‘thick’ morality may be very different. Moral arguments directed towards other cultures appeal to ideas that have thin meanings. Thin ideas, in turn, constitute commonalities that are embedded in thick, particularistic meanings. For this reason, such commonalities are revealed only on ‘special occasions’—
in moments of crisis when there is a need to unite against a common enemy. Thus, Americans could sympathize with Chinese students in Tiananmen Square when they marched with placards demanding ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. The value of minimalism is that it engages disparate people, or cultures, in sharing like experiences. On the other hand, it would be quite wrong to assume there is only one model of democracy that can be exported around the world. The specific reasons that provoked the demonstrations in China are rooted in a set of values stemming from the marchers’ own particularistic thick morality.

Concerning the 1990s, one of Walzer’s greatest concerns is the move to reassert local and particularistic identities, especially in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. What he calls ‘the return of the tribes’ has meant the return of tribal wars, such as in Bosnia. Citing fear of conquest and oppression as the primary reason for such conflicts, Walzer suggests the creation of ‘protected spaces’ as a way of giving the different tribes the right to ‘self-determination’. He is ambivalent about the scope of this right in the post-Cold War era. He supports the idea of separation as long as it agrees with the popular will of the people, but he also acknowledges that the creation of one nation-state often means the oppression of another nation’s independence. Underlying the ‘thin’ principle of self-determination is the belief that all nations ought to be allowed to govern themselves according to their own political needs. On the other hand, as a minimalist universal idea, this does not offer criteria for evaluating how such self-government should be implemented in particular political and cultural contexts. Rather than legislate on this issue, Walzer argues that there can be no single model, either of ‘self-determination’ or of ‘democracy’. Tribalism must be accommodated in a variety of ways that cannot be determined in advance.

Walzer’s work on just war theory, self-determination and humanitarian intervention and the Gulf War, and his broader approach to political theory, have been widely discussed and debated. For students of international relations, two major criticisms of Walzer are worth noting. First, he has been accused of failing to integrate domestic and international relations within a single theory of justice that would include principles of redistribution across borders, not merely within them. However, Walzer’s communitarian beliefs prevent him from saying much about issues of global poverty and other problems of international inequality:

The only plausible alternative to the political community is humanity itself, the society of nations, the entire globe. But were
we to take the globe as our setting, we would have to imagine what does not yet exist: a community that included all men and women everywhere. We would have to invent a set of common meanings for these people, avoiding if we could the stipulation of our own values.8

Naturally, this position has been roundly criticized by cosmopolitan critics, who have accused Walzer of privileging the nation-state, not just as a legal ‘community’, but also as a moral one.9 Second, there is a tension in Just and Unjust Wars arising from Walzer’s appeal to human rights as the basis of the war convention regarding jus in bello, and his appeal to the legalist paradigm in limiting the right to go to war for the purpose of self-defence. The latter imposes strict limits on the scope of justifiable intervention in the affairs of another state. Walzer tries hard to minimize the danger of moral crusades by conceding that the society of states is less analogous to domestic society than the older just war theorists claimed; its rules call for even greater prudence in their enforcement. This is why he argues that the exceptions to the rule of non-intervention must be seen as exceptions, justified only when it can be demonstrated clearly that there is no ‘fit’, as he puts it, between a government and its people. Otherwise, we must err on the side of caution. However, by appealing to human rights as the basis of the war convention regarding the use of force once war has begun, and by conceding exceptions to the rule of non-intervention on grounds of human rights, Walzer creates problems for himself.

If the legitimacy and sovereignty of states ‘derives ultimately from the rights of individuals’, and if there is no precise way of determining a threshold beyond which legitimacy is lost, then it ought to follow that to the degree that a state violates human rights, it loses both its legitimacy and its sovereign rights, including the right to be protected by the principle of nonintervention: the grosser the violation, the weaker the claim to such protection… morally speaking, one could always consider [intervention] as a possible remedy.10

Without elaborating on this argument in detail, it remains unclear that Walzer’s attempt to ground the rights of state on the basis of human rights succeeds in reconciling the ethics of the legalist paradigm with the cosmopolitan ethics of its critics. Despite these problems, Michael Walzer’s attempt to modernize just war theory remains one of the most important contributions to normative international theory.
Notes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 61–62.
4. Ibid., pp. 86–108.
6. Ibid., p. xxiii.

Walzer’s major writings


See also: Beitz, Nardin

Further reading


The following thinkers were not trained in the specific academic field of international relations. In particular, Anthony Giddens, Michael Mann and Charles Tilly share an intellectual background in sociology. Their interest in international relations arises from a prior concern with the historical dynamics of the rise of the state and its relationship with war and capitalism over time and space. To a greater or lesser degree, the following thinkers are all on the left of the political spectrum, even though there are some interesting similarities between their views of the state and those of realists, who tend to be politically conservative in outlook. These thinkers depart from realism in their refusal to examine international relations as a sphere of activity separate from ‘domestic’ politics. They are interested in the historical conditions that gave rise to such a differentiation of political activity. Furthermore, whereas realists tend to contrast the domestic and the international in oppositional terms (order versus anarchy, peace versus war), these thinkers are arguably more emphatic in asserting the dominance of power politics at both levels of analysis. The state is ‘Janus-faced’. Its ability to generate loyalty and resources in order to wage war with other states is closely connected with its dominance over other actors in civil society. The following key thinkers are historians on a large scale, comparing the trajectory of the rise of the state across space as well as time. As with the thinkers examined in a number of the categories used in this book, they are engaged in a number of internal debates, over the role of capitalism in historical explanation, the relative weight given to what Michael Mann calls ‘the sources of social power’, and the future of the state in an era of apparent ‘globalization’ of economic activity.
ANTHONY GIDDENS

Anthony Giddens’s contribution to the study of international relations has been both direct and indirect. He has written a great deal on the importance of ‘the international’ for our understanding of the nature of the state in particular, and ‘modernity’ in general. In addition to his own interest in the importance of international relations for sociology, his work on ‘structuration theory’ in the 1970s has inspired a number of international relations specialists. In particular, Alexander Wendt has borrowed extensively from Giddens’s early work on the ‘agent–structure’ problem for his own research. Like Michael Mann and Charles Tilly, Giddens believes that an adequate analysis of the modern state must embrace ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ levels of analysis, although his own theory of the state is developed via an extended critique of Marxism in social theory, rather than as a direct result of empirical analysis in historical and comparative sociology. Giddens explicitly attempts to avoid reifying structures in accounting for social and political change.

As with Mann and Tilly, the reader may be intimidated by the volume of Giddens’s written work. Fortunately for students of international relations, only a few of his books are important in this field, and his reputation is such that there is an excellent secondary literature on his work.

In January 1997, at the age of 59, Giddens took up the post of Director of the London School of Economics. His appointment was partly due to the multidisciplinary scope and relevance of his work, in addition to his stature in sociology. He was born in January 1938 and achieved a first class honours degree in sociology and psychology at the University of Hull in 1959. After a short period of postgraduate study at the LSE, where he was awarded an MA in sociology in 1961, he taught the subject at the University of Leicester until 1970, and then returned to Cambridge to teach and pursue his doctoral research. In 1976, he was awarded his PhD from King’s College, Cambridge. In 1986, he was appointed Professor of Sociology at Cambridge, and he remained there until becoming Director of the LSE. Giddens has also taught extensively in the United States and Europe. In 1985, he was instrumental in setting up Polity Press, a successful academic publishing house in the UK; and in 1989, Giddens was appointed Chairman and Director of the Centre for Social Research.

In light of the wide scope of Giddens’s work, I focus here on three aspects of his research that are most relevant for the study of
international relations. These are: his theory of ‘structuration’ as an overarching methodological approach in social analysis; the key elements of his theory of the modern state; and his more recent contributions to the debate over the nature and trajectory of ‘modernity’ and ‘globalization’.

In Giddens’s comprehensive introductory textbook on sociology, the term ‘structuration’ does not even appear in the index, but he explains the basic idea behind this term in the following passage:

Social systems are made up of human actions and relationships: what gives these their patterning is their repetition across periods of time and distances of space...we should understand human societies to be like buildings that are at every moment being reconstructed by the very bricks that compose them. The actions of all of us are influenced by the structural characteristics of the societies in which we are brought up and live; at the same time, we recreate (and also to some extent alter) those structural characteristics in our actions.1

Giddens argues that an adequate sociological analysis of any ‘social system’ must engage in what he calls a ‘double hermeneutic’ (or method of interpretation), paying close attention to the ways in which ‘structures’ both constrain action and make meaningful action possible. His idea of structure is similar to that found in linguistics rather than in conventional sociology. Structures are like rules and resources that are ‘instantiated’ in social systems as actors draw from them in their daily social existence. Much of Giddens’s work in the 1970s was an elaboration of structuration theory against what he perceived to be the structural determinism of Marxist and functionalist theories of social class in industrial societies.

He was also engaged in an ongoing critique of the influence of positivist epistemologies in the social sciences, according to which actors are assumed to be products of impersonal and determinate social forces. The idea of ‘structuration’ attempts to mediate between excessive voluntarism and its opposite, determinism, in sociology. As Daniel Ross points out, ‘as a child of a project of synthesis, [structuration] must be seen as a methodological apparatus separated from substantive concerns’.2 It should also be noted that the ‘double hermeneutic’ has important implications for the social function of the sociologist. Giddens argues that, in engaging in sociology, we are establishing the meaning of the actions of people who are themselves already in the process of establishing the meaning of those same
actions. There can, therefore, be positive exchanges between the perspectives of the sociologist and those of the actors he or she is studying. Each can learn from the other, and so sociological knowledge can even transform the lives we lead.

For students of international relations, Giddens’s most important book is undoubtedly the second volume of his critique of Marxian historical materialism, *The Nation-State and Violence* (1985), in which he takes up a number of themes introduced in his first volume, *Power, Property and the State*. The latter, published in 1981, is a sustained attack on Marxist and functionalist approaches in sociology. It also introduced the idea that although human beings ‘instantiate’ the social world through their activity, they draw upon resources and conditions brought into being and reproduced through ‘modes of structuration’ that distribute resources unequally and help to sustain asymmetrical power relations. Giddens argues that functionalist and evolutionary frameworks of analysis fail to acknowledge the revolutionary manner in which social resources are distributed in capitalist societies. He distinguishes between two kinds of resource. *Allocative* resources are primarily economic and material, while *authoritative* resources are those that sustain the unequal distribution of allocative resources in society. Prior to the onset of capitalism, he claims that the degree of control of a given type of social resource – allocative or authoritative – over time and space is low. With the onset of capitalism, what Giddens refers to as ‘time–space distanciation’ undergoes a marked expansion.

The heart of his argument is that it is only in capitalist society that class constitutes the underlying structural principle of the whole society. While various kinds of non-capitalist society had classes, only in capitalism does class permeate and structure all aspects of social life. Giddens thus distinguishes between ‘class-divided societies…within which there are classes, but where class analysis does not serve as the basis for identifying the basic structural principle of that society’ and ‘class society’ *per se.*

Only in capitalism are the relations of domination over allocative resources the central relations that sustain power relations in general, whereas in non-capitalist societies the relations of domination over authoritative (social-political) resources constitute the basis of power. He claims that the nature of capitalist domination over the characteristics of daily life is radically distinct from all earlier forms of social organization, and is intrinsically connected to the commodification of time and space, the separation of form and content. By revealing the nature and extent of ‘time–space distanciation’, Giddens casts doubt over the validity of a historically materialist developmental view of social change. The classic Marxist scheme,
which traces an evolution from slave societies to communism via feudalism and capitalism, must be rejected. It is hampered by a teleological viewpoint (informed by Hegel) that presupposes a necessary movement from the particular to the universal in the form of a revolutionary working class with an emancipatory aim. For Giddens, the commodification of time and space is just as important as the commodification of labour in making capitalism possible and, what is more, the modes of structuration that sustain ‘time–space distantiation’ cannot be explained solely in terms of the demands of capitalism.

*The Nation-State and Violence* takes up the argument introduced in the first volume, and explores the conditions that make it possible to sustain the dominance of class society. This is the book in which Giddens links the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ dimensions of modes of structuration in the modern era. Once again, the theme of ‘time–space distantiation’ is centre stage. Furthermore, Giddens argues that the development of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state cannot be understood adequately in any simple ‘base–superstructural’ manner. Each has its own independent logic and cannot be reduced to the other. ‘Capitalism [must be] prised free from the general framework of historical materialism, and integrated in a different approach to previous history and to the analysis of modern institutions.’

Giddens claims that the accumulation of administrative, and particularly state, power is the dominant force driving distantiation. The rising administrative power of the state derives from its capacities to code information and supervise activity. As a result, the state increasingly can control the timing and spacing of human activity. It is not just the commodification of labour power that makes the development of productive forces possible. Surveillance in the workplace is equally important. Drawing heavily on the work of Michel Foucault, Giddens argues that the concentration of allocative resources depends upon authoritative resources, so that productivity does not develop from within capitalism alone.

The development of capitalism depended upon the emergence of a centralized state capable of pacifying the population and enforcing a calculable law, subject to neither the whim of kings nor lordly exemption. As in the work of Charles Tilly, Giddens claims that this task was accomplished through the expanding administrative power of absolutist states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, driven in part by the exigencies of changing modes of warfare. The demand for resource extraction led the state to monetize the economy and stimulate its growth, and to secure mass conscription. The reduction
of overt violence within the state, combined with the growing surveillance of its population by the state, was a necessary precondition for the expansion of industrialism and capitalism. Thus, the latter is

a novel type of class system, one in which the class struggle is rife but also in which the dominant class...[does] not have or require direct access to the means of violence to sustain [its] rule.⁵

Industrial capitalism is internally ‘pacific’, but only because military power ‘[points] outwards towards other states in the nation-state system’.⁶ For Giddens, ‘modernity’ is characterized by the complex relationship among four ‘institutional clusterings’: heightened surveillance; capitalism; industrialization; and the centralized control of the means of violence. In his excellent analysis of the importance of Anthony Giddens for students of international relations, Justin Rosenberg spells out the implications as follows:

The emergence of the nation-state system is understood from the outset as part of the same process of internal consolidation. The (outward) political sovereignty, which becomes the central organizing principle of the state-system, is the expression of an (internal) administrative and coercive unity established at the expense of other, transnational and local, forms of political power.⁷

Giddens’s analysis of this process differs significantly from those of Tilly and Mann, however, for he is interested in the way in which actors, and particularly state elites, instantiate the structural constraints confronting them. He argues that a body of discursive knowledge – first balance of power and later sovereignty – which states use to regulate the relationship between them, also shapes the organizational structure of the modern state. The sovereignty of the nation-state, the formal principle that states are equal in the eyes of international law, is derived not only from internal processes, but also from a widening external interaction of several states around this ‘discourse’. The latter constitutes the emerging state; it does not simply describe it. Absolutist France was the first state to play a central role in Europe without becoming an empire, and the first to develop a diplomatic corps. That diplomacy, which Giddens calls the ‘reflexive monitoring’ of the conditions of state reproduction, contributed to the instantiation of the legal and political structures of the international system. The ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ are interconnected, not separate, political realms.
In 1990, Giddens published *The Consequences of Modernity*. In a sense, this book begins where *The Nation-State and Violence* left off, as Giddens explores the possible trajectory of ‘modernity’ into the future and evaluates its dangers and opportunities. Modernity is characterized, once again, in terms of relations between its ‘institutional dimensions’ – surveillance, industrialism, capitalism and military power. Giddens is particularly interested in whether the ‘globalization’ of modernity means that we are now in what some have called a ‘postmodern’ era. He doubts it, arguing instead that modernity has become ‘radicalized’ rather than transcended. He suggests that postmodernism is really just an aesthetic category reflecting the radicalization of modernity, and that the condition of ‘late modernity’ does not preclude systematic knowledge about it.

In this book, Giddens is very concerned with the pace and scope of modern life, which he describes as a ‘juggernaut’. The image conveys the feeling of many people today that we have created ‘a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of our control and which could rend itself asunder’. Part of the problem, he argues, lies in the pace of distantiation in the late twentieth century. He talks about the way in which social life has become ‘disembedded’ from particular geographical locales, lifted out and reorganized across large time–space distances. The social importance of trust, in particular, has been vested in disembedded, abstract systems.

Despite his grim portrayal of modernity, Giddens feels that the juggernaut can be steered, at least partially. In this context, he moves towards a non-Marxist critical theory without guarantees that he calls ‘utopian realism’. Arguing that terms such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ are obsolete, he endorses a dual commitment at the global level to *emancipatory politics* – ‘radical engagements concerned with the liberation from inequality or servitude’ – and to *life politics* – ‘radical engagements which seek to further the possibility of a fulfilling life for all, and in respect to which there are no “others”’.

Superimposed upon, and with the potential to counter the globalization of, his four institutionalized clusters of modernity, Giddens identifies four ideal-type clusters of opposition. Thus, he advocates not only the internationalization of the labour movement, but also ecological movements to counter the continued devastation of the environment, peace movements to counter the internationalization of the arms trade, and free speech or democratic movements to counter the state’s control of information and social surveillance. All this is part of a political project that seeks to identify possible agents and oppositional trajectories to counteract
the ‘high-consequence risks’ confronting the contemporary world. The four institutions of modernity make possible a more rewarding existence than any premodern social system, but only the sustained endeavour of a praxis of utopian realism will put it in our grasp. Whatever one thinks of such a ‘praxis’, and of Giddens’s move from sociological analysis to normative prescription in recent years, his work is of importance for the study of international relations. As Rosenberg notes, it helps to provide ‘a conceptual vocabulary for thinking about the nation-state system generically, and about the specific ways in which violent means are mobilised and implicated in the reproduction of its core institutions’.10

Notes

5. Ibid., p. 159.
6. Ibid., p. 192.
9. Ibid., p. 156.

Giddens’s major writings

MICHAEL MANN


See also: Mann, Tilly, Wendt

Further reading


MICHAEL MANN

Michael Mann’s contribution to the study of international relations is not based on any particular allegiance to one of the existing theoretical perspectives within the discipline. He regards himself as ‘a consumer’ of international relations research, an ‘outsider’, just ‘one of those general readers on whom the sales of international relations books depend’. Of course, in a formal sense, this is correct. Mann,
who was born in 1942, is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and he identifies his own area of research as macrosociology, or historical sociology, ‘the history and theory of power relations in human societies’. In any other sense, Mann’s self-description is far too modest. His work on the sources of social power in history, the rise of the state and the fate of the state in the post-Cold War era justify his inclusion in this book as a major producer of theory in the study of international relations. In addition, his contribution undermines the assumption that international relations can be understood within a separate, autonomous, academic discipline of international relations.

It would be fair to say that the scope of Mann’s work is broader than that of any other key thinker in this book, and the sheer volume of his writing makes it very difficult to summarize. Consequently, I focus here on the main elements of his theory of social power in history, and his contribution to our understanding of the nature of the state. Finally, I describe how Michael Mann applies his theoretical and historical work to two important areas of contemporary debate: the relationship between international stability and the domestic characteristics of states; and the impact of ‘globalization’ on the nation-state. At the time of writing, Mann’s work on the history of power remains incomplete. In 1986, he published the first of four volumes on the sources of social power in history. The second was published in 1993. The third volume, in which Mann covers the twentieth century, has yet to appear, and he promises to focus on the theoretical implications of his historical narrative in the final volume. Consequently, what follows is a brief summary of work in progress rather than a final report.

In the first volume of *The Sources of Social Power*, which covers the period of history from Neolithic times to the eighteenth century, Mann introduces his typology of four different types of power and their interaction over time and space. He argues that we must reject two common assumptions if we are adequately to understand historical and social change. First, historical change is not evolutionary, but ‘neo-episodic’. By evolution, he means the gradual, inexorable establishment and rise of rank societies, ‘civilization’ and the state. Mann argues that what appears in hindsight to have been a continuous growth in our ability to marshal social power and control our natural environment was, in fact, the accidental consequence of episodic changes in human history. At critical episodes in human history, the distribution of forms of power between social groups changed, resulting in further changes in types of rule. Second, Mann rejects the idea that societies have a self-contained, unitary form. Instead, he
offers a definition based on four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP). Mann’s ‘political’ category refers to the ‘administrative’ capacity of ruling elites, a source of power that does not possess the same categorical autonomy as the others. This is because any exercise of political power depends on the possession of either ideological power or economic power, and normally a combination of both force and belief.

One could compare Mann’s forms of ‘social power’ with Susan Strange’s forms of ‘structural power’. Strange distinguishes between structures of production, finance, security and information. Mann conflates production and finance in the ‘economic’ category; his ‘military’ category conforms to what Strange calls ‘security’; and there is some similarity between what she calls ‘information’ and what Mann refers to as ‘ideology’. He argues that each of these sources of power has its own network of relationships and interactions, its own spatiotemporal organization, so that societies appear, in toto, as ‘confederal, overlapping, intersecting networks’ combining areas of authoritative power with areas of diffused power. The first volume then traces the interaction of the sources of power over human history, ending up with Mann’s account of the rise of the state as the dominant form of political rule. At the risk of oversimplification, there are four distinct episodes in the historical narrative, each of which is characterized by particular configurations of political rule.

Mann argues that after a long period of human life without states, the earliest civilizations and states in human history were two-tiered, federal systems, a grouping of city-states tied at a higher level by more diffused networks of ideology, alliances and trade. The rise of coercive empires, or ‘empires of domination’, is associated with more intensively coercive networks of power. Mann traces their rise to the takeover of Sumerian civilization by Sargon of Akad in 2310 BC. The explanation for the first transformation in forms of state/political rule is very complex, but Mann dwells a great deal on the phenomenon of ‘caging’. Other things being equal, people resent coercive rule and seek to escape it when they can. Noting how the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, India and China were associated with flood plains and associated corridors of alluvial agriculture surrounded by deserts, he talks about societies becoming caged or circumscribed, trapped in particular territorial and social relationships which facilitate the rise of use of military coercion.

Avoiding any assumption of inevitable historical development, Mann then examines the collapse of coercive empires and the development of feudalism. Coercion through military power may be necessary to
control growing populations and enable elites to extract the economic surplus, but it is easier to conquer people than to govern them over extensive geographical territory. Tensions existed between intensive networks of power at the imperial core and the diffused power networks at the periphery. Of particular note is Mann’s emphasis on the reasons why empires of coercion often collapsed because of the inability of ruling elites to control the periphery. In part, changes in the technology of war facilitated collapse. For example, the use of charioteers and the introduction of iron for weapons and ploughs over the first millennium BC shifted power to the geographical sources of iron and, ultimately, to Barbarian Europe. What distinguished Greek civilization was its strategic marshland position between the Middle East and those lands of the heavier, wetter soils of Europe. The rise of the Roman Empire is traced to its superior infantry force and a ruling-class culture of unprecedented literacy, capable of assimilating any conquered elite in its path. At the same time, Roman civilization extended the Western migration of civilization’s leading edge, even though it, too, was unable to control its periphery against barbarian invasion.

In the era of European feudalism, Mann suggests that the relationship between forms of power changed again. This time, power was diffused. Networks of local and decentralized power proliferate, with no one social group having a monopoly, and each having a degree of autonomy. The localization and intensity of these power relations is seen as providing medieval Europe with a special dynamism, one that encouraged developmental as opposed to cyclical change. On the other hand, the Christian Church provided a more extensive network of ideological power that cut across the many local spheres of lordly power. Mann argues that the Church was a crucial source of normative pacification for European society, relying here on Emile Durkheim’s argument that religion provides a bond of social cohesion. The Catholic Church ‘pacified’ violence between and within states and ‘regulated’ trade. Its preaching of ‘consideration, decency, and charity towards all Christians’ imparted a ‘common humanity’ and ‘social identity’ to all Europeans that acted as a ‘substitute for coercive pacification normally required in previous extensive societies’. In addition, the Church provided a network of links for trade.

Over time, these links were increasingly secularized, activated more by the needs of trade and capitalism than the Church. Combined with the dynamism of its local competitive power relations, these pan-European networks of trade fostered a distinct capitalist ethos from as early as the ninth century onwards. The rise of the territorial state took place much later, when the Church itself was unable to
maintain its own unity, and it divided into Catholicism and Protestantism, culminating in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (the usual starting point for students of international relations). In his historical analysis of the emergence of the territorial state, Mann stresses the importance of external military competition among elites as the main impetus, rather than the needs of internal political administration.

The connection between war among states and their internal development is explored further in the second volume of Mann’s *magnum opus*. Once again, the dynamic relationship between the sources of social power is employed as the organizing motif for Mann’s meticulous analysis of the period from the eighteenth century to the First World War. The focus of inquiry is geographically confined to Britain, Germany, France and the United States, with some reference to Russia and Austria-Hungary. He argues that, in the eighteenth century, military and economic sources of power dominated political and ideological sources, whereas in the nineteenth century the relationship was the other way round. Mann covers all the major political revolutions and the industrial revolution that open his period. He offers an intricate analysis of the functional, bureaucratic and fiscal expansion of the state and, as in the first volume, he refuses to privilege *a priori* any one source of power over the others in the absence of historical verification. For Mann, the sources of social power are, as he puts it, ‘entwined’. At one period of time, one source may increase rapidly (such as military power in the late eighteenth century), with a powerful effect on states and classes. But the forms of power are not fully autonomous. The characteristic structural developments of the period emerged from such entwining, justifying Mann’s hostility to all forms of sociological determinism or reductionism.

While we still await Mann’s grand theory of power, we must be content with the heuristic utility of his ‘IEMP model’, as he calls it, ‘an analytical point of entry for dealing with a mess’. It is also useful for deepening our understanding of the state itself, a necessary first step in evaluating the extent to which ‘state power’ is changing under the impact of alleged ‘globalizing forces’ of varying kinds at the end of the twentieth century. Drawing on the work of Max Weber, Theda Skocpol and Charles Tilly, Mann combines institutional and functional elements in defining the state as:

1. A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying
2. centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a centre to cover
3. a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises
a monopoly of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence.\textsuperscript{5}

He makes an important distinction between despotic and infrastructural power. The former refers to ‘the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups’. The latter refers to ‘the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm’.\textsuperscript{6} It makes no sense to distinguish between strong and weak states without specifying their relative power along both dimensions, despotic and infrastructural. Mann himself distinguishes four ideal types of state. Feudal states are weak along both dimensions of power. Imperial states enjoy high levels of despotic power, but the degree of infrastructural co-ordination is low. Bureaucratic states (a term that covers capitalist democracies) are powerful in an infrastructural sense, but weak in a despotic sense. Authoritarian states (such as Nazi Germany and the former Soviet Union) have high levels of despotic and infrastructural power, although one might argue that the Soviet Union belongs in the imperial category rather than the authoritarian one. Whatever one thinks of the way in which Mann classifies states within his typology, the typology itself is extremely helpful in comparative sociology as well as the study of international relations.

Mann argues that there has occurred a long-term historical growth in the infrastructural power of the modern state, as the range of ‘logistical techniques’ for the effective penetration of social life by the state have multiplied. These include a division of labour between the state’s main activities, which are co-ordinated centrally; the expansion of literacy, enabling messages to be transmitted through state territory; the development of coinage, which allows commodities to be exchanged under an ultimate guarantee of value by the state; and the increasing rapidity of communications infrastructure. However, he also makes the point that such logistical techniques, while their historical growth has facilitated the expansion of the state’s infrastructural power, are also available for use by other groups in civil society.

In the whole history of the development of the infrastructure of power there is virtually no technique which belongs necessarily to the state, or conversely to civil society…[t]he obvious question is: if infrastructural powers are a general feature of society, in what circumstances are they appropriated by the state? What are the origins of the autonomous power of the state?\textsuperscript{7}
Mann’s answer to these questions identifies three features of the state, which account for its endurance as a form of political rule since the late medieval period. First, the state is necessary in the sense that all societies require rules. While there are alternatives to the state as the provider and enforcer of rules to maintain social order (such as force, exchange and custom), ‘societies with states have had superior survival value to those without them’. Second, in addition to maintaining internal order, the state performs a variety of functions that enable it to transcend particular group interests within the state. Chief among these are the provision of military defence against other states, maintaining communications infrastructure and economic redistribution and regulation. While these two features are usually singled out as the most important in justifying a view of the state as ‘janus-faced’, Mann adds a third feature, which is spatial and organizational. Only the state is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it claims authoritative power. No other ‘power groupings’ drawing on different combinations of the sources of social power share this particular feature of the state. It follows that

autonomous state power is the product of the usefulness of enhanced territorial centralization to social life in general.9

It should be clear by now that Michael Mann is no mere ‘consumer’ of international relations theory, for his work has major implications for a number of important debates in the field. I will (briefly) illustrate just two examples of Mann’s contributions to our understanding of contemporary international relations. First, he claims that ‘the association of liberalism, constitutionalism or democracy with pacifism is a complete and utter fabrication’. This is a typically bold claim, which undermines the arguments of many liberals who account for the relative absence of armed conflict between democracies on the basis of their inherently ‘pacifist’ nature. Mann believes that such arguments stem from a failure to appreciate the capacity of non-state actors to appropriate military power to serve their own interests. He defines militarism as ‘the persistent use of organised military violence in pursuit of social goals’ and distinguishes between militarism as a policy tool used by states and ‘civil society militarism’. Liberals in the study of international relations, he argues, focus on the former and neglect the latter, thus overlooking the record of militarism by Europeans in the colonies over the past 200 years. Indeed, Mann holds that such militarism increased overseas as liberal democracies were becoming stronger in Europe:
Within liberalism not the nation and the state but the individual and the civil society have been viewed as the bearers of the moral developmental project. Thus the liberal ‘civilizing mission’ was decentred and diffuse...[After] political self-rule, [British colonials] no longer thought of themselves as British; yet to consider themselves as ‘American’ or ‘Australian’ was problematic since the indigenous peoples might share that identity and they were enormously different and ‘inferior’...Indeed, the more domestically liberal the [colonial] regime, the nastier the record. A regime which does not regard its subjects as equal citizens may be less likely to espouse racism to justify expropriation and violence. And it was European racism that encouraged the worst atrocities. Thus the Spanish and Portuguese colonies saw fewer atrocities than the British, while the democratic American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand ex-colonies perpetrated more than their former colonial masters.12

If this example of Mann’s work makes us suspicious of a benign liberal view of itself, his most recent work on globalization (also a major pre-occupation of international relations theorists) helps to dispel the idea that some new form of human society is in the making. In light of Mann’s extensive writing on the state, as well as his careful distinctions between different types of state, we should not be tempted by the simplistic suggestion of a zero-sum relationship between ‘all states’, on the one hand, and ‘globalization’, on the other. Mann’s most recent article distinguishes between five ‘socio-spatial networks of social interaction’ – local, national, international, transnational and global. He then analyses four alleged ‘threats’ to the continued survival of the nation-state (‘global’ capitalism, environmental danger, identity politics and post-nuclear geopolitics). Not surprisingly, Mann debunks most of the conventional wisdom on the imminent demise/continued resilience of the state as a form of political rule. His article is a superb illustration of the utility of the IEMP model to shed light on the differential impact on different types of state in each of the four spheres of ‘threat’, and the distribution of trends among the five networks of interaction.13

In conclusion, Michael Mann is far more than a mere ‘consumer’ of international relations theory. He is a major contributor to the field, whose work on the history of social power is acknowledged as one of the most pioneering intellectual projects in social theory this century. It is no surprise that someone of his breadth and depth of knowledge has little regard for disciplinary boundaries in the social sciences. He declares that he ‘is not an admirer of what passes for
theory among academics, all those abstract -isms and -ologies’. Despite this apparent disregard for the academic division of labour, however, Mann acknowledges a tendency towards ‘relativism’ in his own work and a refusal to lay bare his own ethical values, let alone defend them. However, although ethical relativism may be a virtue for the macrosociologist, it is of little use in helping us imagine a just world order that could inspire us to redirect the sources of social power in a more humane manner than they have been deployed in the past. As Perry Anderson notes, ‘no sociological enterprise of this magnitude has ever been undertaken that was not animated by some – tacit or explicit – political passion. One waits absorbed to see what that will prove to be.’ In the meantime, there is still a role for traditional political theorists in the academy.

Notes

3. Ibid., p. 381.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid., p. 11.
8. Ibid., p. 12.
9. Ibid., p. 29 (emphasis in original).
11. Ibid., p. 224 (Mann’s emphasis).
12. Ibid., p. 235.

Mann’s major writings


See also: Giddens, Tilly

Further reading
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JUSTIN ROSENBERG

Of the many important scholars in international sociology, Justin Rosenberg is arguably the most cutting-edge and provocative. Rosenberg was awarded his PhD from the London School of Economics, where he taught for a few years before accepting a senior lecturer position at the University of Sussex, where some of the most notable Marxist-based researchers in international relations are based, including Kees Van der Pijl and Martin Shaw. While at the LSE he trained several scholars in international political sociology, most notably Benno Teschke, who is now senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Sussex. Rosenberg’s insights into the state of social theory in international relations are unquestionably among the most brilliant in the field, and are likely to continue to inspire many more scholars to employ Marxist-based approaches to
re-evaluate the limits and problems of social theory in international relations. Certainly, they testify to the enduring power of Marxism to address today’s social problems in a globalizing world.

During the late 1980s, the inter-paradigm debate, or what some prefer to label as the third debate (even though some critical theorists will refer to the positive versus post-positivist debate as the third great debate), pitted against each other globalists, rationalists and Marxists/structuralists. Rosenberg’s work clearly fell into the Marxist camp. But unlike other Marxist or Gramscian-based approaches, his remained far more closely wedded to historical materialism and social praxis. Thus, in his work *The Empire of Civil Society*, Rosenberg critiques what Cox and others had already labelled as realism’s historically impoverished analysis of political structures and state sovereignty.¹ Here he shows that realist conceptions of anarchy and sovereignty are based on false and limited ontological assumptions. Rather than constituting fixed, stabilizing political structures of the international system, anarchy, in his view, reflects a fluid dynamic of social and political relations in the international system. As Rosenberg puts it: ‘geopolitical systems are not constituted independently of, and cannot be understood in isolation from, the wider structures of the production and reproduction of social life’.² States and other players of the international system do not behave independently of one another; rather, their behaviour is shaped by their interaction and their participation in the creation and reproduction of social practices. This socio-historical process is why sovereignty, for instance, has evolved over the years; and why this evolutionary process also reflects the changing nature of anarchy. Nineteenth-century social anarchists, for instance, might contend that dismantling the hierarchical class structure of society through class revolution achieves the same aim: the elimination of the false pretences or existing fixed, hierarchical conceptions of political rule and understanding. Much the same applies to social theory and anarchy in international relations. As Rosenberg states: ‘This rediscovery of anarchy as a social form comprises a decisive break with realist theory in much the same way as the earlier redefinition of sovereignty enabled us to break decisively with realist history’.³

For Rosenberg, the problem of anarchy remains a central ‘precept’ of modern social thought. This is because in the absence of any single ruling government, conflict and competition fuel the struggle for freedom and social justice.⁴ Marx, it should be stressed here, maintained a dual focus on class conflict and communist society (the universal class), preferring to frame the latter as the beginning of a
utopian society, one that was free of the destructive social forces and conflicts inherent in capitalism. Rosenberg’s point, however, is not that we should strive for social utopia, but, rather, that anarchy can and should be seen as the problem in social theory in international relations, that is, the failure to explain the social formation of practices. This is why re-engaging Marxist concepts of class struggle and social justice at the international level remains so crucial for social theory in international relations.

Rosenberg’s critique of globalization theory is driven by the need to re-engage Marxism. He argues that globalization theory, which emerged in the early 1990s, remains grounded in a false set of social and political pretences. His argument is that the categories of global civil society and cosmopolitan democracy reflect fixed or given assumptions of the novelty of the global. Yet it is precisely this novelty that represents an immutable and false premise of their argument. In other words, what precisely is the nature of novelty? And how did it emerge? It may be true that the global represents a new social phenomenon, yet it should be the social task of theorists to investigate the origins of the concept of the global; not to treat it as given. For Rosenberg, it would be fair to say that globalization theorists have betrayed social theory by abandoning this task of investigating the content of social and political concepts (not just their form). Are social theorists, then, as he suggests, any different from those mainstream social scientists they seek to critique? And are they not failing to learn from the mistakes of positing ontological assumptions of global order, the content and substance of which cannot be investigated?

These are concerns that he addresses in his second book, *The Follies of Globalisation Theory*, where he argues that the ‘fundamental problem with globalization theory lies not in the difficulties of its encounter with international relations, but rather in the deeper contradiction already alluded to at the level of social theory itself…the conceptual inflation of the spatial which is both difficult to justify ontologically and liable to produce not explanations but reifications’.5 Much of the criticism in this book focuses on the works of Anthony Giddens, David Held, Anthony McGrew, Zygmunt Bauman, Jan Art Scholte and Daniele Archibugi, who, in his view, fail to provide concrete empirical frameworks. From Rosenberg’s perspective, globalization theory refers to social theory that arose during the 1990s in the social sciences and humanities – when, in other words, the historical conjuncture between the rapid acceleration of flows in trade and capital flows, and the breakdown of the Soviet Union (or the rise of
one transnational superpower), created a new zeitgeist or spirited quest. The fruits of such a historical conjuncture were global models of democracy, universal communities, and trans-advocacy networks.

In his long essay in the journal *International Politics*, Rosenberg claims that the socially transformative events of the 1990s led to a new vacuum in social theory. Here the sense of filling this vacuum created what he points out was a ‘sense of temporal accelerations and spatial compression’. The zeitgeist of the 1990s was nothing more than a self-contained historical conjuncture that produced a lot of interesting abstract theory about the global, but was little more than a temporary phenomenon. As he puts it: ‘when the process of filling the vacuum came to an end, the salience of the spatio-temporal phenomena which produced Globalization Theory would start to fade – because it was the movement of the process which generated that salience’. Because globalization theorists were not willing to critique the spatiotemporal meanings of their theory, they had become what he calls ‘ideological amplifiers’ of globalization.

We should stress that Rosenberg’s aim in this long article is not merely to offer a diagnosis of globalization theory, but rather to provide a reliable prognosis and direction for social theory. As with any passing phenomenon, the end of zeitgeist brings new opportunities to reflect upon (and move beyond) the high-spirited, hollow ideas of the zeitgeist. The challenge, he explains, is to engage in a three-part movement: ‘from an initial, general designation of ‘globalization’ as a Zeitgeist; through the identification of its symptomatic affinities with the experience of capitalist development; and into the pinpointing of its concrete production and dissolution in the unique international conjuncture of the 1990s’.

In his view, this challenge raises two central questions. The first has to do with the international, or the relationship between the international and global, and how this bears upon the explanation of empirical events in international relations. Here he argues that globalization theory has not produced a concrete agenda, since its engagement with the meta-theoretical concepts of global and global society prevents its proponents from investigating the empirical realities of the globalizing world. The second question deals with the role of social theory in explaining the historical process of change. Here Rosenberg insists that we need to return to Marx’s theory of capitalist society in order to explain the evolution of the international into the global. If Rosenberg is correct that globalization theory of the 1990s remains a passing episode of history, then it becomes important that theorists learn not simply to interpret social life, but to change it.
Whether or not this is what Rosenberg intends in terms of applying Marxism, it is clear that the failed promises of globalization theory are not just a matter of exposing the false promises of that theory. Rather, they are about invoking Marxist concepts of international class struggle and reification to explain the social and empirical forces, as well as the changing institutional dynamics, of globalization.

Still, it is important to stress that Rosenberg’s internationalist focus calls attention to the more formidable political challenges that many globalization theorists fail to appreciate, especially during the post-9/11 era (global terrorism and state failure). If, for instance, we know what needs to be globalized, then surely we need to theorize about the sticking points of realpolitik or the problem of state failure. To appreciate these political challenges is to realize the international dimension of global politics. As Rosenberg seems to suggest, we need to focus on the social dynamics of this international dimension for two general reasons: that states still choose to oppress their citizens; and that global institutions remain powerless to prevent such oppression. Thus, the larger question that Rosenberg’s Marxist-based approach raises is this: how has our understanding of the concrete historical and material circumstances of capitalist society been obscured by the reifications of globalization theory?

Many, however, remain sceptical of Rosenberg’s efforts to devise Marxian-based social theory of the evolution of the international into the global. George Lawson, for instance, argues that Rosenberg’s Marxian-inspired reductionist approach loses sight of the importance of indeterminacy, and even agency.9 This may be a bit unfair to Rosenberg, and even to Marx himself, whose politics always emphasized, to some degree, the indeterminacy of labour power. Yet if there is one clear sticking point in Rosenberg’s framework, it is that he overstresses the promises of Marxism itself. Marxism will always remain a key, if not timeless, foundation of international relations theory; however, Marxists’ social categories such as class conflict and reification also need to be treated as contingent concepts and principles. Rosenberg’s strict focus on Marxism seems to suggest otherwise.

Notes
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 156.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 8.

**Rosenberg’s major writings**


See also: Mann, Giddens

**Further reading**

Mathias, Albert, ‘“Globalization theory”: yesterday’s fad or more lively than ever?’, *International Political Sociology* 1 (2007), pp. 149–64.


**CHARLES TILLY**

Over the past two decades, many students of international relations have become increasingly sceptical of the realist claim that state behaviour can best be understood on the assumption that the state is a unitary, rational actor in international relations, ignoring conflicts within states. An apparently contrary trend can be observed in
historical sociology, in which writers such as Michael Mann, Charles Tilly and Anthony Giddens have appealed to international relations to repudiate the Marxist view that all levels of politics are best explained primarily as a result of domestic class struggle in the context of capitalism. As Michael Mann observes, ‘sociologists became aware that our specialism was neglecting the impact of geopolitics on social relations. We first borrowed precisely the traditional form of realism from which many IR practitioners were fleeing’. However, the way in which Charles Tilly has appropriated ‘realism’ in trying to understand long-term social change at the global level is far removed from what many students in international relations understand by the term. Although he has firmly placed the role of war back on the historical sociological agenda in accounting for the rise of the nation-state, Tilly departs from many ‘realists’ in international relations in two key respects. First, he is interested in long-term processes of state formation per se rather than the historical patterns of the balance of power between states. Second, he dispenses with the assumption that there is a categorical substantive difference between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ relations, according to which the distinctive characteristics of the latter (war, anarchy, the balance of power) are read off against the more pacific and ‘rule-based’ character of politics within the sovereign state. As he puts it:

At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract [or] the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.\(^2\)

It would therefore be wrong to assume that the rise of historical sociology in the study of international relations leaves ‘realism’ securely entrenched as the dominant framework of analysis. While certain elements are retained, particularly the emphasis on the role of war and the ubiquity of power in global politics, the traditional division between domestic and international politics becomes extremely problematic as a useful tool of analysis. As Fitzpatrick points out, Charles Tilly and others start from precisely that agenda of questions about ‘domestic’ power politics…effectively suppressed in realist discourse, and subsequently work [their] way toward the ‘international’ (or…geopolitical) dimensions of such conflict as a result of dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of established ‘domestic’ paradigms.\(^3\)
Indeed, ‘dissatisfaction with established paradigms’, whether in sociology, political science or international relations, is a persistent theme in Tilly’s work, beginning with his earliest analyses of collective violence in eighteenth-century France, and including his latest work on the rise of the state and the role of revolution in European history.

Charles Tilly was born in 1929 in Lombard, Illinois. He studied at Harvard University, earning his bachelor’s degree in 1950. He served in the US navy during the Korean War, then returned to Harvard for his PhD in sociology in 1958. In the 1960s, he taught at the Universities of Delaware, Toronto and Harvard. In 1969, he was appointed Professor of History and Sociology at the University of Michigan. This is where he set up the Center for Research on Social Organization. At the Center, Tilly devoted a great deal of time, money and collaborative effort (which included his wife and son) to creating enormous data banks of empirical evidence against which to test hypotheses and develop theories on the sources and dynamics of ‘collective action’ in European history, with a particular focus on France. As Lynn Hunt observes, Tilly has been compared with ‘an [entrepreneurial] captain of scholarship, a Henry Ford directing the mass production of quantitative studies of strikes, food riots, and tax rebellions’. He became Theodore M. Newcomb Professor of Social Science at Michigan in 1981. Three years later, he joined the New School for Social Research in New York as Distinguished Professor of Sociology and History, and was named University Distinguished Professor in 1990. In 1996, he moved to Columbia University as the new Joseph L. Buttenweiser Professor of Social Science.

The first thing to note about Tilly is the sheer volume of his published work. He has written more than 20 books, and sits on the editorial boards of two dozen journals in history, political science and sociology. A review such as this can focus only on those areas of most importance for students of international relations.

In the 1960s, Tilly concentrated his efforts on the phenomenon of ‘collective violence’ in French history, examining the entire record of riots, violent demonstrations and brawls between rival groups in order to map and explain social change. His first book, The Vendée (1964), traces a process of rapid and uneven ‘urbanization’ and ‘centralization’ in the west of France prior to the great uprising of 1793. His argument is that the counter-revolutionary violence of that year may have been sparked by conscription, but was in fact the product of structural, economic and social change. Local peasants and artisans took the side of the ‘aristocrats’ against the ‘patriots’ because the latter were the agents of the expanding and much-
resented state and the representatives of encroaching and threatening urban markets.

In a succession of books that followed (Strikes in France, 1830–1968, published in 1974; The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930, published in 1975; From Mobilization to Revolution, 1978), Tilly followed up on the same themes he introduced in The Vendée. Concentrating primarily on France, but also relating his argument to other European states, Tilly developed a research agenda with a dual focus. On the one hand, he was interested in ‘the little people’ and the ways in which particular groups in society act to defend or extend their own interests – however they are conceived – against other groups. On the other hand, he was fascinated by the impact of huge structural changes on people’s lives, changes that mysteriously rewrite the rules of collective action. He makes a crucial distinction between different kinds of ‘collective violence’ in French history. Prior to the seventeenth-century efforts of rulers to centralize the French state, violence is primarily competitive. It takes place between different groups in local communities, and is the product of constant but stable conflicts of interest and power. From the mid-seventeenth century to the Second Revolution of 1849, violence is primarily reactive. It is a manifestation of ‘defensive, backward looking conflicts between…local people… and agents of the nation’. This is the period of the major expansion of the French state, which demands more taxation and increasing resources for an emerging national agricultural market. Finally, proactive violence has been the predominant form since the mid-nineteenth century, as groups no longer resist the encroachment of the state, but instead seek to control or influence it. The groups themselves are transformed from informal, impermanent communal organizations into enduring special-purpose associations.

As the work on collective violence on France developed in the 1960s and early 1970s, Tilly began to stake out a particular theoretical orientation to the study of social change which challenged the dominant assumptions of Durkheimian sociology in the United States. According to this tradition, collective violence is the result of social dislocation, strain, anomie and the breakdown of social control. Tilly challenged both the assumption that social systems are inherently benign, and the political bias of sociologists in favour of law and order and the status quo. As William Sewell describes it, Tilly ‘sees society as composed of groups with conflicting interests that are held together not by a value consensus or by the re-equilibriating motions of a finely tuned social system but by the exercise of economic and political power’. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Tilly became more
explicit about the basis of his methodological assumptions and the way in which they challenge traditional approaches in sociological research. In 1984, he published his manifesto for historical sociology, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*.

The argument of this book is that we need to rid ourselves of what Tilly calls eight ‘pernicious postulates’ of nineteenth-century sociological thought. These false principles include beliefs that: (1) there are distinct, autonomous societies; (2) social behaviour results from individual mental states; (3) social change is a coherent social phenomenon; (4) large-scale social changes occur in a series of stages; (5) differentiation leads to advancement as well as to (6) disorder; (7) disorder and ‘deviant behaviour’ result from rapid social change; and (8) conflict precipitated by constituted authorities is legitimate, while conflict precipitated by individuals is illegitimate. The book illustrates the ways in which these postulates of ‘nineteenth-century folk wisdom’ still influence the study of sociology, and Tilly calmly states that, as a consequence, ‘little of long-term value to the social sciences has emerged from the hundreds of studies conducted during the last few decades that have run statistical analyses including most of the world’s national states’. Tilly’s main targets are Durkheim and Tonnies, rather than Marx or Weber, and in the latter third of the book Tilly devotes himself to the more constructive task ahead. He urges sociologists to engage in ‘genuinely historical work’ and carry out research on the assumption ‘that the time and place in which a structure or process appears makes a difference to its character, that the sequence in which similar events occur has a substantial impact on their outcomes, and that the existing record of past structures and processes is problematic’. For students of international relations, this book is a useful primer before examining the book on which Tilly’s reputation in the study of international relations is based, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990*, published in 1990.

*Coercion, Capital and European States* is a synthesis of the methodological and substantive arguments that Tilly had been developing over the previous decade. In some ways, this study represents the capstone of his lifelong interest in state formation, and elaborates arguments that he had begun to make in 1975, when he edited *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*. Tilly is concerned with two very big questions. What accounts for variations in time and space between the forms of the European state, and why did they finally converge on the national state? Dominant theories often ‘posit a single, central path of European state formation and a set of deviations from the path explained by inefficiency, weakness, bad luck, geopolitical
position, or the timing of economic growth’. He shows in great detail that European state formation was anything but a uniform process. The fully-fledged national state is a very recent and rare form of political rule. For long periods of history, it had to share the European political landscape with city-states, empires, theocratic enclaves and other varied principalities. The development of the nation-state itself proceeded along a variety of trajectories, reflecting distinct blends of two different ‘materials’ for state-building: coercion and capital. Fundamentally, Tilly claims that states are shaped by the need to wage war, and that need, in turn, impels their rulers to extract resources. In ‘capital-intensive’ settings, resources are monetized or involved in value-added production. They are controlled by those involved in exchange and production for diverse markets, otherwise known as capitalists. In ‘coercive-intensive’ settings, resources are found in kind (especially raw materials), controlled by landlords who rely on coercion to extract them. Resources in these settings tend to be dispersed over large amounts of territory.

Tilly’s basic thesis is that since different states emerge in different settings, and since the two kinds of setting require different patterns of state bargaining and organization to extract their resources, states will differ in their organization and development. In very capital-intensive settings – the Rhineland, the Netherlands, Italy – states will tend to be small, city-based, republican and commercial. Such states can flourish as long as the trade routes under their control produce high levels of resources that are sufficient for military defence. In very coercive-intensive settings, large empires will tend to develop, such as Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The latter sought to discipline and control the local landlords who controlled dispersed resources, and also tried to concentrate those resources for the state. But this is very difficult and often inefficient. Tilly follows Michael Mann’s argument here, suggesting that, while imperial armies could conquer peasants without too many difficulties, they could not overwhelm highly concentrated resources of capital-intensive centres. Some empires, such as Hungary and Poland, could not even control their local landlords.

In between these extremes were states that developed in areas with various mixes of capital and coercive resources, such as England, France, Spain and Prussia. Depending on the particular blend, they developed a mixture of the characteristics of the states at each extreme of the spectrum. The convergence on the national state took place when resources could not readily be translated into war-making potential. After the French Revolution, it was no longer possible to make war by hiring and supplying a mercenary army. Such armies could
not face up to the forces of a nation in arms. The latter fought more effectively and cheaply, and on a greater scale, than the mercenary armies that had contested Europe between 1400 and 1700.

Consequently, from 1700 to 1918 Europe’s less efficient city-states, and empires, were largely squeezed out by the competitive process, and national states emerged as the dominant form of political rule, combining size, national mobilization, and access to commercial and coercive resource extraction. States such as Britain and France were able to combine advantages of their mixed setting. They had relatively strong state apparatus, confident aristocracies, thriving market-oriented economies and a vigorous commercial class. So they made the transition to direct rule within a national state relatively early. Capital-intensive regions such as Italy, and coercion-intensive regions such as Eastern Europe, were slower to evolve to the national state norm.

But the crucial factor in explaining the rise of the national state is the increasing scale of war and the growing integration of the European state system. The military advantage of national states over their competitors is the key to answering the question Tilly sets himself at the beginning of the book.

In the twentieth century, Tilly argues that war-making has become a more specialized, professional enterprise. This has led, once again, to different state trajectories in different settings. In economically dominant, capital-rich states, military professionalization has facilitated greater ‘civilianization’ of government. Under the intense pressures arising from the need to extract resources for war, state officials have yielded a variety of rights to their populations and accepted a widening array of domestic responsibilities. But in dependent, ‘developing’ and regionally competing states (in the Third World), greater military professionalization has led to greater militarization by governments, as the coercive resources of the armed forces proved superior to weak, capital-based resources of civilian regimes.

In 1992, Tilly published his reflections on the implications of the end of the Cold War in light of his theory on the consolidation of the national state in Europe. He suggests that in the short term, Europe will witness two contradictory trajectories. In one sense, there will be some increase in the number of states, particularly in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union. The universal appeal of the national idea will continue to inspire what Tilly calls ‘state-seeking’ nationalists, but he believes there are limits to such a process of state proliferation. In Western Europe, Tilly suggests that the pressures of ‘war-making’ have been subdued, at least temporarily. In the absence of a well armed nuclear enemy, rich states will no longer need to
engage in the process of state consolidation. Instead, Tilly identifies a number of factors that threaten an end to the survival of consolidated states. These include:

- the global mobility of capital, the rising importance of Japanese capital in Asia, the United States, and Europe, the worldwide circuits of labor, the rapid transmission of information and technology, the decreasing capacity of rich states...to exclude poor outside workers from their labor markets...all promise to sap the capacity of any state to control its borders, shelter its own citizens from outside influences, [and] impose independent and centrally directed public policies.10

The future, he concludes, could be benign or malign. On the one hand, there is the possibility of a more diverse world that resembles, in some respects, the European political landscape of the Middle Ages, ‘but without the empires and squabbling small states’. On the other hand, the end of the formal, state-led ‘protection racket’ between rulers and the ruled could lead informally to ‘a world of banditry, of hatred, of parochialism, and of gross inequality’.11 States may no longer need to honour the rights of groups such as organized labour, and the achievement of years of proactive collective action will slowly disappear. Tilly hopes that ‘benign pluralism’ will triumph over ‘malign segmentation’, but he is none too certain about the outcome.

In conclusion, one has to admire the bold sweep of Tilly’s research. He is at the forefront of historical sociology at the end of the twentieth century, and his work, as one might expect, has attracted a great deal of attention across the social sciences, not just the study of international relations. If there is one notable flaw in his work, it would be similar to that of Michael Mann. In the final analysis, Tilly is a materialist. Despite his genuine concern for the interests of groups that contest and sometimes seek to influence the state, he always emphasizes the role of structural forces that appear to be beyond the control of individual agents. Similarly, the role of ideas is subordinate to the interplay of economics and war in human history. As Jack Goldstone complains,

- ideological issues play no role in his state making; the Reformation and the rise of nationalist ideologies are no more than pretexts for wars, rather than shapers of states in their own right...[t]he notion that states have positive qualities, such that people might desire stronger or more nationalist states, rather than merely suffer their exactions, seems absent from Tilly’s history.12
Having said that, Charles Tilly must be credited with bringing war back onto centre stage in the study of sociology and international relations, and his work provides enormous potential for all those similarly disappointed with the existing ‘paradigms’ of international relations. The challenge for those inspired by Charles Tilly is twofold: how to include the role of ideas in the comparative study of social change; and how to connect long-term trends with short-term processes. Given the pace of change in the technology of war, the human race can no longer afford to allow war to play as central a role in its future as it has in its past.

Notes


8. Ibid., p. 79.


11. Ibid., p. 717.


Tilly’s major writings


‘War making and state making as organized crime’, in Paul Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 169–98.

See also: Giddens, Herz, Mann, Wendt

Further reading

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

Immanuel Wallerstein was born in 1930. He graduated from Columbia University in 1951 and continued his graduate studies there, completing his PhD in 1959. He taught sociology at Columbia until 1971, when he was appointed Professor of Sociology at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. In 1976, he became Director of the Fernand Braudel Centre and took up a Distinguished Chair in Sociology at Binghamton University (State University of New York), where he continues to teach and research.

Wallerstein began his career as a student of African politics, specializing in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. But his reputation as an international theorist is based on his radical attempts to reconceptualize international relations in the context of his arguments concerning the nature and history of the modern capitalist ‘world-system’.

Wallerstein is the pioneer of world-systems theory, which is based in part on radical dependency theories of underdevelopment in the 1950s as well as the French Annales school of historiography. In three pioneering volumes of extraordinary historical detail and theoretical ambition, Wallerstein has attempted to look beneath the
epiphenomena of diplomatic and military relations among states to grasp the logic of a single world-system.

It is important to understand at the outset that the term ‘world-system’ does not refer primarily to the geographical scope of capitalism, merely to the fact that the logic of the system operates at a different level than any existing political unit such as the nation-state. His most famous text, The Modern World-System, published in 1974, locates the origins of the modern world in what he called ‘the long sixteenth century’, from around 1450 to 1670. Before this period, Western Europe was feudal, and economic production was based almost entirely on agriculture. From 1300 onwards, however, agricultural production fell rapidly as changes in the European climate contributed to a rapid increase in the incidence of epidemics among the peasant population. It was not until the 1500s that Europe moved towards the establishment of a capitalist world economy, in which production was oriented towards exchange in the market rather than seasonal consumption, those who produced goods earned less than their value, and the driving force of capitalism became the endless accumulation of material goods.

Economic growth in the new era entailed the expansion of the geographical scope of the market, the development of different forms of labour control, and the rise of strong states in Europe. The new world economy that emerged differed from previous empires in that it coexisted with a multiplicity of political jurisdictions and was characterized by a new international division of labour between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’.

The core refers to those regions that benefited most from change. In the period of initial expansion, this included most of north-western Europe (France, England and Holland). The region was characterized by strong central governments and large mercenary armies. The latter enabled the bourgeoisie to control international commerce and extract economic surplus from trade and commerce. The growth of urban manufacturing was fed by movements of landless peasants from the countryside to the cities, while improvements in agricultural technology ensured continuous increases in agricultural productivity. The core is where capital is always concentrated in its most sophisticated forms. Banks, the professions, trade activity and skilled manufacturing are all sufficiently widespread to sustain a wage-labour economy.

The periphery, in contrast, refers to regions lacking strong central governments, dependent on coercive rather than wage labour, and the economies of which depend on the export of raw materials to the core. Latin America and Eastern Europe were key peripheral zones in
the sixteenth century. In Latin America, the Spanish and the Portuguese conquests destroyed indigenous political leaders and replaced them with weak bureaucracies under European control. Native populations were killed or enslaved, African slaves were imported to work the land and the mines, and the local aristocracy was complicit with a system that kept it in power while it presided over the production of goods primarily for consumption in Europe. In the periphery, extensive cultivation and coercive control of labour achieve low-cost agricultural production.

Wallerstein also refers to semi-peripheries as well as external areas. Semi-peripheries were either regions that could be located geographically in the core but were undergoing a process of relative decline (Spain and Portugal) or rising economies in the periphery. They were exploited by the core, but in turn took advantage of the periphery. Some external areas, such as Russia, maintained their own economic systems and were largely self-sufficient in food. Unlike some of the dependency thinkers who posited a polar relationship between two basic categories, Wallerstein argues that the semi-periphery is a crucial buffer between core and periphery. An ideological consensus over the desirability of capitalism and the concentration of military power among powerful hegemons in the core would be insufficient to prevent serious conflict in the system as a whole:

[Neither] would suffice were it not for the division of the majority into a larger lower stratum and a smaller middle stratum…the semi-periphery is assigned a specific economic role, but the reason is less economic than political…one might make a good case that the world-economy…would function every bit as well without a semi-periphery. But it would be far less politically stable, for it would mean a polarized world-system. The existence of the third category means precisely that the upper stratum is not faced with the unified opposition of all the others because the middle stratum is both exploited and exploiter.1

Much of Wallerstein’s work traces the geographical expansion of the world-system over time. Two stages in particular mark its development from the sixteenth to the late twentieth century. Up to the eighteenth century, the system was characterized by a strengthening of European states, following the failure of the Hapsburg Empire to convert the emerging world economy to a world empire. Increasing trade with the Americas and Asia enriched small merchant elites at the expense of wage labourers in Europe, while its monarchs expanded their power
to collect taxes, borrow money and expand militias to support the absolute monarchies. Local populations in Europe became increasingly homogeneous as minorities were expelled, particularly Jews. In the eighteenth century, industrialization replaced the emphasis on agricultural production, and European states embarked on an aggressive search for new markets to exploit. Over the past 200 years, new regions have been absorbed into the system, such as Asia and Africa, increasing the available surplus. However, it was not until the early years of the twentieth century that the world-system became truly global.

Wallerstein also traces the rise and decline of core hegemons (or dominant powers) in the world-system over time. In 1984, he described ‘three instances’ of hegemony; ‘the United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century, the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth, and the United States in the mid-twentieth’. In his more recent work he has speculated on the future of the world-system in light of debates regarding the alleged decline of the United States in the world economy and the end of the Cold War. He fears that many are drawing hasty conclusions from the collapse of Marxism–Leninism in 1989, suggesting that the collapse of the Soviet Union and its peripheral status is not good news for the dominant forces of the capitalist world-system, because it removes the last major politically stabilizing force that helped to legitimate the hegemony of the United States. In Geopolitics and Geoculture (1991), he suggests that the period of US hegemony may be over now that Japanese and Western European enterprises are genuinely competitive with American companies. But in the absence of the ‘Soviet threat’, it is unclear whether conflicts between states in the core can be diluted by appealing to any common ideological interest in sustaining co-operation. He believes that the world-system will continue to function as it has for the past 500 years in search of the endless accumulation of capital and goods, but the periphery will be increasingly marginalized as the technological sophistication of the core accelerates.

For Wallerstein, the capitalist world-system – while it may continue for some time yet – is characterized by some fundamental contradictions, which will ultimately bring about its demise even as it appears to consolidate its global control. First, there is continuing imbalance between supply and demand. So long as decisions about what and how much to produce are made at the level of the firm, the imbalance will be an unintended consequence of continuous mechanization and commodification. Second, whereas in the short run it is rational for capitalists to make profits by withdrawing the surplus from immediate consumption, in the longer term the further
production of surplus requires a mass demand that can be met only by redistributing the surplus. Third, there are limits to the degree to which the state can co-opt workers to maintain the legitimation of the capitalist system. As he puts it,

whenever the tenants of privilege seek to co-opt an oppositional movement by including them in a minor share of the privilege, they may no doubt eliminate opponents in the short run; but they also up the ante for the next oppositional movement created in the next crisis of the world-economy. Thus the cost of co-option rises ever higher.³

Finally, and most significantly, there is the contradiction between the one and the many, the coexistence of a plural states system within one world-system. While this facilitates the expansion of the system, it also impedes any attempt to develop greater co-operation to counter systemic crises in the system as a whole.

Wallerstein’s approach is characterized by two fundamental epistemological commitments. He is fundamentally opposed to the idea that one can study processes of economic ‘development’ within states without situating them in a much broader spatial and historical context. To study the state as if it were the unit within which problems are both generated and potentially solved is to accept uncritically the dominant liberal ideology of progress. According to this ideology, the way out of economic underdevelopment for poor states is to adopt the political, economic and cultural characteristics of ‘developed’ states. If governments adopt ‘free market’ policies, and promote private enterprise and an entrepreneurial culture, then there is no intrinsic barrier to modernization.

Equally, Wallerstein takes issue with those on the left who believe that underdevelopment is promoted by core states, the prosperity of which lies in their ability to extract economic surplus from periphery states. Insofar as this implies that Third World states should somehow withdraw from the capitalist world economy, Wallerstein argues that in a single world-system, peripheral states cannot develop along lines different from those imposed by the core.

Partly inspired by the work of Karl Polanyi, Wallerstein is also extremely critical of Western social science, which treats politics, economics, history and sociology as separate ‘disciplines’ in the social sciences. He certainly would not recognize the study of international relations as an autonomous discipline, and his approach is therefore radically at odds with the realist view that its autonomy arises from
the special character of relations among states in an anarchical environment. This is only one aspect of the structure of the world-system, and a subordinate one at that. Indeed, he believes that the development of Western social science cannot be disentangled from the growing power of the state and its need for ‘experts’ to assist it in managing ‘the dangerous classes’. Since the late eighteenth century, the modern era has been dominated by the idea of progress and by the political myth that sovereignty is legitimate, as the power of states is said to derive from ‘the people’. For Wallerstein, the modern ideologies of conservatism, liberalism and socialism are best understood as political programmes to manage the social turmoil that constant economic change engenders. At the end of the twentieth century, many people believe that liberalism is now dominant. The threefold political programme of universal suffrage, the welfare state and the creation of national identity effectively secured the legitimation of the world-system in Europe, and provides a model for universal aspiration outside it. Most social scientists espouse a liberal ideology, for the whole enterprise of social science is founded on the premise of social progress based on the ability to manipulate social relations, provided this can be done in a ‘scientific’ manner.

Wallerstein’s work has – as one might expect, given its radical challenges to orthodox social science – been the subject of intense debate. Traditional Marxists have complained that he misunderstands the nature of capitalism, focusing too much on the logic of exchange in the market rather than on modes of production. Ernesto Laclau, for example, claims that ‘the fundamental economic relationship of capitalism is constituted by the free labourer’s sale of his labour power, whose necessary precondition is the loss by the direct producer of ownership of the means of production’. If wage labour is the defining characteristic of capitalism, then Wallerstein’s whole model is cast in doubt, as other forms of labour have been dominant in other parts of the world, making it difficult to define them as capitalist.

Indeed, Wallerstein’s views have been attacked from across the ideological spectrum. Socialists who believe that radical reform is still possible within the boundaries of the state, or between socialist states, have not taken kindly to the idea that socialism is possible only at a global level. Wallerstein takes the Trotskyist position of dismissing ‘socialism in one country’, defining communist states as merely collective capitalist firms whose very participation in the world-system prevents the transition to socialism at a global level. More orthodox scholars have attacked the extreme structural–functionalism of Wallerstein’s theoretical approach. Realists, for example, would argue
that if the competitive interstate system is itself derived from the
economic logic of the capitalist world-system, how does one account
for competitive behaviour among political units before the sixteenth
century? They argue that there is a distinctly political logic involving
the struggle for power among sovereigns, which cannot be reduced
to capitalism. As Kal Holsti has pointed out, ‘to say that war between
capitalist states is inevitable is like saying that collisions between
Ford automobiles are inevitable; but which is the critical variable?
Automobile or Ford? State or economy?’

It might also be argued that the rigidity of the core/semi-periph-
ery/periphery mode fails to account for anomalies such as the rise of
some states to ‘core’ status (Japan?) because it presupposes a zero-sum
relationship among states in the system. The structure of the system
remains constant for Wallerstein, so that if some states appear to rise
and move from one category to another, others must fall. Given the
generality of the theoretical approach, as well as its historical depth, it
is sometimes difficult to place some states within any of the categories.
For example, on the basis of its GNP per capita and standard of
living, Australia can be categorized as part of the core, even though
Wallerstein himself places it in the semi-periphery. As Alexander and
Gow point out, ‘the economic analysis gives no systemic clues as to
the relationship between economic position in the world economy,
geopolitical position and the emergence of semiperipheral politics’.

Finally, one might note a tension between the empirical claims of
Wallerstein (which should therefore be amenable to hypothesis-testing)
and his contempt for conventional methodologies of theory con-
struction in the social sciences. Is it possible to make deterministic
claims about the primacy of global economic forces and at the same
time defend those claims not on criteria of empirical validity, ‘but on
their heuristic value; i.e. whether they make sense to the people and
organizations who are seeking to act in world-historical contexts and
need to understand the dynamics of change…in these contexts?’ Of
course, this is a tension that characterizes a great deal of radical
thought that defends the need for change, on the basis not of moral
criteria articulated in the tradition of political theory, but of empirical
claims regarding the inherent inequality of the capitalist system.

Notes

1. Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The rise and future demise of the world capitalist
    system: concepts for comparative analysis’, Comparative Studies in Society


7. Ibid., p. 217.

**Wallerstein’s major writings**


See also: Cox, Frank, Giddens
Further reading


INDEX

accountability 87, 94, 168, 182
Action and Reaction in World Politics (Rosecrance) 115–17
actors 17–18, 45, 216, 222, 224, 312, 327; constructivism and 123, 128, 131, 133–34, 138–41, 152–57; historical sociology and 354–55, 357, 366, 374; liberalism and 70, 107–8, 112, 115–16, 118
Adorno, Theodor 194–96
Africa 6, 77
After Hegemony (Keohane) 109–10
agents/agency see actors
‘The agent-structure problem … ’ (Wendt) 155
AIDS 221–22, 263
Alexander, Malcolm 389
Allison, Graham 43
amalgamated communities 69–70
America as an Ordinary Country (Rosecrance) 120–21
American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (Kennan) 39
American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Gill) 178–79, 184
Américas 6, 28–29, 84, 110, 147, 173, 176, 367, 384–85 see also Canada; United States
America’s Economic Resurgence (Rosecrance) 121
The Anarchical Society (Bull) 211, 213–14
anarchy 191, 220, 254, 296–97, 312, 370–71; constructivism and 128, 131–33, 135, 145, 153, 155;
English School and 215, 227, 236, 243–44; liberalism and 69–70, 103, 110; realism and 43, 46–47, 53, 55, 58, 60–61
Anderson, Benedict 33, 259
Anderson, Perry 83, 368
Angell, Norman 114–15, 118
anti-communism 3, 25, 39, 45
appeasement 11, 28–29, 38, 78
The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault) 266, 268
Archibugi, Daniele 194, 371
arms races 7, 28, 40, 59, 102, 215–17
Aron, Raymond 3–9, 98 see also Hoffmann, Stanley; Morgenthau, Hans; Waltz, Kenneth
Around the Cragged Hill (Kennan) 40
Ashley, Richard 249, 251–58, 263, 269, 273 see also Walker, Robert B. J.; Waltz, Kenneth
Asia 21, 38, 84–85, 110, 118, 147, 385
Asia-Pacific region 21, 38
association, modes of 328, 331
Austin, John 196, 221
Australia 107, 206, 367, 389
authoritarianism 38–39, 61, 133, 168, 365
INDEX

colonialism 6, 175, 367, 385
common sense 189–90
communicative action theory 138, 141, 193, 195–96, 198–99
communism 12–13, 38–39, 77, 102, 167, 321
communitarian movement 281, 316, 336, 346–47
complexity 98, 100–102, 107
Concert of Europe 116–17, 120
consensus 167–68, 172, 195–97, 238
conservatism 31–32, 37, 116–17
constitutional structures 139–41
constitutionalism 158, 178, 181, 366
constitutive norms 123, 127–28
Constructing the World Polity (Ruggie) 149
constructivism 123–24, 191, 223–24, 229, 285, 304 see also Kratochwil, Friedrich; Onuf, Nicholas; Reus-Smit, Christian; Ruggie, John Gerard; Wendt, Alexander
containment policies 37–39, 101–2
The Control of the Arms Race (Bull) 215
cosmopolitan democratic order 193–94, 234, 319, 322–24, 336, 371
Cox, Robert 163–71, 178, 186, 189–92, 370 see also Gilpin, Robert; Keohane, Robert O.; Krasner, Stephen; Ruggie, John Gerard
Cristaudo, Wayne 83
critical theory 125–28, 139, 161, 163, 229 see also Cox, Robert; Frank, Andre Gunder; Gill, Stephen; Gramsci, Antonio; Habermas, Jürgen; Linklater, Andrew
Crowder, George 324
Cuba 174
cultural issues 85, 189, 299–300
cybernetics 70–71

‘Dangerous Liaisons?’ (Reus-Smit and Price) 139
Dead Ends (Hoffmann) 101–2
decolonization 28, 53, 119, 217
deconstruction 249, 254, 259, 269–71, 273, 275
defence 25, 313, 343, 348
Defending the National Interest (Krasner) 45–46
democracy 169, 195, 319–22, 366 see also cosmopolitan democratic order; liberal democracies
democratization 25, 173, 182
dependency theory 171, 383
Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (Frank) 175
Der Derian, James 263, 270
terri, Jacques 258, 262, 270
détente policies 28, 39
determinism 11, 28, 56, 61, 253, 354
Deutsch, Karl 65, 67–73 see also Haas, Ernst
developing countries 32, 44, 46, 172, 174–76, 387
difference 205–7, 346, 367
differentiation 75–76, 145
diplomatic-strategic behaviour 4–5
disciplinary neoliberalism 178, 180–81
Discipline and Punish (Foucault) 267
Discourses of Global Politics (George) 269
distribution: of capabilities 60, 157; of power 144, 146 (see also balance of power); of resources 355; of wealth 89, 312
distributive justice 103, 313–16, 330, 335, 346
division of labour 60, 118, 145
domestic politics 51–52, 58, 147–48, 204, 312, 337, 351, 353, 357, 375; liberalism and 77, 100, 108, 110, 114, 116, 120–21
dominant representations 157, 351, 357–58
Doty, Roxanne Lynn 275
Doyle, Michael 73–81
Drury, Shadia 84–85
dualistic approaches 11, 118, 155, 173, 176
Dunn, John 82–83
Dunne, Tim 212, 224, 226–32, 243
see also Bull, Hedley; Buzan, Barry; Wight, Martin
Durkheim, Emile 61, 149, 172, 363, 377–78
Duties Beyond Borders (Hoffmann) 102–3
Eastern Europe 347, 380, 384
economic aid 37–38, 173–74
economic crises 94, 120, 147, 168, 175
economic forces 43–47, 106, 109–10,
117–18, 144–45, 166–69, 172–75,
181, 287–91, 321, 364, 387–89
economic interdependence 16–17
Edkins, Jenny 285
El Salvador 86
Elshtain, Jean Bethke 279, 281–87,
298–99 see also Enloe, Cynthia;
Walker, Robert B. J.; Walzer, Michael
emancipation/liberation 192, 253–54,
305, 358
Empire of Civil Society (Rosenberg) 370
Empires (Doyle) 75, 77
empirical theories 52, 55–56, 68,
71–72
empirical validation 42–48, 59–60,
74, 80, 93, 96, 107, 117, 153,
183–84
end of history 81–85, 89, 319, 322
The End of History and the Last Man
(Fukuyama) 81–83, 85, 87
'Engaging Foucault' (Selby) 270
England 76, 175, 379
English School 13–14, 80, 135, 141,
211–12, 326, 329–30, 332 see also
Bull, Hedley; Buzan, Barry;
Dunne, Tim; Vincent, John;
Wight, Martin
Enlightenment values 14, 194, 202,
251, 263, 265, 271, 305
Enloe, Cynthia 279, 287–94, 298–99
see also Elshtain, Jean Bethke;
Sylvester, Christine; Tickner, J. Ann
environmental factors 5–6, 19, 29,
110, 116, 169, 303
epistemological issues 153, 226, 249,
251–53, 284
ethics 6–7, 34, 50, 98, 102, 141, 193,
228, 256, 261, 275, 284; of compromise 10–11 see also Beitz,
Charles; Held, David; moral
principles; Nardin, Terry; Rawls,
John; Walzer, Michael
ethnic issues 12, 32–33, 87
Etzioni, Amitai 34
Europe 37, 53, 77, 84, 91–92, 100–101, 109–10, 147, 166, 175, 179,
290 see also Concert of Europe;
Eastern Europe; Western Europe
European Community 94, 222, 322
European Union 120, 197
evolutionary theories 4, 9, 139, 355
see also progress, concepts of exclusion/inclusion 205–7, 288, 297
essential threats 221–22
exploitation 174–75
Falk, Richard 237
false consciousness 164, 189
fascism 3, 12, 31, 67, 92, 99, 194
faultlines of civilization 32–34, 218
feminism 164, 263, 279, 281–82,
284–85, 288, 290, 292–93, 295–97,
299–300, 302–6
Feminist International Relations
(Sylvester) 298
Feminist Theory and International
Relations in a Post-Modern Era
(Sylvester) 295, 298–99
Ferguson, Kathy 298
First World War 9, 54, 117, 119
Fitzpatrick, John 375
The Follies of Globalization Theory
(Rosenberg) 371
Foreign Policy 260–62
Forstythe, Murray 329
Foucault, Michel 135, 181, 183, 205–6,
253, 258, 263, 265–73, 356
Fox, William 12
France 6, 54, 77, 88, 94, 99, 101,
117, 147, 357, 376–77, 379–80
Frank, André Gunder 171–78 see also
Cox, Robert; Wallerstein, Immanuel
Frankfurt school 127, 194, 206
freedom see emancipation/liberation
From International to World Society
(Buzan) 222, 229–30
INDEX

Fukuyama, Francis 77, 81–91, 319, 322 see also Doyle, Michael; Rosecrance, Richard
functionalism 96, 138, 355, 364, 388
fundamental institutions 140–41

game theory 6, 51, 107, 154–55, 216
Gaullism 3, 101
Gender in International Relations (Tickner) 298, 303
gender issues 279 see also Elshtain, Jean Bethke; Enloe, Cynthia; feminism; Sylvester, Christine; Tickner, J. Ann
Genealogy of Sovereignty (Bartelson) 269
global economy 166, 168, 174, 287, 289–91, 321 see also world economy
global liberalism 46–47, 168
The Global Political Economy (Gill and Law) 178

Globalization and Militarism (Enloe) 292
Goldstone, Jack 381
Gorbachev, Mikhail 40, 119, 168
governance 89, 95–96, 144
Gow, John 389
Gramsci, Antonio 164, 166, 183–84, 186–93 see also Cox, Robert; Gill, Stephen
Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Gill) 190
great powers 11–12, 44–45, 52–53, 59–60, 71, 145, 161, 216
Grieco, Joseph 111
Grotian tradition 70, 214, 218, 227, 230, 244

Gulf War 261, 291, 344–45, 347
Gulliver’s Troubles (Hoffmann) 99
Haas, Ernst 91–98
Habermas, Jürgen 124, 127, 138, 141–42, 193–200, 206, 218, 253
see also Linklater, Andrew; Reus-Smit, Christian
Harvard School 106, 112
Hegel, G.W.F. 3, 83, 85–86, 203, 338
hegemonic stability theory 112, 145
Held, David 193–94, 318–26, 371 see also Cox, Robert; Falk, Richard; Fukuyama, Francis; Linklater, Andrew; Ruggie, John Gerard
Herz, John 23–30, 253 see also Carr, Edward Hallet; Giddens, Anthony; Mann, Michael; Morgenthau, Hans
heterodoxical approaches 125, 128–29
hierarchies 131, 168, 339
Hill, Christopher 233
historic bloc 188, 190
historical materialism 4, 170, 184, 189, 263, 354–56
historical sociology 138–41, 204–5, 351 see also Giddens, Anthony; Mann, Michael; Rosenberg, Justin; Tilly, Charles; Wallerstein, Immanuel
INDEX

historical systems 115–17
History of Sexuality (Foucault) 267
Hobbes, Thomas 4, 25, 83, 86, 130–31, 158, 243, 312
Hobbesian tradition 131, 158, 187, 214, 230, 242, 314
Hoffmann, Stanley 54, 98–105 see also Aron, Raymond; Kennan, George; Kissinger, Henry; Morgenthau, Hans; Walzer, Michael
Holsti, Kal 389
homesteading 296, 298
Horkheimer, Max 194–96
Human Rights and International Relations (Vincent) 235, 237–38
humanitarianism 212, 223, 235–36, 332, 341, 347
Hungary 379
Huntingdon, Samuel 30–36 see also Fukuyama, Francis
Hussein, Saddam 291, 344–45
idealism 9–10, 25–28, 53, 68, 83, 99, 111, 198, 226, 244, 311
identity issues 259, 261–62, 279, 284, 288, 298, 302, 367
Ideologies of Globalization (Rupert) 190
ideology 45, 100, 102, 119, 164, 167, 179–80, 238
imagined communities 259–62
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 148, 181–82, 322
imperialism 52, 75–77, 117, 175, 379, 384–85
In Defence of the National Interest (Morgenthau) 54
India 175
individual autonomy 131, 180, 194, 202, 233, 314, 319–20, 323, 335
individual rights 312, 342
individualism 131, 243, 303, 334, 337
industrialization 4, 21, 173, 175, 357, 364
inequality/equality 13, 84–85, 120, 161, 169, 217, 279, 303–4, 389;
and political theory/ethics 313, 320, 334, 337–38, 346
information flows 70–71
Inside/outside (Walker) 269–70, 276
instrumentalism 195–96, 251–52, 303, 327
interdependence 43–46, 59–60, 92, 96, 101, 106–9, 115, 118, 144–45, 244, 314–17, 370
international law 141–42, 235, 237, 313, 322, 326, 329, 331
international political theory 62, 154, 202–3, 309 see also Beitz, Charles; Held, David; Nardin, Terry; Rawls, John; Walzer, Michael
International Political Theory (Beitz) 309
International Politics in the Atomic Age (Herz) 26–27
International Relations (Rosecrance) 115
International Theory (Brown) 245
International Theory (Wight) 240–41
internationalization 168–69
inter-paradigm debate 59–60, 108, 112, 370
interpretive approaches 226–28, 230, 258
Inventing International Society (Dunne) 226–29
Iraq 29, 149, 152, 193, 198, 261, 291, 344–45
Islam 32–33, 170
isolationism 54, 149
Italy 88, 379
Jackson, Robert 206
James, Alan 233
Janus and Minerva (Hoffmann) 104
Japan 19–21, 37, 43, 85, 88–89, 106, 109, 118–21, 147–49, 179, 262, 386
Jarvis, Darryl S.L. 251
Jones, Adam 284
Jones, Clive 220
Jones, Roy 245
Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer) 341–42, 346, 348
just war theory 341–48
justice 128, 140–42, 193, 198, 215–16, 234, 237, 239, 245, 309, 311–14; as fairness 334–39 see also distributive justice
Kantian tradition 158, 202–3, 230, 305, 336, 346
Katzenstein, Peter 139
Kennan, George 36–42, 50, 54, 56
Kenny, Michael 183, 191, 270
Keohane, Robert O. 43–44, 46, 65, 105–14, 126, 145, 156, 229, 304, 306, 311 see also Haas, Ernst; Ruggie, John Gerard; Waltz, Kenneth; Wendt, Alexander
Kissinger, Henry 101–2, 180
knowledge 127–29, 151–52, 249 see also epistemological issues
Kojève, Alexandre 84
Kosovo 193, 198
Krasner, Stephen 42–50, 108, 145 see also Gilpin, Robert; Keohane, Robert O.; Waltz, Kenneth
Kratochwil, Friedrich 124–30 see also Onuf, Nicholas; Reus-Smit, Christian; Wendt, Alexander
Kukathas, Chandran 336
Kuwait 152, 261, 291, 344–45
labour movement 169, 358
Lacan, Jacques 135, 137
Laclau, Ernesto 127, 388
Laffey, Mark 263
Law, David 178–79
Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Nardin) 328, 331
The Law of Peoples (Rawls) 309, 336–39
Lawson, George 373
legalistic approaches 39, 111, 133, 343–44, 348
legitimization 4–5, 52, 141–42, 195, 197–98
Legitimization Crisis (Habermas) 194–95
Lenin, Vladimir 161, 244
levels of analysis 58–61, 145
Lever–Tracy, Constance 89
liberal democracies 86–88, 90, 140, 338
liberal internationalism 17, 21, 26
Lijphart, Arend 70
linguistic theory 133–34, 221–22, 275
Linklater, Andrew 201–9, 229, 316–17 see also Beitz, Charles; Cox, Robert; Giddens, Anthony; Habermas, Jürgen; Mann, Michael; Walzer, Michael; Wight, Martin
Locke, John 83, 86, 131, 158, 243
Logic of Anarchy (Buzan et al) 220–22
Long, David 106, 112
Madness and Civilization (Foucault) 267
Man, The State, and War (Waltz) 58, 60
Maneuvers (Enloe) 292
Mann, Michael 204, 351, 353, 357, 360–69, 374–75, 379, 381 see also Giddens, Anthony; Tilly, Charles
Mao Tse Tung 174
Mapel, David R. 244
Marchand, Marianne 304
marginalization 176, 284, 386
Marxism 14, 45, 139, 263, 303, 319–21, 323; and critical theory 161, 166–67, 183, 188–89, 204, 206; and historical sociology 353–56, 369–73, 375, 386, 388
master–slave dialectic 84
INDEX

material factors 83, 158, 191–92
Mazzini, Joseph 235–36
McCarthy, Thomas 196
Mearsheimer, John 111

Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (Linklater) 201, 203–4
mercantilism 20–21, 118, 120, 175
meta-theory 157, 205, 251, 273
metropolis-satellite relations 173–74
Michalak, Stanley 108
Middle East 173
middle-ground constructivism 123, 125–26, 137, 158
militarism 31–32, 119, 290–92, 366, 380
military force 103, 107, 147, 362–64, 366
military issues 289–92, 303
military security 16–17, 42, 102, 107, 118–19
Mill, John Stuart 235–36
Miller, J.D.B. 213
Mitrofanu, David 92
The Modern World-System (Wallerstein) 384
modernity 249, 251, 253, 273, 353–54, 357–59
modernization 171, 173–74
moral principles: and constructivism 138, 140–41, 158; and critical theory 202, 205–7; and the English School 211, 216, 228, 230, 238, 244; and gender issues 283, 290; and liberalism 102–4; and political theory/ethics 311, 313–14, 317, 327, 331, 336, 344–48; and realism 5, 12, 34, 39, 54
The Moral Purpose of the State (Reus-Smit) 139–40
Morgenthau, Hans 5, 25, 50–58, 234, 236 see also Carr, Edward Hallet; Herz, John; Kennan, George; Kissinger, Henry
Morning After (Enloe) 290
Morton, Adam David 191
multilateralism 140, 142, 144, 146–49, 169
multinational corporations 13, 17, 45, 312
multipolarity 5, 37, 59–60, 62–63, 71, 100
Murphy, Craig 191, 292

Nagel, Thomas 311
Nardin, Terry 244, 326–34 see also Bull, Hedley; Vincent, John;
Walzer, Michael; Wight, Martin
National Deconstruction (Campbell) 262
national identity 34, 197, 259, 261
national interest 31–32, 40, 45, 54, 56, 108
National Socialism see Nazism
Nationalism and After (Carr) 12–13
Nationalism and Social Communication (Deutsch) 67
The Nation-State and Violence (Giddens) 355–56, 358
nation-state systems 354–57, 359
NATO 38, 149, 322
Nazism 3, 31, 67, 92, 194
neocolonialism 103, 217
neofunctionalism 91–95
neorealism 59–60, 63, 109, 131, 144–46, 153–54, 156–57, 163, 220, 253–54
Neorealism and its Critics (Keohane) 190
The Nerves of Government (Deutsch) 70–71
Netherlands 379
Neufeld, Mark 255–56
Neumann, Iver B. 233, 237
New Zealand 367
Nietzsche, Friedrich 85, 268
9/11 attack 33–34, 89, 207, 373
Nixon, Richard 39, 106, 180
non-governmental institutions 107, 141–42, 263
Nonintervention and International Order (Vincent) 235–38
non-liberal states 78, 338–39
norms/normative theory 178, 192, 206–7, 363; and constructivism
INDEX


North–South divide 46, 48, 330

Nye, Joseph 106–9, 311

Oakeshott, Michael 326–28, 330–31
objectification 126, 266, 268
oil crises 43, 45, 47
O’Neill, John 85–86
Onuf, Nicholas 130–37 see also Kratochwil, Friedrich
OPEC 47, 106
openness/closure of economy 43–44, 46
order 133, 135, 213–18, 234, 274–75
The Order of Things (Foucault) 266
original position concept see veil of ignorance concept
otherness 260, 262–63

pacifism 342, 366
Palan, Ronen 135
panopticon effect 181–83, 267
Parsons, Talcott 172–73
particularism 204–5, 211–12, 346–47
Peace and War (Aron) 3, 5–6
peace movements 38–39, 296, 358
perestroika 119, 168
performativity 196, 221, 262
peripheral states 75–77, 384–87
Petit, Philip 336
Pin–Fat, Veronique 285
Plato 84–85
pluralism 7, 69, 80, 103, 222–23, 228, 234, 324, 336, 338, 346, 381
Pocock, J.G.A. 133
Pogge, Thomas 335
Poland 379
Polanyi, Karl 164, 168, 182, 387
The Political Economy of International Relations (Gilpin) 17, 20
Political Liberalism (Rawls) 336

Political Realism and Political Idealism (Herz) 25–26
political theory 131–33, 136, 201–3, 206, 215, 229, 241, 245, 275, 279–84 see also international political theory
Political Theory and International Relations (Beitz) 311, 315, 317
Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau) 52, 55
The Politics of International Law (Reus-Smit) 141
Politics Without Principle (Campbell) 261
Poole, Ross 90
Popper, Karl 183–84, 274
Portugal 367
positivism 111, 126, 136, 153, 163–64, 184, 252, 311, 354; post-positivism 226–30, 256, 306
postmodernism 127–28, 146, 201, 205, 249, 295, 298, 358 see also Ashley, Richard; Campbell, David; Foucault, Michel; Walker, Robert B. J.
poststructuralism 82, 135, 253, 258, 266, 270–71
Power and Interdependence (Keohane and Nye) 107–8
Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Gill) 180–81, 184
power, concepts of 249, 254, 275 see also hegemonic power; social power
power politics 31, 50–55, 107–8, 110, 242, 311, 389 see also hegemonic power
Power Politics (Wight) 240, 243–44
Power, Property and the State (Giddens) 355
power relations 165, 293, 361 see also balance of power
presentism 73–74

400
INDEX

prestige politics 52, 56
Price, Richard 125, 139, 220
Primacy or World Order (Hoffmann) 101
The Prison Notebooks (Gramsci) 187–88
Producing Hegemony (Rupert) 190
Production, Power, and World Order (Cox) 165
production relations 165–66
progress, concepts of 9, 14–15, 51, 65, 95, 173, 196, 203, 387–88
prudence ethic 7, 78, 80, 327
public goods 17, 20
Public Man, Private Woman (Elshtain) 282
quantum theory 158–59
radical internationalism 24, 161, 164, 171, 173, 175, 320, 388
rationalization 172, 195–97
Rawls, John 309, 312–13, 315–16, 334–41, 346 see also Beitz, Charles
Reagan, Ronald 59, 101–2, 114, 119, 169
realism 1, 254, 277, 284, 293, 303, 309, 311, 329, 342; and constructivism 126, 132–33, 144, 149; and critical theory 161, 167–68, 170, 180, 187, 191, 204, 206; and the English School 215, 220, 226, 242, 244; and historical sociology 351, 358–59, 370, 374–75, 387–89; and liberalism 4, 23, 31–34, 45, 51–53, 69–70, 79–80, 96–104, 106–12, 117–18 see also Aron, Raymond; Carr, Edward Hallet; classical realism; Gilpin, Robert; Herz, John; Huntingdon, Samuel; Kennan, George; Krasner, Stephen; Morgenthau, Hans; neorealism; scientific realism; structural realism; Waltz, Kenneth
realpolitik 32, 193, 283
reciprocity principle 110, 147
recognition concept 83, 85–87, 197
reconstruction 131–32, 135–36
redistributive mode of development 165–66, 337, 347
reflectivism 229–30, 252, 256
regime analysis 95, 110, 112
regimes debate 46–48
regional integration 68–70, 72, 91–95
Reidy, David 338
reification 154–55, 157, 195, 373
relativism 14, 164, 184, 255–56, 271, 329, 368
religion 32–34, 283, 312, 342, 363–64
Rengger, Nick 135
The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Onuf) 136
Reus-Smit, Christian 125, 137–43 see also Habermas, Jürgen; Kratochwil, Friedrich; Onuf, Nicholas
revolutionism 100, 214, 227, 234, 239, 242–44, 376–77
Richardson, James 21
Ringmar, Erik 156
The Rise of the Trading State (Rosecrance) 114, 117–18
rise/decline of states 16, 18–19, 21, 26, 362–67, 375, 378–81, 389
Risse, Thomas 138, 199
Rosecrance, Richard 114–22, 145 see also Keohane, Robert O.; Waltz, Kenneth
Rosenberg, Justin 357, 359, 369–74 see also Giddens, Anthony; Mann, Michael
Ross, Daniel 354
Rostow, Walt 173
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 79, 104, 131, 312
Ruggie, John Gerard 143–51 see also Cox, Robert; Gilpin, Robert; Keohane, Robert O.; Krasner, Stephen; Waltz, Kenneth
rule/rules 93, 133–35, 140–42
Rules, Norms and Decisions (Kratochwil) 127
Rupert, Mark 190–91
Russia 6, 119–20, 188, 379, 385
INDEX

Sandel, Michael 336
Schmidt, Brian 74, 79
scientific knowledge 151–52, 306
Scientific Man versus Power Politics
(Morgenthau) 51–52
scientific realism 126–27, 156, 223
Searle, John 134, 196
Second World War 9, 12, 18, 27, 92,
118–19, 147, 260
securitization 221–22
security communities 65, 69–70, 147
security dilemma 25–28
security issues 16–17, 42, 102, 107,
118–19, 220–21, 259–63, 303,
305
Selby, Jan 270–71
self-determination 290, 313–14, 347
self-identity 226–27
self-interest 51, 93, 110, 312
self-reflexivity 124, 126, 128–29
Sewell, William 377
Simulating Sovereignty (C. Weber) 268
Smith, Michael 40–41
'Social forces, states, and world
orders' (Cox) 190
social mobilization 68–69
social movements 176–77, 277, 312,
347, 358, 387
social power 361–65, 367–68
social practices 133–34
social relations 126, 128, 165–66
social science approaches 78, 152,
223–24, 233, 243, 265, 387–88
social theory 131, 139, 156, 158
Social Theory of International Politics
(Wendt) 137, 158
social virtues 87, 89
socialism 80, 83, 167, 169, 174, 176,
313, 388
socialization 124, 137, 158, 288, 304
societas 327–28, 330
society of states 140, 205, 211, 217–18,
228, 233–39, 241–42, 328–29
The Soldier and the State (Huntingdon)
31–32
solidarism 211–12, 222–23, 228, 234,
237, 244
solidarity 141, 194–95, 197–98
The Sources of Social Power (Mann) 361
Southeast Asia 147
sovereignty 47–48, 60, 128, 202, 228,
357, 370, 388; political theory/
ethics and 309, 322, 343–44, 348;
postmodernism and 249, 261, 268–69,
276–77
Soviet Union 157, 347; critical
theory and 166, 168, 173; the
English School and 216–17, 235–36;
historical sociology and 371,
380, 386; liberalism and 78, 101–2,
114, 119; postmodernism and 251,
260, 262; realism and 4, 7, 9, 12–
13, 20–21, 27–28, 32, 36–40, 53,
56, 59–62
Spain 367, 379
speech act theory 134, 196, 221–22,
268
Spheres of Justice (Walzer) 346
stability/instability 5, 12, 17, 19, 52–54,
60–62, 71, 109, 115–16, 147, 361
Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow) 173
Stalin, Joseph/Stalinism 3, 36, 38
state autonomy 96, 148, 183, 314,
365–66
state behaviours 73, 115, 123, 157–
58, 168, 374–75
state control 47, 166
state formation 378–80
state goals 5, 55, 111, 123, 154
'state of nature' metaphor 130–31
'State power and the structure of
international trade' (Krasner) 43–44
State-Building (Fukuyama) 89
Strange, Susan 23, 288, 362
strategic behaviours 6, 26, 60, 138,
167, 196
Structural Conflict (Krasner) 46
structural power 181–82, 362
structural realism 106, 109–10, 116,
220–21
The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere (Habermas) 194
structuralism 45, 133, 178, 370, 388
structuration theory 133, 155–56,
353–57
structures 61, 133–34, 138–39, 152,
154–56, 167
subversive approaches 251, 253, 255
superpowers 6–7, 28–29, 39, 44, 53,
59–63, 100, 102–3, 119, 238, 291
INDEX

survival ethic 29, 242
Sylvester, Christine 294–301 see also Enloe, Cynthia
systemic factors 75–77, 115; changes 18–20, 96, 109–10, 121, 144–46, 165 see also world-systems theory
Systems of States (Wight) 240

Tacit knowledge 151–52
Tangle of Hopes (Haas) 96
technical rationality 252, 256
technological development 28, 53
territoriality 19, 27–28, 118, 146, 202, 314, 321, 343, 366
Thatcher, Margaret 169, 293
The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas) 195
Theory of International Politics (Waltz) 59, 61–63, 144
A Theory of Justice (Rawls) 312
Theory of Justice (Rawls) 334, 337
two practice relationship 11, 55–56, 161, 163, 180, 249, 252, 274–75, 292
Thick and Thin (Walzer) 346–47
The Third Wave (Huntingdon) 32
Third World 46–47, 171–72, 175, 380, 387
Thompson, Janna 315
themos 84–85
Tickner, J. Ann 279, 298–99, 302–7 see also Elshtain, Jean Bethke; Enloe, Cynthia; Sylvester, Christine
Tilly, Charles 204, 259, 351, 353, 356–57, 364, 374–83 see also Giddens, Anthony; Herz, John; Mann, Michael; Wendt, Alexander
transnationalism 92–96, 106, 167–68
Transnational Relations and World Politics (Keohane and Nye) 106

transportation 46–47
Trilateral Commission 179–80, 183
Truman, Harry S. 38, 149
trust 85, 87–89, 128, 138, 358
Trust (Fukuyama) 85, 87–88
The Twenty Years’ Crisis (Carr) 9, 11–12, 227–28

UNESCO 47–48
unipolarity 21, 62
United Nations 92, 95–96, 119, 143, 236, 322, 345; General Assembly 105
unity 75–76
universalism 10, 223, 228, 236–37, 316–17, 329
universitas 327–28
U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (Gilpin) 17
utilitarianism 21, 65, 149, 253, 311, 316, 335, 344
utopianism 4, 7, 9–11, 13–14, 99, 103, 253, 309, 311, 324, 358–59, 371

Vasquez, John 55

veil of ignorance concept 312, 316, 334–36, 339
The Vendee Vendée (Tilly) 376–77
Vietnam 38, 43, 45, 56, 106, 171, 341
Vincent, John 211, 218, 223, 232–40, 330 see also Bull, Hedley; Walzer, Michael; Wight, Martin
violence, collective 376–77;
legitimacy of 4–5, 52 see also
INDEX

intervention issues; military force; war/peace theories
‘virtual state’ era 119–20
Waever, Ole 144, 221
Walker, Robert B. J. 249, 254, 263, 269–70, 273–78 see also Ashley, Richard
Wallerstein, Immanuel 155, 204, 383–91 see also Cox, Robert; Frank, André Gunder; Giddens, Anthony
Waltz, Kenneth 5, 42, 55, 58–64, 108–9, 118, 144–45, 156, 253 see also Gilpin, Robert; Keohane, Robert O.; Morgenthau, Hans; Wendt, Alexander
Walzer, Michael 103, 238, 329, 331, 341–50 see also Beitz, Charles; Nardin, Terry
War and Change in World Politics (Gilpin) 17–18
war/peace theories 19–20, 31, 111, 375; causes 6–7, 10, 58, 86, 116, 282; and gender 283–84, 286; and state development 364, 379–80, 382
Ways of War and Peace (Doyle) 74–75, 78–80
weaker states 12, 46, 166 see also developing countries; peripheral states
Weber, Cynthia 268–69
Weber, Max 4, 50, 149, 194–95, 249, 277, 364, 378
welfare 4, 84, 168, 176, 195, 311, 335
Wendt, Alexander 124, 126, 132, 135–37, 151–60, 223, 229, 251, 297, 353 see also Giddens, Anthony; Keohane, Robert O.; Wallerstein, Immanuel; Waltz, Kenneth
Western Europe 9, 92, 94, 198, 384, 386
Westphalian system 19, 114, 324, 364
What is History? (Carr) 14
When Knowledge is Power (Haas) 95
‘Why is there no International Theory?’ (Wight) 227, 241–42
Wight, Martin 13, 80, 131, 201–2, 207, 211, 214–15, 218, 222–23, 227–29, 233–34, 240–47, 254, 315, 329 see also Bull, Hedley; Carr, Edward Hallet; Nardin, Terry
Wind, Marlene 135
Winning the Peace (Ruggie) 148
Women and War (Elshtain) 282, 284–85, 298
World Accumulation (Frank) 175
world economy 43–44, 46, 119–20, 147–48, 181 see also global economy
World of Our Making (Onuf) 131–34, 136
world order 89–90, 100–103, 144, 147–48, 164, 166–67, 214, 222, 228
World Trade Organization 111, 147, 181–82
world-systems theory 171, 383–89
Writing Security (Campbell) 259–63
Yugoslavia 37
zero-sum games 53, 242, 367, 389
Zimbabwe 295, 297, 300
zone of peace 77–78, 84–86

404